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PUBLISHER’S NOTE
is a privilege to publish for general circulation a volume
of such permanent importance as Twenty-five Years of Ac
counting Responsibility, 1911-36, by George O. May. The
essays and discussions assembled here were first gathered and
published privately by the author’s associates to commemo
rate his completion of twenty-five years as their senior part
ner. This compilation reflects the developments during one
of the most important epochs in the history of professional
accountancy. The author from his eminent position as head
of one of the largest firms in the world has had peculiar op
portunities to contemplate the changes in accounting and
their effect upon the business of this and other countries.
The present publisher sought and obtained permission to
reproduce this vital contribution to the literature of ac
countancy.
The matter included in this volume consists of expressions
of personal views and opinions, with the single exception of
an extract from correspondence between the New York
Stock Exchange and the American Institute of Accountants
through its committee on cooperation with stock exchanges.
Mr. May was chairman of the committee, and the corre
spondence is included by permission of the Stock Exchange.
It is closely related to other matter in the volume.
After the first edition had gone to press Mr. May pre
sented testimony on the revenue bill of 1936 which attracted
wide attention. In the present edition that testimony and
also a recent address upon the same subject are included.
It
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PART I
THE PROFESSION OF ACCOUNTING

I

THE ACCOUNTANT AND THE INVESTOR *
(1932)
I was invited to be one of the lecturers in this series,
I hesitated on account of a conflict of feelings. I was gratified
by an invitation to lecture at an institution which means so
much as Northwestern has come to mean in the field of busi
ness education, but I felt that ethics should be practiced
rather than preached; and I was dismayed at the thought of
contributing one of several lectures on the ethics of a single
profession. When, however, Professor Custis suggested that
I talk on the ethical obligations of the accountant to the in
vestor, my doubts were resolved, because the suggestion of
fered an opportunity to discuss before a sympathetic audience
some of those phases of accounting practice which make it,
to me, the most attractive of the professions which are closely
allied with business; and an opportunity, also, to discuss
some questions possessing a broader interest.
Before discussing the ethical questions which arise between
the accountant and the investor, it seems desirable to con
sider briefly the nature of the investor’s interest in the work
of the accountant and the conditions under which that work
is ordinarily done. Accountancy today has become an im
portant profession, the work of which varies greatly in char
acter and purpose. Its work may, perhaps, be divided into
three broad classes: first, the constructive work, such as the
formulation and installation of systems of accounting; sec
ond, the detailed auditing of cash and other transactions; and
third, the preparation and verification of financial statements.
When

* A lecture given at Northwestern University, Chicago, Illinois, on January
11, 1932, under the auspices of the William A. Vawter Foundation on Busi
ness Ethics. Published in The Ethical Problems of Modern Accountancy,
Ronald Press Co. (1933), pp. 26-54.
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It is with this third class of work that the investor is more
particularly concerned.
Investors are interested in the reports of accountants on
the affairs of businesses in which they already are, or con
template becoming, security holders. If they already hold
securities of a corporation carrying on a business, they are
concerned with the annual reports presented by the directors
to keep them informed of the progress of the enterprise.
These reports contain, among other things, annual accounts,
which may be certified by accountants. If investors are only
potentially interested in any securities, they may turn either
to the annual reports or, if the securities are newly created,
to the “offering” or prospectus issued by the banking house
sponsoring them. This prospectus is likely to contain finan
cial statements made by or on the authority of accountants.
It is interesting to note that the development of the work
of the accountant in relation to annual reports and pro
spectuses dates from the last great period of depression which,
beginning in 1893, came to an end with the sound money
victory of 1896. My own experience in Wall Street began
just as that period ended; and the. memory of the disastrous
losses, shown year after year in the middle 90’s, and of the
successes subsequently achieved around the end of the cen
tury by the same companies, enables me to take heart of
grace in even this distressing time.
The practice of having annual accounts audited, which
began to make headway in the late 90’s, has grown so that
today about eighty to ninety per cent of all industrial com
panies whose securities are listed on the New York Ex
change publish audited accounts.
In the early days of my experience, representations in
prospectuses as to earnings and assets were usually based
on information furnished to the bankers by the officers of
the company, and were made by the issuing house itself.
Later, it became more and more customary for the issuing
houses to secure confirmation of the accounts by accountants,
but they continued to make the representations themselves.
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More recently the practice has developed (which has long
been customary and is now compulsory in England) of pub
lishing the results of the accountants’ investigations in the
form of a report from the accountants themselves, embodied
in the prospectus. Some concerns, however, still cling to
the old procedure and rely on accountants’ reports only to
support their own representations should those representa
tions later be challenged.
With the rapid development of this field of accountancy,
it is not to be expected that standards either of practice or
of ethics should be uniform throughout the profession or
uniformly satisfactory. It is in times of depression such as
we are now passing through that reforms are most easily
initiated, and it is timely, therefore, to consider now what
standards of ethics the profession of accountancy can fairly
be asked to accept and adhere to.
It will be well, next, to consider the nature of the account
ant’s responsibility in respect of financial statements which
are embodied either in a prospectus or in the annual report
of a corporation. As a preliminary to a consideration of this
question, I should like to emphasize the fact that the accounts
of a corporation carrying on a complex modern business are
not, and cannot be, statements of absolute fact. They are
necessarily based largely on conventions, on estimates, and
on opinions. I shall return later to a further discussion of this
point, but think it desirable to mention it early in my ad
dress, as, I have found from experience that it is by no means
always fully appreciated even by people who might be sup
posed to be well versed in financial affairs.
The character of the accountant’s responsibility in respect
of accounts embodied in a prospectus or in an annual re
port rests naturally on the nature and purpose of those
documents. The prospectus is a document issued by a
vendor of securities, and is frankly designed to induce in
vestors to purchase securities. An annual report is a docu
ment addressed by the directors to shareholders reporting

6
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on their administration of the affairs of the company for the
year and the financial results thereof.
A number of differences between the two cases at once
suggest themselves. The banker, who is offering securities, is
not expected himself to be informed regarding the financial
status and past earnings of a corporation. He must make
his representation on the authority of others. He may con
ceivably rely on the representations of the officials of the
company, but obviously this course involves a certain danger,
since they are interested parties. Therefore, he is likely to
have recourse, instead, to the accountant, who can furnish a
disinterested report. In such a case, the full responsibility is
put squarely on the shoulders of the accountant.
In the case of the annual report, however, the primary
responsibility for the financial statements submitted to share
holders rests with the officers and directors, and the function
of the accountant is to advise the shareholders whether, in
his opinion, the statements so submitted fairly present the
position of the company and the results of its operations.
The investor has the right to assume that the figures, let us
say, of earnings, presented by an accountant in a prospectus
represent the accountant’s own best judgment of the results
for the period which they cover. In the case of similar fig
ures appearing in the annual report of a corporation, not
quite the same assumption can properly be made. In that
case, the figures should represent the best judgment of the
officers and the directors—a judgment, however, which the
auditor either concurs in or regards as being within the
reasonable limits of a legitimate difference of opinion, un
less the contrary is indicated by his certificate.
Every balance sheet is, as judicial authorities have recog
nized, necessarily a matter of estimate and opinion, and in
some cases the limits of a reasonable difference of opinion
may be fairly wide. I do not wish to make too much of the
point, but the investing public generally fails to appreciate
that there is any distinction at all, and therefore it is essen
tial to mention that it does exist, and that it must exist.
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Often, perhaps usually, the accounts presented in an annual
report are the results of discussion between the officers or
directors of the corporation and its independent auditors,
and represent their combined judgment. But the represen
tatives of the corporation, on the one hand, and the account
ant, on the other, may not entirely agree, and in such a case
the accountant can properly accept the judgment of the cor
poration’s representatives if he is satisfied that it is honestly
formed and inherently reasonable.
Suppose, for instance, the question to be what provision
for depreciation is required; and suppose that the directors,
if left to themselves, would consider a provision of $50,000
as adequate, while the auditor would favor the provision of
from $80,000 to $100,000. The directors may agree to
provide $70,000 if thereby they can secure the auditor’s
unqualified certificate to the accounts. For the purposes of
an annual report, the auditor would be quite justified in
accepting this solution, perhaps saying in his certificate that
the provision made is reasonable. But if he were preparing
figures for a prospectus, the sole responsibility for which
would be his, he would be bound to give expression to his
own final judgment, though in reaching that judgment he
would naturally give full consideration to the views of the
company’s representatives.
Another and perhaps more important distinction between
the prospectus and the annual report is that the annual re
port is essentially historical in its character, whereas the pro
spectus, even when it deals with events in the past, does so
solely for the bearing that they have on the prospects for the
future. For, obviously, the intending investor has no inter
est in what has happened in the past merely because it has
happened; he is interested only to the extent that the past
is a guide to the probable future.
I should like to emphasize this point particularly, because
in recent years there has, to my mind, grown up a tendency
to attach an altogether exaggerated importance to the earn
ings reported annually by corporations as an index of future
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earning capacity and, consequently, of the value of the busi
ness. This tendency has, I think, incidentally had the effect
of magnifying the swings in the market prices of stocks. In
passing, I might express the opinion that the habit of valu
ing stocks at ten, twelve or any other number of times the
annual earnings applicable thereto, and using for the pur
pose of the calculation the earnings of a single year, has
tended to bring about excessive valuations for stocks in
periods of great prosperity and correspondingly inadequate
values in times of depression such as we are now passing
through.
Perhaps I can sum up the position by saying that the in
vestor should be entitled to regard an accountant’s statement
in a prospectus as a little more objective and more clearly
indicative of earning capacity than a statement made in an
annual report primarily by the directors but with the concur
rence and approval of the auditor.
I should like, now, to consider in more detail the position
of the accountant in relation to the prospectus and the an
nual report of a corporation. I will take the prospectus first
because, as I have already pointed out, the accountant as
sumes the greater responsibility in respect of such a docu
ment.
When a banker contemplates an issue of securities of, let
us say, an industrial company, he is likely to take steps to
secure the report of an accountant on the financial position
and past earnings of the business. In doing so, he has two
purposes in mind: first, to decide whether the proposed issue
is one that he cares to undertake; secondly, to ascertain what
sort of a presentation of facts he is likely to be able to secure
for the purpose of influencing the judgment of potential
investors. Very commonly he will ask the corporation pro
posing the issue to cause an examination to be made by ac
countants satisfactory to him. In such work, the accountant
is retained at the request of one party, but is actually em
ployed and paid by another, and the purpose of his work is
ultimately to influence the attitude of third parties with
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whom he never comes into contact. It is apparent at once
that he owes an obligation to each of three groups or parties,
and that the interests of these groups are by no means
identical.
Now, the most difficult ethical problems .generally arise
from conflicts of interests and conflicts of loyalties. The
simplest case is that in which the personal interest of the
accountant conflicts with the interest of his client; but ob
viously no one can claim to be a member of a profession, or
expect to succeed in one, unless he is prepared, when neces
sary, to subordinate his own interest to that of his client.
More difficult problems arise in cases such as the one I
have just outlined, in which the accountant owes an obliga
tion or a loyalty to more than one individual or group of
individuals, and the interests of the different parties conflict.
Naturally, the problem is not made any less delicate by the
fact that the accountant is dealing with matters of opinion
in relation to operations with which one of the parties (the
corporation) through its officials should be more completely
informed than he can be.
Frequently, the first stage of his work is an investigation
and report to the issuing house upon representations previ
ously made to it by the corporation, and upon his report
the issuing house decides whether those representations have
been borne out and whether the issue is one which it is will
ing to sponsor. During this stage, the corporation and the
issuing house are on the opposite sides of the table. If this
stage is successfully completed, and mutually satisfactory ar
rangements are agreed upon by the corporation and the
issuing house, the questions arise what is to be shown in the
prospectus, and in what form, and from this point onwards
the interests of the issuing house and the corporation are,
broadly speaking, identical.
The accountant is apt to encounter difficult ethical prob
lems at both stages of the procedure, but those encountered
in the later stage are by far the more difficult and are the
only ones with which we are concerned today. In the first

10
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stage, the issuing house is trading with the corporation and
has an interest in stressing any weaknesses in the corpora
tion’s position in order to secure more favorable terms. The
accountant is frequently under pressure from two parties ad
vancing conflicting views on the question at issue, and owing
a duty to each party. He has, however, the advantage of
hearing fully the arguments on both sides and reaching his
decision with due regard thereto.
In the second stage—when the prospectus is being prepared
—the banker and the corporation are, as I have said, united
in presenting their views. The banker is sometimes found
to be minimizing at this stage weaknesses which he had
stressed in the first stage. The accountant must recognize
that his paramount obligation is to the investor, to whom his
report is in reality to be addressed; and that the investor is
someone with whom the accountant in the nature of things
is not in touch, and who is incapable of presenting argu
ments counter to those presented on behalf of the banker
and the corporation. The problem is made the more diffi
cult because the importance of the accountant’s report often
lies as much in what it implies as in what it says, and because
the differences relate almost universally to questions, not
of right or wrong, but of judgment.
To illustrate my point—the fact that a corporation has
made money in the past has absolutely no significance to the
potential investor except for its bearing on the probable
earnings of the future. Therefore, neither the issuing house
nor the accountant has any ethical right to put forward a
statement of past earnings if to their knowledge it is calcu
lated to mislead the investor as to the reasonable prospects
for the future. On the other hand, what has been accom
plished in the past is usually the main factual basis for esti
mating future prospects, and it is certainly no part of the
work of the accountant to make estimates for the future; so
that if he is to make any contribution at all to the knowl
edge of the investor, it must be in the form of a report on
what has taken place in the past.
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What position, then, ought the accountant to take if either
general conditions or the conditions specifically affecting the
business under consideration have changed since the profits
proposed to be reported were earned? This is a question
which has occasioned conscientious accountants much con
cern. Conditions are never exactly the same from one year
to another, and investment must, as a practical matter, al
ways be based on imperfect knowledge and approximations.
I suggest that the auditor should always consider how far
conditions at the time of issue differ from those obtaining
during the period covered by his report, and particularly
how far any changes are a matter of common knowledge. He
may, for instance, properly certify accounts covering a period
of five years even though in his judgment general business
conditions are as a whole less favorable than the average dur
ing the period covered by his report. He might conceivably
justify certifying profits earned during the boom period
which culminated in 1929, after the collapse of that year,
upon the ground that the change of conditions was a matter
of common knowledge and that everyone must judge for him
self how far-reaching its effects would be. He certainly
would not be entitled to certify figures for a prospectus if to
his knowledge, but not to the knowledge of the public, new
conditions had arisen within the corporation itself which
practically negatived the possibility of a continuance of any
such earnings in the future, or made earnings dependent
upon entirely different considerations.
An accountant would hot, for instance, be justified in giv
ing a certificate which he knew to be desired for use in a
prospectus in circumstances such as came to my notice (not
in this country) recently. A corporation had conducted a
very satisfactory and profitable general investment business
for a number of years. Control of it was acquired by a
financier of somewhat doubtful reputation, who proceeded
at once to dispose of the investments previously held and to
reinvest the proceeds in a series of companies controlled by
himself. He also put out a prospectus in which he invited
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subscriptions to new securities of the investment company
on the basis of the results obtained in the past under condi
tions entirely different from those existing when the issue
was made.
Obviously, problems of great nicety must constantly arise,
and in order to solve them properly the accountant must
possess good judgment and be willing and able to exercise
that judgment objectively and dispassionately. The investor
must rely on the judgment and ethical standards of. the ac
countant, and except in cases so flagrant as to be fraudulent,
the community will be wiser to leave the penalty for failure
to justify such confidence to be inflicted through the loss
of standing in business which is likely to follow upon it,
than to attempt to impose legal penalties.
To be willing to exercise his judgment objectively and dis
passionately the accountant must be a man of high character,
prepared to recognize and observe high ethical obligations
even to his own immediate disadvantage. To be able to do
so he must be free from any relation to the subject matter
or to the parties in interest which might cloud his judgment
or impair his loyalty to the investors to whom his paramount
duty is owed. As I have indicated, he necessarily stands in
some business relation to the corporation creating the securi
ties and the banking house undertaking their issue, but he
should be careful to keep those relations on such a footing
as to insure that his freedom of action and independence of
judgment will not be affected.
It might be a counsel of perfection to suggest that no ac
counting firm should give a report or certificate if any mem
ber of the firm has any interest, however slight, in the cor
poration creating the securities to be sold. On the other
hand, it would seem unnecessary to say that an accountant
should regard himself as disqualified from giving any certifi
cate or opinion if he has any substantial interest in the cor
poration whose securities are to be sold. Yet I have en
countered at least one case in which this principle has been
ignored by accountants carrying on a large business and
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claiming a good standing. As a practical rule, an accountant
should run no risk of putting himself in a position where his
interest might with any reason be thought to be large enough
to affect his judgment, and it is the part of wisdom to re
solve all doubts on such a question conservatively by declin
ing the doubtful appointment.
Similarly, the accountant should be extremely careful not
to put himself at any time in the position of accepting from
the issuing house any favor, or of buying securities from it
on any terms more favorable than those offered to the gen
eral public. His compensation for services should be fixed,
so as to make it as nearly as possible a matter of indifference
to him whether the issue is or is not made, or whether if
made it is or is not successful. Any agreement in advance
whereby the compensation to be received is directly depend
ent on the success or failure of the financing destroys the dis
interestedness of the accountant and is wholly objectionable.
These general considerations seem to me to offer little
difficulty. The really difficult ethical problems of the ac
countant arise when differences of opinion develop between
him and the officers of the, corporation or the representatives
of the issuing house, and when actual or potential weaknesses
in the position of the issuing corporation are disclosed. Fre
quently, the facts of an industrial situation are uncertain,
and the most correct accounting treatment of them is a
matter of opinion. The officials of the corporation may
represent the situation forcefully, and the accountant, while
taking a different view, may believe them to be honest and
may be conscious of the fact that their familiarity with the
subject and knowledge of the details are necessarily greater
than his own. He should, however, remember that as against
their advantage of greater familiarity he possesses the im
portant advantage of greater objectivity, and though he
should always be open to conviction by sound reasoning, he
should never allow his judgment to be overborne by the
mere authority of interested parties.
Perhaps I might illustrate the difficulties of the situations
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which arise by an actual case, where the differences of opin
ion became a matter of public record. In connection with
an important recent issue, the accountants, after listening to
the views of the management, felt compelled to formulate
their conclusions on a basis different from that which the
management thought appropriate. In the prospectus it was
explained that the earnings, as reported by the accountants
employed in that connection, were based on amortization
tables which differed “drastically” from those theretofore
accepted by the corporation on the advice of accountants, and
the following statement was made: “The management be
lieves that the adjustment, which accounts in large measure
for the variation between the figures shown above and the
interim figures reported by the Corporation, is extremely con
servative and in the light of subsequent experience, may
prove to be excessive.”
It is easy to realize how embarrassing the situation in this
case must have been. The question was purely one of opin
ion, the correct answer to which only time could determine.
The management was, as the prospectus indicated, very defi
nite in the expression of its opinion, and had the support
of other accountants. The financial issues at stake were im
portant. No doubt the accountants engaged in connection
with the prospectus could have framed a form of statement
which would have conformed to the views of the manage
ment, and which would have left them in a position legally
secure. But ethically they were bound to give effect to the
judgment which, whether right or wrong, they had honestly
and definitely formed.
It is painful to have to disagree with those by whom one
has been retained, and the person in whose interest one
does so is unlikely ever to know what has been done or to
appreciate the stand that has been taken on his behalf. But
in the long run, the willingness of an accountant to do what
he conceives to be his duty to the unknown investor, even if
by so doing he alienates a client and suffers a present loss of
business, brings a rich reward both in self-respect and in a
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professional reputation which, in turn, brings a pecuniary
benefit.
Fortunately, in recent years a clearer recognition on the
part of issuing houses of their own true interests has tended
to make such controversies less frequent and less acute. The
wise issuing house today recognizes that the prospectus is the
basis of its contract with the investor and that all questions
of ethics apart, it is not even expedient to issue a prospectus
in which material facts are unfairly or inaccurately stated or
suppressed. Such a course may help the sale of securities at
the moment, but that is of little worth if it creates possible
ground of action against the banker later, should the securi
ties for any reason involve the investor in loss. It is to the
interest of the issuing house to see that no pretext is afforded
for a later claim for rescission or damages. Here, again, an
illustration may be helpful.
A few years ago, in discussion of a proposed issue, the ac
countants insisted that the existence of certain litigation
should be disclosed. The junior representatives of the issu
ing house strongly opposed this suggestion, saying that it
would be fatal to the issue, and the lawyers seemed disposed
to agree with them. The matter was, however, taken by
the accountants to the head of the firm, who instantly decided
that the existence of the litigation must be disclosed so
clearly as to preclude any possibility of a claim being made
against his firm later in the event that the litigation should
result adversely to the corporation. He further expressed
the opinion that such frank disclosure would affect the issue
favorably, not unfavorably; and events seemed to bear out his
judgment, the issue being extremely successful.
I believe that every high-minded accountant has accepted
the principle that, once his conclusions are reached, the re
port or certificate which he issues, and which is designed to
influence action, must be so worded that not only will every
statement made therein be literally true, but every inference
which could legitimately be drawn from the language will
be warranted by the facts. There is no place in accountants’
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certificates for what President Roosevelt once called “weasel
words.’’
In England, it would appear that what has heretofore been
regarded as a canon of ethics may sometimes be a legal obli
gation, enforcible, possibly, under the criminal law. As long
ago as 1884, Lord Blackburn, in the House of Lords, in a
civil case expressed admirably his view of the position of
those concerned in the issue of a prospectus: “If,” he said,
“with intent to lead the plaintiff to act upon it, they put
forth a statement which they know may bear two meanings,
one of which is false to their knowledge, and thereby the
plaintiff putting that meaning on it is misled, I do not think
they can escape by saying he ought to have put the other. If
they palter with him in a double sense, it may be that they
lie like truth, but I think they lie, and it is a fraud. Indeed,
as a question of casuistry, I am inclined to think the fraud
is aggravated by a shabby attempt to get the benefit of a fraud
without incurring the responsibility.” Since that time, many
an embittered victim of a disingenuous prospectus has no
doubt echoed the outburst of Macbeth which Lord Black
burn had in mind:

“And be these juggling fiends no more believ’d,
That palter with us in a double sense;
That keep the word of promise to our ear
And break it to our hope.”
In the case against Lord Kylsant, which attracted attention
here as well as in England and which was recently decided
adversely to him both on his trial and in the Court of Crimi
nal Appeal, it was admitted by the Crown that every state
ment in the prospectus was literally true. Nevertheless, the
Judge charged the jury that if they believed that when the
language was used the defendant knew that it was calculated
to induce investors to draw entirely false inferences and in
tended that it should have this effect, they should convict him
of the. charge, which was that he had issued a prospectus
which he knew to be “false in a material particular” with
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intent to induce persons to subscribe for the debentures
offered.
Unfortunately, the precise grounds on which the pro
spectus was held to come within the statute are not entirely
clear. Two paragraphs were specified in the indictmentone, giving average profits for ten years, the other, which
followed immediately, containing a statement of dividends
which showed that dividends had been paid in all but one
of the last seventeen years. On the trial, the Crown in stat
ing its case and the Judge in summing up seemed to take
the view that the statement of an average for ten years, when
in fact all, or substantially all, of the profits were earned
in the first four of the ten years and the operations in some
of the later years resulted in losses, was a statement false in a
material particular, even though the average was authenti
cally true. In sustaining the verdict, however, the Court of
Appeal pointed to the statement of dividends paid as being
the portion of the prospectus that was particularly deceptive
by reason of the false inferences it was likely and intended
to create.
To justify a criminal conviction on the ground that a state
ment of dividends created a natural inference as to earnings,
when there was, in fact, a separate paragraph dealing with
earnings, might seem to be straining the law. Possibly, how
ever, what the Court had in mind was that the statements
made in successive paragraphs regarding earnings and divi
dends were together so misleading as to justify a jury in find
ing a criminal intent. Fortunately, no accountant was
chargeable with responsibility for the language used in the
Royal Mail prospectus; and I think most accountants would
refuse to certify an average alone where the figures for indi
vidual years were ascertainable.
This is not the place in which to pursue the particular
question before the courts in the Kylsant case. For the pres
ent it is sufficient to say that all questions of criminality or
even civil liability apart, the ethical obligation of the ac
countant is clearly to see that no statement is put forward
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which is a half truth or which he realizes will probably give
rise to inferences which would, in fact, be ill founded. Of
course, he cannot be held responsible for every inference,
however unwarranted, which the ignorant or careless in
vestor may draw from the appearance of his name in a pro
spectus. Every accountant with any considerable practice has
probably, after a company with which he has been associated
has come to grief, been told in aggrieved tones: “I took it
for granted that if your name was on the document it was
all right; I didn’t trouble to read just what you said.” Such
an attitude is wholly unreasonable; but if a statement carries
a natural and almost irresistible inference, the accountant
is ethically and perhaps legally as responsible for that infer
ence as for the literal truths of the words he uses.
The question of phraseology assumes a different form
when we come to consider accounts embodied in annual re
ports. As I have pointed out, the figures and the language
of an accountant’s report or certificate, given for use in a
prospectus, are his own. Others may make suggestions, but
the final decision is entirely in his hands. The annual ac
counts of a corporation, on the other hand, are those of its
officers and directors, and the primary responsibility is shared
between them. In this case, it is the accountant who makes
suggestions and the directors who must make the final de
cisions. When they have done so, the accountant must con
sider what report he will make to the shareholders on the
accounts which the directors have adopted.
Clearly it is not desirable that he should insist on register
ing every difference of opinion, however slight, that may arise
between the directors and himself. His power to render
service to the shareholders, and his ability to influence direc
tors towards sound decisions, will be impaired if he adopts a
too pedantic or too captious attitude. But when he differs
with the directors on a point which he deems really impor
tant, he should indicate his dissent and express it clearly.
There is probably considerable justice in the criticism that
qualifications of accountants’ reports are frequently inade-
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quate to convey to the average shareholder the precise nature
and extent of the accountant’s reservation. Those versed in
financial affairs regard any sort of a qualification as a danger
signal and refuse to pass it until they are satisfied just what
danger threatens. But it would be a distinct forward step if
auditors would aim to express their qualifications in clear,
non-technical as well as unambiguous language. This point
may be elaborated by a future lecturer, as Mr. Hoxsey of
the New York Stock Exchange is taking a keen and active
interest in such questions.
In relation to annual accounts, a conflict of interests, which
I have not heretofore mentioned, may arise between those
who are already shareholders and those who may become so.
The auditor’s primary ethical duty is clearly to existing
shareholders, but since he knows his report is likely to influ
ence others to become shareholders, he must recognize some
obligation to that class of investors. At the same time, an
nual accounts are historical in their nature. They are not
intended to be and cannot properly be regarded as designed
to indicate earning capacity. And if accounts are fair as an
historical record, no one can justly assert a grievance against
the accountant on the score that they led him to draw infer
ences as to future earning prospects which the accountant
with his greater knowledge might have known to be un
warranted.
To illustrate the point—suppose a company to have been
operating during a year on the basis of a sales contract cov
ering the bulk of its output at a high price, which at the end
of the year has expired and been replaced by a contract at a
substantially lower price. An accountant would not be justi
fied ethically in giving a certificate of the profits for the year
for use in a prospectus, without referring to the expiration of
the old contract and the making of the new one. It would,
however, be no part of his duty to refer to the contract situ
ation in his certificate to the annual accounts, though it
might be a part of the ethical duty of the directors to do so
in their report.
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While everyone experienced in corporation finance must
recognize the impossibility of giving to annual accounts all
the significance as indices of earning capacity which in
vestors (and those who undertake to advise investors) too
often attribute to them, neither directors nor auditors can
completely ignore the fact that the history of the past is
commonly regarded as some guide to the prospects for the
future. The obligation of directors is, it would seem, greater
if they have caused the securities of their company to be
listed on a public exchange, for in doing so they have invited
the public to trade in those securities. They have endeav
ored to secure for their shareholders the advantage which a
broader market sometimes affords; and both they and the
shareholders should be willing to pay the fair price for this
benefit.
That fair price seems to me to be a sufficient disclosure of
the affairs of the corporation to enable the public to deal
in its securities with a reasonable degree of understanding.
I have heard it argued that it is impossible to throw the full
light of day on the affairs of a corporation, and that it is
therefore unwise for a body like the New York Stock Ex
change to exert its influence actively to secure more dis
closure than corporations would otherwise undertake. The
suggestion is, that as a result of such efforts the public is de
ceived because it is led to believe that it is trading in the
full light of day when it is trading only in the twilight.
Personally, I have no sympathy with this point of view, but
favor a liberal standard of disclosure. Inasmuch as Mr.
Hoxsey has been one of the most persistent and effective cam
paigners in favor of publicity, I trust that he, when he comes
to lecture to you, will discuss the question more fully than
I can now attempt to do.
The difficult questions in this field revolve largely around
two classes of items frequently referred to as “non-recurring
items” and “secret reserves.” The term “non-recurring
items” is applied to those items, whether of income or outgo,
which, although relating to the business and properly finding
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their way into the income account, are in character quite ex
ceptional and not likely to be repeated at all regularly. Illus
trations may be found in the case of recovery of insurance on
the life of the president of the company, or a loss through
fire of an important plant. “Secret reserves” is the term ap
plied to amounts set aside out of income purely as a precau
tion and not in respect of any losses presently known or an
ticipated. The amounts so set aside may be used to meet
totally unexpected losses in the future, or may be restored at
a later date to the income account.
It is obvious that both classes of items require either to be
eliminated or given special consideration in any study of
the income account which is designed to determine the
normal earning capacity of the business; but how these items
should be treated in the regular annual reports of corpora
tions is a question on which there is considerable divergence
of opinion and practice. I think the minimum which a rea
sonable standard of ethics calls for on the part of directors
and auditors of companies whose securities are listed on ex
changes is that when any important non-recurring items are
included in the income of the year, the fact that they are so
included shall be clearly stated; and that where secret reserves
are drawn upon to improve the profits of the year, this fact,
also, shall be disclosed. I do not think there is room, thus
far, for any serious disagreement. Differences, however,
would arise on the further suggestion which I would make,
that the amounts involved should in all cases be indicated.
There remains for consideration the attitude of the ac
countant towards the original establishment of secret re
serves, the result of which is, of course, that the profits for
the period in which they are established are understated.
This is a particularly difficult problem because of the varied
ways in which what are substantially secret reserves can be
established. There is the simple case of a general reserve for
contingencies; but there are more difficult cases, such as
the under-valuation of inventories or securities, which have
precisely the same effect.
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One view of the question is that the directors should al
ways submit accounts that represent as accurately as possible
their best judgment of the true profits for the year, accord
ing to the general method of accounting adopted by the
corporation. Others take the position that all businesses are
subject to many hazards which cannot be accurately meas
ured; that the attribution of profits to years is at best largely
conventional; that business moves in cycles; and that a cer
tain amount of deliberate understatement in good years is
warranted and in the interests of the shareholders.
The question is partly a practical and partly an ethical
one, and my own judgment is that directors would usually
be well advised to follow their own judgment in regard to
the establishment of precautionary reserves, but to disclose
to shareholders the fact that the reserves have been made.
Whether they should give general publicity to the amount
of the reserves established is a matter of judgment. Their
ethical obligation is probably discharged if they tell share
holders explicitly that reserves have been made, and give
them the opportunity to make further inquiries if they so
desire. Drawing on reserves to supplement current profits
is, as I have indicated, an entirely different matter, and
should be fully disclosed.
So far as the accountant is concerned, I do not think that
in the present state of public opinion and general practice
he can be charged with an ethical duty to insist on the dis
closure even of the fact that a secret reserve has been created,
if he believes that the action was taken in good faith and if
the amount involved is not so large that ignoring it com
pletely distorts the earnings picture. Cases occasionally arise
in which the accountant may be convinced that earnings are
being deliberately understated in order that one group, often
referred to colloquially as the “insiders,” may profit at the
expense of the general body of shareholders. There can be
no question of his ethical obligation to the shareholders as a
whole in such a situation. His position at such times would
be greatly strengthened if he were elected by the shareholders
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and directly responsible to them instead of being appointed
by and responsible to the officers or directors as is the com
mon case in our country.
I hope that this discussion of the ethical obligations of the
accountant to the investor will be sufficient to convince you
that the high-minded accountant who undertakes to practice
in this field assumes high ethical obligations, and it is the
assumption of such obligations that makes what might other
wise be a business, a profession. Of all the group of pro
fessions which are closely allied with business, there is none
in which the practitioner is under a greater ethical obliga
tion to persons who are not his immediate clients; and it is
for this reason that I believe accounting ought, and can be
made, to take an outstanding position in this group.
I would not have you think that because the investor is not
his immediate client the accountant owes nothing to the in
vestor except legal duties and ethical obligations. This is
not, of course, the fact. It is to the investor that he owes his
entire practice in the field of financial auditing, and it is only
because the investor exists and attaches, weight to an ac
countant’s report that the banker employs the accountant’s
services in this field. And the continued success of the ac
countant is dependent on his retaining the confidence of the
investing public. An enlightened self-interest, therefore, as
well as self-respect calls for the maintenance of a proper
ethical standard by the practitioner.
The young accountant may find it hard to take the first
stand for the principles that have been suggested for his ob
servance, but he will find that this is essentially a case in
which “it is the first step that costs.” Perhaps, therefore, I
may, in bringing this discussion to a close, indulge in a per
sonal reminiscence which bears on this point and which as it
happens relates, also, to the question of showing average
profits, which arose in the Kylsant case.
A good many years ago—as a matter of fact, in 1899—owing
to the death of one of the senior partners, I was called upon
to settle with an important New York banker the form of
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a certificate for use in connection with a prospectus. As the
issue was to be made on both sides of the Atlantic, it was
planned to print the accountants’ certificate in the prospectus
as was and is customary in England.
The profits of the company showed a fairly steady decline
over a period of ten years except that in 1898, owing to the
Spanish-American War, they rose considerably to a point
higher than the average of the ten years. The banker de
sired the certificate to show only the average for the ten years
and the profits for the last year. I demurred to this sugges
tion on two grounds: first, that it was contrary to the practice
of my firm to show only averages where the profits for sepa
rate years were readily ascertainable; and, secondly, that the
information proposed to be given would create a natural
but erroneous impression as to the trend of profits.
The discussion became difficult, and it was indicated to me
that if we adhered to the position I had taken there would
be no possibility of any similar differences with that particu
lar banker in the future. However, I refused to modify the
stand I had taken and was supported by the senior partner,
with the result that no certificate was printed in the pro
spectus, but a statement was made by the banker on his own
responsibility. I felt that I was right, but I could not fail to
be conscious of the fact that my first important interview
with a banker had not been a success and promised to result
in the loss of an important client.
There was, however, a sequel. Some six months later, the
same banker was contemplating the purchase of a business
and desired a full and reliable report on its operations. His
lawyers approached the firm saying that while he still
thought we were entirely wrong in the stand we had taken
six months earlier, he believed that we had taken it in per
fect good faith and that the incident should not, therefore,
be a bar to friendly relations between us. They thereupon
gave us instructions to make the investigation, and further
intimated that the banker desired that I should personally
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take charge of it; and I may add that the banker is today a
valued client of the firm.
This sequel made the whole incident one of the most help
ful of my experiences, and I hope it may also be of service
in encouraging those of you who may be about to start prac
tice, or are in the early days of practice, to take a firm stand
for sound ethical principles, which I am sure will ultimately
tend to bring you professional success as well as a conscious
ness of professional integrity.

II

QUALIFICATIONS IN CERTIFICATES *
(1915)
First of all, the fact that the qualified certificate has been
selected by the authorities of the association as a suitable
topic for discussion is evidence of the progress our profession
is making, for it is not so many years since the qualified
certificate was not sufficiently common for the subject to be
of importance.
Twenty years ago an audit certificate seldom assumed any
special importance. It was regarded rather as a frame which
helped to set off the financial picture. Obviously it is better
to present a picture unframed than in a frame showing bare
spots from which the gilt has disappeared; and so the de
mand was for an unqualified certificate or none at all. This
condition is at least in part responsible for the opinion some
times expressed that an accountant should give no certificate
but an unqualified one, though often the opinion is the re
sult of a failure to read a certificate properly and a desire to
blame the accountant for subsequent failure of the enter
prise, possibly due to the very causes which necessitated a
qualification in the certificate. We too frequently hear in
vestors say: “Oh, well, I didn’t read every word of the cer
tificate; I saw it was signed by so and so and I thought that
was good enough.” Of course, the position is unreasonable,
but if we remember that there was a time when practically
all certificates printed were unqualified because qualified
certificates were wrongly regarded as valueless and promptly
suppressed, we may find for those who take the position some

* An Address at the annual meeting of the American Association of Public
Accountants, Seattle, Washington, September 21, 1915. Cf. The Journal of
Accountancy, Vol. XX (October, 1915), pp. 248-59.
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better excuse than mental laziness or an unfair desire to
make the accountant the scapegoat.
The impracticability of the suggestion that only unqualified
certificates should be given is apparent. A client retains an
auditor to audit his accounts, with a view to certifying a bal
ance sheet. The auditor dissents from the treatment of an
item in the balance sheet but finds the books and accounts in
all other respects correct. Clearly the client is entitled to a
certificate as to their correctness subject to the one point; and
it is desirable too, as a matter of broad policy, that he should
get it, otherwise one of two things would be likely to happen
—either an exaggerated impression as to the unreliability of
the accounts would be created by the refusal of a certificate,
or the auditor to avoid that serious result would waive or
sink his convictions and sign an unqualified certificate.
Moreover, every balance sheet, as has been judicially pointed
out, is necessarily to some extent a matter of estimate and
opinion, and qualifications often represent an honest differ
ence of opinion between directors and auditors. What more
effective disposition can be made of such a case than for the
stockholders to have placed before them the two views—the
one perhaps possessing the advantage of greater familiarity
with the subject matter, the other the advantage of a more
detached viewpoint, and then for the final disposition of the
question to be determined by the stockholders?
Before leaving this question it may not be amiss to point
out that among the things to be done by investors and bank
ers to make audit certificates attain their full value (what
accountants have to do is not now discussed) are these:
(1) Use every opportunity to extend the practice of hav
ing auditors appointed by and report to stock
holders;
(2) Note and require explanations where companies
which present audited accounts one year present un
audited accounts the next or change their auditors.

The next question to be considered is the more difficult
one as to the form and character of qualifications. In the
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consideration of this question, qualifications may be divided
into two groups—those that merely limit responsibility with
out expressing or implying disapproval of the accounts (as,
for instance, where branch accounts have been accepted with
out audit) and those that constitute criticisms of the accounts
(as, for instance, where proper provision for depreciation
has not been made).
The great essential of any proper qualification is, of course,
that it shall be clear and readily understandable by anyone
not expert in accounts, and shall be expressed directly and
not implied by subtle refinements in wording which may
easily escape the notice of many who read the certificate. An
accountant who relies on fine distinctions of language, or the
assignment of wider meaning to a word or phrase than it
would ordinarily be given, to limit his responsibility for ac
counts he has certified, may succeed in avoiding any legal
liability therefor but prejudices the interests of the whole
profession. This is not to say that great care in the choice
of words in a certificate is undesirable or superfluous; on the
contrary, the ideal certificate is the one that conveys precisely
. the right shade of meaning to anyone who carefully studies
its every word and at the same time creates the correct gen
eral impression in the mind of anyone who reads it hurriedly
and with no more than ordinary care.
Qualifications which limit responsibility should not only
indicate the extent of the limitations but their importance;
at least, if the limitation is of marked importance, that fact
should be made clear. Thus, in the illustrative case above
cited, it should not be considered sufficient to state that the
branch accounts have been accepted without audit if the
branch assets constitute, say, 75% or more of the total so that
only a small proportion of the total has been really verified.
As to qualifications which are in the nature of criticisms
of the accounts, it would clearly be desirable that they should
show the exact or approximate effect on the accounts of the
adoption of the auditor’s view; but such an ideal is not always
attainable, and it cannot be said that any qualification which
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falls short of this standard is defective. The generally ac
cepted rule is that a qualification is adequate if it is sufficient
to put the reader on notice and afford him a basis for investi
gation if he desires to carry the matter further. Thus, a
qualification “subject to the fact that no provision has been
made for depreciation” is regarded as sufficient without any
statement by the auditor as to what provision he thinks
should be made.
Although in some cases a more specific qualification which
would indicate the precise amount involved might be unde
sirable from the business standpoint in a certificate receiv
ing wide publicity, yet there is some justice in the demand
for less general qualifications, which is sometimes heard. So
long as audits are not compulsory, however, progress in the
desired direction can be made only with the assistance of
bankers and investors—particularly the former, since the in
vestors are not organized and are not in so advantageous a
position for making their wishes effective as the bankers.
Accountants gladly recognize the help which bankers have
given in recent years, and the resulting improvements in the
form of accounts and certificates is apparent. Continued
cooperation will produce continued improvement.
So long as the discontinuance of audits or change of au
ditors passes without comment from stockholders or creditors,
the auditors are hampered in their efforts to make accounts
as accurate and their certificates as complete and informative
as possible. If auditors take too rigid a stand the directors
will simply publish unaudited accounts or perhaps seek some
more amenable auditors. It is not the financial effect on
themselves of such a course that influences those auditors
who view their responsibility most seriously to modify their
position so as to reach an agreement with directors if pos
sible; it is the knowledge of the fact that too rigid an attitude
will defeat the very purpose they are seeking to accomplish.
They realize that it is to the public interest that they should
concede something in the language of a certificate or that
they should bring the accounts nearer to the correct standard
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even though that standard be not quite attained, rather than
that the accounts should be published entirely uncorrected
and unexplained. There are many accountants who would
never pass accounts they did not thoroughly approve for the
sake of retaining the audit, who have done so for the reason
just given. Of course, there can be no compromise on really
vital questions, and the determination of the proper limit of
concessions calls for the nicest judgment. Extended experi
ence convinces, however, that the policy has in the long run
resulted in greater improvement in accounting standards
than a more drastic policy would have produced and has
been beneficial to the business and financial community.
Turning now to the consideration of specific forms of
qualification, it should perhaps be pointed out that in the
ordinary certificate that “in our opinion the balance sheet is
properly drawn up so as to set forth the true financial posi
tion of the company as shown by the books and accounts,”
neither of the expressions “in our opinion” and “as shown
by the books and accounts” should be regarded as a quali
fication. The insertion of the words “in our opinion” is an
honest recognition of the fact that the certificate can be but
an expression of opinion, as indeed a balance sheet itself
is in a large measure. The use of the expression “as shown
by the books and accounts” does not justify the certification
of accounts which are in accord with the books if the audi
tor has reason to believe that the books are not correct or has
not satisfied himself that they are correct. It is suggested,
however, that the phrase is so frequently regarded as a limi
tation, or in some cases an attempted evasion of responsi
bility, that it would be well to omit it. The statement that
“the balance sheet is in accord with the books and in our
opinion, etc.,” is suggested as a preferable form.
The insertion of limiting phrases should not be regarded
as absolving the auditor from all duty and responsibility
in regard to the assets or liabilities to which the phrases
apply. Thus, before issuing a certificate containing a state
ment that the branch accounts have been accepted without
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audit, the auditor should look into the way in which the
branch accounts are prepared and satisfy himself as far as is
possible without auditing the branch accounts that he is
justified in accepting them, and that there is no evidence
tending to show that they are unreliable. In the same way
a statement that valuations of certain assets by persons indi
cated have been accepted should not be embodied in a cer
tificate if the auditor suspects the good faith or qualifications
of the valuers.
It is, naturally, the qualification which constitutes a criti
cism that offers the greatest difficulty. Much of the objection
offered by directors to qualifications seems shortsighted.
For instance, if it is apparent on the face of a company’s
accounts that no provision has been made for depreciation
where a provision is ordinarily regarded as necessary, it
would seem wise for the directors to accept a certificate withthat one qualification, and to offer an explanation of the
omission if they deem it proper to do so. If an unqualified
certificate is given, any competent person examining the ac
counts. and finding that no depreciation is provided and no
comment on the fact is made by the auditors will begin at
once to suspect other defects in both the accounts and the
auditors. No doubt there are many less careful or com
petent recipients of reports who would not carry their
analysis so far, but of these a large part probably would not
read the certificate at all and others would take the qualifica
tion lightly, perhaps dismissing the requirement of a pro
vision for depreciation as one of the accountant’s fetishes.
The readers whose impressions are of most importance to
the directors issuing the report are, it is believed, more
likely to be unfavorably impressed by the unqualified than
by the qualified certificate in such a case. That this is so
is perhaps indicated by a growing tendency to discard the
ostrich-like policy in such matters and to aim rather to mini
mize the effect of unfavorable features in accounts and re
ports by stating them boldly.
An amusing feature of the continual discussion of the form

32

THE PROFESSION OF ACCOUNTING

of qualification is the way in which an expression, such, for
instance, as “subject to,” acquires an evil significance, and
great effort is expended in finding a more acceptable equiva
lent. The equivalent in time falls into disrepute, and a
fresh search is instituted. The attitude of those to whom
the qualified certificate is given is perhaps natural—no great
harm results—and possibly in so far as the attitude stimulates
the ingenuity of the auditor, widens his vocabulary and tends
away from stereotyped forms of expression, it may be said
to be positively beneficial.
An interesting question arises as to how far an exposi
tion of the views of directors may properly be, appended to
a qualification. In general the more detached the attitude
of the auditor, the more his certificate creates the impres
sion that it was designed to benefit his ultimate clients to
whom the certificate is to be presented, rather than his im
mediate clients—those by whom the certificate is sought—,
the greater weight his audit will carry. But where an audi
tor in a certificate intended for stockholders criticizes the
accounts in any particular, the directors may reasonably de
sire to be sure of having their point of view put before the
stockholders, and that at as nearly as possible the same time
as the criticism. Hence, such expressions as “no provision
has been made for-------- , the directors considering, etc.”
It is suggested, however, that this practice should be resorted
to only very sparingly. The comment that no provision has
been made for something implies that the auditor thinks
some provision should have been made. If the auditor then
proceeds to state the directors’ reasons for not making the
provision, it may be urged that he should logically go on to
show why these reasons were not accepted by him as con
clusive. There are, of course, cases where the value of
certain assets' or the amount of certain liabilities is so un
certain that neither auditors nor directors can form definite
opinions. If in such cases the best judgment of the auditor
differs from that of the directors, or if the auditor is not
prepared either to endorse the directors’ opinions or express
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one of his own, a statement of the facts and of the directors’
views thereon may, it would seem, properly be embodied in
the audit certificate. An alternative course which has often
proved convenient and satisfactory to all concerned is for the
auditor to agree with directors on a statement to be made
by the latter in their report to stockholders regarding the
special point involved, and for the auditor then to certify
that the accounts, “read in conjunction with the explanation
regarding-------- contained in the directors’ report, set
forth, etc.”
One note of warning may be sounded. It must be remem
bered that some rules of accounting are rules of conserva
tism, not of law, and an auditor cannot compel his client
to be conservative under penalty of receiving only a quali
fied certificate. If accounts clearly state the method of treat
ing certain items and that method is not improper, though
not the most conservative, the auditor is not justified in giv
ing his certificate a qualified form.
In general where facts are fully disclosed in the accounts
in such a way as to be readily understood, one of the great
objects for which auditors are constantly striving is attained,
and the references to features which are not treated precisely
in accord with the auditor’s view may be made less severe
than where suppression of material fact aggravates error in
treatment.
Pursuing this line of thought, it is suggested that com
ments, not really critical, but which clients will nevertheless
resent as being likely to be regarded by the public as quali
fications, may often be obviated by embodying the equivalent
explanation in the accounts. Suppose, for instance, that
during the year the basis of valuation of capital assets has
been changed with a resulting large credit to surplus: if the
accounts do not disclose these facts the auditor must bring
them out in his certificate. The change may be perfectly
proper, and the client may object to the reference in the
certificate on the ground that it implies—or will be regarded
by many as implying—a doubt as to the propriety of the
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change. The natural solution of such a difficulty is to
amplify the accounts so as to bring out the facts, and the
reference in the certificate can then be omitted. Experience
suggests that this alternative is not used so freely as it might
properly be, and that, consequently, much friction that could
easily be avoided occurs between auditors and clients.
It may be well now to consider briefly some of the points
on which qualifications are more commonly necessary, and
in doing so the balance sheet items may be taken in the
usual order: capital assets, investments, inventories, accounts
receivable, deferred charges, capital and current liabilities,
surplus.
Qualifications as to capital assets are perhaps the most fre
quent, the reasons being partly that there is more room for
difference of opinion as to capital assets than as to current
assets or liabilities and that capital assets are not of great
importance for credit purposes, and directors are, therefore,
willing to accept qualifications as to capital assets where
they would prefer to adjust current items rather than have
any qualification in regard to them.
Depreciation and discount on bonds charged to capital are
time-honored subjects of qualification. Fortunately, the
auditor’s position as to both has been made easier by the
growing insistence of courts and regulating authorities upon
their correct treatment. Those who urged ten years ago that
discount was not a proper charge to capital were faced by
interstate commerce regulations providing for its charge to
cost of property, but the rule has since been changed, and
other regulating bodies have followed the Interstate Com
merce Commission. Today an auditor comparatively seldom
has difficulty in securing acceptance of the sound accounting
principles regarding depreciation and discount, and the issue
is usually only as to the amount to be written off—an issue
that must always be open for discussion.
Another question as to capital assets concerns the adoption
of valuations in lieu of previous book figures. In such cases,
unless the auditor has reason to doubt the good faith of the
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valuation, the question is, as already suggested, best dealt
with by clear explanations in the accounts.
Investments frequently offer difficulty where values have
depreciated or are not well established. The auditor’s con
tention that provision should be made for a fall in value of
marketable securities, though appreciation should not be
taken up until realized, is attacked as illogical, though it
obviously is the one safe rule. An explanation or qualifica
tion in the certificate is desirable where the rule is not fol
lowed, unless the amounts involved are relatively small and
the facts are clear in the face of the accounts as, for instance,

Marketable investments at cost $..............
(market value $.............. )
In the case of investments the value of which is uncertain
(which include securities the quoted prices of which are
nominal), the basis of valuation should -be made clear either
in the accounts or certificate; and where the amount is at all
material and the valuation is not at cash cost, a reference
to the item in the certificate is always desirable. If the audi
tor regards the securities as not being worth the value at
which they are taken, a qualification is required such as:
“Subject to the value of the investments, we certify, etc.”
If the auditor has no reason to dissent from the valuation
and yet is unable fully to confirm it independently, the cer
tificate may read: “Accepting the valuation placed on the
investments by-------- , I certify, etc.” Where the auditor
is unwilling to go so far as to “accept” the valuation he can
state the basis and say: “Upon this basis, I certify, etc.,” leav
ing every reader to decide for himself as to the propriety of
the basis.
Inventories may probably be valued legally at a figure not
exceeding their net realizable value (i.e., their selling value,
less costs of realization), but the “cost or market, whichever
is lower” basis is so obviously sound and so generally adopted
that a departure from this basis should be indicated either
in the accounts or certificate; except, perhaps, in certain in-
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dustries, such as the leather or packing-house businesses,
where it is a matter of common knowledge that costs are
practically unobtainable for finished products, and that it is
a trade custom to adopt a valuation based on selling prices
with conservative deductions.
Differences of opinion as to the necessary reserves for bad
debts sometimes give rise to qualifications, and even more
generally the necessity for reserves for collection expenses
on debts where collection cost is an important item (as, for
instance, in instalment businesses) is or should be the sub
ject of comment in the auditor’s certificate. The necessity
for such reserves is not yet fully recognized, and the practice
of establishing them is by no means universal. The position
regarding future collection expenses now is similar to the
position regarding depreciation a few years ago, and it is to
be hoped that the coming years will furnish a parallel to the
steady growth of sounder opinion on that question.
Deferred charges are a fruitful source of qualifications:
officers who are anxious to avoid showing a deficit but are
unwilling to overstate “real” assets are tempted sometimes
to solve the difficulty by carrying as deferred charges items
which ought to be charged to profit and loss and would have
been so charged without question if operating results had
been more favorable. The particular forms of qualification
are so varied that no general comment is possible.
Qualifications as to liabilities usually relate to liabilities
unascertained in amount or contingent, which exist and are
not noted on the balance sheet, or to such special liabilities
as indebtedness for goods in transit, or for goods intended
for sale in a future season, the invoices for which are post
dated. In such cases both the asset and the liability are
sometimes omitted, but they should be disclosed or the fact
of their being omitted clearly brought out.
In addition to the questions which have been already dis
cussed and which indirectly affect the amount of the sur
plus, questions arise as to the manner of stating the surplus.
These questions include the proper disclosure of extraor-
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dinary profits, the separation of earned surplus from surplus
arising in other ways, and the treatment of losses which it
is claimed are chargeable against prior surplus instead of
against current operations. These questions often give rise
to serious differences between client and auditor, the client
arguing that “it is all the same in the end and that there
is nothing in the balance sheet that is riot literally true.”
The auditor’s position must be that to receive a clear Cer
tificate accounts must be fair as well as literally true. Ac
counts are often more important on account of the infer
ences that may be drawn from them than as mere statements
of a past condition. We all know how easy it is. to join to
gether a series of statements, each of which is literally true,
in such a way that an inference will naturally be drawn
which is in reality incorrect. The auditor aims to ensure
not only that statements he makes or certifies shall be true,
but that every legitimate inference drawn from them shall
also be correct. Of course, he can accept no responsibility
as to unwarranted inferences, though it is often sought to
impose such a responsibility on him.
Qualification is sometimes necessary as to the general form
of accounts submitted to the auditor, especially in the case
of holding companies. While the general adoption of the
practice of publishing consolidated balance sheets affords the
auditor a strong argument in favor of that form of state
ment, clients who desire to publish a holding company bal
ance sheet have the legal position in their favor. The audi
tor can, however, meet such cases by insisting that while
the balance sheet is a correct balance sheet of the holding
company, it does not adequately disclose the financial posi
tion unless supplemented by a consolidated balance sheet of
the subsidiaries or its equivalent.
Questions also arise where extraordinary transactions such
as the declaration of a large dividend which very materially
affects the financial position, have taken place shortly after
the date of a balance sheet and before the certificate is
signed. These questions are of great importance where the
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balance sheet is likely to be used for the purpose of securing
credit. Irrespective of any technical view of such a question,
which might seem to justify a clear certificate, the auditor
should take a broader view; and if he feels that there is
danger that the statement prove seriously misleading, he
should take adequate steps to avoid that result.
Another general question which it may be well to touch
upon is the position where an auditor is appointed by a
company long in existence to make an audit of its accounts
for one year. Is a specific disclaimer of responsibility as to
the accounts prior to the year under audit necessary? The
correctness of current assets and liabilities can be deter
mined without delving into the past to any great extent,
but capital assets carried at cost are not so easily verified.
Where the balance sheet shows the figures of capital assets
at the beginning of the year and the charges during the
year, and the auditor states that he has audited the accounts
for the year, he is justified in accepting the opening balance,
unless he has reason to believe it to be incorrect, because
the capital assets could only be verified by auditing, at least
in part, the accounts of a prior period. Taking into con
sideration the fact that capital assets are not usually stated
on the basis of present values, the magnitude of the task
involved in a complete verification of the capital assets, and
the clear indication on the face of the balance sheet that the
opening balances have been accepted, no one would be jus
tified in assuming that the auditor had in such a case done
more in connection with capital assets than verify the
changes during the year. This is especially true where the
long form of certificate is given, stating specifically that the
changes during the year have been examined and- found to
be proper, the inference clearly being that the auditor is
not prepared to accept responsibility for the treatment of the
accounts in the past, though in practice auditors usually look
cursorily over the past history of capital asset accounts with
a view to detecting any gross inflation or special adjustments
thereof.
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This discussion of specific qualifications has been limited
to those arising on the certification of annual balance sheets.
The questions arising on certificates of profits for prospec
tuses and other special work are to a large extent similar and
will offer no difficulty to anyone who has a clear idea of the
principles which govern the issue of certificates as to annual
accounts.
In granting certificates the accountant stands between his
client and the public, and the decision as to how far he can
go to meet his client’s wishes and still do his full duty to
the public is often difficult to make. Upon his ability to
decide such questions rightly his ultimate standing and suc
cess largely depend. He should err, if at all, on the side
of the public, for undue laxity will damage the profession
and himself; at the same time excessive rigidity, as has been
suggested, will often defeat the purpose he is seeking. As
in most walks of life, success lies in finding the happy mean.

III
A PROPER COURAGE IN THE ASSUMPTION OF
RESPONSIBILITY BY THE ACCOUNTANT *

(1926)
your Committee invited me to speak tonight, they
suggested that I should, if possible, select a topic which
would possess not only a professional but a more general
interest. Since that invitation was extended, the article
by Professor Ripley on corporate publicity, which has re
ceived such general notice, has appeared in the Atlantic
Monthly, and it has seemed to me to raise questions of great
professional importance which affect also the whole financial
community. In speaking before the American Institute of
Accountants at Atlantic City recently, I drew attention to
the significance of the movement initiated by Professor
Ripley as affecting accountants, and with your permission I
should like to develop more fully some of the thoughts then
briefly expressed.
It is not perhaps inappropriate to do so in the State of
New Jersey, as, though your State is no longer a pennant
holder in what has become a somewhat undignified compe
tition for new incorporations, some of the country’s most
important industries are still conducted by corporations or
ganized under your laws,
At Atlantic City I suggested that an extension of the
practice of having accounts audited annually, which has now
become almost universal among the important industrial
companies, might do much, perhaps more than supervision
by the Federal Trade Commission, to bring about improved
standards of corporate publicity. I may say that I have since
received, with much gratification, a very cordial letter from
When

* An address delivered to the Society of Certified Public Accountants of
the State of New Jersey, Newark, N. J., October 19, 1926.
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Professor Ripley welcoming the suggestions I then put for
ward.
At that time I expressed the view that if the desired end
were to be accomplished it would be necessary that the re
sponsibilities of auditors should be made more real and
definite, and that as a necessary corollary auditors would
have to be given fuller and more clearly defined authority
and be reasonably assured of an opportunity to present their
views to stockholders if they should unfortunately come into
serious disagreement with the directors or officers of the cor
poration under audit.
The status and responsibilities of an auditor who certifies
or reports upon the annual accounts of a corporation are
at present vague and indefinite; some accountants, I believe,
would be glad to have them remain so. Why, they would
ask, should we add to our responsibilities? The answer is,
of course, simple. We cannot expect, for any length of
time, to get something for nothing; and if we wish to see the
prestige and authority of the profession, or for that matter
its financial rewards, continue to increase, we must be pre
pared to assume correspondingly greater responsibilities.
We should, nevertheless, be careful what responsibilities we
assume; a rash assumption of responsibility in matters be
yond our competence would be as disastrous to the profes
sion as unwillingness to assume it in matters which are
within our competence.
From time to time we see corporations which have been
audited fail as a result of conditions which were either not
discovered or not brought out by the auditors; in connection
therewith we hear comments on the uselessness of audits.
As well might we complain of the uselessness of doctors be
cause people die of complaints other than old age. Some
times no doubt the auditor is fairly subject to criticismjust as doctors sometimes are; in other cases no such criticism
is warranted.
The position is simply that an audit is not a complete
safeguard and insurance against all financial ills any more
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than the doctor’s services are against all bodily ills. Quacks
there are of course in both professions who assert extravagant
pretensions, and they are a menace to both the professions
and the general public. Few people are so foolish as to
reject medical advice entirely because it sometimes proves
defective; it would be equally foolish to deny the value of
audits on similar grounds. Fortunately this elementary fact
seems to be generally recognized if we may judge from the
rapid and widespread growth of the practice of having ac
counts audited. This growth is the more remarkable when
we recall that in the early years little support was given to
the movement by bankers and others who should have been
the first to recognize the possibilities of the development.
I believe, however, the time has come for a great step
forward in the interests both of the financial community and
of the profession. Unless some effective steps are taken to
meet criticisms such as those voiced by Professor Ripley, the
result will be some sort of bureaucratic control, and I am
satisfied that through proper cooperation methods can be
devised, without resort to government, which will be more
effective and at the same time less burdensome and vexatious
than control by a governmental body is likely to be.
It may be said, and we should have to admit, that there is
not in the profession as it now exists a body of men capable
of dealing adequately with the problem of securing full and
fair publicity in corporation matters, laying down proper
standards and seeing that they are duly observed. It is,
however, even clearer that there is no such body outside the
profession, and the extent to which corporations are already
audited shows that at least we have an adequate nucleus
about which we can build.
As I have already suggested, it seems to me that if the
profession is to take its proper place in this development
two things are essential: first, that it should squarely face its
responsibilities; secondly, that it should strenuously resist
any attempt to impose on it responsibilities beyond its ability
to bear. I think the profession as a whole will gladly assume
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its proper responsibilities if those responsibilities are reason
ably defined and if commensurate powers are given to it.
When I say the responsibilities of the auditor should be
defined I do not mean that a fixed code of procedure must
be laid down; that is not possible; much must always be left
to the judgment of the individual auditor. Such general
guides as, for instance, the memorandum on balance sheet
audits which was drafted by the American Institute of Ac
countants in the first year of its existence, and provisionally
adopted and circulated by the Federal Reserve Board, are
of very great value, and much more might be done along
similar lines.
Useful work has since been done by the Institute’s Com
mittee on Cooperation with Bankers and by other commit
tees of the Institute or State Societies; and similar coopera
tion with such bodies as the Listing Committee of the New
York Stock Exchange might lead to the formulation of other
standards with which it would be the duty of every prac
ticing accountant to be familiar.
In any such work we must be practical; it is no use laying
down counsels of perfection or attempting to extend the
scope of an audit unduly. An audit is a safeguard; the
maintenance of this safeguard entails an expense; and this
expense can be justified only if the value of the safeguard
is found to be fully commensurate with its cost. The cost
of an audit so extensive as to be a complete safeguard would
be enormous and far beyond any value to be derived from it.
A superficial audit is dangerous because of the sense of false
security which it creates. Between the two extremes there
lies a mean, at which the audit abundantly justifies its cost.
The problem is to determine this happy mean, to ensure
that the auditor does not fall short of a reasonable discharge
of his duties, and that the investor or lender does not at
tribute to the audit a greater significance than it can as a
practical matter possess. And it must be recognized that
skilled dishonesty, especially collusive dishonesty, may at
times and for a time deceive even the auditor who conducts
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what is regarded as a reasonable audit, and that this should
be so is not to be regarded as a defect of the system, since,
as I have said, audit procedure represents a balancing of the
consideration of risks on the one side and cost on the other.
As a matter of fact, investors and lenders need protection
against deliberate dishonesty less than protection against un
sound practices and undue optimism. In the experience of
my firm, and probably it is also the experience of other
firms, cases of deliberate dishonesty are trivial in number
in comparison with cases where misrepresentations have been
made on the basis of excessive hopes, or as the result of un
willingness to face unpleasant facts, or through an incorrect
treatment of facts which there was no attempt to conceal, or
which the ordinary procedure of an audit would readily dis
close.
To illustrate the point I am attempting to make, I might
refer to the demand which has sometimes been made, as for
instance by a banker in an address before the New York
Society of Certified Public Accountants some time ago, that
auditors should assume complete responsibility for the cor
rectness of inventories. Now, every banker no doubt would
be glad to have the auditor assume such a responsibility if he
would be willing to do so without any increase in his fee,
but I do not believe one banker in a thousand would advo
cate such an extension of responsibility at the price of the
increase of the cost of auditing which would be necessary
if the auditor were to undertake the work which would
justify acceptance of so great a responsibility. I will not
undertake to say how many times the present cost of audit
ing would be multiplied if this suggestion were universally
adopted, but it would clearly be a case of multiplication, not
one of relatively simple addition.
I am whole-heartedly opposed to any such proposition.
In the first place, I do not believe the verification of physical
inventories is within the competence of auditors; in the
second place, I do not think any case has been made out for
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the verification of inventories in the manner suggested either
by auditors or by any other independent experts.
As in most other financial matters, the problem presents
different phases in the case of the large and small corpora
tions respectively. In the case of the large companies the
loss to an individual grantor of credit in a particular case
might be substantial and very serious. In such companies,
however, if a reasonable system of inventory is in force (and
it is a part of the ordinary procedure of audit to see whether
such a method is employed), then the collusion necessary to
perpetrate an inventory fraud on any large scale is so ex
tensive that only the most desperate of dishonest executives
would ever think of resorting thereto.
In the case of smaller companies, deliberate falsification
is no doubt more easily effected, but unless and until ex
perience shows it to be a common occurrence, grantors of
credit should find their protection in the distribution of
risks and rely on the law of averages rather than attempt to
enforce safeguards involving an expense wholly out of pro
portion to the demonstrated risks.
The conclusions thus reached by reasoning are confirmed
by experience. Going back over that of my own firm in the
last thirty years I find it difficult to recall more than, at most,
a single case in which material overstatement of inventories
occurred that would not have been disclosed by the work
done in an ordinarily efficient audit, but which independent
inventory checkers might reasonably have been expected to
detect. In the course of this period we have by ordinary
audit methods in very many cases found that inventories
were overstated either in quantities, as the result of incor
rect methods of inventory determination, or in valuation.
I think those who advocate a complete change in the
auditor’s work and responsibilities in relation to inventories
both overlook the great practical value of the work now
done by auditors in relation to inventories, and also greatly
exaggerate the value and importance of the further verifica
tion which they would like auditors to undertake.
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Some bankers appear to think that auditors at present do
practically nothing to ascertain whether the inventories are
correctly stated, and are surprised when confronted with a
statement of what the auditor can and should do—such, for
instance, as is set forth in the Federal Reserve Bulletin on
the audit of credit statements. It is only fair to say that
others are very appreciative of the auditor’s work, and such
publications as the Institute’s bulletin in 1921, when prices
were crumbling and inventories and commitments were mat
ters of vital importance, have elicited warm expressions of
approval from well-informed bankers.
If the question be considered, as I think it should be, from
the standpoint of a comparison between the risks involved
and the costs of eliminating, or materially reducing, those
risks, then I am satisfied that the independent verification of
annual inventories will be found not to be a practical sug
gestion.
The demand has arisen, I think, as a result of a few
sporadic cases, and I feel sure there will always be enough
experienced men in both the banking and the accounting
worlds to appreciate the unwisdom of adding to the general
credit system an expensive piece of machinery, the need for
which seldom arises. No doubt, however, special inventory
verification should and will be made where suspicions are
aroused or unusual conditions seem to make them necessary.
Returning to my main subject, I have said that if auditors
are to assume greater responsibilities they not only should
be given adequate powers but should also be put in a
stronger position in the event of their finding themselves in
serious disagreement with the directors or officers of a com
pany which they audit. At the present time auditors hold
office usually at the pleasure of the officers of the company.
We have all known cases in which the auditor, possibly
towards the end of his audit, finds himself unable to approve
of the accounts which the officials of the company have pre
pared, and on informing them of his position, is told, po
litely or otherwise, to discontinue his work, and later finds a
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statement issued by the company signed by more subservient
auditors. To meet this situation it seems to me that the
auditor should be assured of a right to report to the stock
holders the results of an audit once he has been commis
sioned to make it.
I think also that he should not be liable to be superseded
without having an opportunity to state his case to the stock
holders. I have, therefore, suggested that auditors should be
elected by, and should report to, stockholders, and that no
auditors other than the retiring auditors should be eligible
for appointment unless due notice should have been given
to the stockholders and the retiring auditors of the intention
to nominate such new auditors. This, as you know, is the
rule under the English law.
I have heard some objection to this suggestion on the
ground that it would operate to the advantage of large firms
of accountants, but I do not believe that it would operate
in any such way. I believe that where auditors are changed
the change is more frequently from a small firm to a large
firm than the reverse, and the suggestion that I have made
seems, therefore, to be calculated to protect the smaller firms
in the retention of the business which they have or may
secure. Certainly nothing would be farther from my wish
than that the provision should operate to deprive small
firms of business.
Since the question has been raised I should like, by way of
conclusion, to say just a few words on the relationship be
tween the large and small firms. I believe the large firm
with numerous offices is a natural result of the form our
industrial and financial development has taken; but I think
there is room and need for both types of organizations, and
that they should be able to practice side by side in amity
and with mutual respect. Many of our ablest practitioners
are connected with relatively small organizations. I recog
nize that the large firms must attract some business from
smaller ones, but I feel very strongly that the larger firms
should do nothing to encourage such transfers, and person
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ally try to discourage them when I have the opportunity.
My firm is altogether unwilling to build up its practice at
the expense of other firms of good standing, large or small.
I believe that the existence of the large firms has created
a greatly increased demand for accounting services, and I
suggest that the smaller firms should regard the indirect
benefits resulting to them from this source as an offset to the
direct losses to which I have referred, and which are nat
urally galling to them. The large firms also provide a train
ing school for young accountants, and in other ways by mere
size they are able to do for the profession things which
smaller organizations could scarcely undertake to do.
I think, however, that the larger firms have a further duty
as a result of their position in the profession. That duty is
to take the lead in correcting defects in practice, and to take
a strong stand with their clients where necessary in order
to maintain sound principles. They can do so more easily
and at the risk of relatively less important sacrifices than
smaller organizations, and the precedents they establish have
more far-reaching effects. The large firms owe it to them
selves and to the profession at large that the precedents they
set should always tend to advance the standing of the pro
fession; should make the work of the large body of thor
oughly conscientious, though less conspicuous, members con
stantly easier; and, above all, should never by laxity or want
of courage create embarrassment for others.
We are sometimes told that some firms can afford to adopt
such policies—the implication being that others less for
tunate cannot. But I believe everyone can afford to do so
because, apart from every other argument in favor of such
policies, experience shows that they pay; not only in our
own, but in other fields we constantly see that fairness, cour
age and honesty do really pay. It is not necessary to at
tribute to the business world of today a higher natural
morality than past generations possessed. The undoubted
improvement in methods can be quite adequately explained
by a constantly increasing recognition of this heartening fact.

IV

PUBLICITY OF ACCOUNTS *
Professor Ripley’s Position

(1926)
The contention of Professor Ripley that stockholders are
entitled to receive reasonably full information regarding the
affairs of a company in which they are interested can scarcely
be questioned.
It is, however, wholly unfortunate that he should in his
enthusiasm for his objective have allowed himself to be be
trayed into inaccuracy and injustice of statement, more es
pecially as his cause is so obviously good. It is because I
fear that the movement toward fuller and fairer informa
tion to stockholders, which has been making great progress
in recent years, may be injured by this unwise advocacy
that I venture to write to you.
Only reference to annual reports is necessary to demon
strate the inaccuracy of such statements as that the Bethle
hem Steel Company does not disclose the method of inven
torying its assets, whether the reference be to fixed assets
or to inventories in the narrower sense of the term. Simi
larly, while Professor Ripley states that the word deprecia
tion might just as well not exist for the National Cash
Register Company under its present management, the only
annual report issued since the recent financing not only
states that depreciation has been provided for but states the
precise amount.
In the same way, references to the prospectuses which one
receives daily will prove the inaccuracy of the statement that
appraisals contained in such prospectuses “are invariably
made up not by experts of independent status, but by those
• A Letter to the New York Times (August 27, 1926).
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whose prospects and emoluments are • directly dependent
upon the existing management.”
Anyone familiar with British practice will be amused or
amazed at the statement that in England questions such as
whether a given item should be charged to capital or income
account “would be referred for decision to an independent
executive committee of the shareholders.”
Moreover, Professor Ripley’s criticisms are neither con
sistent nor judicial. We find him criticizing one company
for a given procedure, while for another which has followed
substantially the same procedure he has nothing but praise.
He is so convinced of the inequities of Dodge Brothers, Inc.,
that he devotes a substantial part of his article to them,
though the one virtue he is prepared to concede is the com
plete frankness of disclosure for which his whole article is a
plea. And, as he himself points out, disclosure is the vital
thing; the form of disclosure is of minor importance.
Professor Ripley seems more concerned to heighten the
color of his picture than to secure either accuracy of detail
or justness of proportion—else why cite as illustrative pf the
attitude of men in executive positions today a foolish ut
terance of more than a quarter of a century ago?
It is impossible here to deal fully with his comments on
corporate accounting, but as an accountant of many years’
standing I may perhaps be permitted to say that his state
ments do not seem to me to indicate a grasp of the prob
lems. For instance, he begins his criticism of no par value
stocks with the statement that under the old par value stock
laws the accounts started from “a bench mark solidly estab
lished—theoretically, at least.” The belief that bench marks
established (however solidly) only in theory were useless, if
not dangerous, was one of the reasons why such practical
men as Francis Lynde Stetson advocated no par value stock
laws.
That these laws have brought new problems and dangers
is realized by no one more fully than by the accountants.
Indeed, the American Institute of Accountants offered $10,
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000 in prizes for the best discussion of the various aspects—
legal, financial, economic and accounting—of the question,
though, unfortunately, the offer elicited no adequate res
sponse. One looks in vain in Professor Ripley’s article for
either sympathetic appreciation of the difficulty of these
problems or constructive suggestions for their solution.
While the subtitle of Professor Ripley’s article is “The
Shareholder’s Right to Adequate Information,” the article
itself is wider in its scope, and the demand for publicity is
urged also in the interests of the speculator, as an adjunct to
industrial efficiency, and on other grounds. This results in
confusion. Everyone will recognize the claim of the in
vestor-stockholder who is in a real sense an owner of the
business. The information best calculated to further his
interests is by no means identical with that desired by the
speculator for a turn who never assumes the full responsi
bility of ownership.
In any consideration of this subject it must be borne in
mind, first, that stock values are usually influenced more by
prospects than by past events; and, second, that, as a dis
tinguished English judge has pointed out, every balance
sheet and income account is necessarily in large measure a
matter of estimate and opinion. If those on the inside in a
corporation desire to profit at the expense of those on the
outside, it is often as easy for them to achieve their purpose
by issuing statements which are adequate and correct accord
ing to every accepted canon as in any other way. No amount
of regulation will make a dishonestly managed company
a satisfactory investment.
I suggest that Professor Ripley’s article presents a picture
of the present situation which is unfair both in detail and
in the large. I believe his perspective is wrong. While
much remains to be done, American stockholders today in
general get fairly adequate information—certainly far more
than the average English stockholder, though Professor Rip
ley compares our practice to the British to our detriment.
Indeed, British practice after years of experience and nu
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merous investigations has come to rely for the protection of
stockholders less upon detailed disclosure than upon the in
tegrity, competence and judgment of the auditors, whose
position has been made stronger in every recent revision of
the Companies Acts.

V
CORPORATE PUBLICITY AND THE AUDITOR *

(1926)
My presence here tonight is a direct result of the publica
tion by Professor Ripley of his article in the September
Atlantic Monthly on the subject of publicity of corporation
accounts.
Soon after that article appeared I wrote to a leading New
York newspaper, drawing attention to certain inaccuracies
in it and suggesting that it did not constitute an altogether
fair presentation of the situation which exists today. Your
committee then invited me to speak at this meeting, and, as
the regular business programme was filled, they suggested
that I might take this occasion to make a few remarks on the
subject of publicity of accounts from the standpoint of di
rectors and auditors.
I do not propose to discuss Professor Ripley’s article in
detail. I dissent from him on some of his facts and on some
of his arguments, and I entirely disagree with his suggestion
as to the rôle which should be played by the Federal Trade
Commission. But I do not wish tonight to discuss these
disagreements; I would rather express my gratification at thesuccess with which he has attracted the attention of the
public to the subject, and consider what we, as accountants,
can do to bring about that improvement in the information
furnished to stockholders and potential stockholders of cor
porations for which his article is a plea. No doubt the pri
mary responsibility for furnishing the stockholders adequate
information rests on the directors, but the auditor ought to
use his best efforts to ensure that the directors publish ac-

* An address at the annual meeting of the American Institute of Account
ants, Atlantic City, New Jersey, September 22, 1926. Cf. The Journal of
Accountancy, Vol. XLII (November, 1926), pp. 321-26.
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counts which conform to the highest established standards,
and ought to be able to advise directors what these standards
are.
I am not sure that auditors have done their full duty in
this respect in the past. To some extent this may have been
due to the limitations of their authority and the rather pre
carious tenure of their appointments. I think the time has
come when auditors should assume larger responsibilities,
and their positions be more clearly defined.
The practice of having independent audits has become so
general that it is no longer necessary to demonstrate its value.
In discussing the subject, therefore, we are now free from
any imputation that we are crying up our own wares.
After undertaking to speak tonight I caused an examina
tion to be made to ascertain what percentage of the com
panies whose stocks were dealt in on a given day on the
New York Stock Exchange had their accounts audited an
nually, and I was myself surprised to find that in the case of
industrial companies the practice had become almost uni
versal; certainly over ninety per cent of all the industrial
companies on the list were audited.
In these circumstances it seems to me that the extension of
the independent audit, accompanied by a clearer definition
of the authority and responsibility of the auditors, is one of
the most valuable remedies to be found for the defects of
which Professor Ripley complains; and I think the Institute
should consider very seriously—and should invite the coopera
tion of other bodies in considering—what are the proper re
sponsibilities of auditors and what can be done to hold them
to such responsibilities and to put them in a position to as
sume all the responsibilities which they ought to assume.
In England, to which country Professor Ripley pointed,
the situation is now fairly clearly defined by statute. I
recognize, of course, that owing to the fact that incorpora
tion is a state question it is not readily possible here to define
audit standards by legislation, but a reference to the English
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statutes may at least be helpful in suggesting the objectives at
which we ought to aim.
Under the English law the independent audit has for
many years been compulsory, the auditors sharing with the
directors the responsibility for the accounts as published.
Auditors have been held liable for damages, and have even
been subjected to criminal prosecution, for participation in
the issue of false accounts. As a necessary corollary they have
been given adequate powers. The language of the English
Companies Act is simple:

Every auditor of a company shall have a right of access
at all times to the books and accounts and vouchers of the
company, and shall be entitled to require from the directors
and officers of the company such information and explana
tion as may be necessary for the performance of the duties
of the auditors.
The following clause provides that the auditors shall make
a report to the shareholders on every balance sheet laid be
fore a shareholders’ meeting during their term of office and
shall state whether or not they have obtained all the infor
mation and explanations they have required and whether
the balance sheet is properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true
and correct view of the state of the company’s affairs. It is
made a misdemeanor to circulate a balance sheet which has
not been audited and which does not bear a copy of the
auditor’s report or a sufficient reference thereto.
Finally, the position of the auditor is strengthened by a
provision that no auditor other than the retiring auditor
shall be eligible for election at an annual meeting of share
holders unless due notice has been given in advance of the
intention to nominate a new auditor, and this notice must
be given to every shareholder and also to the retiring audi
tor. If, therefore, directors are disposed to seek new auditors
because of differences of opinion with the existing auditors,
ample opportunity is afforded for the shareholders to be
come informed of the merits of the case and act accordingly.
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A government committee which recently reviewed the
English company law in the light of developments during
the last twenty years felt able to report:
We are of the opinion that in general the law as it stands
with regard to the powers and duties of auditors is satis
factory.
and also:

Cases in which auditors fall below the level of their duty
are few and far between.

Now, while it is doubtless impracticable to bring about
through legislation in this country a development similar to
that which has proved so satisfactory in England, I see no
reason why this should not be done in a large measure
through the cooperation of such bodies as the leading stock
exchanges, the investment bankers and the banks which
grant credit, and I suggest that the Institute should en
deavor to bring about cooperation to this end. Every mem
ber of the Institute, I believe, appreciates the value to its
membership, to the banks and to the business of the country,
of the cooperation with bankers in regard to credit state
ments which has been developed in recent years. I think
the Institute should seek to extend such cooperation to the
field with which Professor Ripley’s article deals. The New
York Stock Exchange, for instance, could readily bring about
through its listing agreements a situation as respects com
panies listed on its exchange similar to that which exists in
England. In recent years the Stock Exchange has given vari
ous indications that it attaches constantly greater importance
to the work of accountants and it has also shown a disposi
tion to examine sympathetically any proposal which may
tend to protect those who deal in the securities which it lists.
It would, I think, therefore be receptive to a suggestion such
as I have put forward.
As I have said, the accounts of a very large proportion of
the industrial companies whose stocks are listed (and I limit
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for the present the suggestion to industrial companies and
exclude railways, public utilities and other companies which
are under some form of public supervision) are now audited;
the public would welcome a clearer definition of the sig
nificance of such audits and of the responsibilities of audi
tors. Such clearer definition, though it might increase the
accountant’s obligation, would also in the long run be of
advantage to the members of the profession and give them
enhanced importance in the business world, just as it has
done in England.
By similar cooperation, standards might be established
for balance sheets and income accounts which would be wel
comed by many corporation executives and accountants who
desire to be guided by the best practice, if they can be as
sured what that practice is.
As regards balance sheets, the essential points are fairly
well established and observed by the leading companies. A
clear statement of the way in which the capital assets are
valued is one requirement of an adequate disclosure which
is not now generally observed, and there might be some dis
cussion as to the form of statement of surplus. The object
should be so to state the surplus as to indicate what part of
it is legally available for dividend distributions and what
part is not so available; but in the present state of the law,
particularly in the case of companies with stock of no par
value, this is not always easy, and it is impossible to lay
down hard and fast rules.
The practice in regard to the income account is not so
well established, and there is probably room for more dif
ference of opinion as to what would constitute a proper dis
closure. The difficulties arise largely from two facts which
are not at all times adequately appreciated. The first is,
that the significance of an income account is two-fold: it
shows what amounts have been earned and are available for
distribution in dividends if the directors see fit to make
the distribution. The income account of the past is also in
a measure a guide to the expectations of income in the
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future. In many cases this second use is the more important
because it is the reasonable expectation of yield in the future
which determines the value of any property today. This
economic truism, which incidentally makes much of the dis
cussion of the values of capital assets from the standpoint of
reproduction cost irrelevant and meaningless, should never
be lost sight of or obscured.
The second difficulty is that the attribution of income to
particular periods of time is at best in a large measure
arbitrary and based on conventions. While we accountants
recognize this fact more fully the longer we practice, it is
by no means properly appreciated by the general public, and
far too much significance is commonly attached to the figure
of income for a particular year or other period.
Bearing in mind these two points, it seems to me that
fairness in the presentation of an income account is even
more important than fulness. Much of the information that
is contained in more elaborate reports is no doubt interesting
to stockholders and appeals to their sense of proprietorship,
but is of little practical value to them. The vitally impor
tant requirements are that, if the profits of the year include
extraordinary or extraneous profits which render the figures
useless as a guide to earning capacity, these should be clearly
disclosed; and, second, that where the accounts are based on
any conventions other than those commonly accepted, that
fact should also be clearly disclosed. I have in mind such
departures from accepted convention as the valuing of in
ventories on a basis other than cost or market, or the failure
to provide for depreciation or depletion. Probably discus
sion would arise as to whether the amount of depreciation
provided should be shown separately; probably on the whole
it should, although the precise amount set aside for depreci
ation or the amount expended for maintenance is of less
real significance to a stockholder than the statement of a
competent and disinterested person who is familiar with the
details of the business that the amount provided or expended
is in his judgment adequate for the purpose.
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Undoubtedly there would be differences of opinion on
the question whether gross sales should be disclosed. View
ing the matter solely from the standpoint of the stockholder
it seems to me this is a question of expediency. Where the
percentage of gross profit is high, the profit is apt to be re
garded as unreasonable, although in judging its reasonable
ness many factors besides the percentage it bears to sales
ought really to be taken into account. A packing company
which can earn a fair return on its investment with a rela
tively small percentage of profit on a large turnover can very
well afford to publish its sales and to point to the small
percentage of profits with an expression of surprise at its own
moderation. On the other hand, an agricultural-implement
company with a large investment and a relatively small turn
over might be merely inviting ill-informed criticism by a
similar disclosure.
Undoubtedly many of the objections to fuller disclosure
are based on unsubstantial grounds and would be cleared up
by frank discussion. Many corporations, as Professor Ripley
points out, disclose in their listing applications information
which they do not give in their reports to their stockholders.
I have been able to touch only briefly tonight on some
of the important phases of the question of publicity of cor
poration accounts; my main purpose is to urge that coopera
tion between interested bodies should do much to improve
the existing situation and that the American Institute of
Accountants might well take the initiative in an effort to
bring about such cooperation. I think the Institute has
reason to be proud of its accomplishments in the single
decade of its existence, but I believe that there is here a field
in which the Institute could do still greater service and in
doing so could help its members to render a higher service
to the community.

VI

EXTERNAL INFLUENCES AFFECTING ACCOUNTING
PRACTICE *
(1929)
In any attempt to deal with a subject such as has been as
signed to me, the first necessity is to place limitations upon
its scope, and on such an occasion as this the limits must be
narrow. I purpose, therefore, to limit the discussion to the
United States and to the period of one generation, which is
about the time that has elapsed since I began accounting
work in New York. Further, I shall deal only with business
accounting, and not with governmental, institutional, or
professional accounts. In drawing the line between external
and internal influences, I shall consider accounting as a serv
ice department of business; and all increases in its efficiency
as an aid to business 1 shall regard, therefore, as created
by internal influences even though they may be attributable
in part to external causes, such as the growing pressure of
competition in business.
The external influences I propose to consider include
regulation, official or unofficial; new taxation; changes in the
form and distribution of the ownership of business; radical
changes in price levels and the like. I shall not attempt to
deal with any phases of the question exhaustively, but shall
try to draw your attention to some of the less obvious as well
as some of the more important of the effects of the external
influences with which I shall deal. The first is the regula
tion of the accounting of public service corporations which
began to be effective about the beginning of the present cen
tury.
In general the effect of regulation has been to produce

* An address to the International Congress on Accounting, New York,
1929. Cf. Proceedings, pp. 686-97.
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more precise but, I believe, less conservative accounting. To
the economist this is probably an improvement; to the ac
countant and the business man the gain may not be so as
sured. Certainly under regulation there has been a far more
extensive capitalization of minor betterments and of interest
and expense items, and to some extent this influence has ex
tended to other fields of business. I admit that in past times
I have felt that the tendency was regrettable and the regulat
ing bodies to blame. But at least on the second point I have
been compelled to change my view. The tendency seems to
me now to be the inevitable result of our constitution as
interpreted by the Supreme Court.
The position seems to be as follows. Whether a rate struc
ture is compensatory or confiscatory is determined broadly
by a comparison between the earnings it produces and the
sum of three things: (1) the cost of rendering the service,
exclusive of property consumption; (2) a fair allowance for
property consumption; and (3) a fair return on the value
of the property employed in rendering service. The value
of the property employed must be its fair present value, and
the determination thereof seems under the Federal decisions
to be almost if not quite unrelated to the determination of
the other elements in the comparison.
It follows that if a minor betterment is charged off as an
operating cost but remains in existence, it is also included
at present value in the capital sum on which a return is
allowed—the rate base, as it is termed—and the public is thus
charged twice. Obviously the only way in which the regu
lating bodies could protect patrons of the utilities against
such results was by insisting on the exclusion from operat
ing charges of expenditures for property which was still in
existence and therefore included in the rate base. This they
have fairly generally done.
A similar question has arisen in regard to depreciation.
The Supreme Court has held that in fixing the rate base only
“observed depreciation” may be deducted from new value.
While neither the Court nor the engineers have made very
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clear just what observed depreciation is (what, for instance,
is the observed depreciation on an installation of electric
light bulbs?) they have made it clear that it is something
quite different from and less than the depreciation which is
computed on the basis of distributing the new value over the
useful life upon some regular plan—a basis which has been
regarded by many regulating bodies and most accountants
as the proper and prudent one. Upon this point varying
policies have been followed by regulating bodies. Some clas
sifications, such as those for gas and electrical utilities pro
mulgated by the National Association of Railway and Util
ities Commissioners and adopted in the State of New York,
appear to accept the Court’s decisions regarding the deduc
tion to be made from new value for depreciation in fixing the
rate base, and to limit the income charge correspondingly.
The Interstate Commerce Commission has taken the opposite
course and has tried to insist on more liberal depreciation
charges against operations, evidently hoping eventually to se
cure harmony in treatment for the two purposes by a re
versal of the attitude of the courts on the valuation aspect
of the question. In other jurisdictions some utilities at least
have been fairly successful in securing the allowance of de
preciation as an operating charge on a higher scale, and
limiting the deduction therefor in valuation to a lower scale,
to their obviously great advantage.
Before passing from this question, I would like to point
out that the differing degrees of conservatism which un
doubtedly exist are a material consideration when the capi
talization of values on an earning basis for utilities and other
business activities is under consideration. If the ratio of
capital value to earnings of utilities is being compared, for
instance, with that of banks, it is necessary to take into ac
count not only the comparative risks and opportunities in
the two fields, but also the fact that if an accountant were
adjusting the earnings so as to make them fairly comparable
his adjustments of the utility figures (if any) would probably
be downward, while there would probably be substantial up
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ward adjustments of the bank figures. This point is not, I
think, so widely appreciated as it should be.
The tendency towards less conservative accounting which
regulation produced was counteracted in general business,
at least for a time, by the development of the income tax
as a part of the fiscal machinery of the Federal and of many
state governments.
It was surprising to note how immediate was the effect of
even such a small tax as the one per cent corporation excise
tax of 1909 in inducing a conservative view of debatable
questions. And all of us who were practicing in the war
years will be able to recall instances of taxpayers seeking
to anticipate deductions in 1916 in order to reduce their
taxes at the 2% rate then in force. Some of us can also
recall cases in which the Bureau of Internal Revenue insisted
on the postponement of the deduction to the year 1917 or
1918 in which the taxpayers, as it turned out, became subject
to tax at rates of perhaps 50% or more. The high taxes
in the war years put a premium on conservatism which
none could ignore, and in the Act of 1918 the Congress gave
legislative sanction to a reasonable conservatism in the ac
counting for profits as between the taxpayer and the taxing
authority by the provision that net income should be com
puted in accordance with the method of accounting regularly
employed in keeping the books of the taxpayer, unless that
method did not clearly reflect income.
In this provision Congress went further than the English
practice; there the law taxed annual gains and profits without
defining them; and the courts had held that profits were to
be determined in accordance with the usages of business
men, and that estimates must be recognized where it was
usual and practically necessary to make them.
For instance, the House of Lords approved * a method of
computation of the income of a fire insurance company
which involved the use of the customary 40% reserve for
* Clark v. Sun Insurance Office, A. C. (1912), 443.
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unearned premiums, Lord Atkinson saying, in an opinion
which will repay perusal:
It is obvious that the amount of the taxable profits and
gains can only be ascertained by some system of averages, or
estimation, or by some other practical rule of thumb based
upon experience and the facts of different cases.
Congress not only accepted the English view that profits
are to be determined by the methods used by business men
but provided in substance that where those methods vary,
any reasonable and well-established variant employed regu
larly by a taxpayer should be accepted. Ever since the Act
of 1918 was passed, however, minor administrative officials
and some of the courts have whittled away from the im
portance of this provision, and have stopped short of the
English precedent in recognizing common business usage,
instead of going beyond it as the Congress did. They have,
for instance, refused to approve the use of estimates in cir
cumstances in which they are customarily employed in busi
ness and undoubtedly would have been sanctioned by the
English House of Lords. They have attempted to establish
rigid and uniform methods and to set up utterly imprac
ticable standards of exactness in the attribution of income
and expenses to particular periods of time. As a result,
many of them (and many others) have come to believe that
the amount of the profits of a given business for a given year
is a fact almost as precise as the amount of gold in a twentydollar coin.
At first the effect was to increase the tax revenues by deny
ing to taxpayers the benefit of methods of accounting, legiti
mately conservative, which they had employed for many
years for good reasons quite unrelated to taxation. But any
seeming advantage to the Government was short-lived and
the position soon reversed, so that today there are many cor
porations computing their taxable income with the approval
of the authorities on bases far more conservative than those
they employ in their reports to their stockholders. Now it
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may be argued that stockholders who share losses as well as
gains and who may cease to be stockholders any day should
be furnished with reports which represent the management’s
best judgment of the profits fairly attributable to the year for
which the report is made, without exaggeration and without
conscious understatement, and that a more cautious view
may quite properly be taken and should be permitted in re
turns to a government which takes a toll of all profits from
year to year but bears no share of losses, except of course as
such losses may reduce its share of future profits.
These considerations are certainly not those which deter
mined the attitude of the authorities; and personally I am
not convinced that the view is a sound one, but believe that
in the long run the best interests of the stockholders will be
served by making reports to them on a basis at least as con
servative as tax returns. I should perhaps make it clear
that I am here referring only to alternative bases of account
ing, such as are applied for instance to installment sales, and
that my remarks have no reference to deductions allowed by
statute, such as discovery depletion, which have nothing to
do with the determination of actual income.
I come now to a third influence on accounting practice
which is of very great importance, namely, the change in
the form and nature of ownership of business. In 1897 there
were about thirty industrial stocks listed on the New York
Stock Exchange; today there are about a thousand, and the
listings on other Exchanges have increased similarly. The
income tax statistics show that of the total net income re
ported by the 450,000 corporations which make returns, more
than one-third is reported by about 200, and more than onehalf by about 1,000 corporations.
These two sets of figures illustrate two pronounced tend
encies of the last thirty years; one towards mergers and con
solidations, and the other towards diffusion of the ownership
of corporations. The first tendency has manifested itself in
various ways. In the first part of the period combinations
were mainly in the form of what is sometimes called vertical
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integration, that is, the combining of the ownership of enter
prises engaged in the successive stages of the process of con
version of raw materials into final products; later horizontal
integration came into favor and combinations were formed
of businesses which were related to one another mainly by
having similar markets and marketing problems. The chain
system has also developed on a large scale in the last quarter
of a century. In some cases chains have been created
through the opening of new branches by an existing corpora
tion, but in other cases the chains have been constituted
largely by the combination of existing companies. Inci
dentally, as this development threatened the existence of the
wholesalers, we have recently seen some important combina
tions of wholesalers in an effort to maintain their place in
the economic life of the day.
Another influence which has greatly affected accounting
practice has been the general rise in price levels brought
about by the war. This change affected accounting practice
directly in various ways, some of which are being discussed
at this meeting. For instance, it raised the question of the
wisdom of adjusting book values of capital assets to the new
price levels, and also the question of the validity of costs
and profits which were computed on the basis of charging
exhaustion of plant only at cost. It also affected account
ing practice indirectly through the change in the attitude of
investors which it produced. Holders of fixed income se
curities who saw the capital value of their investments sink
because of the increase in interest rates, and the purchasing
power of the yield of their investments lessen because of
higher price levels, began to wonder whether such invest
ments afforded real safety or whether there was not ulti
mately greater safety to be secured by taking a certain com
mercial risk and investing in securities which possessed more
capacity for adaptation to changed conditions. Common
stocks which represented an interest in actual property obvi
ously were more likely to maintain a constant real value in
the face of a major change in the general standard of money
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values of property or in the yield from property than bonds
or preferred stock the principal and yield of which were
fixed in terms of money.
A realization of these truths brought common stocks into
favor among investors and caused a marked enhancement in
their market value. Furthermore, even those who were not
prepared to make such a radical change in their investment
policy as to buy common stock came to demand that fixed
yield securities should carry with them some form of par
ticipation in excess earnings. This has led to the creation
of an extraordinary variety of security issues carrying all
sorts of combinations of preferential rights with participa
tions in excess earnings, options and the like. There is little
doubt that in many cases these securities have been created
with only shadowy ideas in the minds of the creators as to
the nature and extent of the rights conferred thereby. Pres
ent litigation indicates that this was true of issues of noncumulative preferred stock in the past; and, while issues of
that particular type of stock are not now common, stocks
carrying a fixed dividend and an additional interest in the
profits of any year in which more than a certain rate is
earned on senior issues are common and present substan
tially the same question. It seems to me a fundamental
objection to this type of security that it attaches an impor
tance to the earnings of a particular year, which is unde
sirable in view of the extreme difficulty of the problem of
subdivision of profit between years in a complex business.
I will defer discussing the effect on accounting of these
developments until I shall have referred briefly to the last of
the external influences which I propose to consider—my
reason being that that influence operates, in general, in the
same direction as the influences just mentioned.
The trend of modern legislation in regard to corporations,
and particularly the developments following the authoriza
tion of stock without par value, seem to me to be of the
utmost importance to accountants. The events to which I
have already referred led to reincorporation of businesses

68

THE PROFESSION OF ACCOUNTING

on a very large scale and hence to keen competition among
what have been described as the “charter-mongering States”
for the business of the corporation lawyers—a competition in
which the State of Delaware will, I think, be generally ad
mitted to have outbid all its competitors. That state has, for
instance, legalized the favorite device of promoters of getrich-quick schemes of paying dividends to subscribers to
capital stock out of the amounts paid in by them on their
subscriptions; it has obliterated, so far as statutes can do so,
the distinction between capital and income, and has enacted
provisions which seem likely to destroy the significance of
such terms as “dividend.” Other states are not far behind.
In 1849, in one of the earliest of the English dividend
cases, Lord Campbell said:
It is most nefarious conduct for the directors of a joint
stock company, in order to raise the price of shares which
they are to dispose of, to order a fictitious dividend to be
paid out of the capital of the concern. Dividends are sup
posed to be paid out of profits only, and when directors order
a dividend, to any given amount, without expressly saying
so, they impliedly declare to the world that the company
has made profits which justify such a dividend. If no such
profits have been made, and the dividend is to be paid out
of the capital of the concern, a gross fraud has been practised.

To the business man this is still sound sense, but anyone
who indulges in any such inferences from the declaration of
a dividend by a company incorporated in a state such as Del
aware may find himself grossly mistaken and yet without any
grounds for complaint in law. We are sometimes told
that power to pay dividends, even though the paying cor
poration has not earned profits to the amount thereof, should
be granted to meet the cases of successor corporations created
by an exchange of stocks without any substantial change of
interest and the like. It would seem that the ingenuity of
lawyers should be equal to the task of devising provisions
that would meet such cases (if that be really necessary) with
out providing such unlimited opportunities for abuse or de
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stroying the significance of terms of established usage which
the public believes it understands.
Our foreign visitors may not be aware that under some
of our state laws stock which has no par value has a “stated
value.” It is common practice to fix this stated value at a low
figure; companies commence business with a small stated
value of capital stock and a relatively large excess of the
value of net assets paid in over that stated value. In the
general affairs of the company the stated value is ignored; it
possesses only a technical legal significance.
It is not surprising that this lack of significance should
tend to extend to the valuation at which capital assets are
entered on the books—one curious result may be noted. If
property acquired for stock having no par value is entered on
the books at a nominal or low value, the annual charge for
the exhaustion of this property is correspondingly reduced
and the book profits to that extent increased. If then the
value of a property or business is to be measured mainly by
its earning capacity, the paradoxical result is reached that the
lower the value at which the property of a business is re
corded on the books the greater becomes the apparent value
of the business.
It is true that numerous states have passed so-called blue
sky laws designed for the protection of investors but, while
some of these have had useful influence, they have not, as a
whole, proved particularly effective. There is, I believe,
more ground for hope in the activities of private organiza
tions of which the most powerful is, no doubt, the New
York Stock Exchange. Those who have followed the devel
opments of the Exchange’s policy in relation to the listing of
securities in recent years will, I think, agree as to the value
of its influence in promoting sound financial practices among
corporations. That influence has been the greater because
the Exchange has exercised its great powers with moderation
and at the same time with courage. All accountants should
lend their full support to such policies as that of the Ex
change and other bodies which are aiming to bring about
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the adoption and maintenance of sound business standards
through non-governmental regulation. If such efforts fail,
we shall be likely to see rigid governmental regulation which,
though it may curb undesirable practices, will also seriously
hamper legitimate business.
Another phase of corporate development needing consider
ation at this time is the change in the relation of stock
holders to the business, brought about by the development of
non-voting stocks and the elimination of pre-emptive rights
of stockholders to acquire new issues of stock. These two
developments have done much to strengthen the position of
the management of corporations. Once a group comes into
control of a corporation it is a difficult task to dislodge it, and,
if new capital is needed, the group can determine whether it
shall be secured from old stockholders or from new sources.
The stockholders’ meetings which may be necessary will
probably be formal affairs unless there is not only strong
opposition but an opposition prepared to spend large sums
of money to defeat the proposal to which it is opposed. So
long as a management exercises its powers with discretion and
shows even a moderate competence, it usually has little diffi
culty in maintaining its position.
It will be clear, I hope, that the tendencies I have men
tioned affect accounting and accountants in an important
way. The allocation of profits to particular years has be
come both more important and more difficult as a result
thereof. The simple rule of conservatism, under which
profits were never anticipated but probable or even potential
losses were provided for, was satisfactory as long as the inter
ests of only long-time stockholders had to be considered. It
is not equally satisfactory to a management that feels that it
may have occasion to trade with other companies on the
basis of comparative earnings, and it is thought by some to
be unfair to stockholders who may desire or be compelled
to realize their holdings.
The task of those responsible for the financial reports of
corporations has become more difficult and more delicate

EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

71

and, since the accountants for the corporations should be
their most competent and disinterested advisers, the oppor
tunity of the accountants, both corporation accountants and
practicing accountants, is enlarged. The service of the pub
lic accountant may take one of two forms; the first, and I
trust the most common form (in which he and the corpora
tion accountant should be found in cooperation), should be
in giving sound advice to those responsible for the reporting
and financial policies of the corporations and in dissuading
them from any accounting policy which might be unjust
to any group of persons having a legitimate interest therein;
the second, where the first fails, lies in protecting the inter
ests of those who may be adversely affected by action of the
management by insisting on a proper disclosure of what has
been done either in the accounts or in the auditors’ certifi
cate.
I would like, however, to emphasize that even when the
accountant has done his best to attain accuracy, investors
must still recognize the limitations on the significance of
even the best of accounts, and the shorter the period covered
the more pronounced usually are these limitations. Accounts
are essentially historical reqords and, as is true of history in
general, correct conclusions cannot be reached by a hurried
survey of temporary conditions, but only by a longer retro
spect and a careful distinction between permanent tendencies
and transitory influences. I cannot help feeling that today
undue importance is frequently attached to the earnings of
a single year or even a single quarter.
Modern developments have tended also to reduce the im
portance of the balance sheet, and they seem to me to neces
sitate reconsideration of the methods of preparation of cor
porate reports.
As business grows more complex it becomes more and
more impracticable to present in a single picture a represen
tation of the position of any important corporation which
will be accurate in detail and perspective in all its parts, and
will tell an intelligible story to the average investor. A series
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of pictures, rather than a single one, is needed—and in such a
series the balance sheet will perhaps be of least significance
to any but the technical experts who will find in it a check
on other parts of the series.
Corporations have generally forsaken the old debit and
credit account form of income statement for the narrative
form which is more intelligible to the layman though less
elegant in the eyes of the technician. They need to do some
thing of the same kind for the balance sheet which is, even
more than the old income account, a creation of technique.
It should be made clearer to the general public that only
in part is a balance sheet in the nature of an instantaneous
picture and that in part it is merely historical and in part
purely conventional. It is beyond the scope of this paper
to explain why this should be so, but even if it must re
main so, the fact should be more generally known and the
historical, conventional and photographic parts more clearly
identified.
An annual report which contains a series of separate state
ments including: (1) a well-arranged income and surplus ac
count; (2) a classified statement of quick assets and liabili
ties; (3) summaries of capital obligations and capital assets;
and (4) a lucid statement of resources which have become
available during the year, and the disposition thereof, will
not gain greatly by the addition of a balance sheet in which
all assets and liabilities are brought together, though custom
and a sense of completeness may call for its inclusion.
Finally, the legal position has become so unsatisfactory
that accountants guided by sound principles and the best
opinion of the day must assume a large responsibility in ap
proving or. disapproving practices admittedly not illegal.
Thus, as I see the position, the opportunity for us to render
service of a highly professional and valuable character is
greater today than ever before, and I trust we shall prove
equal to the opportunity offered us.

VII
EFFECT OF INDUSTRIAL MERGERS ON ACCOUNTING
PRACTICE *

(1929)

is one tendency in modern corporation development
that I would like to speak on especially—that is the tendency
towards mergers and consolidations throughout the country.
I suppose it is an economic development that can hardly
be arrested, but it brings in its train a great many unfortu
nate consequences, as I suppose is true of all important eco
nomic changes.
I cannot view, without regret, the elimination of so many
independent business men throughout the country or their
being forced to choose between accepting the position of
salaried employees and being forced out of business alto
gether, though this is an inevitable incident of this develop
ment.
Another thing that I view with regret is the displacement
of local auditors of these smaller concerns and their replace
ment by firms which enjoy a national reputation. The rela
tions between the national firms and the local firms have al
ways seemed to me a question of very real importance to the
profession. I have never regarded their positions as at all
antagonistic. In the past, undoubtedly a certain amount of
work of the local accountants has passed in the natural de
velopment of business to the national firms, but I have felt
that that was far more than compensated for by the general
development of accounting throughout the country, which
could not have been accomplished without the national firms,
and I still feel that the national firms ought to be an asset to
the local firms.

There

* Excerpt from an address delivered at the New England regional meeting
of the American Institute of Accountants held at Boston, May 6th, 1929.
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I do not think that the national firms any more than the
local firms can prevent the operation of an economic trend
such as I have referred to. I know—speaking for my own
firm—we have tried at times to do it but unsuccessfully. We
have never wished to grow at the expense of the local ac
countants. We have encouraged our clients more than
once to retain the local accountants where we felt there was
reason to believe that the local accountant could render all
the service that was required; but I know that, nevertheless,
we and other national firms must have taken a very consider
able business from local accounting firms and that the loss
of that business to the local accounting firms has been far
more important to them than its gain has been to us. Now,
what can we do to compensate? The one thing above all
that I think every national firm should do is to maintain
standards commensurate with its position; I fear that there
are some national firms that do not, either in the ethics of
getting business or in the ethics of doing business. I think
it is the duty of the big firms to fight the battles for the
whole profession. They can do it at much less relative
cost. In order to fight these battles of principle, one has to
be prepared to lose connections which carry remunerative
fees or prestige that is valuable in itself. If the small firm
loses an important audit, it means a substantial share of its
total business; a big firm can lose a number without really
feeling it. And that is why I feel that the first and foremost
duty of the national firms is to take the strongest possible
stand on questions of ethics and on questions of principle,
and in both these fields to fight the battle of the whole profes
sion. Now, I don’t think that we are all doing it, but I think
we ought to do it, and I am glad of an opportunity to express
myself very plainly on the subject.
I sympathize very heartily with the local firms, which are
doing good work in a professional spirit but complain that
the national firms are not always maintaining the standards
of either accounting principles or ethics that they advocate
and seek to impose on the profession as a whole.
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There is no doubt that there is room in the profession for
both national firms and local firms, and I don’t think if
the two work together properly that anything essentially
antagonistic in their position can develop. That it is pos
sible to make a great success without having a national or
ganization is obvious.

VIII
THE ROYAL MAIL (KYLSANT) CASE *
A LETTER TO H. L. H. HILL, ESQ., PRESIDENT OF THE INSTITUTE
OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES

(1931)
My dear Mr. Hill:

As a result of the Royal Mail case the Institute is obviously
face to face with one of the greatest problems and, as I see it,
one of the greatest opportunities presented to it in the course
of its existence.
For many years I have taken an active interest in the ques
tion of disclosure of financial information to shareholders,
and at the moment I am chairman of a committee of the
American Institute, appointed to cooperate with the New
York and other stock exchanges in this field. This may serve
as my excuse for laying before you, as President of the Insti
tute, the views herein expressed. If I put them forward
merely as my own views, it is because I have had no
opportunity to discuss them with others who might be in
terested and entitled to address you; but they are the result
of many discussions and of contributions from many and
varied sources.
I do not feel any embarrassment in discussing the question
by reason of the fact that one of my partners was involved in
the Royal Mail case, because the view taken here (and, as I
judge, in London) has, I think, generally been that upon the
accounts charges in that case it was a system, rather than indi
viduals, that was on trial; and I think the general conclusion
has been that though the individuals were clearly entitled to
acquittal, the system must be condemned and must be
changed.
• Rex v. Kylsant (1931).
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It has come as a surprise to many people here to find that
the practice in respect to disclosure was so much better than
in England. Many, both inside and outside the accounting
profession, had thought that by long and laborious effort
they were gradually raising the standard to a point which had
been reached in London many years ago; and to find the case
entirely otherwise has come as a distinct shock to them.
I think opinion here would generally agree with the view
expressed in the evidence submitted on behalf of the Insti
tute before the Greene Committee in 1925, that the form and
content of commercial accounts are matters that cannot be
satisfactorily dealt with by legislation. There are, however,
it would seem, two corollaries to this proposition: the first,
that neither directors nor auditors can properly regard legal
requirements as setting the measure of their obligation to
shareholders; the second, that it is incumbent on all the
parties interested to work continuously to improve standards,
and by precept and example to endeavor to secure a reason
able degree of publicity in corporate accounts.
If I might offer criticisms of the evidence to which I have
referred, my first would be that it failed to emphasize these
corollaries. For instance, the Institute, in my opinion, can
not properly take the position (which it took in its evidence)
that the requirements for disclosure should not be enlarged
by law, unless it is prepared to do everything it can to insure
that auditors shall use their power and influence to secure a
reasonable degree of disclosure; it cannot properly oppose
enlargement of the rights of shareholders' to inspect books
unless it can say that it is improper practice for any of its
members to certify accounts which do not constitute a rea
sonably adequate and fair disclosure; and it cannot properly
oppose disclosure in regard to secret reserves unless the code
of practice which it enforces, or at least enjoins on its mem
bers, calls for adequate disclosure when such reserves are
established or drawn upon. The case is the stronger where
the shares of a company are listed on the Stock Exchange
and the public thus invited to buy and sell them.
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I cannot help thinking that it is a reproach to all con
cerned in the City—the Stock Exchange, the banks, the ac
countants, the solicitors, and the directors of large commer
cial companies—that the standards of disclosure by public
companies should have remained or become so low, while the
distribution of shareholdings has been becoming so much
wider. I recognize that such powerful bodies as the Stock
Exchange and the big banks have been inert, and that this
has made the task of improving standards more difficult. But
it seems to me that this merely made the opportunity of the
Institute the greater; and that with the stronger position
given auditors under the Act of 1908, and with the enhanced
prestige which accountants have enjoyed, especially since the
war, the profession could have accomplished most of what
was needed without other aid.
Undoubtedly the American point of view on these ques
tions has been greatly influenced by the extent of the effort
which has been made to convert shares of industrial and
other companies into a more liquid form of asset. Obviously,
if such shares are to be regarded as a liquid asset and freely
traded in, there must be available at all times reliable in
formation upon which estimates of value may be predicated.
Whatever may be the cause, there is no doubt that in the last
twenty years there has been an enormous improvement in the
standards of disclosure here. That improvement has been
brought about by the cooperation of a number of bodies; the
banks through their credit departments and the Stock Ex
change through its listing committee have played a very im
portant part, but the accounting profession has, I believe,
also contributed in a very substantial way to the results which
have been achieved.
My second criticism of the Institute’s evidence would be of
the statement that to attempt to prescribe that there should
be a profit and loss account published as well as a balance
sheet “is considered likely to do more harm than good.”
It is, I think, generally recognized that earning capacity is
the most important single test of value; and if any accounts
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are to be given to shareholders, it is difficult to see why the
profit and loss account is not at least equally as important
as the balance sheet.
Since this evidence was given, Parliament has, of course,
reached a conclusion opposed to that reached by the Insti
tute, and a profit and loss account is now required by statute.
The question at present, therefore, is what is the object of
the profit and loss account, and how can that object be best
served without detriment to other interests of the share
holders.
The answer to the first part of the question is, I suggest,
that the profit and loss account is valuable to shareholders
principally for the light it throws on the efficiency of the
management and on the earning capacity of the company
under the conditions existing during the period to which it
relates, and the form and content of the account should be
determined with the purpose of making it as effective as
possible for these uses. It is not to be expected that the
account will afford complete illumination on either point;
but present shareholders in respect of the first, and both
present and potential shareholders in respect of the second
point, are entitled to demand that it shall afford them all the
light that can properly be given, and above all, that it shall
not mislead them.
It is easy to cite difficulties which may be encountered in
formulating accounts; but experience shows that in the great
majority of cases the issues are simple, and the auditor has
no real difficulty in determining whether accounts submitted
to him for approval are adequate or inadequate, helpful to
shareholders or misleading; and every auditor should as a
matter of professional ethics, not of law, refuse to recognize
law or custom as justification for signing them if he regards
them as either inadequate or calculated to give rise to infer
ences which are not warranted by the facts. If a new manage
ment draws on secret reserves created by conservative pred
ecessors, to eke out the meager results of its own inefficiency,
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without disclosing the fact to the shareholders, can there be
any doubt that the auditor has a moral duty to reveal it?
In saying this, I am in no wise oblivious of the impossibil
ity of establishing fixed standards of accounting, nor of the
necessity of leaving the control of company matters generally
in the hands of directors. Within the limits of a reasonable
difference of opinion an auditor may properly subordinate
his own judgment to that of directors, and unless the point
is of crucial importance he can quite properly refrain from
telling the stockholders of that difference of opinion. Nor
have I any sympathy with the view that the so-called “man
in the street,” supposedly of subnormal intelligence, should
set the standards of disclosure. If the accounts are clear
enough to enlighten a normally competent analyst, that is
sufficient; he can interpret to the less intelligent, if necessary.
It must be borne in mind that when a reputable company
publishes and a reputable auditor accepts accounts which
are lacking in fairness or frankness, the value of all accounts
and of all audits is impaired. If some accounts bearing emi
nent names are known to be unreliable as indices of value or
of the results of operations, the public has no means of know
ing which are and which are not reliable.
Before concluding, I should like to say a word on the diffi
cult question of wholly owned subsidiaries. The present
English law on the subject seems scarcely worth the paper
on which it is written. I suggest that the Institute should
tackle seriously this vexed question. Accounts which ignore
the operations of subsidiaries except the payment of divi
dends are inadequate. How the facts regarding such opera
tions should be disclosed is a matter of judgment, and I
should not advocate insistence by the Institute on any partic
ular method. But at least it can and should insist that if
the operations of the subsidiaries are not fairly reflected in
the dividends received by the parent, some proper reflection
must be given if the auditor is to certify that the accounts
of the parent company show the true position of its affairs.
The Institute and the leading firms have an opportunity
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at the present time by a display of courage and independence
to effect a great reform and are assured of public support in
doing so, and I hope they will make the most of the oppor
tunity.
Yours very truly,
George O. May.
August 21, 1931.

IX
INFLUENCE OF THE DEPRESSION ON THE PRACTICE
OF ACCOUNTANCY *

(1932)
I am not one who believes that any benefit can be derived
from the mere contemplation of misfortune, and I should
not, therefore, undertake to address you today were it a ques
tion merely of dwelling on the unfortunate immediate effects
on the profession of the unparalleled depression through
which we have been passing. I deeply regret the loss of em
ployment by many worthy members of our profession and
the difficulties which some of our practitioners have expe
rienced; but I should not feel that the depression would be
worth our study unless we could derive either some legiti
mate satisfaction or some instruction, or both, from the
process.
I think we can derive satisfaction from the abundant evi
dence of the importance of our profession which the depres
sion has elicited. The numerous defalcations which have
unfortunately but naturally resulted from it have brought
home the importance of detailed audits by outside auditors
in the case of those companies which are not of sufficient
magnitude to justify the maintenance of an adequate system
of internal check. Other incidents have demonstrated the
importance of external audits in the case of companies at
the other extreme of the range: namely, those companies
which in their magnitude and importance have sometimes
been deemed to be above the need of auditing. I think that
in both fields we can look forward confidently to a perma
nent growth in the work of the profession as the result of
* An address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Institute
of Accountants, Kansas City, Missouri, October 18, 1932. Cf. The Journal
of Accountancy (November, 1932), Vol. LIV, pp. 336-50.
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this temporary depression and that the outlook is favorable
to those carrying on efficiently either large practices or small.
It is, however, the lessons which we can learn from the
depression that I propose particularly to consider.
It is in times of stress that defects and inadequacies of a
structure become most readily apparent; and it has seemed
to me that it would be worth while to consider what defects
in the economic structure the present depression has revealed,
and how far accountants have any responsibility therefor or
any opportunity to bring about improvement in the future.
Obviously, the depression is not the resultant of any single
cause but of a multiplicity of causes. Of the many to which
it has been partly attributed, most lie in fields with which
the accountant as such is not concerned, and this group in
cludes those in regard to which controversy has been the
keenest—such as the relation to the depression of the develop
ment of intense post-war nationalism, tariffs, war debts, and
the gold standard. Some, however, seem to me to relate to
phases of our economic life with which the accountant has
a very direct concern.
First of all, I propose to discuss a phase of the question
with which, as Chairman of your Committee on Cooperation
with. Stock Exchanges, I have been much concerned in recent
months. No one doubts that one of the major contributing
causes to the depression was the enormous volume and ex
travagantly high prices which characterized the dealings in
corporate stocks in the period prior to the collapse of 1929.
An outstanding characteristic of that movement was the new
emphasis laid on earning capacity as the measure of value
of such securities; and, as frequently happens when new
recognition is given to an old truth, we have seen during
periods of inflation and deflation this truth applied in a most
reckless and ill-advised manner, not only by investors, but
by many who have undertaken to advise others. Such people
were no doubt right when they argued that earning capacity
was usually the main criterion of value. They may have
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been right in their second proposition, that the fair value
of securities of a given type was a multiple—ten, or fifteen,
or twenty—of the earning capacity attached to the security.
They were, however, hopelessly wrong when they predicated
their calculations on the assumption that the earning capacity
was fairly measured by the past or prospective earnings for
a comparatively short period, without any adequate knowl
edge of the way in which the figures of earnings employed
in their calculations were derived.
Nothing has astonished me more in conversations with
men fairly well versed in financial matters than their failure
to appreciate the importance of methods of accounting in
relation to corporate earnings and to capital values predi
cated on earnings. We accountants know how varied are the
methods commonly and legitimately employed, how great
the effect of a difference of methods on the earnings of a par
ticular short period may be, and how erroneous may be con
clusions as to capital value based on such earnings. An illus
tration may make clearer the point I have in mind.
Let me take a simple case of one of the unemployed who
joined the apple-selling rush in the winter of 1931. He
started on the first day believing that he could sell two crates
of apples, which cost him $2.00 each, at a profit of more
than one hundred per cent. At the end of the first day he
found that he had sold the contents of one and collected
$5.00. The wholesale price of apples remained unchanged
and it was quite clear to him, and it must be to everyone
else, that he had made a profit of $3.00.
The second day, however, complications arose. As a re
sult of the rush, the wholesale price of apples had risen to
$2.25 a crate, and at that price he bought one crate. He was
also able to increase his price slightly, and the sale of one
crate produced $5.50. Apples were still quoted wholesale at
$2.25 when he ended his day’s work, and the question arose
in his mind whether his profit for the day was $3.25 or $3.50.
Looking at the matter one way, he had $3.25 more cash
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than he had at the beginning of the day, and he had
one crate of apples on hand just as he had at the beginning.
Looking at it another way, the crate of apples that he had
bought that day had cost him $2.25 and was still worth that
sum, and what he had sold was the crate of apples bought
the previous day at $2.00; and as he had realized $5.50, he
had made a profit of $3.50.
The third day, the public demand for apples began to de
cline. He was able to buy another crate of apples for $2.00,
and the sale of one crate produced only $4.50. To make
matters worse, he found that by the end of the day the whole
sale price of apples had fallen to $1.75. He was sorely
puzzled to determine how much profit he had made that
day. He still had a crate of apples, as he had had in the
morning, and he had $2.50 more cash, so that from this
standpoint his profit was $2.50. If, however, he took the
view that what he had on hand was the crate he had bought
that day, and that what he had sold was the crate which had
cost $2.25 the previous day, his profit was only $2.25. Look
ing at it in a third way he perceived that at the close of the
previous day he had had a crate of apples that had cost him
and was worth $2.25; at the end of that day he had a crate
of apples which was worth $1.75 and $2.50 in cash, a total
of $4.25, so that from this standpoint his gain for the day
was only $2.00.
He concluded that, anyhow, the business was an unsatisfac
tory one, and decided to buy no more apples; and on the
fourth day he was able to sell the contents of the crate he
had on hand for $4.00.
Looking back over the experience of the four days, it was
clear that he had bought four crates of apples at a total
cost of $8.25 and had sold the contents for a total of $19.00,
and thus had made a total profit of $10.75. It was apparent,
however, that the profit from day to day varied according
to the way in which the stock he carried over from day to day
was treated. The only day in which the amount of profit was
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clear was the first day. The following table shows the distri
bution of profits between days on the different theories,
which I may now describe in the terms in which they are
commonly described by accountants, to whom all three
methods are familiar:
On the basis of stating the in
ventory at latest cost, the
profit was ...........................
On the basis of inventorying at
cost or market, whichever was
lower ..................................
On the basic stock method (that
is, valuing stock at a uniform
price) ..................................

First
day

Second
day

Third
day

Fourth
day

Total

$3.00

$3.50

$2.25

$2.00

$10.75

3.00

3.50

2.00

2.25

10.75

3.00

3.25

2.50

2.00

10.75

If next we assume three men, A, B, and C, having exactly
the same experience but using the three different inventory
methods, respectively, in the order above named and report
ing their profits accordingly—then if we were to appraise the
value of the respective businesses by multiplying the profits
shown in, say, the second period, by a uniform multiple, we
should reach the conclusion that the businesses of A and B
were worth substantially more than that of C; while if we
made the calculations a day later and used the third period as
our basis, we should conclude that C’s business was by far the
most valuable of the three.
Of course, on the illustrative case assumed the conclusion
is fantastically absurd; but enlarge the scale of the illustration
in volume, time and complexity, so that it will deal with
years and millions of dollars instead of days and dollars, and
you have exactly the situation that has been presented in the
period that has elapsed between the close of the last depres
sion in 1921 and the present time.
Nor do the three methods of computing profits for the
different periods exhaust the variations in commercial prac
tices. Some corporations, for instance, would treat the re
duction of inventory from cost to market value as a charge to
surplus, and show:
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Net income
First day...................................................... $ 3.00
Second day..................................................
3.50
Third day....................................................
2.25
Fourth day..................................................
2.25
$11.00
Less—Charge to surplus
Third day....................................................
25

$10.75*
Now investors, and even some who undertake to advise
investors, are apt to give the same weight to profits of com
panies in the same business without knowing whether the
profits to which their calculations are applied have been
computed on the same basis or how great the effect of a
difference in method might be. And as most of you prob
ably know, such computations have frequently been made
on the basis of profits for a single year if not for a shorter
period. I remember, for instance, the case of a banking house
acquiring the business of a large corporation for the purpose
of resale to the public on an agreed basis measured by the
earnings of a past year, without any specification of the way
in which the earnings had been or were to be determined
except that it was to be in accordance with good accounting
practice; and as this paper was being written I happened
to see a publication of a firm of investment advisors contain
ing this language: “When the statement is made that the
majority of common stocks are overvalued at current levels,
it is meant that they are selling at higher values than are
justified by a six to nine months’ improvement in earning
power at the best rate foreseeable.”
By comparing the figures in the table I have already given,
* Those desiring to pursue the question further may be interested to com
pare the annual reports for 1931 of the National Lead Company, the Good
year Tire & Rubber Company and the American Smelting and Refining Co.
Such a comparison affords much food for thought, and I was very much in
terested, therefore, to see a question in a recent examination paper on ac
counting principles of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administra
tion, calling for a discussion of the difference of method between the Good
year and National Lead companies,
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you will notice that the method of valuation at cost or
market, whichever is lower (which is by far the most com
monly employed of all methods), results in showing larger
profits in a period of rising wholesale and retail prices and
lower profits in a period of declining prices than the basic
stock method. For this reason, it has been urged that the
basic stock method is really a safer and saner way of measur
ing earnings than the cost or market basis. . I think it must
be admitted that the cost or market basis is designed prima
rily to afford a sound balance sheet value, and that some
change of method, or some change in the form of presenta
tion of results, may be called for at this time, when the in
come account is becoming recognized as potentially, at least,
more significant than the balance sheet. But without pass
ing on this minor question, I think we can agree on the
major point that, particularly in times of changing prices, it
is very important that those who undertake to appraise capi
tal values on the basis of current earnings should know just
how the earnings are computed.
I chose my illustration from the field of inventory valua
tion, but this is by no means the only part of corporate ac
counting in respect of which legitimate methods vary. Meth
ods of treatment of plant and equipment, for instance, vary
even more widely. I noticed recently a statement by an
economist that the heavy investment in capital equipment
characteristic of the present age tended to make the process
of readjustment in a period of falling prices more painful
and prolonged than it would otherwise be.* Certainly, this
characteristic of heavy capital investment gives rise to the
most difficult problems of modern accounting—problems
which cannot be solved by any precise mathematical or logi
cal processes but require foresight and judgment in their
handling if even measurably accurate solutions are to be
reached.
The questions what expenditures ought to be capitalized
* Frederick C. Mills, Economic Tendencies in the United States; Aspects
of Pre-War and Post-War Changes (1931).

INFLUENCE OF THE DEPRESSION

89

and when expenditures so capitalized ought to be charged
off are not easy to answer, and experience shows that corpora
tions adopt an infinite variety of methods in dealing with
them. At the one extreme are the methods prescribed by
many public-service commissions, according to which all ad
ditions and improvements are capitalized and units of prop
erty are charged off only as they are actually retired or are
about to be retired, when the charge may be made against
either operating expenses or surplus. At the other extreme
is the method formerly employed by the General Electric
Company, by which all capital expenditures are charged off
against income in the year in which they are incurred, no
charge being made, naturally, for depreciation of previously
existing plant. Between these extremes the accounts of cor
porations reflect every gradation from over-liberality to over
conservatism in attributing charges to capital and amortiz
ing them through depreciation charges or otherwise. Here,
again, anyone appraising the stock of a corporation on the
basis of its earnings should know what methods of account
ing have been followed.
It may be suggested that the accountant who audits the
accounts of a corporation and satisfies himself that they are
presented on a fair basis has no further responsibility to the
individual investor or analyst who may draw unwarranted
inferences from the accounts. That is, no doubt, quite true;
but if the profession is to render the fullest possible service,
surely it must keep in touch with the trend of economic
developments and try to meet the legitimate demands that
grow out of such developments.
Now, one of the major economic developments of recent
years has been the change in the nature and status of cor
porate securities. This change has been brought about by
two tendencies in the development of corporations: first, the
tendency to consolidate businesses into large units and, sec
ondly, the ever-widening diffusion of security holdings. The
great social significance of these tendencies was recognized
some years ago by the Social Science Research Council, and
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that body instituted a study which resulted in the publica
tion of a work bearing the title, The Modern Corporation
and Private Property.* From this work it appears that
roughly 40% of the business wealth of the country (other
than banking) is controlled by the two hundred largest cor
porations. It also appears that the control of the two hun
dred corporations in turn is roughly as follows:
Management control. . .
Legal device..................
Minority control............
Majority ownership.. ..
Private ownership........
In hands of receiver.. ..

By number By wealth
44%
58%
21%
22%
23%
14%
2%
5%
6%
4%
negligible
1%
100%
100%

It was impracticable to carry the study further to cover
smaller, but still large corporations, but the analysis shows
clearly how very far the separation between beneficial owner
ship and control of corporate property has already proceeded,
and doubtless the process will continue in the future.
Concurrently, there has been a constant attempt to make
corporate stocks, which in essence are capital assets, more and
more into a liquid security, readily marketable and suitable
as collateral for demand or short-time obligations. The
three tendencies combined seem to me to have created a legit
imate basis for the demand for full and more enlighten
ing information in regard to the operation of the larger
companies whose securities are widely distributed and sub
ject to continuous market dealings. If market values are to
be fairly appraised, information throwing light on the earn
ing capacity is of the first importance. The reports issued
by such corporations must not be regarded as having only
historical interest—it must be recognized that their principal
value lies in enabling thousands or tens of thousands of
stockholders to deal intelligently with their investments in
* A. A. Berle, Jr., and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property.

INFLUENCE OF THE DEPRESSION

91

corporations and potential investors to form reasonably in
formed opinions on the attractiveness of the stocks of corpo
rations at the prices at which they are available. I think
the accountant should take cognizance of this situation and
do his part toward securing the fulfillment of the require
ments to which it gives rise, and I think his part can be made
a very important one.
To my mind, the first essential is to bring about a better
understanding by investors of what accounts are of should be,
and what they are not and cannot be. Investors should be
brought to realize that the value and significance of corporate
accounts depend partly on the methods of accounting em
ployed by the corporation and partly on the degree of wis
dom and honesty displayed in applying those methods. And
here it is important to note that the use of the most conserva
tive method may, for a short period, result in an overstate
ment of earnings. If, for instance, during a year of depres
sion, a corporation which capitalizes nothing and charges no
depreciation, suspends all construction work, the results for
that year will be presented in an unduly favorable light, al
though the accumulated surplus may still be conservatively
stated.
In the second place, it seems to me highly desirable that
the reports and accounts of corporations should be made
more fully explanatory, so that investors and others inter
ested will know generally what methods of accounting have
been followed and be in a position to appraise the value of
the resulting figures accordingly. This development seems
to me infinitely preferable to the alternative which at once
suggests itself of uniform methods imposed by external au
thority. I think, also, that in the formulation of methods
of accounting the preeminent importance of earning capac
ity should be recognized and the consequent importance of
furnishing to stockholders and investors an income account
which will give as fair an indication of the earning capacity
of the business during the period to which it relates as can be
given.
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I think it only fair to add that, from a fairly wide interna
tional experience, I believe information is more fairly given
in respect of corporate affairs in this country than in per
haps any other important commercial country. This, how
ever, ought to be so, for the simple reason that the three
tendencies to which I have referred (those towards concen
tration into larger units, diffusion of shareholdings, and the
creation of a status of liquidity for corporate stocks) have
proceeded much further in this country than elsewhere.
Your Committee on Cooperation with Stock Exchanges, of
which I am chairman, has been much impressed with the de
termination of the New York Stock Exchange to exercise
its influence more than in the past in the direction which I
have indicated and with the possibilities of helpful coopera
tion on the part of accountants. This committee during the
past year has given much consideration to the subject, and
the views which I am expressing today are in a large measure
the result of that consideration.
It is quite true that the public accountant has no power to
initiate improvements in corporate methods of accounting or
reporting, nor to exercise pressure to bring them about. The
initiative lies theoretically with the shareholders; practically,
with the directors or officers of corporations. The power to
exercise pressure resides mainly in those bodies which afford
a market in which dealings mainly take place. But the ac
countant who has earned the confidence of his clients can, by
influencing them, contribute greatly to the success of the
movement. Most corporation executives will, I believe, be
found willing to afford reasonable information to their share
holders if the question is placed fairly before them.
I venture, therefore, to express the hope that accountants
in their audit practice and in their conferences with corpo
rate officers regarding the form and content of annual ac
counts will bear constantly in mind the desirability of indi
cating clearly on what bases assets and liabilities are stated
and results computed; the growing relative importance of the
income account as compared with the balance sheet; and the
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fact that the value of the income account depends on its be
ing a fair indication of the earning capacity of the business
under the conditions existing during the year to which it re
lates as determined by a fair and consistent application of ac
ceptable methods of accounting.
There are one or two other problems in accounting which
have assumed much greater importance as a result of the de
pression, and with which I should like to deal briefly. One
is the acquisition by corporations of their own capital stock.
It would be out of place to discuss the broad question
whether corporations should enjoy the unrestricted right to
acquire their own capital stock, though accountants who
have seen the unfortunate consequences that flowed from
some such acquisitions in the latter part of 1929 and in 1930,
and the abuses of the right in certain cases, cannot fail to
recognize that there is a case for some restriction. I propose
to deal only with the treatment in accounts of purchases
actually made.
I- have never been able to agree with the view that a cor
poration’s own stock is ordinarily an asset of the corpora
tion, though I have been willing to recognize the practical
convenience of treating it as such where stock is acquired as
a part of a related series of transactions which include its
resale in the immediate future. Certainly, if it is to be
classified as an asset it should be excluded from current as
sets (unless under contract for early realization) and should
be separately disclosed. Even if such stock may be shown
as an asset, it is incorrect, in my view, to include dividends
thereon in the income of the corporation.
It is even more important that accountants should set their
faces against the practice of treating a resale of the corpora
tion’s capital stock as producing a profit which can properly
be credited to the income account. My objection to the prac
tice is threefold:
In the first place, the view taken by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue that a corporation cannot derive income from deal
ings in its own capital stock appears to me sound in theory.
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A special case is presented where the corporation has agreed
with the subscriber to preferred stock to repurchase that
stock at a fixed price. There is some argument that when it
purchases stock and thereby extinguishes such an obligation
for less than its face value it makes a profit which is analo
gous to the profit on the retirement of a bond at less than
par. But in the case of purchase and resale of a pure stock,
I think the Bureau’s rule is economically as well as legally
correct.
In the second place, the case for permitting corporations to
trade in their stocks is much weaker than the case for per
mitting mere acquisition. It is a plausible argument that
the purchase of capital stock, when it is selling below its fair
value and the corporation has available funds, is advantage
ous to all the shareholders: to those who sell or may want to
sell, by tending to prevent the price from falling still further
below its fair value; to other shareholders, by increasing their
proportionate interest in the company on favorable terms.
It is not easy to see in what circumstances a similar plea
could be offered in relation to the resale. The acquisition of
stock seems to me to be justifiable only for retirement or for
use in some way other than in ordinary trading operations
(e.g., for issue to employees or in conjunction with a new
acquisition of property); and such use should not be re
garded as giving rise to income.
Thirdly, there is the important practical reason that recog
nition of such profits would open the way to a particularly
vicious abuse in the case of corporations which have stock
outstanding that is selling at a price substantially below the
figure at which it is stated in the company’s balance sheet.
If the view were accepted that a profit which would be a
legitimate credit to income might be derived from the pur
chase and sale of the capital stock of the corporation, the
management would be able to buy the stock, and if the price
should rise, to derive from resale a profit which could be
credited to income; while if the price should decline, the
company would be in a position to cancel the stock and thus
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to avoid any charge to income account, showing, instead, a
credit to capital surplus arising from the cancellation of the
stock acquired at less than book value.
Another practice is that of writing down the property ac
counts of a corporation and correspondingly reducing the de
preciation charges against income. Whether such a proce
dure is proper seems to me to depend on the facts in relation
to the property and on the way in which the transaction is
effected and disclosed. Some would argue that the exhaus
tion of capital value (depreciation) during a year is a ques
tion of fact unrelated to the values at which the assets are
carried; but this contention seems to me to be applicable
where the object is to determine the profits of an enterprise
(which is no doubt sometimes the proper objective of the
investor or analyst), rather than in the ordinary case where
we are trying to determine the profits of a continuing com
pany which is carrying on the enterprise.
There must be continuity in corporate accounting, and
the figures at which property legitimately stands on the books
of a corporation cannot be ignored in calculating its depre
ciation charges. If a company has acquired assets at less than
their fair present value, it is entitled to reap the benefit in its
income account as the assets are gradually used up in service.
The converse is in theory equally true; but, as a practical
matter, if as a result of either purchases or revaluation at a
time when price levels were higher a company is carrying
depreciable assets at a figure clearly and substantially in ex
cess of the fair value which such assets possess today and seem
likely to possess in the near future, it seems to me desirable
to permit it to deal with the excess book value as a capital
loss and by formal action to reduce the book value of the
assets to a fair figure and thereafter compute depreciation on
the basis of the reduced value, unless such action would
prejudice the position of a senior security which the corpora
tion has a legal or moral obligation to preserve intact. If the
company could legally accomplish the desired result by re
organization, it seems desirable to permit it to do so without
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that expense, provided that the same respect is shown for
prior interests as would be enforceable in a reorganization,
and that the action taken is fully disclosed and formally ap
proved by the shareholders.
Such a course seems particularly justifiable where the
market value of the stock of the corporation is far below the
value at which it appears in the balance sheet. In such cir
cumstances, it would be pedantic and foolish to insist that
the company should by excessive depreciation charges make
real a value for the capital stock which at present exists only
on the books, especially as such a course would necessarily re
duce reported earnings and tend to reduce the current
market value of. the stock so far as that value is predicated
on earnings.
It is, however, always desirable to consider the collateral
effects of any such action, as, for instance, in relation to
taxes; and certainly no adjustment should be made unless the
present value is carefully determined, the excess is substantial,
and the management is satisfied that the level of values to
which the properties are to be reduced is likely to persist for
a period of years. Much embarrassment has been occasioned
to companies which in the period of inflation wrote up their
properties to values which have since proved to have been
only, temporary; and it is easy today to err in the opposite
direction.
Moreover, the new value should be fair. It is obviously
improper to reduce the book value to a value below the fair
value, thus reducing the charge for depreciation to a figure
which is less than the actual exhaustion of values that is tak
ing place and overstating the earnings of the company. Ex
perience shows this point to be one of very considerable im
portance; the attempt is sometimes made to pave the way
for the future inflation of earnings by deliberate understate
ment of present assets.
As I have indicated, also, the rights of prior security hold
ers should be respected. If, for instance, a corporation has
issued prior securities on a representation as to the amount
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of assets available as security therefor, this would seem to im
ply at least a moral obligation to charge depreciation on a
scale sufficient to maintain such values; and the reduction
of book value, followed by a reduction of depreciation
charges, might in such a case easily result in distributing, by
way of dividends, sums that ought rightly to be retained for
the protection of prior securities.
Action would seem to be permissible and desirable where
the facts are such as those set out in the annual report for
1931 of the Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation, from
which I quote:

During the past year a detailed survey of all plants, items
of equipment and other fixed assets has been made to deter
mine the changes which have taken place in their productive
ness and replacement value. Since the formation of the
corporation in 1917, there have been improvements in manu
facturing methods and changes in location of plants to areas
permitting more favorable manufacturing and distribution
operations. Because of the decrease of approximately 21%
in general construction costs during the past two years, the
present book value of many items of property acquired, con
structed or appraised during periods of high labor and ma
terial costs exceeds the present replacement value.
The constantly changing costs of labor and material make
it impossible to maintain property records sufficiently flex
ible to show at all times the true replacement value of the
fixed assets of the corporation.
However, when the change in values is as great as that
which has occurred in the last few years, a restatement is de
sirable. To permit the records to continue to show the
values of earlier years might easily become misleading,
especially to those who lay great emphasis upon the ‘book
value’ in evaluating the corporation’s securities.
Accordingly, in the balance sheet submitted herewith the
value of buildings, machinery and equipment has been writ
ten down to the extent of $39,794,031.11. A portion of this
was charged directly to surplus and a portion to the reserve
for depreciation. The amount charged to reserve has in
turn been restored by a transfer from surplus as a provision
for unidentified obsolescence, thus leaving the reserves for
depreciation, etc., intact. It is true that many items of prop
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erty, such as real estate, mining lands and water powers, have
enhanced in value much beyond their cost and that this is
nowhere reflected in the records. The enhancement of such
items, not being structures, cannot be measured by the cost
of labor and materials.
Aside from the consideration of a nearer approach to
accuracy, the readjustment of the account will relieve the
consolidated income from the burden of annual deprecia
tion and amortization charges on property or values which
do not contribute to earnings.
The percentage of reduction in capital value was less than
the percentage of decrease in general construction costs, so
that depreciation calculated on the reduced values would
presumably be sufficient to provide for replacement of the
property at current price levels; the revised value was care
fully ascertained; the excess of book value to be dealt with
was substantial; the amount of prior securities outstanding
was small; the action taken was fully disclosed; and the
amount written off was charged against a previously existing
surplus.
There are other questions which have arisen or the im
portance of which has greatly increased as a result of the
depression. On the other hand, the depression has both
demonstrated the unsoundness and minimized the impor
tance of the practices of treating stock dividends as income
in the amount of the market value of the stock received, and
regarding the proceeds of the sale of rights as wholly income,
by means of which stocks of holding companies which formed
the apices of pyramids were raised to heights from which
they have since crashed, in some cases to complete ruin. This
paper has, however, already reached its appointed length;
and it has seemed to me better to concentrate our attention
today on a small number of important issues, rather than to
attempt to cover too wide a field.
In concluding, may I say that I recognize that the issues I
have discussed are of particular importance to companies
whose securities are listed on exchanges and to members
whose practice brings them into contact with such com
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panies. I should like, therefore, to explain that the choice
is not due to any failure to recognize that such practice con
stitutes only a small percentage of the accounting work of
the profession today, but to a desire to deal with questions in
relation to which I could feel that my experience both in my
practice and in my capacity as chairman of one of your special
committees qualified me to express an informed opinion.

X

THE ADVANTAGES OF THE ELECTION OF AUDITORS
BY THE SHAREHOLDERS *

(1932)
one finds people for whom one has respect expressing
different views on a question, one is very apt to think that
the real difference lies not in their opinions so much as in
the subject with which they conceive themselves to be deal
ing. That is universally recognized in all sorts of affairs.
Most of the plans for promoting peace between nations rest
on the proposal that if people only agree thoroughly upon
what they are talking about most of their differences will
disappear.
So when I see people advocating different ways of appoint
ing auditors, I think very possibly it is because they have
different kinds of audits in mind and different purposes to be
accomplished by auditors. Obviously there are at least as
many different kinds of audits as there are different proposals
before the meeting tonight. The officers of a company may
desire an audit for a check on their employees. The directors
may desire an audit as a check on their officers. The stock
holders may desire an audit as a check on the directors.
And possibly a large part of the difference that may develop
tonight may turn on those differences in the purposes of an
audit.
I have assumed, however, that we were talking about some
thing such as your President just referred to, a proposal to
require audits for the protection of investors; and if the
audit is primarily for the protection of the investor, it seems
When

* From a discussion on "Election or Appointment of Auditors” at a meet
ing of the New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants, January
18, 1932.
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to me entirely natural that the investor should be the person
who chooses the auditors.
Now I think, by way of clearing the ground further, that
we might as well be realistic and take it for granted that
whatever form of election of auditors is provided for, the
auditors will, in the first place, be chosen by the officers of
the company in the great majority of cases.
I remember when the Canadian Bank Audit Act was under
consideration I was talking to one of the most influential
directors of one of the biggest banks, and I said to him, “I
suppose that although the law calls for the election of
auditors by the stockholders, they won’t have anything to do
with it; but do you, as directors, expect to have anything to
do with it?”
He said, “Oh, good heavens, no! The general manager
will pick the auditors.” (Laughter.) But it is just because
I think the officers will pick the auditors in the first place
that I think they ought to be elected by the shareholders,
although that may sound a bit paradoxical—but paradoxes
are very often well founded.
In order to make my position entirely clear I would say
that I do not think it is any use having auditors elected by
the shareholders unless you take some further steps to safe
guard the situation.
The real difficulty of the audit situation, viewed from the
standpoint of the auditor as the protector of the investor, is
that if the auditor and the management do not agree, it is
the easiest thing in the world, as things now are, for the
management, in saying good-bye to the auditors, to say, “We
will get somebody else.” That proved to be one of the great
defects in England, where for many years they have had the
system of election of auditors by the shareholders. So, to
meet that situation, in a revision of the Companies Act some
years ago in England, they put in a provision which has
been very effective, or rather, two provisions:
First, that no auditors, other than the retiring auditors,
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could be nominated unless notice were given to the share
holders at a certain time in advance of the meeting;
Secondly, that at any meeting of shareholders, up to the
meeting at which the successors were elected, the auditors
should have the right to appear and to address the sharehold
ers. The result of that has been that if the auditors and the
officers or directors fail to agree on a question, the auditors
can say: “If you adhere to this position we shall have to
qualify our certificate and appear at the annual meeting and
state our reasons for doing so.” It doesn’t often happen that
that comes about because the auditors won’t take that posi
tion unless they are very sure of their ground. On the other
hand, if the auditors are sure of the ground, the directors
won’t risk going to the meeting with a situation of that
kind.
So that just gives the auditor the additional weight in
the scales to enable him to stand up against the directors
and management and insure what he regards as a proper
presentation of the accounts, without being in such a strong
position that he overrides the officers and directors. It
brings about a very nice balance of power between them
and, generally speaking, I think gives a very effective pro
tection.
That is the scheme that I think ought to be employed if at
any time the legislature in this State sees fit to prescribe an
audit for the protection of investors. The audit as between
directors and officers or as between officers and employees
is a purely internal matter with which I think the State legis
lature should not concern itself, but I do think that the in
vestor needs a great deal more protection today than he is
getting.
The New York Stock Exchange is doing quite a little for
him, but I don’t think it ought to depend entirely on bodies
of that kind, and I think it would be a great step forward if
the legislature of New York, the great commercial State
of the Union, would take the lead, as it took the lead in
creating this profession as an organized profession, and adopt
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some measure requiring the election of auditors for the pro
tection of investors.
I wouldn’t by any means suggest that every corporation in
corporated in the State should be required to have auditors—
I think that would probably be premature at this time. But
I do think that at least every corporation which offers its
securities publicly for sale or causes its securities to be listed
on any exchange might reasonably be subjected to that pro
vision; and it might possibly also be wise to extend it to any
corporation having an outstanding capital sto,ck beyond a
certain minimum and having more than a certain number of
shareholders, although that is a secondary question on which
I wouldn’t pass at this time. But I do think that if they are
going to do anything for the protection of investors they
should let the investors who are the stockholders elect the
persons who are to protect their own interest.

XI
KREUGER AND TOLL *

(1933)
your experience in this entire Kreuger & Toll picture,
what is your professional opinion of an arrangement wherein
the auditor reports to shareholders rather than to the com
pany, Mr. May?
Mr. May. Well, as the result of all my professional ex
perience, I am heartily in favor of such an arrangement, and
I have strongly advocated it; and I have had some part in
bringing about the action of the New York State Chamber
of Commerce recently favoring that action.
Mr. Marrinan. May I ask as a matter of helpfulness to
the committee that you give us your professional opinion
as to the relative development of accountancy in England
and in the United States?
Mr. May. Well, that is rather a large order. It is by no
means a one-sided question. In some respects English prac
tice has gone ahead of American. In other respects I think
American practice has gone distinctly ahead of English. I
think it may surprise you, but American practice is distinctly
ahead of English in the amount of information which is
given to shareholders—unquestionably.
The Chairman. Do they seem to need more information
over here?
Mr. May. Well, if you like I will tell you—I do not want
to volunteer remarks, but if it will throw any light I will
tell you how, in my judgment, that has come about. It
happens to be a situation that I have studied rather inten
sively the last two or three years. I think there is a strong
From

* Testimony before Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Cur
rency, United States Senate, “Stock Exchange Practices,” 72nd Congress, Sec
ond Session, Part IV (1933). pp. 1265-66; 1273-74.
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feeling to the same effect in England that information is
inadequate in England. And the reason has largely been
that the regulation in England is statutory. And, of course,
statutes can lay down only what I call minimum standards,
failure to comply with which subjects them to penalty.
What we want is much higher standards than that. And
the result of these standards laid down by law in Eng
land has been that company officials who were reluctant to
give information have said, “Well, that is all the law re
quires, and you have got no right to ask us to give more.”
And some auditors have accepted that position. Whereas
here I think the profession has taken the position that what
is due to shareholders is a matter of good conscience and
good business practice. And there are no legal limitations
on it. So they must use their own judgments when they
consider that the directors are giving a reasonable amount of
information to the shareholders. That, I think, is the history
of the development.
Mr. Marrinan. That does not, of course, prevent the pos
sibility of regulation which would compel all necessary in
formation?
Mr. May. Well, that is a difficult branch of legislation;
and when you come to formulate it, I think you will find,
for the reason that I have said, you can set down only a
standard which everybody is bound to observe, and that
must be a relatively low standard. You cannot put it so
high as the best practice should be when you establish a
practice by law.

Mr. Marrinan. We of course are searching the picture
here, Mr. May, for any safeguards that may be discovered
in this Kreuger & Toll secured debenture issue situation in
behalf of the stockholders or investors. Would you say that
in the field of accounting, and confining yourself wholly to
the secured debenture issue, any adequate safeguards were
set up in the matter of accounting?
Mr. May. I am not familiar with that particular issue.

106

THE PROFESSION OF ACCOUNTING

I have seen the prospectus, but I have not carefully studied
it. I do not know what kind of protection there was, if any.
Mr. Marrinan. There was no audit, Mr. May, of any
kind, as nearly as we can ascertain. Would you think it
possible to keep faith with investors without an audit?
Mr. May. In 1929; yes. Today, perhaps hot. Then I
would say, especially with a security issue, I would not have
thought that an audit was a normal part of the protective
machinery that was provided. That is one of the good
things that I think has come out of this—that people have
realized that, however trustworthy people may seem to be,
some objective study is eminently desirable. In fact, the
whole advance of accounting in this country is marked by a
series of events like this. The Claflin incident gave tre
mendous impetus to accounting. Banks in those days used
to say that they would not give that for an audit certificate
when they had a name like Claflin on the papers. Now
they have come to find that, even though it may be only one
case out of a hundred, it may sometimes be a valuable ad
ditional protection. And I think it has developed fairly
logically and fairly satisfactorily.
Of course, all these things are a question of balancing
risks against costs. If you create a machinery of protection
that is unduly expensive, you kill industry and you put a
burden on new financing that is out of proportion to its
value. It is a very nice question of adjusting the degree of
precaution to the reasonable expense. And you will always
find some outstanding cases where an exceptionally clever
crook will beat the precautions that are, as a practical mat
ter, advisable for the general run of business. It is no good
legislating to surround every transaction with every precau
tion that seems necessary when you are dealing with a
supercrook. And if you did so in ordinary banking, you
would make ordinary banking out of the question. And if
you take every precaution, you will realize that there will
be a certain amount that will slip through in spite of the
high degree of protection that you put forth,
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Mr. Marrinan. By that statement you do not wish to be
understood as minimizing the recommendations that you
have made in your report?
Mr. May. Not at all. I think those are well within the
limits, and I think if I should be erring I should err on the
side of a little extra precaution. But at the same time it
would be disastrous to attempt to weigh down business with
precautions that would be very expensive and in ninety-nine
cases out of a hundred would be supererogatory.
CONCLUSIONS OF FINAL REPORT OF

PRICE, WATERHOUSE & CO. ON THE KREUGER & TOLL
GROUP OF COMPANIES, 1932.*

In concluding this Report we propose to deal briefly with
three questions of general interest, namely:
(1) Where has the money gone which the public has sub
scribed?
(2) To what extent were reported earnings real?
(3) How early did Kreuger’s irregularities begin and
what enabled them to be concealed?

To answer the first question it is necessary to deal with
the combined position of five of the principal Companies
taken collectively: i.e., the three which sought money from
the Public on a large scale, comprising:
(1) A. B. Kreuger & Toll
(2) International Match Corporation, and
(3) Svenska Tandsticks A.B. (The Swedish Match Com
pany)

and the two underlying Finance Companies, viz.;
(4) N.V. Financieele Maatschappij Kreuger & Toll, and
(5) Continental Investment A.G.

The aggregate Funds made available to these Companies
during the period of 14¼ years from January 1, 1918, to
* Printed in “Stock Exchange Practices,” op. cit., pp. 1262-4.
participated in the preparation of this final Report.

Mr. May
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March 31, 1932, inclusive, and the eventual disposition
thereof, as revealed by our Investigations, expressed in
Swedish Kronor at par and in round numbers, is shown in
the following statement:
Funds Provided
(1) Net Proceeds of Share and Debenture Is
sues, i.e., including Premiums and de
ducting Discounts and Issue Expenses
(2) From Bank Loans and Bill Credits
(3) From Other Credits (Net)
(4) From Revenue Sources
Net income before providing for shrink
age in value of Securities, Debenture
Interest and Dividends paid
Total Funds Provided
S.Kr.
Disposition of Funds.
(1) Debenture Interest and Dividends paid to
Security holders outside the Group
(2) Withdrawn by Ivar Kreuger
On Current Accounts
347.363.000
Securities and other Assets
appropriated
468.492.000
815.855.000
Less:—Assets introduced
383.809.000
(3) Invested in Securities acquired and in
Associated and Subsidiary Companies
(Net)
In Government and
other Marketable
Securities
1.127.405.000
In Associated Com
panies
548.544.000
Together
1.675.949.000
Less:—Appropriated by
Ivar Kreuger (in
cluded in appropri
ations shown above)
207.341.000 1.468.608.000
In Subsidiary Manu
facturing and Trad
ing Companies
241.585.000
(4) Invested in Intangible Assets (Monopoly
Concessions)
Total accounted for
S.Kr.

2.104.569.000
613.892.000
5.320.000

150.962.000
2.874.743.000

668.280.000

432.046.000

1.710.193.000

64.224.000
2.874.743.000

The approximate value of the Investments at March 31,
1932, as based on the best information available (i.e.,
market quotations, carefully considered estimates and, as
regards Investments in Subsidiary Manufacturing and Trad
ing Companies, their provisional book values), is about
S.Kr. 775.000.000, which, when compared with the aggregate
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Book Value above shown of S.Kr. 1.710.193.000, reveals a
shrinkage of about S.Kr. 935.000.000.
Turning to the second question, our examination has dis
closed that during the same period of 14¼ years the ap
parent reported Earnings and Income of these Companies
combined in the aggregate were grossly overstated. The ex
tent of this overstatement is shown in the following com
parison of the reported Earnings (adjusted to eliminate InterCompany Dividends, Debenture Interest and other Items
irrelevant to the present consideration) with the approximate
aggregate Combined Earnings and Income as now ascer
tained:
Earnings and Income as based on Published or Book Figures
adjusted to eliminate Inter-Company Dividends, Debenture
Interest and other items irrelevant to the present consid
eration ........................................................................................
1.179.357.000
Approximate Real Earnings and Income (both Normal and
Extraordinary) on the same basis, which is before providing
for shrinkage in value of Investments estimated at about
S.Kr. 935.000.000 ...........................................................................
150.962.000
Excess of Reported Earnings as above over Real Earnings as
above ..................................................................................... S.Kr. 1.028.395.000

This difference of S.Kr. 1.028.395.000 is made up of Fic
titious Credits to Income Accounts, aggregating S.Kr.
043.693.000, less a sum of S.Kr. 15.298.000 representing
1.
the net adjustment of normal Profit and Loss Items.
The amount of Fictitious Earnings and Income includes
some items which may have had an appearance of reality
when considered solely from the standpoint of the individual
Companies receiving the credits, in that they were supported
by what purported to be Guarantees of another Company
within the Group or by actual Cash Remittances.
There are a number of items, aggregating a fairly sub
stantial sum, the genuineness of which is doubtful, and in
regard to these the lenient view has been taken in that for
the purpose of this analysis they have been classed as
“Genuine.”
The total Earnings of S.Kr. 150.962.000 shown above,
which, it should be reiterated, are before providing for
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Debenture Interest and shrinkage in Investment Values, are
equivalent to about 1½% on the relative average Capital
(Share and Debenture) invested in these Companies during
the same period.
Neither these Earnings nor any other facts developed by
our examination lend any support to the view that Kreuger
possessed business ability so extraordinary as to warrant the
grant to him of the freedom from control or disclosure of
his actions which he enjoyed.
With regard to the third question, we have already in
dicated that the manipulation of accounts goes back at least
as far as 1917. The fraudulent practices assumed large pro
portions in 1923 and 1924 and continued thereafter, cul
minating in the fabrication of £21.000.000 (nominal) of
Italian Government Bonds.
The perpetration of frauds on so large a scale and over
so long a period would have been impossible but for (1) the
confidence which Kreuger succeeded in inspiring, (2) the
acceptance of his claim that complete secrecy in relation
to vitally important transactions was essential to the success
of his projects, (3) the autocratic powers which were con
ferred upon him, and (4) the loyalty or unquestioning obedi
ence of Officials, who were evidently selected with great care
(some for their ability and honesty, others for their weak
nesses), having regard to the parts which Kreuger intended
them to take in the execution of his plans.
The absolute powers with which Kreuger was vested gave
him complete domination of the entire Group and of all the
Executive and Administrative Staffs. Indeed he conducted
the entire business as though he was accountable to no one,
as evidenced by his action in Inter-Company matters in re
spect of which the rights of third parties, such as the Security
Holders and Creditors of each Unit, were completely ig
nored.
Closely related to the causes already mentioned are the
complicated and confused bookkeeping in regard to many
important transactions, and the gross inadequacy of the docu
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mentary evidence in support of accounting entries which
our examination has disclosed.
The frauds could not have been consummated without
assistance—witting or unwitting—of some of his associates, in
cluding some of the Officers of the Holding and Financial
Companies; nor could they have been concealed if either
the Audits of the Companies had been coordinated under
a single control, or if the Audits, though not so coordinated,
had been carried out in all cases with proper honesty, effi
ciency and independence. It is apparent that the employ
ment of different Auditors for different closely associated
Companies, restrictions in the scope of examinations, sub
serviency if not complicity on the part of some of the em
ployees and some of the Auditors, and forgery of documents
in order to meet demands for evidence confirmatory of book
entries, all contributed to prevent such Audits as were made
from resulting in exposure.
The history of this Group of Companies emphasizes anew
the truth that enterprises in which a complete secrecy on the
part of the chief executive officer as to the way in which
important parts of the capital are employed is, or is alleged
to be, essential to success are fundamentally unsuited for
public investment, since such secrecy undermines all ordi
nary safeguards and affords to the dishonest executive un
equalled opportunities for the perpetration and concealment
of frauds.
Upon the conclusion of our investigation, which has now
extended over seven months, we desire to place on record
that in the course of our work we have received throughout
the most sympathetic cooperation and support of the various
Committees, Liquidators and Administrators, as well as the
whole-hearted assistance of the present Officials and Staff.
Our cordial thanks are due for this cooperation and for the
unfailing patience and courtesy in difficult circumstances
which have everywhere been accorded to us.

XII
AUDITS OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTS *
(Extracts from correspondence between the Special
Committee on Cooperation with Stock Exchanges, G. O.
May, Chairman, of the American Institute of Account
ants and the Committee on Stock List of the New York
Stock Exchange)

(1932-1934)
September 22, 1932.

The Committee on Stock List,
New York Stock Exchange,
New York, N. Y.
Dear Sirs:

In accordance with suggestions made by your Executive
Assistant, this Committee has given careful consideration to
the subject of the general line of development of the ac
tivities of the Exchange in relation to annual reports of
corporations.
It believes that there are two major tasks to be accom
plished-one is to educate the public in regard to the sig
nificance of accounts, their value and their unavoidable limi
tations, and the other is to make the accounts published by
corporations more informative and authoritative.
The nature of a balance sheet or an income account is
quite generally misunderstood, even by writers on financial
and accounting subjects. Professor William Z. Ripley has
spoken of a balance sheet as an instantaneous photograph of
the condition of a company on a given date. Such language
is apt to prove doubly misleading to the average investor—
* “These letters constitute a history of an important development in the
recognition of the place which accountancy occupies in modern finance and
business.” The first communication which follows was placed in evidence
by the Chairman of the Committee on Stock List of the New York Stock
Exchange in a hearing before the United States Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, January 12, 1933.
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first, because of the implication that the balance sheet is
wholly photographic in nature, whereas it is largely histori
cal; and, secondly, because of the suggestion that it is possible
to achieve something approaching photographic accuracy
in a balance sheet which, in fact, is necessarily the reflection
of opinions subject to a (possibly wide) margin of error.
Writers of textbooks on accounting speak of the purpose
of the balance sheet as being to reflect the values of the
assets and the liabilities on a particular date. They explain
the fact that in many balance sheets certain assets are stated
at figures which are obviously far above or far below true
values by saying that the amounts at which such assets are
stated represent “conventional” valuations. Such statements
seem to involve a misconception of the nature of a balance
sheet.
In an earlier age, when capital assets were inconsiderable
and business units in general smaller and less complex than
they are today, it was possible to value assets with com
parative ease and accuracy and to measure the progress
made from year to year by annual valuations. With the
growing mechanization of industry, and with corporate or
ganizations becoming constantly larger, more completely
integrated and more complex, this has become increasingly
impracticable. From an accounting standpoint, the distin
guishing characteristic of business today is the extent to
which expenditures are made in one period with the definite
purpose and expectation that they shall be the means of pro
ducing profits in the future; and how such expenditures
shall be dealt with in accounts is the central problem of
financial accounting. How much of a given expenditure of
the current or a past year shall be carried forward as an asset
cannot possibly be determined by an exercise of judgment
in the nature of a valuation. The task of appraisal would
be too vast, and the variations in appraisal from year to year
due to changes in price levels or changes in the mental atti
tude of the appraisers would in many cases be so great as to
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reduce all other elements in the computations of the results
of operations to relative insignificance.
Carrying the thought one stage further, it is apparent that
the real value of the assets of any large business is de
pendent mainly on the earning capacity of the enterprise.
This fact is fairly generally recognized by intelligent in
vestors as regards capital assets such as plant and machinery,
but it is not equally generally recognized that it is true,
though to a lesser extent, in respect of such assets as inven
tories and trade accounts receivable. Those, however, who
have had experience in liquidations and reorganizations
realize that in many industries it becomes impossible to
realize inventories or accounts receivable at more than a
fraction of their going-concern value, once the business has
ceased to be a going concern. To attempt to arrive at the
value of the assets of a business annually by an estimation
of the earning capacity of the enterprise would be an im
possible and unprofitable task. Any consideration of the
accounts of a large business enterprise of today must start
from the premise that an annual valuation of the assets is
neither practical nor desirable.
Some method, however, has to be found by which the pro
portion of a given expenditure to be charged against the
operations in a year, and the proportion to be carried for
ward, may be determined; otherwise, it would be wholly
impossible to present an annual income account. Out of
this necessity has grown up a body of conventions, based
partly on theoretical and partly on practical considerations,
which form the basis for the determination of income and
the preparation of balance sheets today. And while there is
a fairly general agreement on certain broad principles to be
followed in the formulation of conventional methods of ac
counting, there remains room for differences in the applica
tion of those principles which affect the results reached in a
very important degree.
This may be made clearer by one or two illustrations. It
is a generally accepted principle that plant value should be
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charged against gross profits over the useful life of the plant.
But there is no agreement on the method of distribution.
The straight-line method of providing for depreciation
which is most commonly employed by industrial companies,
the retirement-reserve method used by utilities, the sinkingfund method, the combined maintenance-and-depreciation
method, and others, are supported by respectable argument
and by usage, and the charges against a particular year may
vary a hundred per cent or more according as one or the
other permissible method is employed.
Again, the most commonly accepted method of stating in
ventories is at cost or market, whichever is lower; but within
this rule widely different results may be derived, according to
the detailed methods of its application. For instance, at
times like the present, cost of finished goods may be deemed
to be the actual cost, as increased by subnormal operation,
or a normal cost computed on the basis of a normal scale of
operations. It may or may not include interest during the
period of production or various kinds of overhead expenses.
Market value may be either gross or net after deducting
direct selling expenses. The choice between cost or market
may be made in respect of each separate item or of classes
of items or of the inventory as a whole. Frequently, whether
a profit or a loss for the year is shown depends on the precise
way in which the rule is applied. And since the conventions
which are to be observed must, to possess value, be based
on a combination of theoretical and practical considerations,
there are few, if any, which can fairly be claimed to be so
inherently superior in merit to possible alternatives that they
alone should be regarded as acceptable.
Most investors realize today that balance sheets and in
come accounts are largely the reflection of individual judg
ments, and that their value is therefore to a large extent de
pendent on the competence and honesty of the persons ex
ercising the necessary judgment. The importance of
method, and particularly of consistency of method from year
to year, is by no means equally understood.
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In considering ways of improving the existing situation,
two alternatives suggest themselves. The first is the selec
tion by competent authority out of the body of acceptable
methods in vogue today of detailed sets of rules which would
become binding on all corporations of a given class. This
procedure has been applied broadly to the railroads and
other regulated utilities, though even such classifications as,
for instance, that prescribed by the Interstate Commerce
Commission allow some choice of method to corporations
governed thereby. The arguments against any attempt to
apply this alternative to industrial corporations generally
are, however, overwhelming.
The more practicable alternative would be to leave every
corporation free to choose its own methods of accounting
within the very broad limits to which reference has been
made, but require disclosure of the methods employed and
consistency in their application from year to year. It is sig
nificant that Congress in the federal income-tax law has
definitely adopted this alternative, every act since that of
1918 having contained a provision that the net income shall
be computed “in accordance with the method of accounting
regularly employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer”
unless such method does not clearly reflect income. In its
regulations the Bureau of Internal Revenue has said, “The
law contemplates that each taxpayer shall adopt such forms
and systems of accounting as are in his judgment best suited
to his purpose.” (Reg. 45, Art. 24.) The greatest value of
classifications such as those imposed on regulated utilities lies
in the disclosure of method and consistency of method which
they tend to produce.
Within quite wide limits, it is relatively unimportant to
the investor what precise rules or conventions are adopted
by a corporation in reporting its earnings if he knows what
method is being followed and is assured that it is followed
consistently from year to year. Reverting to the illustrations
already used, the investor would not need to be greatly con
cerned whether the straight-line or the sinking-fund method
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of providing for depreciation were being employed by a
given corporation, provided he knew which method was
being used and knew that it was being applied in the same
way every year. But if depreciation is charged in one year
on the straight-line basis applied to cost and in another is
charged on a sinking-fund basis applied to a valuation less
than cost, the investor may be grossly deceived unless the
change is brought to his notice. For this reason, the re
quirement of the Exchange that the depreciation policy of a
company applying for listing shall be stated in the applica
tion is valuable, and it might well be amplified to include
an undertaking to report to the Exchange and to stockhold
ers any change of policy or any material change in the man
ner of its application.
Again, it is not a matter of great importance to investors
whether the cost-or-market rule for stating inventories is
applied to individual items or to the inventory as a whole,
but it is very important to the investor that he should be
advised if the test is applied to individual items at the be
ginning of the year and to the inventory as a whole at the
close thereof.
It is probably fairly well recognized by intelligent in
vestors today that the earning capacity is the fact of crucial
importance in the valuation of an industrial enterprise,
and that therefore the income account is usually far more
important than the balance sheet. In point of fact, the
changes in the balance sheets from year to year are usually
more significant than the balance sheets themselves.
The development of accounting conventions has, con
sciously or unconsciously, been in the main based on an
acceptance of this proposition. As a rule, the first objective
has been to secure a proper charge or credit to the income
account for the year, and in general the presumption has
been that once this is achieved the residual amount of the
expenditure or the receipt could properly find its place in
the balance sheet at the close of the period, the principal
exception being the rule calling for reduction of inventories
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to market value if that is below cost. But if the income
account is to be really valuable to the investor, it must be
presented in such a way as to constitute to the fullest pos
sible extent an indication of the earning capacity of the
business during the period to which it relates. This Com
mittee feels that the direction of the principal efforts of the
Exchange to improve the accounting reports furnished by
corporations to their stockholders should be towards making
the income account more and more valuable as an indication
of earning capacity.
The purpose of furnishing accounts to shareholders must
be not only to afford them information in regard to the
results being achieved by those to whom they have entrusted
the management of the business, but to aid them in taking
appropriate action to give effect to the conclusions which
they reach regarding such accomplishments. In an earlier
day, stockholders who were dissatisfied with the results se
cured by the management could perhaps move effectively to
bring about a change of policy or, failing that, a change of
management. With the growth in magnitude of corpora
tions and the present wide diffusion of stock holdings, any
such attempt is ordinarily impracticable because of the effort
and expenditure that it would entail. The only practical
way in which an investor can today give expression to his
conclusions in regard to the management of a corporation
in which he is interested is by retaining, increasing or dis
posing of his investment, and accounts are mainly valuable
to him in so far as they afford guidance in determining which
of these courses he shall pursue.
There is no need to revolutionize or even to change ma
terially corporate accounting, but there is room for great
improvement in the presentation of the conclusions to which
accounts lead. The aim should be to satisfy (so far as is
possible and prudent) the investor’s need for knowledge,
rather than the accountant’s sense of form and respect for
tradition, and to make very clear the basis on which accounts
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are prepared. But even when all has been done that can
be done, the limitations on the significance of even the best
of accounts must be recognized, and the shorter the period
covered by them the more pronounced usually are these
limitations. Accounts are essentially continuous historical
records; and, as is true of history in general, correct inter
pretations and sound forecasts for the future cannot be
reached upon a hurried survey of temporary conditions, but
only by longer retrospect and a careful distinction between
permanent tendencies and transitory influences. If the in
vestor is unable or unwilling to make or secure an adequate
survey, it will be best for him not to rely on the results of a
superficial one.
To summarize, the principal objects which this Commit
tee thinks the Exchange should keep constantly in mind and
do its best gradually to achieve are:
' 1. To bring about a better recognition by the investing
public of the fact that the balance sheet of a large modern
corporation does not and should not be expected to repre
sent an attempt to show present values of the assets and lia
bilities of the corporation.
2. To emphasize the fact that balance sheets are neces
sarily to a large extent historical and conventional in char
acter, and to encourage the adoption of revised forms of
balance sheets which will disclose more clearly than at pres
ent on what basis assets of various kinds are stated (e.g., cost,
reproduction cost less depreciation, estimated going-concern
value, cost or market, whichever is lower, liquidating value,
et cetera).
3. To emphasize the cardinal importance of the income
account, such importance being explained by the fact that
the value of a business is dependent mainly on its earning
capacity; and to take the position that an annual income
account is unsatisfactory unless it is so framed as to con
stitute the best reflection reasonably obtainable of the earn
ing capacity of the business under the conditions existing
during the year to which it relates.
4. To make universal the acceptance by listed corpora
tions of certain broad principles of accounting which have
won fairly general acceptance (see Exhibit I attached), and
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within the limits of such broad principles to make no at
tempt to restrict the right of corporations to select detailed
methods of accounting deemed by them to be best adapted
to the requirements of their business; but—
(a) To ask each listed corporation to cause a statement
of the methods of accounting and reporting employed by
it to be formulated in sufficient detail to be a guide to its
accounting department (see Exhibit II attached); to have
such statement adopted by its board so as to be binding
on its accounting officers; and to furnish such statement
to the Exchange and make it available to any stockholder
on request and upon payment, if desired, of a reasonable
fee.
(b) To secure assurances that the methods so formu
lated will be followed consistently from year to year and
that if any change is made in the principles or any material
change in the manner of application, the stockholders and
the Exchange shall be advised when the first accounts are
presented in which effect is given to such change.
(c) To endeavor to bring about a change in the form of
audit certificate so that the auditors would specifically re
port to the shareholders whether the accounts as presented
were properly prepared in accordance with the methods of
accounting regularly employed by the company, defined as
already indicated.

This Committee would be glad to discuss these sugges
tions with you at any time, and to cooperate with the Ex
change in any action it may see fit to take along the lines
indicated.
Yours very truly,
George O. May,
Chairman.
EXHIBIT I
It is suggested that in the first instance the broad prin
ciples to be laid down as contemplated in paragraph 4 of
the suggestions should be few in number. It might be de
sirable to formulate a statement thereof only after consulta
tion with a small group of qualified persons, including cor
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porate officials, lawyers and accountants. Presumably the
list would include some if not all of the following:
1. Unrealized profit should not be credited to the income
account of the corporation either directly or indirectly,
through the medium of charging against such unrealized
profits amounts which would ordinarily fall to be charged
against income account. Profit is deemed to be realized
when a sale in the ordinary course of business is effected,
unless the circumstances are such that the collection of the
sale price is not reasonably assured. An exception to the
general rule may be made in respect of inventories in in
dustries (such as the packing-house industry) in which owing
to the impossibility of determining costs it is a trade custom
to take inventories at net selling prices, which may exceed
cost.
2. Capital surplus, however created, should not be used to
relieve the income account of the current or future years of
charges which would otherwise fall to be made thereagainst.
This rule might be subject to the exception that where, upon
reorganization, a reorganized company would be relieved of
charges which would require to be made against income if
the existing corporation were continued, it might be regarded
as permissible to accomplish the same result without re
organization provided the facts were as fully revealed to, and
the action as formally approved by, the shareholders as in
reorganization.
3. Earned surplus of a subsidiary company created prior
to acquisition does not form a part of the consolidated earned
surplus of the parent company and subsidiaries; nor can any
dividend declared out of such surplus properly be credited
to the income account of the parent company.
4. While it is perhaps in some circumstances permissible
to show stock of a corporation held in its own treasury as an
asset, if adequately disclosed, the dividends on stock so held
should not be treated as a credit to the income account of the
company.
5. Notes or accounts receivable due from officers, em
ployees, or affiliated companies must be shown separately and
not included under a general heading such as Notes Receiv
able or Accounts Receivable.
The Exchange would probably desire to add a rule regard
ing stock dividends.
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EXHIBIT II
The statement of the methods of accounting contemplated
in paragraph 4a of the suggestion would not be in the nature
of the ordinary detailed classification of accounts, nor would
it deal with the machinery of bookkeeping. It should con
stitute a clear statement of the principles governing the
classification of charges and credits as between (a) balance
sheet accounts, (b) income account and (c) surplus account,
together with sufficient details of the manner in which these
principles are to be applied to enable an investor to judge
of the degree of conformity to standard usage and of con
servatism of the reporting corporation. Its content would
vary according to the circumstances of individual com
panies, but some of the more important points which would
be disclosed thereby would be as follows:
THE GENERAL BASIS OF THE ACCOUNTS:

Whether the accounts are consolidated, and if so, what
rule governs the determination of the companies to be in
cluded in consolidation; also, a statement as to how profits
and losses of subsidiary and controlled companies not con
solidated are dealt with in the accounts of the parent com
pany.
THE BALANCE SHEET:

(a) In respect of capital assets, the statement should show:

(1) What classes of items are charged to property ac
count (whether only new property or also replacements
and improvements);
(2) Whether any charges in addition to direct cost,
either for overhead expense, interest or otherwise, are
made to property accounts;
(3) Upon what classes of property, on what basis, and
at what rates provision is made for, or in lieu of, depreci
ation;
(4) What classes of expenditures, if any, are charged
against reserves for depreciation so created;
(5) How the difference between depreciated value and
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realized or realizable value is dealt with on the sale 01
abandonment of units of property;
(6) On what basis property purchased from subsidiary
companies is charged to property account (whether at cost
to subsidiary or otherwise).
(b) In respect of inventories: The statement should show
in fairly considerable detail the basis of valuation of the in
ventory. The statement under this head would be substan
tially a summary in general terms of the instructions issued
by the company to those charged with the duty of preparing
the actual inventories. It would not be sufficient to say that
the inventory was taken on the basis of cost or market, which
ever is lower. The precise significance attached to these
terms should be disclosed, for the reasons set forth on page
3 of the letter.*
The statement should include a specific description of the
way in which any intercompany profit on goods included in
the inventory is dealt with. It should show under this head,
or in relation to income or surplus account, exactly how re
ductions from cost to market value are treated in the ac
counts and how the inventories so reduced are treated in the
succeeding period. It is, for instance, a matter of first im
portance to investors if inventories have been reduced to
cost or market at the end of the year by a charge to surplus
account, and the income for the succeeding year has been
determined on the basis of the reduced valuation of the
inventory thus arrived at. Obviously, under such a proce
dure the aggregate income shown for a series of years is not
the true income for the period.
(c) In respect of securities: The statement should set forth
what rules govern the classification of securities as market
able securities under the head of “current assets” and se
curities classified under some other head in the balance sheet.
It should set forth in detail how any of its own securities
held by the reporting corporation, or in the case of a con
solidated statement any securities of any company in the
group held by that or any other member of the group are
dealt with in the balance sheet. (Stock of subsidiaries held
by the parent will of course be eliminated in consolidation.)
The disclosure of the basis of valuation of securities is cov
ered in paragraph 2, page 6, of the recommendations con
tained in the letter.f
* Cf. above, p. 115.

† Cf. above, p. 119.
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(d) Gash and receivables present few questions, though
where sales are made on the instalment plan, or on any other
deferred basis, their treatment should be fully set forth, in
cluding a statement of the way in which provision is made
for future collection or other expenses relating to sales al
ready made but not liquidated, and to what extent deferred
accounts are included in current assets.
(e) Deferred charges: The statement should set forth
what classes of expenditures are in the company’s practice
deferred, and what procedure is followed in regard to the
gradual amortization thereof. (This question is of consider
able importance, as substantial overstatements of income may
occur through deferment in unprosperous periods of ex
penses ordinarily chargeable against current operations, pos
sibly followed by writing off such charges in a later year
against surplus account.)
(f) Liability accounts: There is normally less latitude in
regard to the treatment of liability accounts than in respect
of assets. The statement should clearly show how un
liquidated liabilities, such as damage claims, unadjusted
taxes, etc., are dealt with. The statement should disclose
whether it is the practice of the company to make a pro
vision for onerous commitments or to deal with such com
mitments in any way in the balance sheet.
(g) Reserves: A statement of the rules governing credits
and charges to any reserve account (including both those
shown on the liability side and those deducted from assets)
should be given in detail. It is particularly important to
know whether losses, shrinkages or expenses which would
otherwise be chargeable against income accounts are in any
circumstances charges against contingent or other reserves,
and whether such reserves are built up partly or wholly
otherwise than by charges to income account.
THE INCOME ACCOUNT:

An adequate statement in regard to the treatment of
balance sheet items discloses by inference what charges and
credits are made to income account or surplus. The addi
tional points required to be disclosed are the principles fol
lowed in allocating charges and credits to income account
and surplus account respectively, and the form of presenta
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tion of the income account. The form should be such as to
show separately: (a) operating income; (b) depreciation
and/or depletion if not deducted in arriving at (a), in
which case the amount of the deduction should be shown;
(c) income from companies controlled but not consolidated
(indicating the nature thereof); (d) other recurring income;
(e) any extraordinary credits; (f) charges for interest; (g)
income taxes; and (h) any extraordinary charges.
The company’s proportionate share of the undistributed
earnings or losses for the year of companies controlled but
not consolidated should be disclosed in a note or otherwise
on the face of the income account. Stock dividends if cred
ited to income should be shown separately with a statement
of the basis upon which the credit is computed.

January 6, 1933.
An announcement by Richard Whitney, President of the New York
Stock Exchange, in regard to the requirement adopted by the Ex
change that listed companies have their annual accounts audited
by independent public accountants.

Since April of 1932 all corporations applying for the list
ing of their securities upon the New York Stock Exchange
have been asked to enter into an agreement to the effect
that future annual financial statements published more than
three months after the date of the agreement shall be audited
by independent public accountants qualified under the laws
of some state or country, and shall be accompanied by a cer
tificate of such accountants showing the scope of the audit
and the qualifications, if any, made by them in respect
thereto. The Committee on Stock List has considered any
reasons advanced why this procedure should not apply in
particular cases, but has made exceptions only in the case
of certain railroad companies.
During this period, the New York Stock Exchange has
not required that audited statements be filed with applica
tions for listing, because it was felt that applicants who had
relied upon the former practice of the Exchange would have
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been subjected to undue delay if the Committee had pur
sued any other course.
The New York Stock Exchange now announces that its
present policy in this respect will be continued until July 1,
1933, after which date all listing applications from corpora
tions must contain the certificate of independent public ac
countants, qualified under the laws of some state or country,
certifying to the correctness of the balance sheet, income
statement and surplus statement for the most recent fiscal
year. In general, the audit or audits must cover all sub
sidiaries, and the scope of the audit must be not less than
that indicated in a pamphlet entitled “Verification of Finan
cial Statements” issued by the Federal Reserve Board in
May, 1929, and obtainable from that board at Washington,
D. C. All applications must include an agreement to the
effect that future annual reports published or sent to stock
holders will be similarly audited and accompanied by a
similar certificate.
The Committee on Stock List may make exceptions to
these requirements in unusual or extraordinary cases where
the enforcement of the requirements would, in its opinion,
be manifestly unwise or impracticable. The Committee
has concluded that for the present it will not require audited
statements from railroad companies reporting to the Inter
state Commerce Commission, except in the case of those
railroads whose accounts have heretofore been currently
audited by independent accountants.
Representative houses and banks of issue have been ad
vised of the foregoing program, and have expressed them
selves as in accord with the plan outlined above which they
believe is sound and consistent with the importance of af
fording to the public the most complete and accurate infor
mation in regard to the financial condition of corporations
whose securities are publicly dealt in.
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Letter to presidents of corporations listed on New York Stock Exchange

NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE
Office

of the

President

January 31, 1933.
Dear Sir:

The New York Stock Exchange has recently announced
its intention of requiring audited statements in connection
with listing applications made after July 1, 1933. The pub
lic response to this announcement indicates clearly that in
dependent audits are regarded by investors as a useful safe
guard.
If, however, such a safeguard is to be really valuable and
not illusory, it is essential that audits should be adequate in
scope and that the responsibility assumed by the auditor
should be defined. The Exchange is desirous of securing
from companies whose securities are listed, and which now
employ independent auditors, information which will en
able it to judge to what extent these essentials are assured
by such audits. In furtherance of this end, we should be
greatly obliged if you will secure from your auditors, upon
the completion of the audit for the year 1932, and furnish
to the Committee on Stock List, for its use and not for pub
lication, a letter which will contain information on the fol
lowing points:

1. Whether the scope of the audit conducted by them is
as extensive as that contemplated in the Federal Reserve
bulletin, “Verification of Financial Statements.”
2. Whether all subsidiary companies controlled by your
company have been audited by them. If not, it is desired
that the letter should indicate the relative importance of
subsidiaries not audited as measured by the amount of assets
and earnings of such companies in comparison with the total
consolidated assets and earnings, and should also indicate
clearly on what evidence the auditors have relied in respect
of such subsidiaries.
3. Whether all the information essential to an efficient
audit has been furnished to them.
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4. Whether in their opinion the form of the balance
sheet and of the income, or profit-and-loss, account is such
as fairly to present the financial position and the results of
operation.
5. Whether the accounts are in their opinion fairly de
termined on the basis of consistent application of the system
of accounting regularly employed by the company.
6. Whether such system in their opinion conforms to ac
cepted accounting practices, and particularly whether it is in
any respect inconsistent with any of the principles set forth
in the statement attached hereto.

I shall personally appreciate very much your prompt con
sideration of this matter and any cooperation which you may
extend to the Exchange in regard thereto.
Faithfully yours,
(Signed) Richard Whitney,
President.

NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE
.

COMMITTEE ON stock

list

October 24, 1933.

To the Governing Committee,
New York Stock Exchange.
Gentlemen:

On January 31, 1933, the President of the Stock Exchange
addressed a general inquiry to all listed corporations, de
signed to secure information regarding the scope of audits
and the responsibilities assumed by auditors which would
put the Exchange in a better position to judge the value of
audits to investors. In this letter, the request was made that
companies whose accounts were audited should secure from
their auditors and furnish to the Exchange, for its use and
not for publication, answers to six questions. Of these
questions, three dealt with the scope of the audit and three
with the principles governing the accounting methods of the
corporation and the form of presentation of accounts to
shareholders,
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The response to this request has been satisfactory, replies
having been received from a large majority of the companies
employing independent auditors regularly. A careful study
of the replies received has brought to the attention of the
Committee a number of points affecting particular com
panies which it has been deemed desirable to take up with
those companies. In a few cases, the questions involved
have been of very substantial importance, but the majority
have been of relatively minor significance.
The replies have indicated very general acceptance of cer
tain principles which the Exchange regarded as of primary
importance and set forth in a statement attached to the
letter of request [see above].
This Committee feels that all these principles should now
be regarded by the Exchange as so generally accepted that
they should be followed by all listed companies—certainly,
that any departure therefrom should be brought expressly to
the attention of shareholders and the Exchange.
In announcing on January 6, 1933, its intention of re
quiring after July 31, 1933, that there should be included
in all listing applications, certificates of independent ac
countants in respect of the balance sheet, income statement
and surplus statement for the most recent fiscal year, the
Exchange indicated that in general the audit must cover all
subsidiaries and the scope thereof be not less than that in
dicated in a pamphlet entitled “Verification of Financial
Statements” issued by the Federal Reserve Board in May,
1929. The request of January 31 called for information as
to whether these standards were currently being maintained
in the audits of listed companies.
Upon the subject of the scope of audits, the existing posi
tion is outlined in a communication addressed by nine lead
ing firms of accountants to the Exchange under date of
February 24, 1933, a copy of which is attached hereto. In
the interests of investors it seems desirable to make clear
what is the scope of audits as currently conducted and to
consider how far it is practicable to extend such scope and

130

THE PROFESSION OF ACCOUNTING

the responsibilities of auditors within the limits of a wise
economy.
The bulletin issued by the Federal Reserve Board, to
which reference has been made, indicated clearly that the
scope of the examination therein provided for was not such
as would lead naturally to detection of (1) defalcations on
the part of employees or (2) any understatement of assets
and profits resulting from charges to operations of items
which might have been carried as assets. The nine firms
of accountants in the letter above referred to pointed out
that the former limitation is particularly applicable to ex
aminations of the larger companies which, generally speak
ing, constitute the class whose securities are listed on the
New York Stock Exchange.
Your committee is satisfied that the detailed scrutiny and
verification of the cash transactions of large companies can
most efficiently and economically be performed by per
manent employees of the corporation, particularly today,
when bookkeeping is to so large an extent done by mechan
ical means, and that it would involve unwarranted expense
to transfer such work to independent auditors or to require
them to duplicate the work of the internal organization.
Your committee, however, feels that the auditors should
assume a definite responsibility for satisfying themselves that
the system of internal check provides adequate safeguards
and should protect the company against any defalcation of
major importance. Unless so satisfied, the auditors should
make clear representations on this point—in the first place,
to the management and, in default of action by the manage
ment, to the shareholders. Your committee also suggests
that this limitation on the scope of the audit, though an
entirely proper one, should be specifically mentioned in the
common form of audit report.
The Committee feels that the auditors should recognize
a responsibility to verify and, if necessary, to report to the
shareholders upon any transactions affecting directors or offi
cers of the corporation in respect of which there might be
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a conflict of interest between such directors and officers and
the general body of shareholders.
Turning to the second limitation on the scope of audits
as outlined in the Federal Reserve bulletin, the accountants
indicated that, generally speaking, their examination of the
income or profit-and-loss account was perhaps less extensive
than the procedure contemplated in that bulletin. The
classification of the income or profit-and-loss account is
clearly a matter of great importance to investors. Whether
income is of such a nature that it may reasonably be expected
to recur or is of an exceptional character is often a vital con
sideration in the appraisal of an enterprise, and failure to
make such distinctions clear in annual accounts is one of the
defects to which the Exchange has had to call attention most
frequently in the accounts of listed companies.
The Committee recognizes that it is neither necessary nor
reasonable to hold auditors responsible for minor errors in
classification, or to ask corporations to incur the expense of
examinations such as would justify the acceptance of such a
responsibility. Auditors should, however, in addition to
satisfying themselves that the net income reported is not
overstated, accept the burden of seeing that the income
received and the expenditures made are properly classified
in so far as the facts are known to them or are ascertainable
by reasonable inquiry. For instance, when non-recurring in
come, shown separately on the books, is merged with recur
ring income in the annual accounts, or when items properly
chargeable against current income are charged against sur
plus or reserve, the facts are bound to come to the attention
of the accountant who makes even the most cursory exami
nation, and he should not certify without a clear qualifica
tion accounts in which anything of this kind has been done.
The inquiry has again emphasized the importance and
the difficulty of the problem of properly reflecting the opera
tions of subsidiary and controlled companies. Consolidation
of accounts of companies in which there are very substantial
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outstanding interests is not a satisfactory solution—indeed,
the Committee is satisfied that no method can be prescribed
which could be applied in every case. Operations of con
trolled companies may be as important an element in the
value of the parent company as those of the parent company
or its wholly-owned subsidiaries. Even where the operations
of controlled companies are conducted at a negligible profit
or loss, this fact cannot be ascertained if the result of such
operations is nowhere reflected in the published financial
statements. The Exchange has recognized that there must
be an element of flexibility in the method of such presenta
tion, so that corporations may choose, from among the sev
eral methods which will give the desired information, that
one most suitable to its individual circumstances. For a
considerable period of time past, the agreement covering this
matter which the Exchange has requested from corporations
applying for listing has read as follows:

To publish at least once in each year and submit to
stockholders at least fifteen days in advance of the annual
meeting of the corporation, but not later than...................... .
a Balance Sheet and Income Statement for the last fiscal
year and a Surplus Statement of the applicant company as
a separate corporate entity and of each corporation in which
it holds directly or indirectly a majority of the equity stock;
or, in lieu thereof, eliminating all intercompany transactions;
A similar set of consolidated financial statements. If
any such consolidated statements exclude any companies a
majority of whose equity stock is owned, (a) the caption will
indicate the degree of consolidation; (b) the Income Ac
count will reflect, either in a footnote or otherwise, the
parent company’s proportion of the sum of or difference
between current earnings or losses and the dividends of
such unconsolidated subsidiaries for the period of report;
and (c) the Balance Sheet will reflect, in a footnote or
otherwise, the extent to which the equity of the parent com
pany in such subsidiaries has been increased or diminished
since the date of acquisition as a result of profits, losses and
distributions. Appropriate reserves, in accordance with
good accounting practice, will be made against profits arising
out of all transactions with unconsolidated subsidiaries, in
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either parent-company statements or consolidated statements.
Such statements will reflect the existence of any default
in interest, cumulative dividend requirements, sinking-fund
or redemption-fund requirements of any controlled corpora
tion whether consolidated or unconsolidated.
The most costly, and the less satisfactory in some respects,
of the suggested methods is the publication separately of the
financial statements of each unconsolidated controlled cor
poration, for the reason that this imposes upon the stock
holder, or analyst, the burden of determining for himself
the equity of the parent company in the earnings of each
such corporation, making it a burdensome matter for him
thus to secure a true picture of the results of operation of the
system as a whole.
With less information than is suggested by one of the
methods in the foregoing agreement, the reports of any com
pany having unconsolidated majority-owned companies are
necessarily incomplete and may be positively misleading.
The Committee believes that this is a subject which might
well receive the consideration of corporate management and
of organized bodies of accounting officers and independent
accountants in order that adequate disclosure may become
generally prevalent and not be confined merely to those
companies which have executed the foregoing agreement
with the Exchange.
At the same time, it might be desirable to attempt to
develop a form of audit report or certificate which would be
more informative to and more clearly understood by in
vestors than the forms now currently in use. It would, in
the opinion of the Committee, be advantageous if audit re
ports were so framed as to constitute specific answers to the
last three questions embodied in the President’s letter to
listed companies of January 31, 1933, namely:

4. Whether in their opinion the form of the balance sheet
and of the income, or profit-and-loss, account is such as fairly
to present the financial position and the results of operation,
5. Whether the accounts are in their opinion fairly de-
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termined on the basis of consistent application of the system
of accounting regularly employed by the company.
6. Whether such system in their opinion conforms to ac
cepted accounting practices, and particularly whether it is in
any respect inconsistent with any of the principles set forth
in the statement attached hereto.
As suggested earlier in this communication, also, it might
contain a clear statement of the scope of the audit in relation
to detection of defalcations by employees.
The matters herein discussed seem to the Committee those
in respect of which clarification and improvement of ac
counting practice are most desirable in the interest of in
vestors. It suggests to the Governing Committee that these
matters should be brought to the attention of listed com
panies and organized bodies of accountants and accounting
officers, with a view to definite action along the lines in
dicated herein.
By the direction of the Committee on Stock List,
J. M. B. Hoxsey,
Executive Assistant.

That the Governing Committee of the New York
Stock Exchange concurs in the suggestions herein con
tained and authorizes the Committee on Stock List to
bring them to the attention of those concerned, as recom
mended.
Ashbel Green, Secretary.
October 25, 1933.

Resolved,

Following is the text of the letter written by nine accounting firms
and enclosed with Mr. Hoxsey’s letter of October 24th:

New York, February 24, 1933.
President,
New York Stock Exchange,
New York, N. Y.

Richard Whitney, Esq.,

Dear Sir:

As auditors of a substantial number of corporations whose
securities are listed on the New York Stock Exchange, we
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have received copies of the letter in relation to audits ad
dressed by you to such companies under date of January 31.
We are anxious to do everything in our power to assist the
Exchange, and it has seemed to us that it will be helpful
and more convenient to the Exchange for us to deal with
some of the general phases of the subject under consideration
collectively in a single letter, reference to which will make
it unnecessary to discuss these points in the letters which
we shall in due course furnish to our clients and which they
in turn will presumably furnish to the Exchange for its
confidential use.
We fully recognize the importance of defining the re
sponsibility of auditors and of bringing about a proper
understanding oh the part of the investing public of the
scope and significance of financial audits, to the end that
their importance should not be underrated nor their pro
tective value exaggerated in the minds of investors. This is
the more necessary because the problem of delimiting the
scope of audits or examinations is essentially one of ap
praising the risks against which safeguards are desirable in
comparison with the costs of providing such safeguards. The
cost of an audit so extensive as to safeguard against all risks
would be prohibitive; and the problem is, therefore, to de
velop a general scheme of examination of accounts under
which reasonably adequate safeguards may be secured at a
cost that will be within the limits of a prudent economy.
The position was clearly stated by a partner in one of the
signatory firms in 1926 as follows:
In any such work we must be practical; it is no use laying
down counsels of perfection or attempting to extend the
scope of the audit unduly. An audit is a safeguard; the
maintenance of this safeguard entails an expense; and this
expense can be justified only if the value of the safeguard
is found to be fully commensurate with its cost. The cost of
an audit so extensive as to be a complete safeguard would
be enormous and far beyond any value to be derived from
it. A superficial audit is dangerous because of the sense of
false security which it creates. Between the two extremes
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there lies a mean, at which the audit abundantly justifies its
cost.
We are in accord with the general concept of the scope
of an examination such as would justify the certification of a
balance sheet and income account for submission to stock
holders which is implied in the reference to the bulletin
“Verification of Financial Statements” contained in the first
question asked by the Exchange. That bulletin was de
signed primarily as a guide to procedure which would af
ford reasonable assurance that the financial position of the
borrower was not less favorable than it was represented by
him to be; and, as the bulletin explicitly states, it was not
contemplated that such an examination would necessarily
disclose under-statements of assets (and profits) resulting
from charges to operations of items which might have been
carried as assets or defalcations, oh the part of employees.
This latter point is particularly applicable to financial
examinations of larger companies which, generally speaking,
constitute the class whose securities are listed on the New
York Stock Exchange. Such companies rely on an adequate
system of internal check to prevent or disclose defalcations,
and independent accountants making a financial examina
tion do not attempt to duplicate the work of the internal
auditors.
The bulletin “Verification of Financial Statements,” to
which reference has been made, was, as was clearly pointed
out in the first edition, framed to fit the case of borrowers
engaged in business on a relatively small or medium-sized
scale. It was recognized in that bulletin (see paragraph 131
of the present edition) that an effective system of internal
check would make some portions of the procedure outlined
in the bulletin unnecessary. Naturally, the larger a corpora
tion and the more extensive and effective its system of ac
counting and internal check, the less extensive is the de
tailed checking necessary to an adequate verification of the
balance sheet. Since companies listed on your Exchange
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are among the larger corporations, it is in general true that
the procedure in examinations of annual accounts is less
detailed in the case of those companies than in the class of
cases which the framers of the bulletin had particularly in
mind. It is, however, true, we think, that the examinations
made by independent auditors in such cases, coupled with
the system of internal check, constitute at least as effective
a safeguard as is secured in the case of smaller corporations
having a less adequate system of internal check, in the ex
amination of which the procedure outlined in the bulletin
has been more closely followed.
The ordinary form of financial examination of listed
companies, in so far as it relates to the verification in detail
of the income account, is not, we believe, so extensive as
that contemplated by the bulletin. To verify this detail
would often be a task of a very considerable magnitude, par
ticularly in the case of companies having complex account
ing systems, and we question whether the expense of such a
verification would be justified by the value to the investor
of the results to be attained. The essential point is to guard
against any substantial overstatement of income, and this
can be reasonably assured by the auditor’s satisfying himself
of the correctness of the balance sheets at the beginning and
end of the period covered by his examination and reviewing
the important transactions during the year.
The second point on which information is requested in
your letter to listed companies relates to subsidiary com
panies. This question is obviously pertinent, and presents
no difficulty to the accountant called upon to reply to it.
The third question, calling for a statement whether all
essential information has been furnished to the auditors
contemplates, we take it, that the auditors shall indicate
whether all the information which they have deemed essen
tial and sought has been furnished to them. It is obviously
conceivable that a management might be in possession of
information which would have a material bearing on the
accountant’s view of the financial position if he knew of
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its existence, but that the auditor might have no way of
discovering that such information existed.
Your fourth question relates to the form in which the
accounts are submitted. We take it that you desire to be
informed whether the accounts in the opinion of the auditor
set forth the results fairly to the extent that they purport
to do so, and that the inquiry does not go to the question
whether regard for the interests of the stockholders calls for
more detailed statements of the financial position and the
operations of the company than those now given. The
question how much information should be given to stock
holders is one on which wide differences of opinion exist,
and it is not our understanding that the Exchange is at
tempting to deal with this point in this inquiry.
Referring to the fifth question, we attach as great im
portance as the Exchange evidently does to consistency of
method in the presentation of financial statements by cor
porations. The only further comment on this question
which seems called for is to emphasize the part which judg
ment necessarily plays in the determination of results, even
if principles are consistently adhered to. There would, we
take it, be no objection to an accountant’s answering the fifth
question in the affirmative, even though in his opinion the
judgment of the management had been somewhat more
conservative at the close of a year than a year earlier, or vice
versa. We think it well to mention this point and to em
phasize the fact that accounts must necessarily be largely
expressions of judgment, and that the primary responsibility
for forming these judgments must rest on the management
of the corporation. And though the auditor must assume
the duty of expressing his dissent through a qualification in
his report, or otherwise, if the conclusions reached by the
management are in his opinion manifestly unsound, he does
not undertake in practice, and should not, we think, be ex
pected to substitute his judgment for that of the manage
ment when the difference is not of major importance, when
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the management’s judgment is not unreasonable, and when
he has no reason to question its good faith.
Your sixth question, apart from the specific reference to
the principles enumerated, aims, we assume, to insure that
companies are following accounting practices which have
substantial authority back of them. Answers to this ques
tion of an affirmative character will not, of course, be under
stood as implying that all of the clients of a given firm ob
serve similar or equally conservative practices, either in the
case of companies engaged in the same industry or in the
case of different industries, or even that the accounting prin
ciples adopted are precisely those which the accountant
would have himself selected, had the sole choice been his.
We agree with the five general principles enumerated
in the memorandum attached to your letter, but it may, we
suppose, be understood that rigorous application of these
principles is not essential where the amounts involved are
relatively insignificant. We mention this point not by way
of any substantial reservation, but to avoid possible later
criticism based on narrow technicalities.
We shall be glad, if desired, to go further into any of the
questions herein discussed, in such a way as may be most
convenient to the Exchange.

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON COOPERATION

WITH STOCK EXCHANGES
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CEDAR STREET, NEW YORK

December 21, 1933.
Mr. J. M. B. Hoxsey, Executive Assistant,
Committee on Stock List
New York Stock Exchange
New York, N. Y.
Dear Sir:

The copy of the communication addressed by your com
mittee to the governing committee of the Stock Exchange
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under date of October 24, 1933, regarding audits, which
was sent to the President of the American Institute of
Accountants, has been referred to this committee. We wel
come the suggestion that the matters therein dealt with
should be brought to the attention of listed companies and
organized bodies of accountants and accounting officers, and
shall be glad to cooperate with the Exchange in the manner
contemplated.
We are glad to note that the replies received to the letter
of the President of the Exchange dated January 31, 1933,
indicate general acceptance of the principles set forth in
the communication of this committee to the Exchange
dated September 22, 1932, and we propose to recommend to
the Institute that these rules, and such acceptance, should
be brought to the attention of all members of the Insti
tute.
We have noted with interest the views expressed by the
committee on stock list with regard to the problem of safe
guarding the transactions of corporations. While agreeing
with your committee that in the case of large companies the
safeguarding of transactions is primarily a matter of internal
organization, we should like to make it clear that we fully
appreciate the value of the detailed audit in appropriate
cases. Where the internal check and control are necessarily
limited or severely restricted, the detailed audit serves a most
useful purpose, though no audit should be regarded as tak
ing the place of sound measures of internal check and con
trol, except in cases where the organization is so small as
to make adequate internal check impracticable.
We believe that accountants, in cases where they do not
make a detailed audit, now regard it as a part of their duty
to inquire into the system of internal check—indeed, this
duty is expressly recognized in the pamphlet “Verification
of Financial Statements’’ as revised by the American Institute
of Accountants in 1929, the first sentence of the general in
structions contained in that pamphlet reading in part:
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The scope of the work indicated in these instructions in
cludes ... an examination of the accounting system for the
purpose of ascertaining the effectiveness of the internal
check.
We would, however, point out that it is always a matter of
judgment on the part of corporate management to weigh the
risks against which safeguards are desirable in comparison
with the cost of providing safeguards. The whole matter
lies in the field of discretion, and if in any case a defalcation
should occur and escape detection, the accountants cannot
be expected to accept any financial responsibility, but only
to accept such blame as may attach to a possible error of
judgment on their part with respect to their review of the
methods and extent of the internal check and control. The
effect on the reputation of a public accountant, arising from
such an error of judgment, is serious and quite sufficient to
ensure care on his part.
We agree with your committee in the view that auditors
cannot properly disclaim all responsibility for the correct
ness of the classification of an income or profit-and-loss ac
count merely because they are not in a position to assume
full responsibility therefor. Your suggestion that auditors
should “accept the burden of seeing that the income received
and the expenditures made are properly classified in so far
as the facts are known to them or are ascertainable by reason
able inquiry” seems to us a reasonable one, and we believe
it is calculated to afford investors in the great majority of
cases the protection which your committee desires. Our only
further comment on this portion of the communication is
that where the facts are clearly disclosed on the face of the
statement it may not be necessary for the accountants to
embody a qualification in their report.
We agree that the problem of reflecting the operations
of subsidiary and controlled companies is one of real dif
ficulty. Experience here and abroad confirms the view that
there is no single satisfactory solution. We believe, how
ever, that if corporate managements and accounting officers
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approach the question with an honest desire to make the
statements as fair and informative as possible, a solution
appropriate to each individual case will always be found,
and we propose to ask the Institute to bring the point to the
attention of all its members and urge their fullest coopera
tion to this end.
We shall be very glad to join in any cooperative effort to
develop a form of accountants’ reports which will be more
valuable to investors. We agree that such reports should
be so framed as to constitute answers to the three questions
contained in President Whitney’s letter of January 31, 1933,
mentioned by you; viz.:
Whether in their [i.e., the auditors’] opinion the form
of the balance sheet and of the income, or profit-and-loss,
account is such as fairly to present the financial position and
the results of operation.
Whether the accounts are in their opinion fairly deter
mined on the basis of consistent application of the system of
accounting regularly employed by the company.
Whether such system in their opinion conforms to ac
cepted accounting practices, and particularly whether it is
in any respect inconsistent with any of the principles set
forth in the statement attached hereto.
We think it desirable, also, as suggested in our report of
September 22, 1932, to emphasize the fact that accounts, and
consequently any statements or reports based thereon, are
necessarily in large measure expressions of opinion. To this
end, we think it desirable that the document signed by the
accountants should be in the form of a report, as in England,
rather than a certificate, and that the words “in our (my)
opinion” should always be embodied therein. It is imprac
ticable to indicate in a standard form of report exactly the
procedure followed, since it will vary in different cases, and
it will be desirable to use language which may understate
what has been done rather than to incur the risk of the ex
tent of the examination being exaggerated by the reader.
With these considerations in mind, we have drafted as a
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basis for discussion a form of report, a copy of which, with
some explanatory notes, is attached hereto, and we should
be glad to have an expression of opinion thereupon from
your committee or others interested. As indicated in the
first note, it would be our view that before issuing such a
report as we have drafted the accountant should have at
least made an examination of the character outlined in the
bulletin, “Verification of Financial Statements” as inter
preted in the communication of your committee to the gov
erning committee of the Exchange dated October 24, 1933.
With renewed assurance of our willingness to cooperate,
and awaiting your advice as to the way in which you think
such cooperation can best be extended, we are
Yours very truly, •
George O. May, Chairman.
REVISED SUGGESTION OF A FORM OF ACCOUNTANTS’
REP.ORT
TO THE XYZ COMPANY:

We have made an examination of the balance sheet of the
XYZ Company as at December 31, 1933, and of the state
ment of income and surplus for the year 1933. In connec
tion therewith, we examined or tested accounting records
of the Company and other supporting evidence and obtained
information and explanations from officers and employees
of the Company; we also made a general review of the ac
counting methods and of the operating and income accounts
for the year, but we did not make a detailed audit of the
transactions.
In our opinion, based upon such examination, the ac
companying balance sheet and related statement of income
and surplus fairly present, in accordance with accepted prin
ciples of accounting consistently maintained by the Company
during the year under review, its position at December 31,
1933, and the results of its operations for the year.

144

THE PROFESSION OF ACCOUNTING
NOTES

1. It is contemplated that before signing a report of the
type suggested, the accountant should have at least
made an examination of the character outlined in the
bulletin, “Verification of Financial Statements,” as in
terpreted in the communication of the Committee on
Stock List to the Governing Committee dated October
24, 1933.
2. The report should be addressed to the directors of the
company or to the stockholders, if the appointment is
made by them.
3. The statement of what has been examined would, of
course, conform to the titles of the accounts or state
ments reported upon.
4. In the second sentence, any special forms of confirma
tion could be mentioned: e.g., “including confirma
tion of cash and securities by inspection or certificates
from depositaries.”
5. This certificate is appropriate only if the accounting
for the year is consistent in basis with that for the pre
ceding year. If there has been any material change
either in accounting principles or in the manner of
their application, the nature of the change should be
indicated.
6. It is contemplated that the form of report would be
modified when and as necessary to embody any qualifi
cations, reservations or supplementary explanations.

XIII

THE IMPORTANCE OF INSISTING ON SOUND
METHODS OF ACCOUNTING *

(1933)
recent action of the New York Stock Exchange and the
similar action on the part of the Curb and the New York
Produce Exchanges, which followed quickly, mark a very im
portant step in the development of financial auditing. These
developments are undoubtedly due largely to the experience
in the Kreuger and other cases. That experience has also
created a demand for legislation for the protection of in
vestors which might or might not be of a character favorable
to the profession. In our view, the profession stands today
at a critical moment in its history, and on the way in which
it discharges the responsibilities placed upon it within the
next year or two will depend to a very large extent its
future.
Holding these views, and realizing as we do the responsi
bilities which attach to the position our firm holds in the
profession, we wish to impress on all offices the importance
of insisting on sound methods of accounting and presenta
tion of facts, however difficult the circumstances may be and
however important may be the client with whom the ques
tions are raised. We are perfectly prepared to sacrifice pres
ent business and profits to maintain the position of the firm
and discharge our obligations to the profession, and have
no doubt that such a policy will also prove ultimately the
most profitable. Naturally, we do not wish to be too tech
nical, nor to attempt to override ruthlessly the judgment of
directors and officials; but we must not lay ourselves open
to the criticism of being subservient to our clients.
The

* A letter to all United States and Canadian offices of Price, Waterhouse &
Co., January 16, 1933.
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We request that you bring to the notice of this office any
proposals as to the form or substance of accounts with which
you are not in entire agreement and upon which you are
not able to induce your clients to accept your views. In
this way you can share with this office the responsibility of
deciding whether to withdraw objections or to insist on a
position whatever the consequences may be;
We must, of course, have proper regard for the views of
directors, but we should be careful not to allow ourselves
to be put in the position of accepting views with which we
are not in full accord on the plea that the directors have
determined the question, without satisfying ourselves that
the views are really those of the directors and not merely
those of the officers, and that the directors have reached, their
conclusions with the full knowledge of the considerations
which have led us to disagree therewith.
This general question is likely to be under discussion in
the Institute and with the exchanges in the near future, but
we think it is well to write you promptly so that there may
be no question of our failing to recognize our full duty to
the profession at this time. Obviously, unless the leading
firms take a stand for proper principles when the necessity
arises, it is not fairly to be expected that the smaller firms,
which occupy a much less favorable position, will do so.

PART II

DEPRECIATION

I

THE PROBLEM OF DEPRECIATION *

(1915)
In recent years the problem of depreciation has received
steadily increasing attention as its importance has become
more widely recognized. Its treatment even today is, how
ever, not in general adequate or satisfactory, and undoubt
edly this condition is in a large measure attributable to a
failure to appreciate fully the many-sided character of the
problem. In this article, therefore, an attempt will be made
to analyze it and to point out its more important features,
and at the same time some consideration will be given to
the question as to how far the problem is one of account
ing and how far it is one of physical inspection and valua
tion.
In the first place it is necessary to consider the causes
which contribute to bring about depreciation and the in
fluences which tend to modify or obscure its effects.
The most convenient subdivision of the natural causes
of depreciation is threefold:

(1) Fall in new value due entirely to external conditions
and not caused in any way by age or change in con
ditions of use of the property;
(2) Exhaustion through age or wear of the property;
(3) Obsolescence or supersession by superior types or
methods.

The essential distinction between the three causes of de
preciation is readily apparent. The first is an influence
which is spasmodic and uncertain, and its effect today may
* The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XIX (January, 1915), pp. 1-13.
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be offset by an exactly opposite tendency tomorrow. The
second is a relentless force operating continuously in one
direction only. Its effects may be modified by skillful, or
aggravated by unskillful, management, just as human life
may be prolonged by care and shortened by neglect; but its
ultimate effects are certain. The third cause is like the
second in that it operates in one direction only, but differs
in that its operation is not steady and persistent but ex
tremely uncertain. In some industries at some stages it may
almost cease to be felt; in other industries or at other stages
it may be the most potent influence of the three.
In any consideration of the question of depreciation the
corresponding question of appreciation cannot be ignored.
The word “appreciation” is etymologically so precisely the
converse of “depreciation” that the element is often regarded
as an equally complete offset to the element of deprecia
tion. It is important, however, to note that (except pos
sibly as to the increase in efficiency up to the point that a
plant has “found itself”) appreciation is practically the
converse only of the first class of depreciation above enu
merated.
In addition to causes beyond human control, depreciation
may arise from causes which are within human control, such
as neglect, misuse or disuse; on the other hand, depreciation
may be arrested or diminished by human effort either
through renewals which restore usefulness or changes which
arrest obsolescence.
Any adequate disposition of the question of depreciation
must, therefore, deal with numerous influences which may
be conveniently tabulated as follows:

Causes

Countervailing Influences

Beyond human control

Beyond human control

Fall in new value
Exhaustion
Obsolescence

Rise in new value
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Within human control
Neglect
Misuse
Disuse
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Countervailing Influences
Within human control
Renewals which prolong useful
life
Changes to retard obsolescence

The next step in any attempt to deal with the problem
must be a consideration of the purposes for which deprecia
tion is required to be measured. These purposes may be
stated broadly as twofold:
(1) In order to determine the value of property; and
(2) To ascertain what provision is required to be made
out of earnings before the true operating profit can
be determined.

Considering these two purposes in relation to the foregoing
analysis of the classes of depreciation, it is apparent that the
depreciation due to fluctuations in new value and the cor
responding appreciation have a very important bearing on
the valuation of property, but have no proper place in the
determination of the results of operations. Property em
ployed in operation is not purchased with a view to sale but,
with the exception of land, is intended to be used in pro
duction and distribution. Therefore, any increase or de
crease in the new value thereof has little or no practical
bearing on the question of operations. In an extreme case
the fall in new values may be so great as to render a unit
obsolete, but such cases are comparatively infrequent and
form a part of the problem of obsolescence rather than a
part of the question of fluctuations in new value. In measur
ing depreciation for operating purposes, therefore, fluctua
tions in new value may be and usually are disregarded, but
in any attempt to maintain continuously a figure of capital
investment based on valuation these fluctuations would be
a most important and difficult factor to deal with.
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In the case of obsolescence the difficulties are greater from
the operating than from the valuation point of view. In
dealing with this question for the purpose of valuation of
any unit it is sufficient to determine whether changes in
methods or types have already taken place to such an extent
as to cause an impairment in its value beyond the impair
ment due to exhaustion. From an accounting standpoint it
is necessary to go further and in fixing charges against opera
tions to allow for the probability that in the future the life
of the unit will be terminated by obsolescence rather than
by exhaustion.
The uncertainty as to the precise effects of obsolescence
is sometimes urged as an argument in favor of making no
provision therefor; but though the effect of obsolescence on
individual units is uncertain, it is usually possible to estimate
its effects on the operations of a business as a whole—and
depreciation schemes are almost necessarily based on aver
ages. Moreover, unless some provision is made, it will be
necessary to write off large sums against operations when
units are abandoned on account of obsolescence before
being exhausted by use. A failure to provide for obsoles
cence is therefore open to the objection that it tends towards
wider fluctuation in results arid is lacking in conservatism.
If a provision is made on a larger scale than proves necessary
the ultimate result will be merely to increase profits in the
future. If, however, provision is omitted, it may result in
inability to meet requirements for modernizing in the fu
ture which may be essential to the continued success or even
to the existence of the business.
The proper course is, therefore, clearly to attempt to pro
vide in advance for obsolescence, though on account of the
uncertainty characterizing the element such an allowance
cannot be calculated with the same degree of accuracy as
that for exhaustion of life through use or wear. All that
can be done is to make the provision as accurate as possible
by the exercise of good judgment and by frequent revisions
and reconsiderations of operating conditions.

THE PROBLEM

153

The foregoing considerations suggest the reason for the
difference between engineers and accountants in their atti
tude on the subject of depreciation. Engineers are more
frequently required to consider the question from the stand
point of valuation; accountants are usually concerned to
ascertain the proper charge against operations. As has been
indicated, the problems have very different features; indeed,
it is not going too far to say that periodical valuations may
be a hindrance rather than an aid to an accountant in the
determination of a proper charge for depreciation.
To illustrate this point:
Assume a plant unit of which copper is an important part,
say, for simplicity, one containing 5,000 pounds of copper,
and whose cost, apart from the copper, is $200. If bought
when copper is at 16¢ it would cost $1,000 and naturally
the new value would fluctuate $50 for every fluctuation of
1¢ in the price of copper.
Now assume that a valuer making periodical inspections
and valuations finds the depreciated value to be 96% of new
value at the end of the first year; 92% at the end of the sec
ond year; and 89% at the end of the third year; and that at
the end of those years the price of copper is 18¢, 13¢ and 15¢.
From the standpoint of valuation—
at the end of the first year the new value of the unit
would be $1,100 and the depreciated value 96%
of $1,100, or $1,056, showing an appreciation of $ 56.00
at the end of the second year the new value would
be $850 and the depreciated value 92% of $850,
or $782, showing a depreciation for the year of.. 274.00
at the end of the third year the new value would be
$950 and the depreciated value 89% of $950, or
$845.50, showing an appreciation of......................
63.50

From an accounting standpoint the operations of the first
year would be considered chargeable with 4% of $1,000,
or $40, instead of being credited with $56; the second year
would similarly be chargeable with $40 instead of $274; and
the operations of the third year would be chargeable with
$30 instead of being credited with $63.50.
The illustration is perhaps an extreme one, but it serves
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to bring out the dangers involved in basing depreciation
charges against operations on periodical valuations without
further analysis.
The fairly common opinion that periodical valuations
form the best, if not the only satisfactory, way of dealing
with depreciation does not stand analysis. The object of a
valuation is to determine the present depreciated value of
property in use, and before the depreciated value can be
ascertained it is necessary to establish the basis upon which
the total ultimate loss from depreciation on any given unit
shall be distributed as between the part of the term of use
of the unit already expired and the part still lying in the
future. Moreover, the final valuation is liable to be so
largely affected by fluctuations in new value (which must be
excluded from consideration in measuring depreciation from
use and obsolescence) as to make it by itself quite incon
clusive on this point. This is not to say that the work of the
valuer may not be made extremely useful in considering
the depreciation problem.
The work of inventorying and the observation of the pres
ent condition, which are a part of the valuation, are of course
of the utmost value in the determination of a proper charge
to operations. The work of the valuer can, however, be use
ful to the accountant only for the purpose of fixing charges
against operations if the latter has an opportunity to analyze,
the valuation and ascertain how much of the change in value
between two dates results from factors of which the account
ant must take cognizance in order to arrive at correct operat
ing results, and how far it is due to mere fluctuations in new
value which for that purpose should be entirely excluded
from consideration.
The fact is that while the phrase “depreciation” strictly
covers a decline in value from any conceivable cause, its use
in accounting practice is generally in a more narrow and
restricted sense, and many of the difficulties which the ac
countant has to face in his efforts to secure a proper treat
ment of the subject arise from misapprehensions as to the
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precise meaning of the term. To those approaching the
subject for the first time or looking at it superficially an en
tirely wrong line of thought is suggested by the word “de
preciation”; it immediately suggests appreciation. A manu
facturer who is urged to provide for depreciation of his plant
replies that it is fully offset by appreciation in his real estate,
or other assets, and the etymological correspondence between
the two words is so complete that he regards the offset as
being as natural and perfect as that between debit and credit.
If he were carrying on his books 1,000 tons of material of
which 50 tons had been consumed and he were asked to
write off that 50 tons he would concede the propriety of the
request at once and his thoughts would not in the same way
turn to the appreciation of his real estate. A little considera
tion will show that the exhaustion in the course of manu
facture of one year’s useful life of a plant which can only
be expected to last twenty years is practically identical in
its nature with the use of 50 tons of material out of a total
stock of 1,000 tons.
Many attempts have been made to meet the terminological
difficulty, but it is not easy to bring a new phrase into gen
eral use or to devise one which will be both short and clear.
“Expired outlay on productive plant” is a phrase suggested
and used by one English authority, and whilst it is not every
thing that could be desired in simplicity and brevity, it does
have the merit of suggesting the real nature of what is com
monly termed “depreciation of plant” more clearly than does
the latter phrase. It does emphasize the fact that it is not
merely a decline in value but a permanent exhaustion that
is taking place; and this is the fact which needs to be em
phasized and reiterated until it is fully recognized and ac
cepted.
If the necessity of distinguishing between fluctuations in
new value and actual exhaustion of useful life of a plant be
conceded, it still remains to consider whether both should
find expression in a company’s accounts. At first sight such
a course may seem desirable, as it has the apparent merit of
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keeping the books in closer accord with existing conditions;
but upon fuller consideration it is questionable whether it
is wise to advocate such a course in the case of a going con
cern. In the present state of the law it seems clear that there
is no obligation on a company to provide for a decline in
new value of fixed assets, and the probable result of advocacy
of the policy of adjusting fixed properties to valuations
would be that such adjustments would be made where the
valuations exceed the book figures but not where the tend
ency is in the opposite direction.
The idea of writing plant values up to valuation figures
is usually attractive to the owner of the plant. Such a course
results in a surplus which, however incapable it may be of
being distributed, is still a surplus. Possibly also the sug
gestion of skill or good judgment in the original construc
tion or acquisition of the plant implied in the adjustment
appeals to him. The benefits are, however, largely illusory.
Appraisals are so much a matter of individual opinion and
temperament that men of wide business experience attach
little weight to a surplus resulting from an appraisal; and,
on the other hand, if the property is adjusted to higher
values the depreciation charges to be made out of future
operations must be correspondingly increased so that ulti
mately the amount added in a lump to plant values, other
than real estate and surplus, has to be wrung in annual in
stallments out of operations.
In cases where new value is less than original cost, operat
ing officials may urge that the valuation should be recognized
and that the plant be charged only with depreciation based
on the new and lower values. They may argue that it is not
fair that their operations should be burdened with a de
preciation charge based on prices which were paid before
they were responsible for the operations of the plant and
which are in excess of the price at which replacements could
now be effected. No year’s operations of a plant are com
plete in themselves; in innumerable ways they derive the
benefits or inherit the burdens resulting from transactions
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of the past, and the primary requirement is clearly to ascer
tain the results of operations under the conditions which
do exist and not upon the basis of imaginary conditions
which might have existed. In judging the efficiency of the
management by comparisons with other plants it may be
entirely proper to make allowance for higher capital costs
and for every other operating advantage or disadvantage at
taching to the plant; but before and beyond all these more
speculative calculations the essential problem is clearly to
ascertain the results of things as they are.
A further question may possibly arise as to whether ob
solescence should be dealt with as a separate problem. There
is much to be said for such a course or at least for dealing
with the question of exhaustion of life in two parts: first,
by a carefully calculated provision based on what can rea
sonably be foreseen; and secondly, by a more general pro
vision for possible curtailment of life through unexpected
developments. Thus a manufacturer may be satisfied to buy
a machine with the expectation that apart from obsolescence
it will do service for from twenty to thirty years and with
a realization of the probability that apart altogether from
wear it is to be expected that developments in the art will
make it wise to abandon the unit in twenty years or so.
There is, of course, always the possibility that some totally
unexpected development may render it obsolete in three, or
five, or ten years, and conservatism would call for some rec
ognition of this possibility.
In these circumstances it would seem entirely reasonable
to make provision for depreciation based on estimated life
somewhat shorter than the maximum life apart from obso
lescence (say, in the illustrative case mentioned, twenty years)
and to supplement such provision by a general provision out
of earnings against which could be charged losses resulting
from unusually rapid obsolescence. On the cither hand, all
provisions for exhaustion of life are uncertain, and to many
an attempt to deal separately with the different degrees of
uncertainty may seem an unnecessary or useless refinement.
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The question is one largely of temperament. A manu
facturer who is willing to give the necessary time and atten
tion to deal with the problem in detail may probably find the
subdivision valuable; a manufacturer who is content to look
at the matter more broadly and to aim at safely conservative
rather than exact calculations may find it unnecessary. The
question is not, like the distinction between exhaustion of
life and fluctuations in value, fundamental, since all ex
haustion of life, whether due to wear or obsolescence, must
be provided for out of the operations before a profit can
safely be said to have been earned.
The next subject for consideration is depreciation due to
causes which are within human control. In establishing pro
visions for depreciation it is usually assumed that everything
that is practical and economical in the way of current main
tenance will be done to prolong the life and the cost thereof
absorbed in operations quite apart from the depreciation
provision. There is often some difficulty in discriminating
between maintenance charges which should be so absorbed
and renewals which fall within the classification next to be
considered, and on this account the course of making one
provision to cover maintenance and depreciation has been
advocated and is sometimes adopted; but while in some cases
such a method may give good results, it is scarcely suited for
general adoption.
The cost of current maintenance varies largely with the
efficiency of the management. The work if carried out eco
nomically at opportune times may cost far less than it would
if less efficiently conducted. The old proverb that “a stitch
in time saves nine” emphasizes the saving which is effected
by making needed repairs promptly and the dangers of de
ferment. Repairs which are made with the plant’s own
facilities at slack times should cost less than repairs carried
out by outside contractors at less favorable times.
To merge the question of maintenance with that of de
preciation therefore involves adding considerably to the pos
sibilities of error in the provision made. Another disad
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vantage of the method is that it affords an opportunity of
unduly relieving operating expenses by charges against the
fixed provision set aside. If the manager of a plant knows
that his operations are charged with a fixed sum to cover
both depreciation and current maintenance, he will realize
that every dollar he can charge to maintenance rather than
to operations will result in an increase in the amount of the
apparent profits from his operation. Another disadvantage
is that no incentive is given to the manager to be economical
in his maintenance work. For these reasons it is usually de
sirable to deal with current maintenance entirely apart from
depreciation. It should perhaps be noted that where de
preciation has not been provided and an attempt is being
made to restate accounts to include a proper provision there
for, maintenance expenditures must be considered, as in such
cases usually amounts will have been charged to maintenance
which if a depreciation reserve had existed would properly
have been charged against the reserve.
Turning now to the countervailing influences of renewals
and changes, a fundamental question arises which it is es
sential to decide when the formulation of any depreciation
scheme is under consideration.
The problem of depreciation is often broadly stated to be
that of distributing the cost of plant (less salvage) over its
estimated life,* and it is not always realized that this is only
true if the phrase “estimated life’’ is used in one of the two
widely different senses in which it is used in different de
preciation schemes. Estimated life may mean either maxi
mum life of a unit extended to the uttermost by rebuilding
and renewals or the minimum life ignoring any such pos
sible extensions. If estimated life is used in the former
sense renewals must clearly not be charged against the pro* An alternative theory is that business may be regarded as permanent and
that the problem of depreciation is to provide the sums necessary to renew
units as such renewal becomes necessary. The comparative merits of the
two theories form an interesting question which is, however, beyond the
scope of this article. The principal difference is that the sum to be pro
vided on the renewal theory is based on probable cost of replacement rather
than upon original cost of units.
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visions thus created but must be absorbed as an additional
charge to operations; and, moreover, the scheme will not dis
tribute the loss from wear and tear equitably over the period
of years but will result in heavy charges in those years in
which renewal and rebuilding take place. If, however, es
timated life is used in the alternative sense of a minimum
life, then all renewals and rebuildings which substantially
prolong life are property chargeable against the fund and
the burden of wear and tear is distributed equitably as be
tween years. Probably the majority of depreciation schemes
are based on the last-mentioned conception of estimated life,
but a notable example of the alternative course is the scheme
of depreciation on railroad equipment now in force.
Another problem offering some difficulty is that of dis
tinguishing between renewals which may be charged against
the depreciation fund and repairs which must be charged
against operations. Whilst this difficulty undoubtedly exists,
it is true of all classifications that they merge one into an
other, and in recent years marked progress has been made in
the direction of an adequate and practicable distinction be
tween repairs and renewals.
Summarizing the considerations affecting the various
causes of depreciation and the relations of the accountant
and other experts thereto, it may be said that the rise or fall
in new values is entirely a question for the valuer and is of
relatively little importance to the accountant, since its bear
ing is limited to the determination of present value for spe
cial purposes and since it should not enter into revenue ac
counts and is not necessarily (or perhaps even preferably)
recorded in the books of account at all. The accountant’s
main concern with this element is to ensure that its opera
tions are not allowed to obscure the effects of the other
elements.
The question of the exhaustion of useful life is one of esti
mate based on experience and checked by observation, and
enters into the problem to an equal extent whether depre
ciation is sought to be measured from the standpoint of valu
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ation or of operating results. It is both difficult and impor
tant; and operating officials, valuers and accountants can
usefully contribute towards securing the best possible treat
ment of if.
The question of obsolescence is one of observation so far
as the present valuation is concerned, and one of judgment
and conservatism from the standpoint of operating results.
On this point the experience of the operator familiar with
the industry and the conservatism of the accountant can
usually be combined to reach a sound conclusion.
As to depreciation due to causes within human control,
provisions for exhaustion are usually based on the assump
tion that the property will be as fully maintained as possible
out of operations. Whether the assumption in a particular
case is valid is clearly a question which cannot be completely
answered from the books and records only. An examination
of maintenance accounts may indicate that the expenditures
made have not been sufficient for the proper current main
tenance of the plant; but even if the amounts expended are
such as would, if well spent, suffice for that purpose, it is still
possible that the expenditures may have been injudiciously
made and the property allowed to fall below the proper
standard of maintenance. On the other hand, the plant may
have been maintained to the satisfaction of an engineer but
the books may show that the cost has in part been excluded
from operations. Consequently, cooperation between engi
neer or valuer and accountant is required to deal with the
question.
As to the countervailing influences of renewals and
changes to restore usefulness or prolong life, their treatment
depends on the general theory of depreciation adopted. This
whole branch of the depreciation problem can most effec
tively be dealt with by a careful analysis of expenditures and’
reports of the precise nature of any work undertaken not
obviously in the nature of current maintenance, and falls
therefore to the accountant. It would, of course, be possible
for a valuer making periodical inventories and valuations
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of the plant to ascertain the amount of such renewals by
careful comparison of the inventories, but the accounting
record will usually be the safer guide, though inventories
may be useful as a check thereof.
From the foregoing brief analysis of the problem of de
preciation, its complexities are apparent. It is also evident
that the problem is not one with which the accountant can
deal adequately single-handed, but that the services of skilled
operators or engineers are required if the most accurate
solution is to be reached. It is, however, equally clear that
the accountant cannot be ignored in any attempt to deal to
the best possible advantage with the problem. In many
phases he is the primary authority, and while an engineer or
other technically qualified person may be needed to pass
upon other phases, the services of the accountant are again
necessary to ensure a proper correspondence between the
physical facts and book records.
It is recognized that the real difficulties arise after the
problem of depreciation has been stated and when the at
tempt has been made to reach a solution thereof in practice.
An adequate conception of the questions involved is, how
ever, not only essential to the accountant to whom falls this
difficult task but extremely desirable in all those called upon
to decide whether his recommendations shall be carried out,
many of whom today oppose proper treatment merely
through lack of comprehension of the problem itself.

II
ON A PROPOSED DEFINITION OF DEPRECIATION *

(1922)

The basic idea conveyed by this word is indicated by its
derivation—de, down, and pretium, price—that is, a reduction
in price or value.
Depreciation is loss in physical or functional value of
physical property other than wasting assets due primarily
and chiefly to ordinary wear and tear which has occurred
theoretically in the past and which is not offset by adequate
repairs and/or replacements. Obsolescence and inadequacy
are included by regulatory bodies and taxing authorities as
contributory causes, but it is more in accordance with fact
to treat these two elements as separate from ordinary wear
and tear on the ground that the loss incident thereto does
not usually accrue and cannot be foreseen with any degree of
accuracy. Depreciation, however determined, is at best
only an estimate. [Cf. The Journal of Accountancy, Vol.
XXXIV (1922), p. 232.]
I think it is unfortunate to stress the derivation of the
word “depreciation,” because the basic idea of depreciation
as used in accounting practice is not primarily one of values
but one of exhaustion of useful life. The word “theoreti
cally” used in the second paragraph of the definition seems
to me wholly out of place; it is not a question of theory but
of fair assignment of the total loss ultimately to be liqui
dated, as between the period already elapsed and the period
remaining in the future. I agree that depreciation is neces
sarily an estimate but, as Lord Justice Buckley said: “The
ascertainment of profit is in every case necessarily a matter
of estimate and opinion.” The provision for extraordinary
storms, etc., referred to in the definition seems to me alto
gether unrelated to depreciation; moreover, to my mind it
• From a letter written in 1922.
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is not only irrelevant but essentially different in character.
Depreciation is something which must be provided before
a profit can be said to have been made; a provision for a
contingency which may or may not happen in the future is a
reservation of profits.
I gather that some accountants do not agree with this
view and that they regard a provision for depreciation as a
reserve coming literally within the terms of the definition of
a reserve as a segregation of profits. Such a reserve is often
loosely spoken of as being provided out of profits, but strictly
speaking the phrase should be “provided out of gross profits
or earnings.” And the reserve is sometimes regarded as re
maining a part of the undivided profits or surplus. This
view was frequently expressed twenty-five years ago when I
first started practice, but so far as my experience qualifies me
to express an opinion the vast majority of bankers, business
men and accountants, both practical and theoretical, have
by now completely discarded it. When the Interstate Com
merce Commission and innumerable public service com
missions have ruled that depreciation is an operating ex
pense, and when Congress has provided that depreciation is
a proper deduction from gross income in determining net
income, it seems to me idle for any accountant to take the
stand that depreciation is a segregation of profits. It reminds
one of the ancient remark of the fond mother as the regi
ment passed by: “They are all out of step except our Jock.”
Depreciation undoubtedly is an extremely difficult prob
lem and I do not know whether the most satisfactory exposi
tion of just what it is, is not that I heard given many years
ago by a very brilliant lawyer; I am afraid, however, it
would not be suitable for your purpose. He said that de
preciation always seemed to him to be like the advertisement
of Ivory Soap: you looked at it from one angle when you
were going up before a public service commission and all
you could read was “9944/100 pure”; you looked at it from
another side when you were trying to sell securities and all
you could read was “It Floats”; and the rest of the time you
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looked straight at it and it was just plain “Ivory Soap” and
God knew what that was. I cannot help thinking that the
drafter of your definition has looked at the advertisement
too much from the first-mentioned side and that his views
have been colored by his close association with one im
portant industry to which it has seemed advantageous to get
a higher capital value for rate purposes by ignoring all de
preciation in excess of observed depreciation, even at the
price of surrendering any claim for such depreciation as a
part of its operating costs.

III

“A CONFUSION OF TERMS” *
(1927)

Editor, The Journal of Accountancy:
Sir: There are a number of points in Professor Cole’s in
teresting article in your March number † which it would
be interesting to discuss.
I am, for instance, less amazed at the difficulty which some
business men find in interpreting financial statements to
which he refers than the certitude with which others inter
pret them and the undue significance they attribute to their
interpretations.
Again, while I agree with Professor Cole that the sig
nificance of a reserve for depreciation is frequently misap
prehended, I believe that far more misapprehension arises
in respect of the word “depreciation” than in respect of the
word “reserve.” Professor Cole seems at times to be him
self a victim of this misapprehension. The reserve for de
preciation of plant in common practice is not an attempt to
measure “overvaluation of assets.” The treatment of de
preciation is based not on valuation, but on exhaustion. De
preciation is frequently provided where values are in
creasing.
My object in this letter is, however, merely to suggest a
solution of the problem of ambiguity in the use of the word
“reserve” different from that proposed by Professor Cole.
The use of the term “reserve” for profits withheld from
distribution is, I think, becoming less and less frequent in
the United States. The practice of allocating practically the
whole of the profits of a year, which is usual in England, is
not ordinarily followed here. Where they appropriate part
• The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XLIII (1927), pp. 310-11.
†W. M. Cole, "A Confusion of Terms,” ibid., pp. 192-98.
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of the profits for dividends and carry a further sum to “gen
eral reserve,” leaving a small amount to be carried forward
in undivided profits account, we should ordinarily declare
the dividend and allow the balance automatically to fall
into surplus. The fact that surplus is unavailable for dis
tribution in dividends and not intended to be so used is
sometimes emphasized by showing it as “appropriated sur
plus.” It might be satisfactory and probably it would be
easier to standardize the use of “appropriated surplus” in the
sense to which Professor Cole would restrict the word “re
serve” and limit the word “reserve” to those uses to which
he would apply the terms “allowance” and “provision.”
I cannot agree with Professor Cole that such a use of the
word “reserve” is incorrect. It is quite true that what he
would call an allowance for depreciation is not a reservation
of profits, but it is a reservation nevertheless (if not of gross
income at least of gross proceeds from sale), and there is no
reason why a reserve should necessarily be a reserve of
profits. One advantage of the course I have suggested is that
a reservation of profits is a part of surplus, not something
distinct from surplus, and is therefore most appropriately de
scribed by the use of the word “surplus” with a qualifying
word or phrase which indicates in what respect it differs
from the rest of the surplus.
This leaves the term “reserve” available for the use in the
sense in which it is, I believe, most commonly used in this
country—a reservation out of the gross proceeds of past busi
ness to meet charges which will or may arise in the future
out of that business.
From the standpoint of history, convenience, practicabil
ity and psychology, I believe this line of distinction is pre
ferable to the distinction suggested by Professor Cole.
Yours truly,
George O. May.
March 14, 1927.

IV
RAILROAD DEPRECIATION *

(i.c.c.

no.

15100)

(1927)
The Transportation Act of 1920 requires the Interstate Com
merce Commission to determine:

The classes of property for which depreciation charges
may properly be included under operating expenses and the
percentages of depreciation which shall be charged with re
spect to each of such classes of property. (Section 20, Para
graph 5.)
Depreciation charges into operating expenses may, I as
sume, properly be made if they tend to produce results which
will be superior to those derived without such charges. The
superiority may consist in greater theoretical accuracy, a
more equitable or more convenient distribution of burdens
as between the carriers and the public, or greater simplicity—
or these various considerations may be in part conflicting
and the propriety of the system of depreciation charges may
depend on where the balance of advantage lies, which in turn
may depend on the importance attached to the possibly con
flicting considerations of theory, simplicity, equity and con
venience.
It could scarcely be held that a system which was both theo
retically sound and equitable must be rejected on the ground
that it involved complexities and inconvenience, though
where equity is not involved, convenience and simplicity
might well outweigh purely theoretical considerations.
It may, therefore, be most convenient to consider the Com* Memorandum submitted November 1, 1927, in relation to the Report of
the Interstate Commerce Commission in No. 151000, set for rehearing on
November 9, 1927.
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mission’s scheme, primarily from the standpoints of theory
and equity. In such an approach to the problem three major
questions arise:
The relation of the problem to that of valuation, involv
ing consideration of the principles of valuation to be assumed
for the purposes of considering this relationship.
The relation of the problem to that of maintenance in
general, involving consideration of the principles governing
the determination of charges against operating expenses in
respect of all forms of property exhaustion.
The relation of the problems to the practice in the past,
involving consideration of the proper treatment of any de
preciation which would, upon the scheme proposed, be
deemed to have accrued in the past.
I propose to discuss these three aspects of the problem in
turn, dealing in connection with each phase with any major
considerations of convenience or practicability which seem
to me to have a bearing on the question.
RELATION OF THE PROBLEM TO VALUATION

Depreciation in its broadest sense is a lessening of worth
from any cause whatsoever; it is, however, commonly used to
signify the lessening of worth in service due to exhaustion of
useful life, other factors in value being left out of account.
Depreciation charges, moreover, are frequently made on still
another basis which does not necessarily imply any very close
relation to the rate of lessening of value—namely, such a basis
as will in a systematic way distribute the original value of a
property unit (less estimated salvage, if any) over the prob
able term of its useful life. The last is the sense in which
the term is commonly used in industrial practice, the distri
bution of the charge for the unit over its useful life being
based on a variety of considerations, and bearing little rela
tion to the course of values during that life.
The language of the Act clearly excludes the possibility
that Congress used the word “depreciation” in Section 20
in its broadest sense. Declines in the value of property due
to purely external causes are not chargeable to operating ex
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penses nor are they capable of determination on any per
centage basis. The language of the Section is not, however,
sufficient to determine what was intended as between the
second and third concepts of depreciation charges above
mentioned, and it would therefore seem that the decision
must be governed by consideration of the general purposes
of the Act and of other acts regulating relations between
the carriers and the public.
One of the main purposes of the Act was to provide for
the determination from time to time of the fair value of the
property of carriers, and to regulate rates and limit the re
turns to the carriers on the basis thereof. The question arises,
then, whether Congress contemplated that the depreciation
charges referred to in Paragraph 5 of Section 20 above quoted
should enter into the determination of the fair value of the
property as well as into the determination of operating ex
penses.
The Commission proceeds on the hypothesis that there is
necessarily a direct and immediate connection between the
charging of depreciation to operating expenses and the de
termination of the rate base value; it says (Report, page
310):
In our consideration, therefore, of the relative burdens
imposed by the depreciation and retirement methods of
accounting, we must start with the premise that the former
presupposes full deduction of accrued depreciation in ascer
taining the rate base value . . . .
If this premise be accepted it follows that the depreciation
system must be one that not only results in a fair charge
against operating expenses but also measures with substantial
accuracy the lessening of worth in service due to exhaustion
of useful life.
The approach to the question as a dual one, affecting both
operating expense and the rate base, presents serious difficul
ties.
While the Commission proceeds on the hypothesis that the
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depreciation charged into operating expenses must be de
ducted from the rate base, the Supreme Court has made it
clear that the rate base must represent the fair present value,
and that in determining that fair value the lessening of worth
as compared with new value must be not wholly theoretical
or based on percentages of general application, but primarily
founded on observation.
There is obvious difficulty in attempting to reconcile the
two positions. In so far as it is possible to do so at all, the
result can be achieved only by adopting a theory of deprecia
tion which will measure with reasonable accuracy the lessen
ing of worth for use in the service due to exhaustion of useful
life, on the basis of cost, and of normal maintenance, leaving
modifications in respect of variations in new value and of
maintenance above or below normal to be dealt with sepa
rately. . The straight line method which the Commission pro
poses to enforce wholly fails to meet this requirement.
THE STRAIGHT LINE METHOD OF WRITING OFF DEPRECIATION
IS DEMONSTRABLY INAPPLICABLE TO THE COMPUTATION OF
VALUES

If property be conceived, as the Commission conceives it,
as representing a capacity for uniform service at a uniform
yield over a definite period of years, the new value of such a
property is (ignoring, salvage) the present value of the an
nual yield to be expected from the employment of such ca
pacity during its useful life, and the value at any later date
is similarly the value of the yield to be anticipated in the
years of life then unexpired. Clearly the rate of lessening of
worth in service in such a case is to be found not by straight
proportion but by reference to annuity tables. If, for in
stance, a unit of property is viewed as representing a capacity
for uniform service at a uniform yield over a period of 50
years, its service value at the end of 25 years is that fraction
of the original value, the numerator of which is the value
of an annuity for 25 years, and the denominator the value of
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a like annuity for 50 years. Assuming an interest rate of
6%, the numerator of the fraction would be 12.78336, and
the denomination 15.76186; in other words, the lessening of
worth due to the exhaustion of one-half of the life of the
property would be less than one-quarter instead of one-half,
and the true value on the Commission’s own hypotheses ac
tually nearer to cost than to the depreciated value as com
puted by the Commission’s method.
The incorrect results produced by the straight line method
of depreciation may be illustrated in another way. Upon the
Commission’s hypothesis that a given unit of property will
yield uniform service over a specified period of time, clearly
the charges against the traffic in respect thereof in each year
should be uniform. The Commission says, page 353:
The principle is fair, however, that the cost resulting
from the using up of property in service should be shared
equally by the years which have had the benefit of the use.

But the charges against the traffic are twofold: first, a charge
for exhaustion; second, a charge for use, computed as a re
turn on investment, and the truly fair principle is that the
combined charges should be the same in each year. On the
Commission’s method, assuming a 6% rate of return, and a
unit costing $1,000, there would be in the first year a charge
against the traffic of $60.00 for use of the property; and as
suming a 50-year life, a charge of $20.00 for exhaustion of
the property—a total of $80.00. In the 50th year the charge
for return on investment would be only $1.20 (6% on
$20.00) and the charge for exhaustion $20.00, as before—a
total of $21.20, or not much more than one-quarter of the
charge in the first year.
THE ANNUITY METHOD OF COMPUTING DEPRECIATION IS THE
ONLY

ONE

CONSISTENT

WITH

THE

COMMISSION’S

HY

POTHESES AND PURPOSES

The error in principle here disclosed would be corrected
by the adoption of the annuity method of provision for de
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preciation; and it seems to me a matter not of argument but
of simple mathematical demonstration that the annuity
method is the only one that is consistent with the Commis
sion’s own hypotheses and upon those hypotheses reflects the
relation between the value of a new unit arid that of a partly
exhausted one.
This may be made clearer by assuming the case of a carrier
offered the alternative of purchasing a new unit with a useful
life of 50 years and a unit exactly similar one year old and
with an unexhausted useful life of 49 years. All the carrier
would gain by acquiring the new rather than older unit
would be the service of the unit in the fiftieth year in the
future and all it could prudently pay for this advantage
would be the present value of the yield from that service to
be received in fifty years. Assuming the annual yield (cover
ing depreciation and return on investment) to be $1,000, and
the rate of return to be 6% per annum, the present value of
the yield in the fiftieth year is found from the tables to be
$54.29.
The value of the new unit would be..................
and that of the unit one year old........................

$15,761.86
15,707.57

the difference being, of course,..........................

$

54.29

as compared with $314.15 depreciation computed on the
straight line basis. The percentage of reduction of worth in
service due to the exhaustion of one year’s useful life out of
a total of fifty years is thus not one-fiftieth or 2%, but just
over one-third of one per cent; the straight line method
overstates the lessening of worth sixfold.
In order to illustrate the importance of the point the
following comparisons are made of the results by the annuity
and straight line methods respectively in the case of prop
erty units, each costing $10,000 and having assumed annual
lives of 30, 50 and 100 years, respectively:
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Straight
line
method

6%
Annuity
method

Thirty-year life:
Charge for depreciation, 1st year.........................
Return on investment, 1st year.............................

$ 333.33
600.00

$ 126.49
600.00

Combined charge, 1st year.............................

$ 933.00

$ 726.49

Charge for depreciation, last year.........................
Return on investment, last year...........................

$ 333.33
20.00

$ 685.37
41.12

Combined charge, last year...........................

$ 353.33

$ 726.49

Accrued depreciation at midlife.......................

$5,000.00

$2,944.15

$ 200.00
600.00

$

(End of 15 th year)
Fifty-year life:
Charge for depreciation, 1st year.........................
Return on investment, 1st year.............................

34.44
600.00

Combined charge, 1st year.............................

$ 800.00

$ 634.44

Charge for depreciation, last year.........................
Return on investment, last year...........................

$ 200.00
12.00

$ 598.53
35.91

Combined charge, last year...........................

$ 212.00

$ 634.44

Accrued depreciation at midlife.......................

$5,000.00

$1,889.69

One-hundred-year life:
Charge for depreciation, 1st year.........................
Return on investment, 1st year.............................

$ 100.00
600.00

$

(End of 25 th year)
1.77
600.00

Combined charge, 1st year.............................

$ 700.00

$ 601.77

Charge for depreciation, last year.......................
Return on investment, last year...........................

$ 100.00
6.00

$ 567.71
34.06

Combined charge, last year............................

$ 106.00

$ 601.77

Accrued depreciation at midlife.......................

$5,000.00

$ 514.99

(End of 50th year)

It will be observed that at mid-life the loss in value measured
on the annuity basis is 58.9% of the amount of “deprecia
tion” computed by the straight line method in the case of a
unit having a total estimated life of 30 years, 37.8% in the
case of a unit with 50 years life and no more than 10.3%
in the case of a unit having 100 years life.
I see no escape from the conclusion that either the annuity
method must be substituted for the straight line method or
all suggestion of close relationship between depreciated
values and fair value in service abandoned.
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THE ANNUITY METHOD DISCUSSED

It may be noted that using the same interest rates, the sink
ing fund and annuity methods give practically the same re
sults. The sinking fund method, however, contemplates the
return of the investment when the unit is retired and is
adapted rather to retirement reserves than depreciation pro
visions. The annuity method is consistent with the Com
mission’s theory that the investment is returned to the in
vestor gradually and therefore seems to be the only logical
method for the Commission to adopt on its own hypotheses,
the validity of which I need not for the present discuss.
The Commission does not discuss the annuity method, but
expresses the view that the premises that underlie the
straight line method are in accord with the principles which
have been enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United
States, and that the method is simpler and easier to apply,
and adds:

Nor are the practical results of the two methods very
different ...

The straight line method is simpler; but for the reasons I
have given above it seems to me that the method produces re
sults that are wholly at variance with the views enunciated by
the Supreme Court, and the tables which have been given
show conclusively that the results of the sinking fund (or the
annuity) method are widely different from those produced by
the straight line method. In the case of a property with a
reasonably long average life the accrued depreciation on the
sinking fund or annuity method at any given date would not
for many years after the initiation of the enterprise be more
than one-third of the amount computed by the straight line
method.
It should be understood that the views expressed above
are based on my understanding that under existing law pres
ent value is the measure of the rate base. I am not con
cerned with the question how the present value is to be de
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termined; the material bearing of the law on the point here
involved is that it seems to require that in determining the
rate base the deduction for depreciation from year to year
shall follow the course of value which the straight line
method does not and is not intended to do.
I recognize that upon some different conception of the
principles governing the determination of a rate base, upon
which the rate base would be the result of a computation
rather than a reflection of value, unexpended depreciation
provisions created by charges against operating expenses
might appropriately operate to reduce pro tanto the rate
base. If such a concept of the rate base were adopted, how
ever, the whole question of depreciation would require to be
considered on a different footing. The majority of econo
mists would, I believe, take the view that upon such theories
the problem of depreciation does not arise.
I have not undertaken to discuss here the question why, in
view of the objections to the straight line method which I
have urged, that method is freely employed in industrial
practice. That the governing considerations are materially
different in the two cases is apparent, and whatever may be
the merits of the straight line method as an empirical method
of distributing the cost of property over its useful life, it is
not properly applicable and is not applied in industrial prac
tice to the valuation of property. A discussion of the indus
trial problem does not seem strictly relevant to the question
under consideration, but in case the point is regarded as of
interest I attach in a note to this report a brief statement
of some of the major differences between the two problems.
RELATION TO OTHER MAINTENANCE CHARGES

In considering a scheme of depreciation charges, a second
fundamental question is whether the charges against the
traffic in respect of property exhaustion should in any given
case be measured by the original cost of the unit exhausted
or by the cost of the replacing unit.
Under the regulations of the Commission now in effect,
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operating expenses are charged with the cost of equipment
retired through depreciation charges, with cost of structures
retired, when retirement takes place, and with the cost of
the renewal, when renewal takes place, in the case of track
material.
In such circumstances, and in view of this historical aspect
of the question, it seems to me that the Commission begs a
vital question when it accepts as axiomatic the proposition
that the cost of property used up in service is the proper
measure of the charge against the traffic in respect of such
exhaustion. It says (page 303):
There also can be no doubt that the cost of such wornout
or abandoned property units is a part of operating expense
to be charged against the service. The basic question is
whether such cost should be charged in bulk at the time
when each unit is retired, or should be anticipated by peri
odical installments spread over its service life.

and again (page 306):

The cost of property consumed in operation is plainly a
part of the cost of rendering service.
SHOULD THE COST OF ORIGINAL INSTALLATION OR THE COST
OF REPLACEMENT BE CHARGED AGAINST OPERATION?

The question .whether original cost or cost of renewal
should measure the operating charge is not of great impor
tance so long as price levels are reasonably stable, but if price
levels materially vary or, in other words, if there is a sub
stantial change in the value of money, then the point be
comes important and also, I think, the unsoundness of the
axiom becomes apparent. This may be illustrated by con
sidering the point in relation to the German railway system
and the post-war currency depreciation in that country. At
the lowest point of currency depreciation, the pre-war invest
ment in the German railways expressed in marks would have
had a value in stable currency of less than a dollar, and the
annual exhaustion of property (or the retirements) in respect
thereof computed in marks upon the cost in marks would
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have been equivalent to less than a cent. This is, of course,
an extreme case, but the same question is presented in a less
acute form whenever there is a substantial change in the
value of money such as the fall that occurred in the United
States as a result of the war.
It is inherently fair that traffic that is paid for in currency
that has depreciated should be charged with the cost of
property used up in operation on the same scale of values.
Suppose that in a given year property is made good to an
extent exactly equalling the amount of property used up in
operation (measurement being made in physical units).
Justice to all concerned would seem to be achieved by charg
ing the cost of making good property during the year against
the traffic of the year. When the value of money has fallen
there is no basic reason why the increased currency cost of
the new property over the cost of exactly similar property
used up in operation should be added to the capital account
of the railroad to constitute a burden on the patrons or the
public in later years.
The Commission dismisses as of little importance the ques
tion of the equities as between patrons at different periods of
time, but the question is not merely one between the patrons
at different times but ultimately one between the patrons
as a whole and the carriers. If a method be adopted which
wrongfully relieves the present patrons and throws an undue
burden upon the patrons of the future, there is a probability
that the patrons of the future will through their representa
tives take steps to relieve themselves of this unjust burden
and the railroads would not be able successfully to resist
such attempts on the ground that they constituted confisca
tion of railroad property. For it would be easy to prove that
any confiscation there might be was not the result of the re
vised regulations but the result of the action of the regulating
bodies in the past, and that the proper time for the rail
roads to have raised the question was at the earlier date.
If the principle be accepted that the sum on which the
carrier is entitled to a return as compensation for the use of
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property in service is its fair present value, consistency would
suggest that the measure of the compensation for property
used up should also be its fair present value or, in other
words, the current cost of replacement of what is exhausted.
I believe also the same result is reached on the assumption
that the rate of return is to be computed upon the amount of
the prudent investment in the property. This theory rests
upon the proposition that when an investment is made in
railroad property it is a permanent investment and the in
vestor exchanges a present command of purchasing power
for a right to receive a reasonable return thereon in the
future, and that thereafter fluctuations in the value or cost
of reproduction of the property represented by his invest
ment are of no practical significance to him. It seems to me
a necessary corollary of this proposition that the burden of
maintaining the property should fall on the users of the
property and that fluctuations in the cost of its maintenance
should be treated as at their risk and charge.
The Commission takes a somewhat different view and pro
ceeds upon the theory that on the replacement of any prop
erty the original investment should be regarded as having
been returned to the investors and a fresh investment made
by them in the replacing unit. This, however, seems to me
not only contrary to the normal course of events but to be
inconsistent with the basic idea of the prudent investment.
It seems to me to be a necessary feature of the prudent in
vestment theory that the investment should be voluntary,
and it is only the original investment which can be said to be
voluntary, replacement being a need which grows out of the
voluntary act of creating the original property.
SUPPORT FOR THE REPLACEMENT BASIS IN PRACTICE

The economic arguments in favor of charging the cost of
replacement rather than the cost of the original unit against
operating expenses, find ample support in practice; it is the
method that has consistently been followed in Great Britain,
and, though methods of railroad accounting and reporting
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there have been the subject of numerous official inquiries,
so far as I know no suggestion has ever been made that the
practice should be modified. It was also, I believe, the com
mon practice of the best-managed railroads in the United
States prior to the regulation of accounting by the Interstate
Commerce Commission; it is the practice which has been re
quired by the Commission under the existing regulations for
the last twenty years in respect to important classes of prop
erty, such as track material.
This being so, the Commission, carrying out its instruc
tions to determine the classes of property to which deprecia
tion charges should properly be supplied, is scarcely entitled
to assume as established the proposition that cost is univer
sally the proper basis for charges against operating expenses
in respect of the maintenance or exhaustion of property.
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE DEPRECIATION CHARGES ECONOMICALLY

WISE?

I might agree with the Commission that if the prudent in
vestment theory of rate base were to be adopted, and if, more
over, depreciation charges were to be set aside, then the un
expended depreciation provisions should be deducted from
the gross investment in arriving at the rate base. But I agree
with those economic authorities who hold that upon this
theory no provisions for depreciation are, upon consideration
of the economic and practical aspects of the question, neces
sary or desirable.
In order to consider this question dispassionately it may be
well to look at it from the standpoint of a community in
which a new railroad enterprise is under contemplation. Let
us assume that it is agreed between the promoters of the
railroad and the community that the former shall be entitled
to a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair return on their
investment in the line, and that the community shall have
the right to restrict closely the profits of the railroad to that
fair return. Would competent economic advisers of the
community advocate such a system of charging depreciation
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as the Commission now proposes? It has already been shown
that the result of this method is to throw the heaviest burden
in respect of use and exhaustion of each unit of property
upon the earliest years of its life. In these earliest years the
amount of service rendered would be less than might reason
ably be expected in the later years; consequently the charge
in respect of the property per unit of service would be still
more burdensome in comparison with the charge for the
service of later years. Such a condition would seem to be
exactly the reverse of that which would be economically de
sirable from the standpoint of the community. Its interests
would be served by keeping the charges in the early years
down to the minimum consistent with maintaining the
efficiency of the property, thus enlarging the volume of the
commodities which could profitably be transported, and
building up both the traffic and the community more rapidly
than would otherwise be possible. The best interests of the
community in such a situation would, it would seem, be
served by a mutual agreement to ignore the depreciation on
the property in so far as it could never be made good while
the property was being operated—the owners of the railroad
agreeing that this depreciation should not be treated as a
part of cost of operation and the community agreeing on the
other hand that in computing return no deduction should
be made from the original investment in respect thereof.
THE REPLACEMENT PRINCIPLE SHOULD AT LEAST BE RETAINED
IN CASES IN WHICH IT IS NOW APPLIED UNDER THE COM

MISSION’S REGULATIONS

It cannot be denied that there is a very substantial case,
economic, historical and practical, for the replacement prin
ciple in general; and it seems to me that the case for the re
tention of that principle in dealing with the classes of prop
erty, such as track material, to which it is now applied is con
vincing, unless real and substantial advantages from the
change to the depreciation principle can be demonstrated.
I can see no such advantage.
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While the application of the depreciation scheme to rails
and ties now treated on the replacement basis is simple so
far as the material cost is concerned, the Commission itself
is forced to the conclusion that it is impracticable in the case
of the labor cost. The application of the scheme to miscel
laneous track material contemplated by the Commission pre
sents exceptional difficulties, which can be overcome only
by the most arbitrary rules.
The depreciation section of the Commission recommended
that the principle be not extended to track materials, but the
Commission rejected this recommendation, apparently in an
effort to achieve consistency; and apart from this one con
sideration the Commission’s discussion of the subject consti
tutes a statement of arguments against its own conclusions
which, though overruled, are not met.
DEPRECIATION CHARGES MIGHT WELL BE CONTINUED IN RESPECT
OF EQUIPMENT

In the case of equipment, on the other hand, the historical
argument runs the other way. Many who disapproved of the
establishment of the depreciation charges in respect of
equipment would concede that it would now be unwise to
reverse that policy. In passing, it may be noted that the
Commission is in error in assuming (page 304) that such a
reversal would add the amount of the existing reserves to
the surplus accounts of the carriers. The true alternative
to the depreciation system is the charging of the cost of re
placements to operating expenses. Under the existing system
the excess of the cost of the replacements of equipment over
that of the units replaced is capitalized, and reversion to the
alternative method would require the charging of the excess
which has been so capitalized to surplus as an offset to the
credit arising from writing back the depreciation reserve.
In view of the great increase in the cost of equipment in
recent years the offset would clearly be very substantial.
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THE PROBLEM OF EXTRAORDINARY REPAIRS

The Commission’s order contemplates a substantial change
in the treatment of equipment depreciation, the provision
being revised to cover not only the cost of the unit but the
cost of extraordinary repairs during its life. The annual
depreciation charge is to be determined by adding to original
cost the estimated cost of extraordinary repairs before final
retirement and deducting estimated salvage, and dividing the
net total by the number of years expected to elapse between
installation and retirement.
The Commission admits the “great practical difficulties”
presented by this method, but says that inclusion of ex
traordinary repairs is “absolutely essential to a properly
comprehensive system of depreciation accounting.”
The proposals of the Commission for solving these diffi
culties are put forward tentatively. The Commission ad
mits that “somewhat arbitrary rules” have had to be made,
but even so the provisions as they stand are clearly inade
quate.
The question at once arises how the cost of extraordinary
repairs is to be estimated; are the estimators to take into
account the probable price levels at the time when the ex
traordinary repairs will be made, or are they to assume that
the price levels at that time will be the same as those prevail
ing when the original unit is installed; and how are differ
ences between the estimated cost of repairs and the actual
costs to be dealt with? No answer to these questions is found
in the report.
It is apparent also that the attempted distinction between
ordinary and extraordinary repairs would offer great oppor
tunities for the manipulation of operating expenses. The
line between the two is proposed to be and must be arbitrary;
and it would be easy for carriers desiring either to swell
operating expenses or to minimize them to do so by splitting
up major repairs into a series of minor repairs which would
be chargeable to operating expenses, or allowing minor re
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pairs to accumulate into a major repair, which would be
chargeable to Depreciation Reserve.
A further consideration is that to base operating expenses
on amounts reserved for future expenditures and to charge
current expenditures against reserves created in past years,
tends to lessen the sense of responsibility of those in all ranks
who are charged with the control of maintenance expendi
tures. It may be doubted whether any system of charging
expenditures in the first instance to operating accounts and
adjusting these accounts to the depreciation basis by any
subsequent transfer will be wholly effective in preventing
this highly undesirable result.
I am prepared to agree with the Commission that extraor
dinary repairs have an essential relation to the problem of
depreciation, but the Commission’s attempt to deal with such
repairs as a part of its depreciation scheme in the case of
equipment, seems to me to introduce complexities and de
tract from the significance of the resulting figures without
solving the problem or producing any compensating ad
vantages. The difficulties in the measurement of the charges
to operating expenses on the basis proposed are serious but
perhaps not much more so than those presented in relation
to other classes of property. The problem of insuring that
only so much of subsequent maintenance expenditure as has
been allowed for in the original provision for depreciation is
charged against the depreciation fund, presents far greater
difficulties, and the report of the Commission fails to indicate
how these difficulties are to be met.
DEPRECIATION ON OTHER CLASSES OF PROPERTY

There remain for consideration the accounts which at
present are treated on the basis that the charge to operating
expenses is based on the cost of the unit retired, but the
charge made only when retirement occurs, and those con
tinuous structures which are seldom retired as units.
The class of property to which a depreciation or replace
ment scheme is most clearly applicable comprises those

DEPRECIATION AND THE I.C.C.

185

structures, such as important bridges, which will require to be
replaced as units and the retirement of which would seriously
distort operating expenses if the cost of the retired unit or
the cost of replacing it were charged into operating expenses
when the retirement occurs. The life of such structures may
be difficult to estimate, but the application of such a scheme
entails less practical difficulties and possesses more obvious
advantages than in the case of almost any other class of
property.
If the depreciation system is to be extended, application to
this class of property would, probably, be the most generally
approved extension. It is also to this class of property that
the annuity or sinking fund methods can most conveniently
be applied, and the life of such structures being usually
fairly long, errors in the estimate thereof would be of little
effect in the early years and could be corrected before overor under-provision would have become serious.
I see, however, no practical advantage in attempting to
depreciate property from its installation if its useful life is
estimated at as much as 80 or 100 years. The value of a
unit having 50 years of useful life unexhausted is on a 6%
basis over 94% of the value of a like unit with 100 years
life unexhausted.
Putting the matter another way, if money is assumed to be
worth 6% (dr even only 5%) and a unit with a useful life of
100 years could be purchased for $100,000 but its life made
perpetual by the expenditure of an additional $1,000, it
would not be economical to spend the additional $1,000,
since the investment of this sum for 100 years would pro
duce far more than $100,000. The distinction between
permanence and an assumed life of 100 years is therefore too
slight to justify depreciating one asset and not the other. It
would be quite adequate to begin to charge depreciation
when the unexpired life falls below, say, 35 years or, at the
outside, 50 years.
In the case of continuous structures, a detailed deprecia
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tion scheme seems to possess very little value and to present
almost insuperable difficulties. To determine what shall be
charged against the reserve and to ensure that such charges
shall correspond to those provided for by credits to the re
serve seem to me problems almost impossible of solution
within reasonable limits of expense. I do not desire to bur
den this memorandum with discussion of technical questions
of secondary importance and therefore merely observe that
these problems do not appear to me to be solved, even in
theory in the Commission’s plan.
PAST DEPRECIATION

The third important relationship involved in considera
tion of any depreciation scheme for the carriers is the rela
tionship to the operations of the past. The Commission does
not attempt to pass finally upon the question how deprecia
tion, which under its scheme is deemed to have accrued in
the past, should be dealt with. It proposes that for the pres
ent the amount should be set up on the books of the carriers
in a suspense account; it does, however, indicate its views
in the following language:

The theoretically correct way of meeting this situation
would be to establish the amount of past accrued deprecia
tion which has not been provided for, and concurrently credit
this amount to the depreciation reserve and charge it to
profit and loss. It is the latter account which has profited in
the past from the failure or partial failure to accrue deprecia
tion charges.
It seems to me that this statement of the position is in
adequate and, as a result, unjust. The omission of depreci
ation provisions in the past is supported too strongly by
theoretical, economic, historical, and practical considera
tions for such omission to be justly characterized as a failure
on the part of the carriers. It seems to me humanly certain
also that if a system of depreciation charges had been in
augurated at the commencement of railroad enterprise in the
United States, the development of the railroads would have
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been made more difficult and the growth of the country
greatly retarded.
Upon a broad view of the situation it seems to me quite
impossible therefore to hold that it is the profit and loss ac
counts of the carriers alone which have profited by the
omission of depreciation charges in the past. The above
considerations apply with peculiar force to depreciation on
the classes of property such as track material, which under
the Commission’s own regulations have been dealt with up
to now on the basis of charging renewals into operating ex
penses. It would probably be reasonable to treat any past
omission to provide adequately for depreciation of equip
ment as a failure on the part of the carriers, seeing that de
preciation provisions have been in force now for twenty years.
If, however, depreciation is to be set up in respect of other
classes of property, the further question arises whether the
amount of the depreciation deemed to have accrued at the
date when the change becomes effective should be provided
in the future through charges against operating expenses or
net income before arriving at the income subject to recap
ture.
THE NECESSITY OF DEPRECIATION CHARGES FOR THE PROTEC
TION OF THE CARRIERS

Commissioner Woodlock in his concurring opinion ex
pressed the view that a system of depreciation charges into
operating expenses was necessary for the due protection of
the carriers. If depreciation is to be deducted from valua
tion, it is reasonable that the carriers should be given an
opportunity to recover depreciation computed on a like basis
through operating expenses. The question, however, is not
one of great urgency and might well await some further de
termination of the principles of valuation and the methods
of computing depreciation in connection therewith. When
this point is reached a system of depreciation in harmony
with the principles of valuation established could be for
mulated. It seems likely to result in confusion and not ad
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vantage to adopt in the meantime a system of depreciation
which is not in harmony with the existing decisions with
regard to valuation and with the prospect of modifying it
substantially when the principles of valuation are more fully
established. When those principles are established better
protection to the carriers and the public could probably be
secured by a broad scheme for accumulating a depreciation
reserve bearing roughly the same relation to the investment
as the depreciation deducted in the net valuation might bear
to the gross valuation, rather than by attempting to follow
the history of units, often small, in meticulous detail.
It is quite clear, moreover, that no system of depreciation
will adequately protect the investment or maintain the effi
ciency of the property, and if this is to be the objective of
the Commission’s efforts, then, even should its present depre
ciation scheme be adopted, it will require to be supplemented
by some scheme for dealing with other forms of maintenance
charges.
SUMMARY

Summarizing my views regarding the proposed scheme, I
recognize that it is a logical complement to the Commission’s
theories of valuation, and if the validity of those theories
were established, the broad outlines of the scheme would be
established with them.
I am disposed further to agree with the Commission, that
apart from question of law or constitutional right the prin
ciple of the prudent investment theory would probably be as
satisfactory as any other method of arriving at a rate base.
I feel, however:

(1) That until legal principles are more clearly estab
lished, the adoption of a general scheme of deprecia
tion charges for all or nearly all property subject to
exhaustion is unnecessary and inopportune.
(2) That the straight line method is wholly inapplicable
to the measurement of the lessening of worth in serv
ice due to partial exhaustion of useful life.
(3) That the Commission’s proposal fails to deal ade
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quately with changing price levels as a factor in the
problem.
(4) That a plan for. dealing with any depreciation at
tributed to the past which shall be equitable, having
regard to the past history of railroad practice and
regulation, is an essential of any satisfactory depreci
ation system. This the Commission’s proposals do
not provide.
(5) That the adoption of the scheme would produce no
gain in accuracy, but would greatly complicate ac
counting, detract from the significance of the accounts,
and increase rather than diminish the opportunities
for manipulation.
(6) That the weight of argument against setting up on a
straight line basis which does not measure the lessen
ing of worth in service depreciation reserves which
can in practice never be expended, is today over
whelming.

In the Commission’s proposals there is an alternation of
sacrifice of theory to practicability and of practicability to
theory which produces a result neither reasonably practical
nor substantially sound in theory.
The establishment of a system of depreciation charges is
itself a sacrifice of practicability to theory; the distribution
of the charge for property exhaustion on the basis of time
without regard to use, and the acceptance of the straight
line method are sacrifices of theory to practicability so
sweeping as to destroy the prospects of any substantial gain
in theoretical accuracy from such a system. Similarly, the
inclusion of extraordinary repairs in the scope of deprecia
tion charges is a major sacrifice of practicability to theory,
but wholesale sacrifices of theory to practicability are, as the
Commission’s report indicates, necessary to make this part of
the scheme workable.
The first suggestion which I would make is that the Com
mission should aim either at substantial theoretical accuracy
or at greater simplicity.
If the former alternative is chosen, the annuity method
should be substituted for the straight line method. If special
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tables, were compiled, an easy task, the application of the
method would not thereafter entail practical difficulties sub
stantially greater than those involved in the straight line
method.
The second problem involved in this alternative, that of
including extraordinary repairs within the scope of the
scheme, undeniably presents greater difficulties. There is
need for elaboration and classification of the proposals of the
Commission in regard to the charges against the reserve
under this head and the treatment of the problem of extraor
dinary repairs made when the price level is materially dif
ferent from that prevailing when the unit was originally
installed.
If the second alternative is adopted the broad policy
should, I think, be:
(1) To limit depreciation charges to equipment and
major units with perhaps in addition a relatively small
general reserve to meet extraordinary retirements of
property not covered by specific reserves.
(2) To depreciate structures on an annuity basis.
(3) To initiate depreciation charges on long-lived prop
erty only when the unexpired life becomes less than
forty years.
Undeniably there is much to be said for approaching the
question from the entirely different standpoint of endeavor
ing to make the maintenance charge for any year reflect as
accurately as possible the exhaustion of property during the
year converted into money on the basis of the price level
of the year. A plan might be devised under which prudent
investment would be the foundation of the rate base, and any
material deficiency or excess of maintenance in any year
would be expressed in terms of money at current values and
charged or credited to operating, the corresponding credit
or charge being a maintenance equalization account which
would enter into the computation of the rate base.
The practical difficulties of such a plan would be slight
compared to those inherent in a scheme such as the Commis
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sion proposes, and such a plan would have obvious theoreti
cal merits. It must be recognized, however, that at the
present time there is no satisfactory basis in law for such a
proposal and also that the principle involved is altogether
different from that which the Commission has followed in
the past, so that the Commission could not reasonably be
expected to adopt such a plan unless it were as a part of a
thorough revision of the principles of accounting of the
carriers, which might well be undertaken, however, since the
accounts are now in large measure an accounting between
the carriers and the public.
NOTE

The problem of depreciation in industrial accounting dif
fers from the problem of depreciation in the case of public
utilities subject to rate regulation or recapture of earnings
in the following, among other, respects:
(1) The value of property employed and of the property
used up by a public utility in rendering service are
essential and major factors in the determination of
the charges for such service. It is mainly from this
fact that the Commission’s concern with depreciation
arises.
The same factors have relatively far less bearing on
prices in the industrial field. This is true for various
reasons. Capital assets, to begin with, constitute a
much smaller proportion of the investment in the case
of industrial enterprises than in that of public util
ities. More important is the fact that in the indus
trial field prices are determined to a far greater extent
by considerations other than cost, such as value to the
purchaser, competition, etc.
(2) The predominant consideration in industrial account
ing is conservatism rather than theoretical accuracy.
This is well illustrated in the rule for valuing inven
tories at “cost or market, whichever is lower”—a rule
founded obviously not on logic or theory but on
abundant caution. The Commission is not justified
in requiring or permitting a method which errs
demonstrably on the side of conservatism to a material

192

DEPRECIATION

extent; the result almost inevitably would be injus
tice to the carrier or the patron.
(3) The accounting for capital assets in industrial prac
tice does not aim at recording the course of value in
service. This is well illustrated by the practice in
charging depletion commonly followed and accepted
by the Treasury. Mines are usually valued by taking
the discounted present value of the estimated yield
from unmined tonnage. Other things being equal,
the value at the end of a year’s operation would be
found by making a similar calculation in respect of
the reduced tonnage. Depletion charges are, how
ever, almost universally computed by dividing the
value of the mine originally determined by the esti
mated tonnage, and thus computing a rate per ton
which is applied uniformly from year to year. No
one would suggest that the deduction of the depletion
so computed from the original cost or value of the
mine would in any circumstances be a proper method
of computing residual value of the mine.
(4) The distinguishing characteristic of American in
dustry is the readiness with which property units are
discarded when superior types become available. In
such circumstances common prudence suggests, in the
case of highly competitive industry, the desirability of
writing off a large proportion of the investment over
the early years of use, conditions during which can
be forecast with some degree of confidence. Hence
' the straight line method is appropriate in industrial
practice; indeed, the diminishing balance method
which produces even greater charges in the early years
is sometimes employed.
The Commission’s hypotheses, if they do not exclude
the application of these considerations to railroad
property, reduce their weight to inconsiderable pro
portions. Upon its view, if a purchase of property is
prudent when made, the carrier is assured of an op
portunity to earn a return on its cost during its useful
life. The incentive to retire the unit on account of
obsolescence before its efficiency is seriously impaired
is almost wholly lacking.
It may be added that the argument advanced by the Com
mission, that the depreciation charge in respect of a unit
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should be equal in each year of its useful life, has more
validity in the case of an industrial enterprise than in that of
a public utility. It is not customary in industrial practice
to include interest in cost, so that the depreciation charge is
the only property charge, and the point made on page 4 of
the memorandum that it is the combined charges for de
preciation and return, rather than one separate charge that
should be uniform, does not arise.

V

CARRIER PROPERTY CONSUMED IN OPERATION AND
THE REGULATION OF PROFITS
A DISCUSSION OF THE I.C.C. REPORT ON DEPRECIATION *

(1929)
I

determining whether a given rate structure of a carrier is
compensatory or confiscatory, it is necessary to make two
allowances on account of carrier property: first, an allowance
for the use, and second, an allowance for the consumption
of property in rendering service. Some property may be in
destructible, so that no allowance under the second head is
called for; other property may be consumed so rapidly that
there is no charge under the first head on account of it. But
in most classes of property both allowances are necessary.
It is generally agreed that the charge for use should be in
the form of interest or return at a percentage rate upon a
fair capital value for the property employed in rendering
service, often called the rate base. Controversy arises over
the questions how the capital value—the rate base—should
be computed and upon what principles the rate of return
thereon should be determined. In respect to the allowance
for consumption of property the questions arise, upon what
basis the allowance should be made in money and whether
it should be made (in the case of property whose useful life
extends over a considerable period) as the consumption pro
ceeds, when it becomes complete, or when it is made good.
Now, while much has been written and conflicting views
have been expressed by courts, commissions, economists and
others on the questions how the rate base should be com
puted and how the rate of return to be applied to that rate
In

* Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. XLIII (February, 1929), pp. 193-220
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base should be determined, and also upon the question
whether the allowance for consumption should or should
not be made as consumption proceeds (or, as it is commonly
phrased, upon a depreciation basis), comparatively little con
sideration has been given to the question how the money
value of property consumed should be computed. Some con
sideration of it might have been expected in connection with
the determination of the extent to which depreciation charges
should form a part of railroad accounting, which was re
quired of the Interstate Commerce Commission under the
Transportation Act of 1920. The Commission instituted an
inquiry (Case 15,100) and held extensive hearings. But in
the decision that the Commission rendered under date of
November 2, 1926, the question how the money value of
property consumed should be computed was scarcely dis
cussed. The Commission passed it over in the following
language:
There also can be no doubt that the cost of such worn-out
or abandoned property units is a part of operating expense
to be charged against the service. The basic question is
whether such cost should be charged in bulk at the time
when each unit is retired, or should be anticipated by peri
odical instalments spread over its service life.

But the proposition that cost is necessarily and universally
the proper basis of the charge for property consumed is by
no means axiomatic. On the contrary, it is far from being
demonstrably sound in theory and equally far from being
adopted in practice—even under the Commission’s own regu
lations.
In the course of the decision the Commission said also:

In our consideration, therefore, of the relative burdens
imposed by the depreciation and retirement methods of ac
counting, we must start with the premise that the former
presupposes full deduction of accrued depreciation in ascer
taining the rate base value.
Since the Commission had deducted depreciation on a
straight line basis in its valuations, it naturally adopted the
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same basis in the decision in question. Furthermore, har
mony with its valuation practice necessitated the application
of depreciation to such property as miscellaneous track
material, though the Commission’s accounting section had ad
vised against such an application on the score of impractica
bility. It also entailed a substantial change in the method
of application of the straight line depreciation plan from
that heretofore applied in the case of equipment.
Here again, however, the Commission seems to stand on
insecure ground, for the conditions which it postulates re
garding the deduction of depreciation in determining the
rate base, coupled with its adherence to straight line depre
ciation, bring its position into direct opposition to Supreme
Court decisions on the point. Thus the Commission’s whole
case rests heavily on an axiom and a postulate, both of which
lack validity. The explanation is apparently that the Com
mission, or some members of it at least, still clings to the
hope that the Supreme Court will reverse its past rulings
regarding the rate base and accept the line of reasoning ad
vanced in various minority opinions, notably in the dissent
ing opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in the Southwestern
Bell Telephone Company case.*
The Commission’s decision of November 2, 1926, gave
rise to much criticism and to requests for rehearing. These
requests were granted and the rehearing, which is now in
progress, seems to be developing, as it rightly should, into a
broad reconsideration of railroad accounting methods in
general. In the circumstances a discussion of the deprecia
tion problem seems opportune, particularly as the account
ant’s view may differ from that of either the lawyer or the
economist.
11

The specific questions which it is proposed to discuss are:
1. Should charges for consumption of property in ren
dering service be based uniformly on cost: (a) for purposes
* 262 u. s., 276.
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of rate and profit regulation; and (b) for current accounting
purposes?
2. Should the charge for property consumed be made in
bulk at the time when each unit is retired, or should it be
anticipated by periodical instalments spread over its service
life?
3. If consumption charges are to be made as consump
tion proceeds rather than when it becomes complete, on
what basis should the accrual be deemed to take place and
be computed?
The relation between the basis of exhaustion charges and
the principles of computation of the rate base is, as the
Commission points out, direct and vital. Some economists *
hold that if the so-called prudent investment theory is to
prevail, depreciation provisions cannot possibly have any
proper place in the scheme of things. It therefore seems
desirable as a preliminary step to discuss briefly the two
principal conflicting theories of rate base determination.
The difference between the two theories, sometimes re
ferred to as the “present value theory” and the “prudent
investment theory” respectively, is understood by all stu
dents of the subject and is sufficiently indicated by two sen
tences—one from the majority opinion and the other from
the dissenting opinion in the Southwestern Bell Telephone
Company case. Mr. Justice Brandeis, advancing the pru
dent investment theory, says: “The thing devoted by the in
vestor to the public use is not specific property, tangible
and intangible, but capital embarked in the enterprise.”
Mr. Justice McReynolds, in the majority opinion, however,
quotes from the decision in the Minnesota rate cases: “The
property is held in private ownership and it is that property,
and not the original cost of it, of which the owner may not
be deprived without due process of law.”
Mr. Justice Brandeis supported his contentions by a force* No attempt is made to cite authorities for this or other economic argu
ments herein advanced, since the writer’s knowledge of the authorities is not
wide enough to enable him to make just attribution. His acknowledgment
of indebtedness to economic writers must be general, not specific.
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ful presentation of the economic and practical advantages
of prudent investment as the measure of the rate base. The
refusal of the majority to accept his conclusion does not
necessarily imply dissent from this part of his argument.
Their view is perhaps rather that the Court is not free to
apply whatever rule may seem economically wisest. Ap
parently in the majority view present value must, under the
Constitution, be the measure of the rate base; cost is sig
nificant only in so far as it reflects fair present value. Eco
nomic considerations may, and indeed must, be taken into
account in determining present value, but the Court is not
free to adopt or approve a basis for regulation which, though
perhaps economically wise, disregards present value. Mr.
Justice Brandeis does suggest that cost is the only practical
measure of present value, but in his main argument he at
tempts to support cost as a measure of the rate base without
linking it to present value. To a layman his failure to carry
the Court with him in this part of his argument seems in
evitable; but the whole discussion illustrates very clearly
how the difficulties of the problem have been accentuated
by the way in which we have drifted into it.
The problem comes before the courts as a conflict of con
stitutional rights which are unequivocally recognized but not
clearly defined. On the one side there is the right of the
people through its representatives to regulate business af
fected by a public interest; on the other the right of the
carriers to protection against complete or partial confiscation
of property. The Supreme Court, in holding that it is the
present value of the property employed that must, under the
Constitution, form the basis for determining whether any
regulation is confiscatory in its effects, does not imply that in
its judgment present value is, from the standpoint of either
carriers or the public, the most satisfactory basis for regula
tion of rates or profits.
Looking backwards, one might say that the acts under
which carrier enterprises were originally undertaken should
have recognized the constitutional rights of the carriers and
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the public, and have laid down principles for determining
fair compensation which would have been binding on both
parties on the acceptance of the acts by the carriers. It may
well be, also, that prudent investment would, in such cir
cumstances, have been the most appropriate measure of a
proper return and its adoption desirable in the interests of
all parties. No such action was, however, taken. The ques
tions may not have been anticipated or, since the economic
gains which would result from the construction of railroads
were obvious, all parties may have been concerned to get
them built and disinclined to raise questions likely to delay
action and not of immediate importance. Apparently for
years after the initiation of the great era of railroad con
struction, competition and similar natural economic forces
were deemed an adequate safeguard against excessive rates.
Conceivably those who foresaw that the question would arise
may have been content to await the day without prior com
mitments, and so to be free then to urge whatever theory
might seem most advantageous to the interests with which
they were concerned. Certain it is that the way in which
we have drifted into the problem, with no clear principles
laid down, but with broad constitutional rights on each side,
makes any present-day solution far more difficult.
The approach to the problem from the standpoint of
prudent investment offers the practical advantages which
Mr. Justice Brandeis pointed out: it recognizes the essential
fact that, once money is invested in a railroad, the invest
ment is valuable only for what it can produce; it has the
merits of continuity and relative certainty. On the part of
carriers, the main objections to prudent investment as a
measure of the rate base are perhaps first and foremost that
it denies the carrier any benefit from the increment in land
values which railroad construction has created, and second,
that it fails to produce a fair return when the currency has
depreciated or there has been a marked rise in price levels.
However, if the carriers are to be participators in the incre
ment in values which they have created, it should be pos
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sible to find a fair and more practical measure of their just
share than the hypothetical appreciation of land which they
own but cannot sell, if at all, without sacrificing other values.
And similarly, if the return to carriers is to vary with
changes in the value of the currency or of price levels, an
adjustment on the basis of the changes in the value of cur
rency as measured by general internal purchasing power or
international exchange value might be simpler and fairer
than one measured by changes in the values of the particular
units of property that go to make up a railroad.
The question is, largely, what form of assurance of return
is calculated to secure capital most advantageously. It is
all very well to say that security is the first requisite, but
what constitutes security? Is it a stable income or a stable
capital value, and in either case is the stability to be meas
ured in terms of money or in terms of purchasing power?
Prior to the war, fixed money income was perhaps mainly
sought. But the course of security and commodity prices
during and since the war has brought home to investors the
possibilities of loss inherent in a fixed-income investment
when interest rates and prices both rise; and in recent years
the importance of stability of real income and of capital
value has been more appreciated than formerly. One mani
festation of this trend is the increased popularity of common
stocks among investors.
The prudent investment theory is capable of adaptation
so that it will tend to meet whatever form of assurance is
deemed most desirable; but when interest rates and price
levels fluctuate, only one form of stability can be obtained
by any one method, and the choice of any one form implies
definite relinquishment of the three other forms of stability.
The alternatives can be summarily stated thus:
1. If the return is restricted to a fixed rate on actual in
vestment, it is the fixed money income that is stabilized, and
the investor assumes the. risk of fluctuations in the purchas
ing power of this income and in the capital value of his
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investment. This is the position under the English Gas and
Water Company Acts.
2. If the fair return is measured by the actual investment
and current rates of interest, it is the capital value of the
investment in money that is stabilized. This seems to be the
principle favored by Mr. Justice Brandeis.
3. If a stable real income is desired, the result can be ob
tained by using a fixed rate of return but using as the rate
base the actual investment adjusted for changes in the gen
eral price level.
4. Finally, the capital investment measured in terms of
purchasing power can be stabilized by adjusting the prudent
investment in respect to the change in the general price level,
and applying to the rate base so ascertained a rate of return
based on current rates of interest.
The method of applying a fair current rate to a fair pres
ent value of the property employed in rendering service,
which has the support of the Supreme Court, differs from
the principle last mentioned in that it takes account of
changes in value not attributable to changes in price levels,
and reflects variations in price of the particular commodities
by which the investment is represented instead of changes
in the general price level.
Theoretically there might be an alternative application of
the present-value theory under which a fixed rate of return
would be applied to the rate base determined on present
values. It would, however, be illogical to determine the
rate base with reference solely to existing conditions and
to ignore existing conditions in fixing the rate of return.
This being so, the alternative scarcely needs consideration.
For the same reasons the variant (3) of the prudent invest
ment theory, above mentioned, may be eliminated or left
to come into existence as a part of a general scheme of
stabilization of the purchasing power of money.
Of the other variants of the prudent-investment theory,
the last mentioned, (4), which contemplates adjustments for
changes in price level and interest rates, has received little
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consideration, though the acceptance of this modification
would go far to reconcile the theory with the basic constitu
tional requirement that the ultimate rate base must be
defensible as a reflection of present values. The prudentinvestment advocates, as a rule, favor the actual money in
vestment as the measure of the rate base.
The Supreme Court rejects this view and insists on pres
ent value. But what is present value? The Court has said
that actual investment, present cost of reproduction, and
other elements are all factors in determining it. The con
clusion reached in any case will depend on the weight as
signed to the various factors. At the moment, however, the
legal standard of present value seems to tend to approximate
cost of reproduction (with some adjustment for decline in
value due to condition).
Notwithstanding the pronouncements of the Supreme
Court, the Interstate Commerce Commission has continued
to express its convictions in favor of prudent investment, and
in some cases to attempt to give practical effect to those
convictions. In the following discussion of the treat
ment of property consumed in rendering service, both the
prudent investment and the present value theories of com
pensation for property use will therefore be kept in mind,
the prudent investment theory being deemed to imply the
use of actual investment, and the present value theory the
use of substantially present cost of reproduction as the rate
base. The question whether any deduction, and if so, what
deduction, shall be made from the gross value for decline
from new condition is reserved for consideration as the dis
cussion proceeds.
III
We may now consider the specific questions raised above,
and first the question, “Should charges for consumption of
property in rendering service be based uniformly on cost
(a) for purposes of rate and profit regulation; and (b) for
current accounting purposes?”
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The question is subdivided into these two parts in order
to emphasize the point that the considerations affecting the
two aspects of the question are not identical. Nevertheless,
while it is not in theory essential that the treatment of
charges for consumption of property in rate cases should be
identical with that in the current accounting of the carrier,
obviously serious inconvenience would result if different
methods were employed for the two purposes; indeed, it is
scarcely too much to say that practicability requires identical
treatment. It follows that any method prescribed by the
Commission should be reasonably appropriate for both pur
poses.
As has already been suggested, the assumption made by the
Commission that the charge for property consumed should
be based uniformly on its original cost does not find support
either in theory or in past practice.
Where rates are being regulated there are at least two
other bases for which theoretical arguments can be ad
vanced: current cost of reproduction and probable cost of
replacement. Prospective cost of replacement seems in prin
ciple the most appropriate basis if the prudent investment
theory of rate base is accepted; if the present value theory of
rate base is adopted, current cost of reproduction from year
to year seems theoretically the correct basis for the compu
tation of the exhaustion charge.
It is inherently fair that, if traffic is paid for in currency
which has depreciated, the charge against the traffic for prop
erty used up in operation should be calculated upon the
same scale of values. Suppose that in a given year property
is made good to an extent exactly equaling the amount of
property used up in operation (measurement being made in
physical units): justice to all would seem to be achieved by
charging the cost of making good property during the year
against traffic of the year. When the value of money has
fallen there is no valid reason why the increased currency
cost of the replacing units over the original cost of exactly
similar property used up in operation should be treated as
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capital expenditure so as to constitute a burden on the
patrons of a later time.
Further: if the principle be accepted that the sum on
which the carrier is entitled to a return as compensation for
the use of property in service is its fair present value, con
sistency would suggest that the measure of the compensation
for property used up should also be its fair present value, or,
in other words, the current cost of replacement of what is
exhausted. The point may be made clearer by an illustra
tion.
Take the first year of the life of a locomotive: suppose its
cost to be $25,000; suppose the fair rate of return for use
(exclusive of exhaustion) to be six per cent; suppose it is
agreed that three per cent of new value is a fair measure of
the annual charge for exhaustion; then the charge against
the traffic for the locomotive is nine per cent (six plus three)
of $25,000, or $2,250. Now consider, say, the tenth year,
when through currency depreciation the new value is $60,000, and the condition of the property, as the result of ex
haustion on the one hand and rebuilding on the other, is
80 per cent of new value—interest rates being unchanged.
On the present value theory the rate base for the locomotive
is 80 per cent of $60,000, or $48,000, and the use charge six
per cent thereon, $2,880. Is it not clear that on the
same theory the exhaustion charge should logically be three
per cent on $60,000, rather than three per cent on $25,000?
The practical objections to the application of this prin
ciple are so great as perhaps to compel its rejection. If so,
it may be argued that whichever of the other bases more
closely approximates to the theoretically correct one should
be chosen. But clearly actual reproduction cost would nor
mally tend to be closer to original cost in the earlier years of
the life of a unit, and to prospective replacement cost in the
later years, so that there could be no preponderance in favor
of either of these bases.
In these circumstances it may be said that the theoretical
arguments are equally balanced, and that the choice between

CARRIER PROPERTY CONSUMED

205

original cost and probable replacement cost should be de
termined by practical convenience. This would mean that
if the charge is to be made for exhaustion as it proceeds,
original cost would be the preferable basis, since original cost
could be more easily ascertained or estimated than probable
replacement cost. If, on the other hand, exhaustion is to be
provided for in bulk when the unit is retired, the actual
cost of replacement would be a more convenient basis for the
charge than an actual or estimated original cost. On the
whole it may be said that, if the present value theory of rate
base is to govern, there is no balance of argument on the
score of either theory or practical advantage in favor of
either original cost or replacement cost as the basis of the
charge to operations for property exhaustion.
Let us now consider the question on the assumption that
the use charge is to be computed upon the prudent invest
ment theory. This theory rests upon the proposition that
when an investment is made in railroad property it is per
manent, that the investor exchanges a present command of
purchasing power for a right to receive a reasonable return
thereon in the future, and that thereafter fluctuations in the
value or cost of reproduction of the property represented by
his investment are of no practical significance to him. It
seems a legitimate corollary of this proposition that the
burden of maintaining the property should fall on those who
benefit from the use of the property, and that fluctuations in
the cost of its maintenance should be treated as at their
risk and charge. This would mean that, if the prudent
investment theory is to control, prospective cost of replace
ment should be the basis of the exhaustion charge, whether
such charge is to be made as the exhaustion proceeds or in
bulk as units are retired.
The Interstate Commerce Commission in its report on
Case 15,100 takes a somewhat different view, and proceeds
upon the theory that on the replacement of any property the
original investment should be regarded as having been re
turned to the investors and a fresh investment made by them
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in the replacing unit. This, however, seems not only con
trary to the normal course of events but inconsistent with the
basic idea of the prudent investment. It seems to be an
essential feature of the prudent investment theory that the
investment is voluntary; and it is only the original invest
ment that can be said to be voluntary—replacement being a
necessity that grows out of, first, the voluntary act of creating
the original property, and second, the use of the property
in rendering service.
This theoretical argument in favor of charging the cost
of replacement rather than the cost of the original unit
against operating expenses finds ample support in practice.
It is the method that has consistently been followed in Great
Britain; and though methods of railroad accounting and
reporting there have been the subject of numerous official
inquiries, apparently no suggestion has even been made that
the practice should be modified. Railroad accounting in
Great Britain has always proceeded on the principle that the
original cost is a permanent investment and that the main
tenance of a property, including the replacement of units,
is to be effected out of revenue. This was also, it is believed,
the common practice of the best-managed railroads in the
United States prior to the regulation of accounting by the
Interstate Commerce Commission; it is the practice that has
been required by the Commission under the existing regula
tions during the last twenty years for important classes of
property, such as rails, ties and other track material.
It must be remembered that the original construction of a
railroad, particularly in a new country, often involves costs
not entailed in the subsequent replacement of units. For
instance, rails may have had to be hauled on mule-back over
mountains at a cost exceeding the cost of the rails at the
point of production, whereas when replacement becomes
necessary they can be shipped over the railroad itself at a
fraction of the original transportation cost. The extraor
dinary transportation cost of the original rail can rightfully
be regarded as attaching to the railroad as a whole, rather
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than to the particular pieces of metal in the track, and every
economic and financial requirement is met when the replace
ment of the rail is provided for through operating expenses
on a basis including a normal current transportation charge.
The answer to our first question may then be stated as
follows:
1. If the rate base is to be computed on the present
value theory, then the balance of argument is slightly in
favor of original cost as the basis of the exhaustion charge if
provision is to be made as exhaustion proceeds, and slightly
in favor of replacement cost if the charge is to be made when
exhaustion is complete.
2. If the rate base is to be computed on the prudent
investment theory, then the balance of argument is decidedly
in favor of replacement cost as the basis of the exhaustion
charge if exhaustion is provided for as it proceeds, and still
more decidedly if the charge is to be made only in bulk when
the exhaustion is complete.
IV

We may now consider the second question stated on page
197, which is in substance whether provision for consump
tion as it takes place—or what is commonly called a depreci
ation scheme—is or is not desirable for various classes of rail
road property.
The reasons that have led the Commission to favor a com
plete depreciation scheme appear to be four:
1. That existing methods do not take out of capital or
charge into operating expenses an exhaustion of value that
has undoubtedly taken place;
2. That the existing methods facilitate manipulation of
operating expenses through excessive or inadequate ex
penditure for maintenance;
3. That such a plan strengthens the financial position of
the carrier and puts it in a position to render better service;
4. That it is necessary, as the Commission sees it, to bring
accounting and valuation methods into harmony.
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The theoretical correctness of the first point may be con
ceded and yet the wisdom of the suggested change, from the
standpoint of the carrier and the public alike, still be seri
ously questioned.
If we consider the usual history of a railroad from its
creation as a new property, we find that, for some years,
while wear and tear will be taking place, it will not be prac
ticable or economical to make good this wear and tear. Con
sequently the renewals will be light and the unexhausted
service value of the property will diminish until a point is
reached where any further deterioration would mean a loss
of efficiency. At this point renewals will, begin, and every
such renewal will tend to restore or extend the original life
of the unit to which it is applied. The point at which such
renewals become necessary will vary with each unit, even of
the same kind. Once the point is reached, the group can
not further depreciate if it is properly maintained; and
hence, in practice, while single units may and frequently do
run down to a point much below this average without be
coming absolutely inefficient, a complete property, if prop
erly maintained, arrives at a more or less stationary value and
never reaches the theoretical scrap value. At this point
proper maintenance will call for expenditures for renewals
and replacements which will approximately equal the de
preciation charge; renewals and replacements, due either to
wear and tear or to obsolescence, all the time tending to post
pone the date when final replacement occurs.*
This brief outline suggests a number of considerations.
There is clearly in the case of a matured property a sub
stantial exhaustion which will never be made good. In the
accounting of a new company is it necessary or desirable to
* It may be of interest to mention that this paragraph is substantially a
quotation from a communication addressed to the Interstate Commerce Com
mission by the writer’s firm in 1908, questioning the soundness of a system
of depreciation which merely distributed the original cost over estimated
life as extended probably by important renewals without making any allow
ance for the cost of those renewals. The Commission in its decision in
Case 15,100 has attempted to meet such criticisms by a modification of the
scheme.

CARRIER PROPERTY CONSUMED

209

provide out of earnings for this exhaustion? If, in the case
of a mature company, no such provision, has in fact been
made heretofore, should it now be made and, if so, how and
by whom should the cost be borne? Precisely what purpose
does such a provision serve? Is it to offset a loss of value?
If so, what is the real loss of value? It is to provide for
replacement? If so, is it not a fact that so long as operations
continue there will always be substantially the same amount
of exhaustion not made good, and that if operations cease
no further replacements will be made?
In order to consider dispassionately the question whether
any depreciation provision is economically desirable, it may
be well to look at it from the standpoint of a community in
which a new railroad enterprise is under contemplation.
Let us assume that it is agreed between the promoters of the
railroad and the community that the former, shall be entitled
to a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair return on their
investment in the line, and that the community shall have
the right to restrict closely to that fair return the profits
of the railroad. Would competent economic advisers of the
community advocate a system of depreciation charges, and,
if so, of what type? The result of a depreciation plan is
obviously to throw an added charge for use and exhaustion
of property upon the earliest years of operation, years in
which the traffic development would be in progress and in
which consequently the charge would be more burdensome
than in later years. Such a condition would seem to be
exactly the reverse of that which would be economically
desirable from the standpoint of the community. Its in
terests would be served by keeping the charges in the early
years down to the minimum consistent with maintaining the
efficiency of the property, thus enlarging the volume of the
commodities that could profitably be transported, and build
ing up both the traffic and the community more rapidly
than would otherwise be possible. The best interests of the
community in such a situation would be served, it would
seem, by a mutual agreement to ignore the depreciation on
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the property in so far as it could never be made good while
the property was being operated, the owners of the railroad
agreeing that this depreciation should not be treated as a
part of cost of operation, and the community agreeing on the
other hand that in computing return no deduction should
be made from the original investment therefor.
If a universal depreciation scheme was not desirable in the
interests of the carrier or the public at the time when rail
road enterprises were in their infancy (and none was ever
put in force, if indeed ever seriously suggested), there is an
even stronger case against imposing such a scheme today
upon railroads which are now highly developed and have
been built up under a system of accounting that contem
plated no provision therefor. If a depreciation scheme is to
be adopted, how is the amount of depreciation deemed to
have arisen prior to the initiation of the scheme to be pro
vided? If it is to be .provided at the expense of the public,
an unnecessary burden will be imposed on the traffic; it
could hardly in common justice be established at the expense
of the carriers. The Commission expresses no final opinion
on this question; it does, however, indicate its views in the
following language (page 384 of the Report):
The theoretically correct way of meeting this situation
would be to establish the amount of past accrued deprecia
tion which has not been provided for, and concurrently
credit this amount to the depreciation reserve and charge it
to profit and loss. It is the latter account which has profited
in the past from the failure or partial failure to accrue de
preciation charges.
This statement of the position is inadequate and, as a
result, seriously unjust. The omission of depreciation pro
visions in the past is supported too strongly by economic, his
torical and practical considerations to be justly characterized
as a “failure on the part of the carriers.” It seems humanly
certain also that if a system of depreciation charges had been
inaugurated at the commencement of railroad enterprise the
development of the railroads would have been made more
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difficult and the growth of the country greatly retarded.
Upon a broad view of the situation it is quite impossible,
therefore, to hold that it is the profit and loss accounts of the
carriers alone which have profited by the omission of de
preciation charges in the past. As regards equipment, it
might be reasonable to treat any past omission to provide
adequately for depreciation as a failure on the part of the
carriers, seeing that depreciation provisions therefor have
been in force now for twenty years. But in the case of prop
erties such as rails, where neither the Commission nor the
practice in other jurisdictions has in the past called for
depreciation provisions, the fact that they have not been
made cannot reasonably be treated as a delinquency on the
part of the carriers, nor could the surplus of the carriers
justly be diminished by whatever amount of depreciation the
Commission might, upon some new theory, decide to at
tribute to the past. The only alternative is that the provi
sion in question, if made at all, should in some way be set
aside out of future earnings. Possibly the most equitable
way would be to accumulate it gradually out of earnings
after the carriers have received a fair return and before any
recapture provisions become effective. In any event, the
adoption of such a scheme would impose an unnecessary
burden on someone in the future.
The economic considerations thus seem to lead clearly to
a conclusion adverse to the proposal.
Turning to the Commission’s second point, there is the
gravest doubt whether the opportunities for manipulation
would be lessened by the adoption of a general depreciation
scheme. This is a highly technical question, which cannot
be fully dealt with here; anyone interested in it will find
some aspects dealt with in a memorandum by the writer in
troduced in Case 15,100, and forming a part of the record
in that case.*
It is suggested that the results sought by the Commission
in this direction, and also the financial strengthening con* See above.
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templated in the Commission’s third point, could be secured
at least as adequately in other ways under the Commission’s
powers of regulation and supervision, and that there is no
real argument under either head for a depreciation scheme.
Some system of reserves for the equalization of maintenance
charges, such as have been employed in the past by sound
railroad managements here and abroad, should under the
Commission’s supervision meet these requirements, as they
have in the past met them without the safeguard afforded
by that supervision. It may be added that no system of
book charges for depreciation will by itself prove very valu
able in maintaining the carriers’ financial integrity. This is
particularly true if the depreciation reserve is to be regarded
as available for financing capital additions, as the Commis
sion contemplates. If, on the other hand, the reserve is to
be kept invested in liquid form, the investment of the huge
sums which would accumulate would present another grave
problem and afford opportunities for serious abuses.
We come, then, to the fourth consideration influencing the
Commission, namely, the relation between maintenance
charges and valuation. In reading the report one feels that
it is this consideration which has weighed most heavily with
the Commission and largely determined its conclusions.
In maintaining its position upon this point the Commis
sion labors under the difficulty that its position is completely
at variance with the Supreme Court’s decisions. In the
Indianapolis Water Company case * the Supreme Court
made it clear that in valuing property for rate purposes the
only permissible deduction for depreciation was the actual
lessening of worth as compared with new value, and added
that such lessening of worth must be not wholly theoretical
nor based on percentages of general application, but pri
marily founded on observation. Now, not only is the Com
mission’s proposed method theoretical and based on per
centages of general application, but the particular theory of
depreciation which it advocates is one that clearly does not
* 272 u. s., 400.
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even approximately reflect the lessening of worth in service
due to the partial exhaustion of useful life.
v

This brings us to a consideration of our third question:
on what basis the accrual of depreciation or exhaustion shall
be deemed to take place and be computed.
In practice there are perhaps four well-recognized methods
of providing for depreciation:
1. The straight line method. This is by far the most
common in industrial practice. It contemplates the distri
bution of the cost of property (less salvage value) over the
useful life in equal instalments.
2. The sinking fund method. This aims to set aside an
nually such a sum as will, if invested, produce an amount
equal to the cost of the property when the life thereof is
exhausted.
3. The annuity method. This regards property as rep
resenting capacity for service over a period of years, and its
service value therefore as that of an annuity for a gradually
diminishing term of years, and adjusts the valuation from
year to year accordingly.
4. The diminishing balance method. This involves the
application of a uniform percentage of reduction to the bal
ance of the property account from year to year, so that the
property will stand at its salvage value, or a nominal figure,
when its useful life is exhausted.
It will be observed that the second and third methods are
substantially similar. Since the sinking fund method con
templates the return of the investment or provision for its
replacement when the unit is retired, it is perhaps technically
the better adapted to replacement reserves (based on esti
mated cost of replacement), while the annuity method is
more strictly applicable to a depreciation scheme designed
to provide gradually for writing off the cost of the original
unit.
The diminishing balance method is of limited applica
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tion: to cases in which the prospects of profitable use are
assured for a brief period only, or to accounts representing a
mass of small units of property which it is impossible to
account for separately.
The straight line method has the virtues of comparative
simplicity and conservatism, but since it ignores interest and
the time element, its adoption necessarily implies renuncia
tion of any attempt to reflect the course of unexpired values
in service.
The annuity method reflects the course of value in service,
and is the only logical method to be followed if the object
is to provide for the return to the investor of the lessening
of worth of a property unit due to the gradual exhaustion
of its useful life as that exhaustion takes place.
Neither the fundamental character of the differences in
principle and purpose between the straight line method and
the annuity (or the sinking fund) method nor the wide dif
ference in the results reached, according as one or the other
is employed, appears to be adequately appreciated by the
Commission.
It has expressed the opinion that the principles underlying
the straight line method are in accord with the principles
enunciated by the Supreme Court—a statement which it is
difficult to accept—and says, “Nor are the practical results of
the two methods [that is, the sinking-fund or annuity method
and the straight line method] very different”—a statement
which is clearly incorrect.*
It seems to the writer a matter not of argument but of
mathematical demonstration, that the annuity method of
computing depreciation is the only one which is consistent
with the Commission’s own hypotheses and which upon
those hypotheses reflects the relation between the value of a
new unit and that of a partly exhausted one. It follows
* A discussion of this point will be found in the memorandum by the
writer of this article filed in Case 15,100. An illustration there given shows
that in the case of property having an assumed life of 50 years, the value in
service (taking money to be worth 6 per cent) at the end of 25 years is
81.11 per cent of new value, which is also the depreciated value on the an
nuity basis; as compared with 50 per cent on a straight line basis.
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either that the annuity method must be substituted for the
straight line method or that all suggestion of close relation
ship between depreciated values and fair value in service
must be abandoned.
If the annuity method is properly applied the depreciated
value will be the fair value in service, subject to fluctuations
in new value and to the effecting of normal maintenance;
this is as near the goal of reflecting true value as percentage
depreciation schemes can come.
The Commission’s arguments for the straight line method
are as untenable as the argument of the carriers that there is
no lessening of value as long as property is maintained in
serviceable condition.
VI

Now the type of depreciation scheme that is applicable,
if any is to be applied, has a most important bearing on the
decision whether any should be adopted.
The difficulties of even the simplest system of depreciation
—difficulties that lie less in establishing the amounts to be
set aside than in determining what outlays shall be charged
against the fund so created—are sufficiently indicated in the
report on Case 15,100. It can scarcely be claimed that ade
quate solutions of such problems as the treatment of extraor
dinary repairs or depreciation of miscellaneous track ma
terial and continuous structure are formulated or even sug
gested in that report. But if to the inevitable complexities
of even a straight line system of depreciation are added the
further complications inherent in the application of the
sinking fund or annuity principle, the resulting method
would be, if riot beyond the limits of practicability, at least
so close to these limits that only a compelling need could
justify its adoption. Dispassionate consideration leads to the
conclusion that no such compelling need exists, even if it
were granted that a general depreciation scheme is, in the
abstract, desirable.
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VII

The conclusions to which this discussion leads may be
summarized as follows:
1. Unless a depreciation scheme is in force, cost of re
placement rather than original cost is the proper basis for
charges for property consumed in operation.
2. While depreciation schemes are an invaluable part of
industrial accounting, a general system of depreciation
charges for railroads is not today desirable.
3. The case for such a system would be weakened if the
prudent investment theory of rate base were to be adopted
as the Commission seems to think it should be.
4. The particular form of depreciation scheme put for
ward by the Commission—the straight line method—is de
monstrably inappropriate for the purpose sought to be
achieved.
5. The Commission’s plan lacks one essential of any satis
factory scheme, namely, a practicable and equitable method
of dealing with the depreciation deemed to have accrued
prior to the initiation of the scheme.
What, it may be asked, are the alternatives? It is sug
gested that since a depreciation scheme for equipment has
been in force for many years it might well be continued and
extended to all classes of movable property, and also to any
classes of property which are essentially in the nature of in
dustrial plant. It might also be desirable to initiate depreci
ation provisions computed on the annuity, or sinking fund,
basis for the replacement of exceptionally large units re
placeable only as a whole.
The only further provision that seems to be called for is
a reserve for the equalization of maintenance charges based
on the reasonable expectations for a period of, say, five or
ten years in the future. In the management of such a reserve
the carriers should be given fairly wide discretion, though
the Commission should retain power to deal effectively with
any case in which the maintenance charges might be grossly
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inadequate or obviously excessive. Transfers to and from
the reserve should appear as separate items in the accounts
so that the actual maintenance expenditures would not be
obscured. So long as the present rules governing the deter
mination of the rate base prevail, this reserve should not in
any event be allowed to exceed the percentage of the book
value of the property to which it would relate, which would
be deductible from the new value of similar property as
“observed depreciation” in a valuation proceeding.
It is believed that a program such as is here outlined
would accomplish all the desirable objects which the Com
mission aims to accomplish by a depreciation system, and
would be free from the objections to the Commission’s pro
posals which have been set forth herein.
Upon the larger question of fixing a rate base, the best
interests of all parties would seem to call for a settlement by
agreement between the carriers and the Commission. For
the moment the carriers have the advantage in the courts.
But few suppose that the carrier groups will in practice ever
be allowed to earn a return on the full present undepreci
ated reproduction cost of their property, and the next turn
of the wheel may leave them in a far less satisfactory position
than they now occupy. They can afford to make consider
able abatements of their claims to secure certainty. The
Commission can scarcely hope to maintain its claim that
straight line depreciation should be deducted from new
value to arrive at present value in service, nor the carriers
their claim that there is no loss of value where there is no
observable loss of efficiency. If the parties could approach
the question in a sincere effort to reach by agreement a
reasonable settlement, instead of advancing extreme claims,
a solution of a difficult and vital problem should be attain
able that would be fair to carriers and the public alike.
Probably new legislation would have to be enacted and ac
cepted by the carriers to enable settlements to be made
which would be permanently effective and binding, but the
advantages to all parties of a fixed method of determining
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the rate base as compared with the ill-defined and uncertain
methods which the Supreme Court has felt compelled by the
Constitution to prescribe, are so apparent and substantial
that it should not be an extremely difficult task to secure the
passage and acceptance of the necessary laws.

VI
FURTHER THOUGHTS ON DEPRECIATION AND THE
RATE BASE *

(1930)
The decision of the Supreme Court in the Baltimore Rail
ways case (The United Railways and Electric Company of
Baltimore v. West et al., Public Service Commission of
Maryland, decided on January 6, 1930) adds a new chapter to
the legal history of the depreciation question in relation to
rate regulation. While the decision of the question immedi
ately at issue was one of great technical interest, the implica
tions of the decision are perhaps of even greater importance,
though that importance may not be so immediately ap
parent. It is proposed to deal briefly with both points.
Depreciation enters into rate cases in two ways. Depreci
ation attributable to a particular period is a charge against
the earnings of that period, and the accumulated deprecia
tion at any given date operates to reduce the rate base (that
is, the value of the property employed in rendering service)
at that date. In this instance it was the first only, the charge
against earnings, that was in question; the rate base was prac
tically agreed, and the treatment of depreciation in fixing
that base was not before the Court.†
The problem of fixing a depreciation allowance to be re
couped out of charges for service is, in part, one of deciding
what exhaustion is to be provided for, and, in part, one of

* Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. XLIV (August, 1930), pp. 687-97.
†† In the present note, only those parts (much the most important) of the
majority and minority opinions are considered which discuss the matter of
depreciation. There was also discussion (as well as dissent) as regards the
fair rate or percentage of return, which should be allowed on the basic
sum—the rate base. The majority held that a return of 7.44 per cent
sought by the Company itself, was the least that could be deemed non
confiscatory; whereas Justices Brandeis and Holmes maintained that “a net
return of 6.26 per cent would seem to be compensatory.”
219
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expressing the exhaustion in terms of money. Under the
first head come such questions as whether the allowance is to
cover only wear and tear, or wear and tear and also obsoles
cence; and whether it is to be measured by observation, or in
some other way. Under the second head comes the question
whether the exhaustion is to be expressed in terms of money
on the basis of original cost, present reproduction cost, or
probable replacement cost.
Questions under both heads had been considered by the
Maryland Commission and the Maryland Court of Appeals,
but only the second phase was discussed by the Supreme
Court. The Maryland Commission, in its decision of the
rate case, had adopted two principles: first, that the annual
allowance for depreciation should be determined on the
basis of original cost; and second, that the allowance should
be. sufficient to “provide a fund out of which retirements
may be met as they occur, and also to create a reserve out of
which ordinary obsolescence may be cared for.”
The Court of Appeals of Maryland had approved the Com
mission’s decision on the second point, but had held that the
allowance should be based on present value instead of orig
inal cost. The Commission had then recomputed the al
lowance on that basis, the result being an increase in the
amount for the year under review from $883,544 to
$1,658,650.
The Supreme Court, in concluding that the order of the
Maryland Commission was confiscatory, deducted the larger
sum of $1,658,650 from the earnings as the necessary pro
vision for depreciation, thus in effect upholding the decision
of the Maryland Court of Appeals on both points. It did
not discuss the principle that a depreciation fund should pro
vide for retirements and ordinary obsolescence, but its ap
proval of this principle is clearly implied in, and necessary
to, the conclusion reached.
In the majority opinion of the United States Supreme
Court, the discussion of the depreciation question begins as
follows: “The allowance for annual depreciation made by
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the Commission was based upon cost. The Court of Appeals
held that this was erroneous and that it should have been
based upon present value.. The Court’s view of the matter
was plainly right.” But in spite of this clear-cut declaration,
the effect of the decision on the question of the basis on
which the exhaustion is to be expressed in terms of money
is not free from doubt.
The standard sum with which the probable yield of a rate
structure is to be compared in order to determine whether
that structure is compensatory or confiscatory may be con
veniently regarded as composed of three parts:

1. An amount to cover a fair return on capital invest
ment.
2. An amount to cover exhaustion of property.
3. An amount to cover all expenses of or incidental to
operation, except those of making good exhaustion of
property.

The first amount is, under a long series of decisions of the
Supreme Court, in the nature of compensation based on
value, not on cost. The third is merely a reimbursement of
cost. The question remains whether the second amount
should be determined like the first, as compensation based
on value, or like the third, as a reimbursement of cost? If
the latter, should the measure be the original cost of the
property exhausted or the cost of making good the ex
haustion?
The majority opinion decides categorically that the allow
ance for exhaustion must not be computed on the basis of
original cost of the property exhausted. It seems to leave
open, however, the question whether the allowance should
be computed as a compensation based on value, or as a reim
bursement of cost based on the actual or probable cost of re
placing the property exhausted. For after upholding, in the
language above cited, the use of present value in the case at
bar, the Court entered upon a discussion which leaves a
doubt as to whether present value was adopted as the basis
because it was present value or because it was the most
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practical approximation to probable cost of replacement.
After quoting the language of the Knoxville Water Com
pany case to the effect that the utility “is entitled to see that
from earnings the value of the property invested is kept un
impaired, so that at the end of any given term of years the
original investment remains as it was at the beginning,” *
the Court adds: “This naturally calls for expenditures equal
to the cost † of the worn-out equipment at the time of re
placement; and this, for all practical purposes, means present
value.”
So far, the argument would appear to lead to the conclu
sion that in principle the allowance was to be based on actual
or probable cost of replacement, and that for the purposes
of the instant case, at least, present value was a reasonable
guide to probable cost of replacement. But in the ensuing
sentence the Court said: “It is the settled rule of this Court
that the rate base is present value, and it would be wholly
illogical to adopt a different rule for depreciation.” Here,
the Court seems to adopt present value upon its own merits
and not as a guide to replacement cost.
Mr. Justice Stone, while concurring in a dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, added a vigorous attack of
his own on the validity, either generally or in this particular
case, of the assumption that replacement cost means, for all
practical purposes, present value. His opinion concludes as
follows:

To say that the present price level is necessarily the true
measure of future replacement cost is to substitute for a
relevant fact which I should have thought ought to be estab
lished as are other facts, a rule of law which seems not to
follow from Smyth v. Ames, and to be founded neither upon
experience nor expert opinion and to be unworkable in
practice. In the present case it can be applied only by dis
regarding evidence which would seem persuasively to estab
lish the very fact to be ascertained.
* In passing it may be remarked that this sounds like an echo of the
prudent investment theory.
† Cost here evidently means cost of replacement, not original cost.
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Mr. Justice Stone did not discuss the argument that it
would be illogical to adopt a rule for depreciation different
from that adopted in determining the rate base. Mr. Justice
Brandeis rejected the argument, on the ground that the de
preciation charge is designed to distribute the total net ex
pense of plant replacement over the period of use. One is
probably justified in concluding that the Court upheld the
present value basis as being, for all practical purposes,
equivalent to the cost of replacement, and that the argument
by analogy from the method of determining the rate base was
thrown in rather as a makeweight.
Whether a depreciation scheme for a regulated utility
should be based on original cost or probable cost of replace
ment is, from a practical standpoint, a relatively minor con
sideration. But it is essential, and the point is important,
that depreciation shall be recognized as a reimbursement of
cost and treated accordingly. Certainly there is nothing in
the decision to preclude the Court from so interpreting it in
any future case, and the hope may be expressed that it will
adopt this interpretation should the question arise, as it
probably will.
Any depreciation scheme is necessarily based to a large
extent on estimates and assumptions. In order that it may
operate equitably, the original estimates and assumptions
must be reasonable, the scheme must be continuously and
consistently carried out from year to year, and proper pro
vision must be made for the correction (without undue dis
turbance of the operating or financial situation) of estimates
made in earlier years which in the light of later experience
may prove to have been too high or too low. A further
essential is that the theory of distribution of the cost of
property over its useful life shall harmonize with the theory
of valuation on which the rate base is to be determined.
Finally it is highly desirable, if not essential, that the scheme
shall be suitable for the current. accounting of the utility,
as well as applicable in the determination of rates.
All these requirements can be met so long as the allow
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ance is treated as a reimbursement of costs, actual or pros
pective. If replacement cost is used rather than original
cost, the basic problem is not changed, even though a new as
sumption becomes necessary, and continuity and provision
for adjustment become the more necessary. If, however, the
view were to be accepted that for rate purposes the allowance
for any year should be determined as compensation for the
exhaustion of life occurring within the year, measured by
observation and expressed in money in terms of current re
production prices, the whole computation being made with
out regard to the provision made in any other year or to
the actual outlays for original purchase or replacement, then
all the essentials above recited would be sacrificed and a
method would be substituted which would be discontinu
ous, conjectural, and utterly unsuited for any other purpose,
if not, indeed, for the purpose contemplated.
These considerations become even more important if the
depreciation scheme aims to provide for obsolescence as well
as mere physical exhaustion. In the Baltimore case, the
Commission upon the original hearing stated its position as
follows: “In making an allowance for depreciation the Com
mission will endeavor to provide a fund out of which retire
ments may be made as they occur, and also to create a reserve
out of which ordinary obsolescence may be cared for.” As
already stated the Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld the
Commission on this point.
Now, allowance for obsolescence is, to repeat, hardly prac
ticable except under a scheme continuously and consistently
applied, with provision for adjustment of estimates on the
basis of experience. Accounting control and observation are
both essential to the proper administration of such a depre
ciation plan. The courts, whose relation to the question is
more remote and spasmodic, are apt to stress the importance
of the second essential, observation; but commissions, whose
relation is closer and more continuous, perhaps realize more
fully the importance of accounting control.
With the modern development of accounting methods,
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book records, supplemented by such engineering reports as
a competent accounting officer will naturally call for, will
prove the most effective and reliable basis for computing and
adjusting depreciation allowances. To illustrate the point
from another field: book inventories, properly maintained
(as they now are by most important corporations), have
proved to be more reliable in the case of any large and com
plex business than inventories based on physical examina
tion, count, weight, and measurement. Much the same is
true in the field of depreciation.
It has been mentioned above as an essential of a sound
system of depreciation for regulated utilities that the meth
ods and theories upon which the annual allowances are
computed must harmonize with the methods and theories
governing the determination of the rate base. It would
seem inevitable that the courts must accept this principle
when once it is clearly presented. If obsolescence is to be
allowed for in determining the annual allowance, it must
be allowed for in the fixing of the rate base—otherwise, the
consumers will inevitably be subjected to a double charge.
But the application of the principle obviously presents a
problem of considerable difficulty.
In this problem, obsolescence may be considered in two
parts: first, what may be called demonstrated obsolescence;
second, potential obsolescence. At the earliest stage—say at
the end of the first year of operation of a new plant—some
reserve will have been set aside for obsolescence; but pre
sumably there will be little if any demonstrable obsolescence
to be provided for and the reserve will be applicable only
to potential obsolescence. How is such potential obsoles
cence to be allowed for in the determination of the rate base?
If the rate base were being determined on the basis of
original cost, it would be a simple and equitable solution to
treat the excess of the reserve set aside for depreciation in
the year, over and above the observed depreciation, as being
a reserve for potential future obsolescence, and the desired
consistency would be secured by deducting it, as well as the
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observed depreciation, from that cost, to arrive at the rate
base.
Where the rate base is computed on present value, prob
ably the only practical way of making the proposed adjust
ment would be by use of ratios. The cost value of the prop
erty subject to obsolescence and the reserve for obsolescence
in respect thereof being known, the deduction for obsoles
cence from the reproduction value might be computed at
the same percentage as the actual reserve for obsolescence
might be found to bear to the cost value of the property
subject to obsolescence.
In the case of the plant of a utility which had been operat
ing for a long period of years, there would be both demon
strated or observable obsolescence, and potential obsoles
cence. It would certainly be desirable, and should be
practicable, to express the demonstrable obsolescence in
terms of money.
Let us suppose, for instance, the case of a unit which cost
originally $1,000 but would now cost $1,200 to replace in
kind. Assume that it has been in service ten years and that
from the purely physical standpoint it would be good for
another ten years’ service. Suppose, however, that it is
capable of being replaced with a unit of a new type which
would cost $900, which would be estimated to have a life,
allowing for physical exhaustion and ordinary obsolescence,
of fifteen years, and would effect an economy .in operation
of $36.00 per annum. Let it be assumed that the fair return
on investment in the utility is 7 per cent, and that deprecia
tion allowances are being computed on a sinking fund basis,
with interest at 4 per cent.
Upon the foregoing suppositions, would it not be fair to
hold that the value of the existing unit, depreciated for ob
solescence, is determined by consideration of the cost of the
new and superior type? If so, it seems clear that allowance
for demonstrated obsolescence (even without taking into ac
count further potential obsolescence) brings a result that is
very close to valuation on the basis of the current cost of the
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most effective unit that could be substituted for the existing
unit, rather than upon the cost of reproducing the unit actu
ally existing.*
The courts in the past have been reluctant to go into this
question. In the Indianapolis Water Company case (272
U. S., 400) the Supreme Court said:
There is to be ascertained the value of the plant used to
give the service and not the estimated cost of a different
plant. Save under exceptional circumstances, the Court is
not required to enter upon a comparison of the merits of
different systems. Such an inquiry would lead to collateral
issues and investigations having only remote bearing on the
fact to be found, viz., the value of the property devoted to
the service of the public.

But with all respect, it would seem that the Court here
begged the question. Why should the value of the plant
actually used be measured by the cost of reproducing it, if
a more efficient type of plant could be constructed at a
materially lower cost? Even if the new value of an existing
plant may properly be computed on the basis of reproduc
tion cost, certainly its value as depreciated for use or ob
solescence cannot be determined without consideration of
the question of its relative efficiency and economy in con
struction and operation as compared with the most efficient
and economical substitute that could be created.
This line of thought suggests that the implicit approval
by the Supreme Court of the recognition by the Commission
of obsolescence as an element of depreciation in rate cases
may be quite as important as its explicit rejection of original
cost as the basis of the calculation of the allowance. Indeed
it may be that further consideration of the depreciation ques* The calculation in detail might be as follows:
The sinking fund required to write off $900 in fifteen years at 4 per cent
would be $44.95; the annual return on $900 at 7 per cent would be $63.00—
together, $107.95. Deducting $36.00 from this amount for the greater econ
omy of the newer unit leaves a balance of $71.95, which would seem to
represent fairly the annual value in service of the existing unit. The cor
responding capital value of the unit on the basis of ten years’ unexpired life,
allowing a 7 per cent return and a 4 per cent sinking fund, would be $469.37.
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tion may eventually shake the foundations of the current
theory of present value. Even if it be granted that, in prin
ciple, present value is a more appropriate basis for calcula
tion of the fair return than original cost, it is obvious that
the current theory of computation of present value is highly
artificial and the results often lacking in reality.
The validity of the conclusions reached under the current
theory depends on the validity of the underlying assump
tions which must be made if a computation is to be possible.
It is necessary to make assumptions as to the conditions im
mediately prior to the theoretical reproduction, which, in
the case of a really important property, such as a large rail
road system, are highly speculative and unreal. Again, as
already noted, in order to keep the inquiry within bounds
the courts have felt compelled to indulge the presumption,
frequently unwarranted, that the existing plant would be
worth reproducing if it did not exist. For instance, the
value of a building and the site on which it stands is assumed
to be the aggregate of the value of the land and of the cost
of reproduction, less depreciation, of the building; though
the land may be taken at its value for an entirely different
purpose, and the true aggregate value of the property may be
the value of the land, less the probable cost of removing the
building.
The resulting valuation is thus a conventional, not a real,
figure. This may not be a fatal objection, but at least con
ventions should be applied with reasonable consistency. If
it be accepted as a convention that properties properly main
tained do not depreciate, then it should be accepted as a
convention that earnings are determinable without any al
lowance for depreciation. If a convention closer to reality
is to be adopted, that properties depreciate through age and
obsolescence, even though well maintained, and that an al
lowance for such depreciation must be made in determining
earnings, then allowance for depreciation from age and ob
solescence, and not merely for observed depreciation, should
be made in fixing present value.
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How far afield and to what results the consistent applica
tion of the doctrines and conventions now current would
lead is a question of vital importance to public utilities and
to the public. At the least, it would seriously modify ex
isting practice in rate regulation; it might result in the break
down of the whole present system. Discontent with that
system is rife, and much of the discontent well-founded. It
is perhaps a question whether regulation on the basis of fair
return is really practicable or effective. Constitutional limi
tations may prevent the substitution of other methods which
have been suggested. But, if this be so, the result may be
a drift toward something entirely different, public owner
ship.
Taking the long view, no problem perhaps possesses more
importance for the utilities than that of presenting some
constructive plan for securing justice to the consumers as
well as reasonable opportunities for profit-making for them
selves. At the moment, however, the utility managers seem,
in general, content to do nothing, and to rely upon the de
cisions of the Supreme Court, and upon the fog with which
the whole question is shrouded as a result of those decisions,
for the maintenance of a situation which for the time is
financially satisfactory. They are not likely to change their
attitude until they are convinced that the protection on
which they rely is not so complete nor so well assured as
they have thought it to be. There is danger to them in a
fuller recognition by the Court of the limited significance
of cost of reproduction of existing plant and of the essential
importance of coordination between the different parts of
the problem of regulation and, more particularly, between
the charges against earnings for depreciation and the deduc
tion from the rate base on account thereof.
The Supreme Court is not committed to any rule of law
which assures to cost of reproduction the importance which
in practice has been given to it in some recent decisions.
If the Court should accept—as in the end it may be com
pelled to do—the logic of cost of production of the most
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efficient substitute (less depreciation) as the basis of valua
tion, while the results would still be uncertain, the uncer
tainty would be fraught with grave danger to the utilities.
They would be wise to recognize this danger, to admit the
unsatisfactory state of regulation, and to devote their ex
perience and their knowledge of the problem to finding a
solution that would be just to the public as well as fair to
themselves.

VII

THE UNITED RAILWAYS DECISION EXAMINED *

(1930)
Supreme Court, in its recent decision in the case of the
United Railways & Electric Company † of Baltimore, handed
down as we go to press, has accepted a logical corollary to
its former decisions. It has long been clear that in deter
mining whether or not a given rate structure is confiscatory
the test is to compare the probable yield thereunder with
the aggregate of three things:

The

(1) The amounts necessarily expended for supplies con
sumed, wages and salaries paid and expense incurred
in rendering the service;
(2) Compensation for the partial exhaustion of the prop
erty used in rendering service;
(3) A return at a reasonable rate on the value of the prop
erty necessarily employed in rendering the service.

In previous cases the court had held consistently that the
third element must be computed upon the present values
of the property, and it is entirely logical that it should now
apply the same ruling to the second element in the compu
tation. Any doubts as to the soundness of this decision must
be based on practical considerations. The difficulties in
herent in such a method of determination are dwelt upon
by Mr. Justice Brandeis in a long dissenting opinion. To
the accountant, much of this opinion will probably seem
persuasive, though it is lengthened and weakened by refer
ences to industrial practices which seem irrelevant to the
present discussion. Industrial precedents are not valid, be
cause cost is the foundation of industrial accounting just
* An editorial contributed to The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XLIX
(February, 1930), pp. 81-83.
†Cf. 278 U. S., 567.
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as surely as present value has become the basis of rate regula
tion through the decisions of the Court.
Viewed from the professional standpoint, the decision un
fortunately seems to imply -a further enhancement of the
importance of the engineer and a corresponding diminu
tion of the part to be played by the accountant. The ques
tion whether rates are or are not confiscatory will become
more and more an engineering question. Up to the present,
the practical application, of the test above-mentioned has
been based mainly on cost of reproduction, which is com
paratively easy of ascertainment; but the next logical step
would seem to be to base the determination on a considera
tion of the cost and the rate of exhaustion of an ideal plant
capable of rendering the same service. If the value of the
property employed or exhausted is to be the test, that value
is no greater because the plant rendering the service is ex
pensive and subject to rapid depreciation than it would be
if the same service were being rendered by a different type
of plant, cheaper to construct and subject to less deprecia
tion. If this view is correct, the determinations of the courts
in future cases may become more and more speculative and
the practical outcome depend largely on the skill of the
professional advisors to the two sides of the controversy.
Our engineering friends are to be congratulated on the pros
pect thus opening up, and we have no doubt the utilities,
with their aid, will fare well in the courts. For the present,
and until the price curve turns downward or new inventions
render existing plants obsolete, the public may expect to
bear not only the cost of higher compensation to the utilities
but the higher cost of securing that compensation.
Of course, there is another side of the picture. The
courts have always insisted that rates must be reasonable and
may not be increased, even if they are not fully compensa
tory, if an increase would make them unreasonable. While
this limitation is itself difficult of enforcement, the American
public by and large gets its service from the utilities at rea
sonable prices. Perhaps, therefore, there will be no general
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complaint if a part of the skill and resourcefulness which is
constantly being devoted to reducing the cost of operation
is diverted to the task of increasing the limit of gross rev
enues. Furthermore, a meed of praise should be accorded
to those who presented to the Court in the Baltimore case a
record which forced the Court to the conclusion that a return
of 6.26 per cent certainly was not, and a return of 7.44 might
not be, sufficient to attract capital into the street railway
field.

PART III
VALUATION

I

THE VALUATION OF GOODWILL *
(1912)

Question: Coming to the question of the value of the good
will, will you please tell us how you estimated that value?
Answer: The value of the goodwill was a very difficult
problem indeed. In the first place, I adopted the method
that has been used in numerous cases which have come to
my notice in the sale of goodwill, of determining the value
solely on the basis of the earning capacity or of the past
earnings. Some time before May 20, Mr. Ordway asked me
a question on that subject, and I worked out the value of
the goodwill for him on the basis of deducting from the
earnings interest on the investment, tangible assets, and then
capitalizing the excess on the basis of five years’ profits.
Now, taking the profits for the five and a half years ending
January 31, 1910, I arrived at a value of eight hundred and
fifty thousand dollars, allowing seven per cent interest on
tangible assets, or a million dollars allowing six per cent.
In considering the question on May 20, I used that calcula
tion as a starting point, and considered what seemed to me
to be the modifying factors. First of all, the profits for the
year 1909 had amounted to only three hundred and ten
thousand dollars, or seventy thousand dollars less than the
average which I had used in the earlier calculations, so that
if the last year’s profits were taken as the basis I figured the
result would be to reduce, the value of the goodwill by a
sum of three hundred and fifty thousand dollars. Then the
other factors which I considered were first of all as regards
the wholesale department. There had been considerable
discussion of a proposed sale of the wholesale department
* Excerpt from testimony, In the Matter of the Estate of E. P. Hatch,
Deceased (Lord & Taylor), (1912).
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without any payment for goodwill, and in the course of
discussion on that subject I learned that there was some
doubt as to the permanency of that business, and further
more that it was a question whether the goodwill of the
wholesale department did not inhere to a large extent in the
two managers who had direct charge of the business and
who were in personal touch with the manufacturing houses
and the trade. Then a further element that detracted from
the value of the goodwill seemed to me to be the dissension
amongst the management, which was undoubtedly operating
adversely to the business. Then again, there was the fact
that most leases of the premises expired in 1914, so that there
was the prospect of having to move the business. Of course
it is not possible to assign specific weights to each one of
these considerations, but weighing all of them together—I
do not know whether I should go any further—I think I have
probably answered your question.
Q. Did you take into consideration the efficiency of man
agement in the retail department?
A. Yes. Of course the retail department—the ratio of
profit in that department had been so much reduced that at
that actual time I should say the profits being earned in the
retail department would not have justified any payment for
goodwill of that business as it stood, although of course the
established name does give the goodwill a value in strong
hands.
Q. Did you also take into consideration the lack of work
ing capital?
A. Well, that was a factor not so much in the valuation
of the goodwill as in the desirability of the proposed sale as
a whole, the lack of working capital; it was a very important
element in that.
Q. Had you any immediate or direct knowledge with re
gard to the inefficiency of the management of the retail de
partment?
A. Well, I had a number of criticisms of it, but the main
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factor to my mind was the low ratio of profit. That, it
seemed to me, must be evidence of inefficiency somewhere.
Q. Where did you get at the figures of the ratio of profit
in the two departments?
A. Well, various statements were prepared.
Q. Were they the result of any researches which you made
in the books of Lord & Taylor or were they based upon re
ports which came to you from others?
A. Do you mean that I made personally? ,
Q. Yes.
A. Or through my representatives?
Q. That you made personally.
A. Not on those that I made personally, except in part
they were figures according to the books and in part they
were figures made up by my subordinates.
Q. Not from the books?
A. Well, from the books with adjustments. Some of them
were absolute book figures.
Q. When you speak of adjustments do you mean adjust
ments in this sense, that somebody took up the accounts as
they stood on the books, and they from time to time made,
so to speak nunc pro tunc, reservations and deductions as
you would have made if you had been there at the time?
A. Yes, that is what I mean by adjusted figures.
Q. Take, for instance, in 1910, you assumed a certain ad
justment made for the year 1906, which in point of fact had
not been made in 1906, is that the idea?
A. Yes, that is what I referred to.
Q. And so on all through the years in succession?
A. Yes, but then I also considered the unadjusted figures.
I have here a statement.
Q. As regards the working capital, should you say to us
the same thing that you said in regard to all those other ele
ments of your judgment, that you attributed to it no par
ticular value in the deductions which were to be made?
A. I think “particular” is an unfortunate term to use,
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because saying “no particular value” might be considered as
meaning “no material value.” I attached no specific value to
it, although I did attach considerable importance to it.
Q. You think that “specific” in this relation might have
a different meaning from “particular”?
A. Well, I do not think it would be so ambiguous.
Q. Have you now told us all that you are able to recollect
with regard to the—if you do not object I shall use the same
word again—particular value that you assigned to these dif
ferent elements of diminution?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, lumping them all together as you have done,
what was their aggregate value as a figure to be deducted
from the figure at which you started?
A. Well, I did not feel it quite necessary to put an ag
gregate value.
Q. Did you simply guess at it?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Did you make an accurate computation?
A. No—
Q. You did not?
A. I took—
Q. One moment. Did you make an accurate computa
tion?
A. No, I did not.
Q. And you did not guess at it?
A. No, I did not guess at it.
Q. And you did not average it?
A. No, I did not average it.
Q. Then will you tell us precisely what you did with it?
A. Well, I took the maximum value for the stock as de
termined by my starting point, and the value that I was asked
to consider for the common stock, and asked myself the ques
tion: Is the difference between those two values, those two
figures, sufficient, in the light of all those circumstances and
of the whole proposed arrangement, to justify you in ad
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vising the executors not to make the proposed sale? That
is substantially how I dealt with the question.
Q. Mr. May, in this question I do not mean to make any
imputation at all upon your purposes, but should we not be
quite right in understanding that when you certified the
balance sheet as of January 31, 1910, you believed that
balance sheet which you certified to be correct?
A. Yes, certainly. Perhaps I ought—if you will allow me,
I will elaborate that.
Q. You say you did understand it to be correct?
A. Yes, it is correct.
Q. What you said was, “We certify that the above balance
sheet correctly sets forth the financial condition of the com
pany at January 31, 1910.”
A. Yes.
Q. Did you believe that statement to be true?
A. I believed that to be true, yes.
Q. Do you now believe it to be true?
A. I still believe it to be true.
Q. When you signed that statement in those words were
you making any mental or other reservations?
A. Well, I do not know quite what you mean by that.
The way I would—
Q. Have you not heard the expression of saying a thing
with a mental reservation?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, you know what the phrase means, don’t you?
A. Well, it has a rather sinister sense, in which sense of
course I had no mental reservations.
Q. You do not now wish to express any mental reserva
tion, do you?
A. No, of course a balance sheet is always a question of
opinion.
Q. It was your opinion, was it not, that this balance sheet
correctly sets forth the financial condition of the business?
A. Yes, it was—
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Q. Was it your opinion or not?
A. It was my opinion that—
Q. Can’t you answer my question yes or no?
A. I think not without giving rise to misunderstanding.
Q. I understand you to say that you are not able to say
categorically either yes or no to the question I put to you,
whether in your opinion this balance sheet correctly sets
forth the financial condition of the company; is that so?
A. Well, of course I can say it is a correct statement, but
I do not know that that is the whole answer. At the same
time I do not want to inject anything.
Q. Now, Mr. May, when you make that remark are you
not really telling us that you made that certification with
some mental reservation?
A. No, all I mean by that: for instance that balance
sheet might have been made up to show a surplus of two
hundred and fifty thousand dollars less, and I would still
have said that it showed the correct position of the company.
Q. Now, how will you explain that discrepancy? You
have certified that when you showed a surplus of four hun
dred and eighty-six thousand dollars that statement was cor
rect; now you say that if you had certified to a surplus of
two hundred and thirty-six thousand dollars, that also would
have been correct.
A. Yes, that is—
Q. Now, they both would have been correct?
A. Well, I think they would have been both correct in
that they would be both fair expressions of opinion; and that
is all a balance sheet ever is.
Q. Oh, you do not regard a balance sheet then as rep
resenting a state of fact, but as representing a state of mind,
is that the idea?
A. Well, I would state my position exactly as Lord Jus
tice Buckley stated it, that it is necessarily a question of
estimate and opinion, every balance sheet.
Q. Did he say that about your opinion?
A. He did not say that about my opinion, he said that
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about every balance sheet; and the greater of course includes
the less.
Q. We all recognize the influential value of expressions
of opinion by Lord Justice Buckley, we do not at all mean to
disparage that, but of course you know, Mr. May, that the
opinion which we are now dealing with is Mr. May’s opinion.
A. Exactly. But I did not feel that I could improve on
the language of the Lord Justice nor did I care to plagiarize
it without acknowledging the source.
Q. Now, then, you tell us that it would have been just as
true to certify to a surplus of four hundred and eighty-six
thousand dollars as it would have been to certify to a surplus
of two hundred and thirty-six thousand dollars?
A. Both would have been certified and both would have
been correct statements.
Q. So you might have cut off two hundred and thirty-six
thousand dollars, might you not?
A. Yes.
Q. And leave no balance?
A. Oh, a further two hundred and thirty-six thousand?
Q. Yes.
A. Well, I do not know how far one could go, but I just
took the figures of the two hundred and fifty thousand less
as representing in my mind the reasonable limit of the opin
ions.
Q. Now, if you could with propriety certify to a surplus
of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars less than you have
certified to, might you not with propriety have certified to
a surplus of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars more
than you certified to?
A. No, I am quite satisfied as to that.
Q. Then your opinion would only be justified in the de
scending scale?
A. In the case of this particular balance sheet.
Q. Once again, if it would have been equally true to say
that the surplus was two hundred and thirty-six thousand
dollars as it was to say that the surplus was four hundred and
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eighty-six thousand dollars—once again, would it not have
been equally true to say that the surplus was nothing at all?
A. Not necessarily. No, not in fact, I think.
Q. Where would you draw the line between two hundred
and thirty-six thousand dollars and nothing at all?
A. Well, I would not draw a hard and fast line anywhere;
but in that balance sheet there are at least—
Q. Wait a minute. I am not talking about that. I am
asking you to give us an answer to my question. You say
you would not draw a fast and hard line anywhere; now, give
us a wavy line somewhere.
A. Well, it is very hard to do.
Q. Is it too hard for you to do?
A. Well, it is too hard for me to do offhand without care
ful consideration.
Q. You mean that in order to do it you would have to
sit down with that large bundle of papers that you have be
side you and work out some mathematical computations?
A. No, I would have to sit down and consider what I
considered the limits of value—of reasonable difference of
opinion as to value of certain assets in that balance sheet.
Q. If I follow you, that would not then be a mathematical
computation but it would be an evolution of opinion, is that
it?
A. That is it, purely an expression of opinion and judg
ment.
Q. So that when we are talking about this balance sheet
of January 31, 1910, when you certified that the correct
financial condition of the company shows a surplus of four
hundred and eighty-six thousand dollars, are we to under
stand that that figure merely represents the evolution of your
opinions up to that time?
A. No, I think that would be an erroneous impression.
But it is our opinion that it is correctly adjusted and it is cor
rectly stated in respect, of course, to the majority of items, in
my opinion; but there are certain items, as I said before, that
are of doubtful value, and in those cases, as I said before,
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we have accepted values placed upon the properties by the
Finance Committee or officers of the Company; and in re
gard to those assets there is room for a certain latitude of
opinion.
Q. Will you tell me once again what you mean by tan
gible assets of this concern?
A. The excess of all assets, excluding goodwill and trade
marks, over liabilities. Net tangible assets is the expression
I would use.
Q. You have not used that word “net” heretofore when I
asked you the questions.
A. Well, I used the same phrase, the investment in tan
gible assets.
Q. If you leave out net, and we are talking about tangible
assets, you would regard, wouldn’t you, the whole amount
of merchandise as a tangible asset?
A. Yes.
Q. And all the horses and wagons as tangible assets?
A. Yes, certainly.
Q. And fixtures?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you regard accounts receivable as a tangible
asset?
A. Yes, I would include everything on the assets’ side of
the balance sheet except the goodwill.
Q. Is it customary in your profession to call an account
receivable a tangible asset?
A. Yes.
Q. What is the meaning of the word tangible as it is used
in your profession?
A. Well, I think it is—unfortunately the whole termi
nology of my profession and of finance generally is pretty
loose, but I think its significance is best reached by saying
that it is everything that is not intangible, and intangible
includes goodwill, trade-marks, patents, franchises, and that
class of property.
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Q. I infer, Mr. May, from your experience and from the
degrees which you hold of which you have told us, that you
know what in ordinary speech the word tangible means,
don’t you?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, what do you understand it to mean in ordinary
speech?
A. Something that can be touched, I imagine.
Q. Like merchandise?
A. Yes.
Q. You can touch merchandise or horses?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you touch an account?
A. You can touch the debtor.
Q. Is that the basis on which you include the debtor’s
debt as tangible?
A. It had not occurred to me before, but possibly it is.

II

VALUATION OF MINES *
(1916)
It is apparent that the maximum value of the mine will be
found by valuing it on one of two theories: the first, that
the mine would be operated until the stock should accumu
late to a point where further accumulation would be un
profitable (assuming that the mine would continue to yield
for that period) and that then the mine would be closed
down and the sulphur on hand liquidated; the second, that
the current production of the mine would first be liquidated
and that the accumulated stock would be sold only when
the mine ceases to produce. Whichever method gives the
higher capital value is properly applicable. Calculations
show that on the basis of any probable volume of sales the
first method gives the higher values (using the same basis,
figures of sales, expenditures, and rate of profit) and this is
true even if, for the purpose of the second method, the op
erations are assumed to continue indefinitely. The first
method is therefore applied in the calculations which follow,
in spite of the fact that it is more complicated in application.
The present value of a sum of money to be received at
a future date varies according to (1) the interval that will
elapse before its receipt, and (2) the rate which is taken as
the proper rate of return upon the present investment.
If the interval and rate of return are known or assumed,
the present value can readily be calculated or found in in
terest tables. In the same way if the rate of return and pres
ent value are known, the interval can be calculated. This
is the form in which the problem occurs in the present case.
This problem is: How long can the company afford to carry

* Excerpt from an affidavit in the matter of appraisal under the Transfer
Tax Law—Estate of Herman Frasch (Union Sulphur Co.), April, 1916.
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stock before selling it? If the selling price is, say, three times
cost, the question is: How many years can the sale be de
ferred and still leave the present value of the proceeds (at
whatever rate of return is decided upon) more than onethird of the face value?
The first requirement is, therefore, to ascertain certain
basic factors for the calculations, viz.:

Probable annual sales (tonnage)
Probable net selling price
Probable production cost
Possible rate of production (assuming operations con
tinue)
(e) Rate of profit which anyone engaged in the venture
would reasonably expect it to yield.

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

I will next deal with the reasonable expectations in regard
to the volume and prices of sales and the volume and cost
of production.
In forming estimates in regard to future production or
sales the natural starting point is the experience of the past.
It is apparent, however, that past results are not in them
selves conclusive; the operations of a patent-owning com
pany for a period immediately preceding the expiration of
its patents being, for instance, useless as an indication of its
future prospects. It is necessary, therefore, in connection
with the results of the past to consider what changes in con
ditions have occurred or can reasonably be foreseen which
will be reflected in the future operations.
The accounts for the 5⅓ years ending April 30, 1914,
which are in evidence, show that during that period the aver
age sales amounted to 270,000 tons; and, in view of the large
accumulation of stock, it is safe to assume that every effort
was being made to press the sales as much as possible while
maintaining prices. During the period, the company had
practically no competitors in the United States, but it ap
pears from the record that at April 30, 1914, serious compe
tition was in sight from the Freeport Sulphur Company
which had produced upwards of 100,000 tons, Bearing in
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mind that within four or five years from the date of com
mencement of its own operations the Union Sulphur Com
pany was producing more sulphur than the market could
absorb, the seriousness of this factor in the situation is ap
parent. A prospective purchaser looking at the situation at
the date of Mr. Frasch’s death would naturally assume that
this competition would result in one or both of two things;
either a drastic reduction in selling prices, or allowing the
Freeport Company to take a fair proportion of the volume
of business to be done with a corresponding reduction in the
volume of business to be done by the Union Sulphur Com
pany. If such reduction were calculated at one-third of the
average business of the preceding five years of the Union Sul
phur Company, this would leave the prospective sales of the
Union Sulphur Company at 180,000 tons per annum. I
think, therefore, that an estimate of 200,000 tons annual sales
is as high as could reasonably be assumed for the future.
As to the price, it appears from the record that the net
price of sulphur at the mine was about $16.40 per ton.
This was arrived at by deducting from the gross price re
alized the cost of freight and all selling expenses. It is, how
ever, necessary to consider also for the present purpose the
working capital required to be invested in carrying on the
operations, because any proceeds from the sale of sulphur
would have to yield a return on the working capital invested
as well as on the price paid for the stock of sulphur itself.
The net assets of the company, exclusive of the mine and
stock of sulphur and its investments in subsidiary companies,
have been computed at $4,317,205.54. Allowing 7% as the
rate of return on this working capital, the rate normally
paid on the preferred stock of industrial companies, would
give an annual charge of over $350,000, or more than $1 a
ton. Allowing for this item and for the fact that with a
smaller volume of business the selling expenses would prob
ably be relatively higher, past experience would indicate $15
as the price per ton to be assumed for the purpose of calcu
lating the present value of the stock of sulphur.
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In view of the fact that the sulphur price had remained
substantially unchanged during the 5⅓ years in which the
company had a practical monopoly, it seems reasonably clear
that no increase in this price could be expected, especially
having regard to the prospective competition of the Free
port Sulphur Company and possibly other companies, to the
large stocks which the company had accumulated, and to the
wide margin between cost and selling prices (selling prices
being at least three times cost). There would seem to be
more reason to anticipate a reduction in selling prices, but in
the absence of any measure of the probable reduction, I have
adopted the figure of $15 and merged the hazard of reduced
prices with the other hazards which are reflected in the rate
of profit allowed in the computation of present values.
As to the volume of production and the costs, there are
statements in evidence showing the production and cost by
years. These figures are as follows:

Year 1909........................................
“ 1910........................................
“ 1911........................................
“ 1912........................................
“ 1913........................................
4 months ending April 30, 1914..

Production
(tons)
270,725
246,510
204,220
786,605
478,565
103,080

Outlays
$1,273,850
1,445,802
1,727,200
2,119,214
1,795,768
556,319

Inasmuch as the results for the year 1911 were doubtless
seriously affected by the expense incidental to the violent
physical disturbances which it has been testified took place
in that year, I think these figures should be disregarded in
forecasting the future (except in so far as they indicate the
financial importance of some of the hazards attaching to the
business). The figures for the period prior to 1911 are also
of little value inasmuch as the change of methods necessi
tated by the disturbance in 1911 has permanently affected
the cost of operation. Comparing the figures for 1913 with
those for 1912 it will be observed that a decrease of 308,040
tons in output was accompanied by a decrease of only
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$323,446 in outlays; and working out the annual equivalent
for the figures for the four months ending April 30, 1914, a
reduction of 169,325 tons a year in production is accom
panied by a decrease of only $126,811 per annum in outlays.
It is readily apparent therefore that the expenses of conduct
ing operations are affected to only a very small extent by the
tonnage of production; and the annual expenditures neces
sary may be analyzed into two component parts—a fixed ex
pense of approximately $1,350,000, and expenses fluctuating
with the output which may be taken at about $1 per ton.
On this basis a scale of costs according to the volume of pro
duction can readily be computed as follows:
Annual
Production
(tons)
200,000
250,000
300,000
350,000
400,000
450,000
500,000
550,000
600,000
650,000
700,000
750,000

Fixed Cost
$1,350,000
1,350,000
1,350,000
1,350,000
1,350,000
1,350,000
1,350,000
1,350,000
1,350,000
1,350,000
1,350,000
1,350,000

Cost vary
ing with
Production
$200,000
250,000
300,000
350,000
400,000
450,000
500,000
550,000
600,000
650,000
700,000
750,000

Together
$1,550,000
1,600,000
1,650,000
1,700,000
1,750,000
1,800,000
1,850,000
1,900,000
1,950,000
2,000,000
2,050,000
2,100,000

Per Ton
$7.75
6.40
5.50
4.86
4.38
4.00
3.70
3.45
3.25
3.08
2.93
2.80

In passing, it may be noted that the expenses have increased appreciably, the fixed expenses being now greater
than the total outlays for 1909. Such an increase is to be
expected in view of the testimony as to the necessity of
pumping out cold water from the property since 1911 and as
to the increasing distance which material has to be moved
to fill in on the surface of the property.
From an examination of the record it appears that the
production averaged:
for the

5⅓ years 391,820 tons per annum
last 3⅓ “
471,741
“
“
435,234

The production of 1912 must be regarded as abnormally
high, just as that for 1911 is abnormally low. On the whole
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a production of 450,000 tons per annum would seem to be a
fair assumption as to tonnage. This would mean total out
lays of $1,800,000 and a cost of $4 per ton.
From the foregoing consideration we may use as reasonable
estimates for the future the following data:
Annual sales.........................
’. . 200,000 tons
Probable selling value (net)..............
$15 per ton
Probable production.......................... 450,000 tons
Cost of production.............................. $4.00 per ton

The period of operation is entirely uncertain and the ques
tion of how best to deal with the uncertainty will be con
sidered later.
A further point remaining to be considered is the ques
tion of taxes, particularly taxes in Louisiana. It appears
from the testimony that the mine taxes amounted to about
214% on the assessed value of the mine. The calculation of
the value of the property will be based on a gradually de
clining stock of sulphur and mine value, and it is therefore
proper to assume that the taxes will be correspondingly re
duced. The most convenient way of allowing for this factor
will be by adding 214% to the rate of profit determined in
the following section in order to provide for these taxes.
Thus if a rate of profit of 15% per annum is assumed, the
calculations of present value must be based oh a rate of
15% plus 214%’ or 171%%’ and so on. Next to be consid
ered is the rate of return that is proper to be applied.
In determining the rate of profit which an investor in this
undertaking would reasonably expect it to yield, the first re
quirement is to consider in a general way what the invest
ment would involve. Roughly it would mean an invest
ment of $10,000,000 more or . less in the acquisition of a
stock of sulphur and a mine, as to the future' production of
which it would be- impossible to make any forecast, and there
would be a further investment of about $4,300,000 to pro
vide the working capital needed in the business. In the
previous section I have assumed a rate of return of 7% on
this working capital, so that it is necessary now to consider
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the rate of return only as the more speculative investment.
The amount to be invested is, of course, substantial, and
the situation is not therefore comparable to one in which an
investor may make a relatively small investment. The differ
ence between the wholesale and retail prices of investments
are as real and marked as the difference between the whole
sale and retail prices of commodities, especially where it is
an outright investment of capital and not a loan that is
offered.
The business and the risks attending it are unusual in
character, which fact would eliminate the conservative type
of investor entirely. To attract the more speculative investor
a relatively higher rate of return is essential. The oppor
tunities for remunerative investment in business in this
country are greater than the funds seeking investments in
which a speculative risk is involved. Consequently, capital
is reluctant to go outside well understood lines of activities
unless special inducements are offered. There is always
and everywhere a tendency to overrate risks which are un
familiar and to demand greater margins of safety or larger
returns to compensate therefor.
If the reasonable expectations above referred to were
realized, the investment would be repaid, together with the
return assumed by instalments over a period of 9½ years.
Taking first the investment in the stock of sulphur, any rate
of return assumed would be seriously diminished if either
the volume of the sales or the selling price should fall short
of such estimates. There is far more ground for expecting a
reduction in price than an increase; and as to the volume
of tonnage I think it would be fair to say that the prospects
of the actual results’ falling short of 200,000 tons sales are at
least equal to the prospects of that volume’s being exceeded.
The profitableness of the business depends largely on the
practical monopoly which the company has enjoyed; and
whilst some allowance has been made for the effect on that
monopoly of the operations of the Freeport Sulphur Com-
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pany, it has been testified that still further competition is
well within the bounds of possibility.
The investment would therefore clearly be one attended
with substantial hazards, and the rate of profit should be
determined with reference to the rate at which earning
capacity is bought or sold rather than with reference to rates
of interest on money borrowed or loaned. Having regard
to my experience in purchases and sales of businesses and
earning capacity, I am convinced that 15% is a moderate
rate to apply to this part of the investment.
The mine and the sulphur must, however, be considered
together for, as already pointed out, the restricted market
for sulphur is one of the most essential features of the situa
tion; and no one could afford to buy either the mine or the
sulphur separately and be faced with the destructive compe
tition which would begin immediately.
In any computations based on future tonnage, in view of
the impossibility of foreseeing the future of the mine, a
higher rate of profit than for the sulphur now on hand is
clearly necessary. In the calculations which follow, the ab
solute uncertainty as to whether the mine will continue to
yield is not taken into account, except in the rate of return
assumed, these calculations being made on the basis of the
mine’s continuing to yield up to the point where further
production would not be profitable. This method involves
assumptions of future production of from 600,000 to 1,900,000 tons (see above). To provide for the hazards involved
in these assumptions (which include the hazards as to the
maintenance of the volume of sales and selling prices during
the period necessary for the realization of this stock), an
addition of 5% to the 15% used for stock actually on hand
is, I consider, undoubtedly a minimum. I do not feel that
any extended discussion of this addition is needed as the
justice of the assumption will, I think, be universally ad
mitted.
The conditions of this particular mine are almost unique,
and it is therefore almost impossible to find exactly analo
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gous cases of purchase and sales. Comparisons with other
mining properties are valueless unless all the facts as to
ore reserves, etc., are fully known. Such instances are
comparatively rare, but I recall one sale of a mining prop
erty for a sum amounting to several million dollars which
fits the case closely. The transaction was between a buyer
and a willing seller. From the standpoint of monopoly and
breadth of market for its output, the company was at least as
advantageously situated as this company, and there were no
special hazards or uncertainties attending the operations.
There was a substantial agreement between the parties as to
the tonnage actually in sight and the rate at which it could
be mined and marketed. The purchase price asked yielded,
on the basis of what was regarded by both parties as the
minimum annual tonnage and the minimum selling value,
a return of over 17% on the investment. On the basis of
tonnage and selling prices which both parties regarded as
reasonable and which were in fact more than realized, the
yield amounted to approximately 25%. In this case the
undeveloped ore was believed and was proved to be very
large, but at the time of the sale was incapable of estima
tion.
While stock exchange values are affected by such varied
conditions that it is difficult to draw conclusions therefrom,
it would be easy to cite many instances of companies en
gaged in staple industries earning profits equivalent to con
siderably more than 15% upon the average market value of
their stock.
My firm has recently compiled from reports on examina
tions made by it, taken at random, a statement showing the
average percentage of profit actually realized in a large num
ber of companies large and small, and the result of this
compilation, which included some companies operated at a
loss, showed that the average return on the investment for
the 158 companies was 13.67%. These are of course reali
zations, not anticipations.
I have frequently known of offers of businesses being re
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jected because the earning capacity on the investment was
not sufficient, where such earning capacity would have
amounted to over 15%. As indicating the commercial value
of earning capacity when attended with any hazards, I might
cite as one of many such instances coming under my personal
observation in the course of my practice the issue of common
stock of the Willys-Overland Company in 1912. This com
pany was capitalized with a common stock of $20,000,000
and a preferred stock of $5,000,000. The earnings were
rapidly increasing and for the last completed. year were
equivalent to just 17% on the common stock. The esti
mate for the then current year’s earnings (which was more
than realized) was about 22% on the common stock. Upon
this showing the stock was offered to investors, or at retail,
at a price of $67.50 per share, and the market value shortly
fell and long remained below that figure.. This is only one
of many cases which I could cite.
Earning capacity of the most stable industrials is seldom
valued at a higher cash value than five years’ purchase, that
is on the basis of a 20% return. A 15% rate is equivalent
to six and two-third years’ purchase.
It may be suggested that the stock of sulphur should be
valued more from the standpoint of merchandise. I do not
think this would affect the conclusion, though I do not think
the standpoint is the correct one. A merchant buying at
wholesale with a view to retail distribution may be satisfied
with a profit, after deducting all expenses, of 5% on stock
which he can turn over four or five times a year or oftener,
but 15% would be a minimum profit on stock which could
be turned over only once a year; and it clearly follows that
if the stock will take more than a year to turn over, the rate
must be 15% for each year the stock has to be held before
sale, which is precisely in accord with the method I have
adopted.
In this discussion I have mentioned some among the many
considerations leading to the conclusion that a rate of 15%
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per annum as to the stock on hand and a rate of 20% as to
any tonnage assumed to be mined in the future constitutes
a moderate basis for the determination of the present value
of the sums expected to be received from the business in the
future. It is important to note also that these rates can
be applied only to assumptions as to the future such that
the chances of failure to realize them are at least measurably
offset by chances of more favorable realizations.
CALCULATION OF VALUE OF THE STOCK OF SULPHUR AT THE
MINE AND THE MINING PROPERTY

For the purpose of this calculation the following data has
been arrived at:
Factors required

Probable volume of sales
Probable net selling price
Probable production
Probable production cost
Rate of profit which anyone
engaging in the venture
would reasonably expect it
to yield
Amount to be added to rate
of return to allow for taxes

My computations
regarding same
200,000 tons per annum
$15 per ton
450,000 tons per annum
$4 per ton
Not less than 15% as to ton
nage actually on hand and
20% on any additional
tonnage assumed to be
mined in the future
2¼%

The ratio of selling price to cost is $15:4 or 3¾:1. The
first step is, therefore, to ascertain how long payment of
$3.75 may be postponed without reducing its present value
below $ 1. Since we are dealing here not with stock actually
on hand but with sulphur to be mined, the rate of return
to be used must be 20% or, adding 2¼% for taxes, 22¼%.
From interest tables the period is found to be 6 years. If
we go beyond this period, say to 6¼ years, we find the pres
ent value of $1 due in 6¼ years (at 5½% payable quarterly
which for convenience I have used as the equivalent of 22¼
per annum) is 26.22¢, so that the present value of $3.75 is
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98.32¢, or less than $1. The limit of accumulation is there
fore six years stock:

6 years sales at 200,000 tons = 1,200,000 tons
The stock on hand is
867,613 “
Difference
332,387 tons
Now the quarterly output is 112,500 tons (¼ of 450,000) and
the quarterly sales 50,000 (¼ of 200,000), so that the stock
will increase 62,500 tons per quarter and will increase by
332,387 tons in somewhat over 5 quarters. After that time
further production would be unprofitable unless the volume
of profitable sales could be increased. Any further produc
tion would have to remain on hand more than 6 years, and
the present value of the sales price would at 20% be less than
the cost of production.
If the production were reduced, the cost per ton would be
increased, and the time when the amount of stock that could
be accumulated profitably would be lessened. If the produc
tion could be kept at a higher figure, the period of profit
able operations would be extended, though not very greatly,
as will appear from later calculations.
The only hope of realizing greater values would lie in
increasing the sales, without unduly reducing the sale price.
Returning to the calculations, the outlook on the assumed
data is therefore:
The stock on hand is.......................................................
which will be sold at the rate of 50,000 tons per
quarter for 17 quarters and in the 18th quarter
There can be profitably mined at the rate of 112,500
tons per quarter for 5 quarters...............................
and in the 6th quarter................................................
Which will be sold...........................................................
in the 18th quarter and at the rate of 50,000 tons
per quarter in the 19th to 30th quarters.............

867,613

850,000
17,613

562,500
69,887

32,387
1,500,000

600,000
1,500,000

The computation is then as follows:
Amounts to Be Received and Present Value Thereof

Sales out of Stock:
850,000 tons at rate per quarter of 50,000 tons at $15 per
ton = $750,000 per quarter for 17 quarters, or
$12,750,000.
Present value of which per tables (15% return
plus 2¼% taxes) is .............................................. $. 8,775,412.50
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17,613 tons in the 18th quarter at $15 per ton = $264,195.
Present value per tables (15% return plus 2¼%
taxes) .......................................................................
$125,474.13
Sales out of Future Tonnage:
32,387 tons in 18th quarter at $15 per ton = $485,805.
Present value per tables (20% return plus 21¼%
taxes) ...................................................................
185,320.03
600,000 tons at rate per quarter year of 50,000 tons at $15
per ton = $750,000 per quarter for 12 quarters,
or $9,000,000.
Present value of which per tables (20% return
plus 21¼% taxes) is ..............................................
2,465,760.00
Together............................................................ $11,551,966.66
From which must be deducted:
Present value of expenditures to be made, viz.:
Operating costs of producing 632,387 tons as
follows:
562,500 tons at rate per quarter year of 112,500 tons at $4
per ton = $450,000 per quarter for 5 quarters.
Present value per tables (20%).$1,948,266.00
69,887 tons in 6th quarter at $4 per
ton = $279,548.
Present value per tables (20%).......... 208,604.31
2,156,870.31
Net present value of Stock of Sulphur and
Mining Property .................
$ 9,395,096.35

A greater capital value would attach to the property if the
volume of sales could be increased, and to a lesser extent if
the volume of production could be increased, with a result
ing decrease in cost per ton. As indicating the range of
values, I have computed the capital value based on sales as
high as 270,000 tons and production as high as 750,000 tons
at a cost of $2.80 per ton. These results may be tabulated
as follows:
Assuming

Sales
(tons')
200,000 per annum
"
200,000
"
270,000
270,000

Production
(tons)
450,000 at $4.00
750,000 at 2.80
450,000 at 4.00
750,000 at 2.80

Limit of
Profitable
Future
Production
(tons)
632,387
882,387
1,832,387
1,899,887

Capital
Value
of Stock
of Sulphur
and Mine
9,395,000
10,042,000
11,847,000
12,800,000

It will be observed that the last two calculations involve
not only unduly optimistic hypotheses as to rate of produc
tion and sales, but also very large assumptions as to the ton
nage which can be secured.
In considering these two calculations it is particularly im
portant to note:
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(1) That the sales during the 5⅓ years were evidently
pressed to a maximum, and the sales for the last four
months of the period were almost exactly the average
of the entire period. Consequently, there was at
April, 1914, practically no prospect of the tonnage
of sales being increased, but there was . almost a cer
tainty of the sales being reduced through the com
petition of the Freeport Sulphur Company, which was
then for the first time beginning to be felt.
• (2) That the price of sulphur during the period had re
mained constant. Here again, therefore, there was
no prospect of more favorable prices but serious
danger of a reduction in prices, having regard to the
wide margin between cost and selling prices, the im
pending competition, and the enormous accumula
tions of stock on hand.
(3) That these calculations assume a future production
of nearly 2,000,000 tons. In this connection it is most
important to observe that while any falling short from
this assumed production would unfavorably affect
the value of the property, there would be no favorable
effect on the value if the mine should be capable of
producing a larger tonnage, since the calculations as
sume the production of the maximum tonnage that
could be profitably marketed on the assumed volume
of sales.
(4) Finally as to the rate of profit assumed, the rate of
15% applied to the stock on hand is undoubtedly
moderate in view of the hazards, and the rate of 20%
would be entirely too low to be applicable to any
calculation involving such optimistic assumptions. It
is used here for the sake of uniformity and not on ac
count of a belief in its applicability. In considering
this question it must be remembered that the rates
in question are applied only to the hazardous or
speculative part of the investment and that for the
assets other than the mine and stock of sulphur
(amounting to over $4,300,000) a rate of only 7% has
been allowed, this allowance being made in the form
of a deduction from the gross selling value.
Combining the investment in sulphur stock capi
talized at 15% and that in working capital at 7%,
the average yield on the two parts would not exceed
12%.
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On each of the four underlying assumptions, therefore,
there is no reasonable prospect of changes which would tend
to increase the value, but serious prospects, amounting in
some cases to practical certainty, that less favorable results
would be secured.
Taking all the considerations together, I am of the opinion
that from the standpoint of scientific computation on the
broad lines usually followed in valuing mining properties,
with only such adaptions as are needed to meet the very
unusual features of this case, the value of the stock of sulphur
and the mine together could not be deemed to be more
than $10,000,000.
The alternative method of valuation would be to regard
the sulphur in stock as a reserve and to value the mine and
the stock on the assumption that the current production of
mine will be sold first and that the reserve stock will be
realized only as and when the current production proves in
sufficient to meet the sales. Possibly, indeed, this is the more
practical method. In mining operations it is customary to
block out reserves of ore in advance of mining operations;
and the stock of sulphur in this case seems in many respects
analogous to such ore reserves, with the difference that the
reserve is carried on the surface instead of in the mine,
this difference being a necessary incident of the character
of the mining operations.
This alternative method will, however, give lower values
than the method I have adopted upon any reasonable as
sumptions as to sales and using the same rates of return, and
so will any intermediate course. As already stated, demon
stration of this fact led me to adopt the method which I
have outlined, in spite of its complexity.
I realize that in practice, theories, and especially theories
the application of which involves some complicated calcula
tions, are often regarded with distrust and are not carried
to their logical conclusion. But this merely means that the
maximum theoretical value will not in practice be realized,
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some part thereof being sacrificed to a natural disposition
to follow on more normal lines which will be regarded as
safer, though it may be questioned whether they will prove
so. It may well be that some deduction should be made
from the results I have calculated to allow for these practical
considerations, but for the purpose of taxation at any rate,
no exception can be taken to the failure to make such a de
duction.
Calculation

of

Value

of

Capital Stock

of the

Union Sulphur Company

Value of sulphur at mine and other mining property, say........ .$10,000,000
Other property in Calcasieu Parish..................................................
379,350
Stock of sulphur other than at mine at $15 per ton.....................
582,780
Miscellaneous assets as to which no question arises (less liabilities)
3,355,074
Investments in subsidiary companies ..............................................
885,369
$15,202,573

or say per share............................................................

$7,600

III

THE MAXIMUM SELLING PRICE OF NEWSPRINT
PAPER *
(1918)
annexed testimony was given before the Federal Trade
Commission in a proceeding to determine the maximum
selling price of newsprint paper, pursuant to an agreement
which provided for the determination of the price by the
Commission subject to a right of appeal to the Circuit Judges
of the United States for the Second Circuit.
The Federal Trade Commission made no express find
ings on the questions covered by the testimony, and fixed a
price on newsprint paper in carload lots of $3.10 per hun
dred pounds. Upon appeal the Circuit Court fixed the
maximum selling price at $3.50 per hundred pounds and
in doing so made the following specific findings:
The

In valuing the capital investment used in producing news
print, prices before the present European War should be
adopted.
In ascertaining capital investment, i.e., the present value
of property actually used in paper production, we exclude
timber lands whether owned or leased, also undeveloped or
potential water power, i.e., water rights; but include mill and
town sites, terminal facilities, and improvements on or de
velopment of natural water powers, together with any in
vestment by way of actual payment for power rights. The
foregoing allowed elements of capital value are the
“tangibles.”
A fair maximum return on said capital in a business of
the hazards proven is 15% per annum.

The Court found the depreciated present value of
“tangibles” at pre-war prices to be $25,000 per ton of daily
capacity, and, adding 10% for going value and $12,000 per
* Testimony before the Federal Trade Commission (March 22, 1918).
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ton for working capital, arrived at an investment of $39,500
per ton. They applied their findings to a plant having a
daily capacity of 100 tons as follows:

The capital invested is 39,500 X 100 = $3,950,000
The fair annual return, 15%
=
592,500
To be obtained by selling all of an
annual production of 30,000 tons,
or a profit per ton of
19.75
Mr. Wise. In your work as accountants do you have occa
sion to be consulted on the question of value of properties?
Mr. May. Well, we do not go into the field of valuation of
properties, but we have a great deal to do with questions
of value as affected by earning capacity.
Q. Yes, and with earnings?
A. And with earnings.
Q. Upon the value of the property?
A. Yes. We have acted for a great many people contem
plating purchasing a business or selling a business, and they
have frequently called on us for advice as to the wisdom of
buying or selling property.
Q. As a preliminary to that advice, I take it, you have to
make an examination of the books of the properties to deter
mine what is shown on those books?
A. Yes.
Q. And in this work have you made a study of the ques
tion of the rate of return on invested capital?
A. The question of return on invested capital is a sub
ject that I have given a great deal of consideration to for the
last fifteen years.
Q. As to industrial businesses?
A. Yes. Perhaps I may explain that I approached the
question from an entirely different angle from Mr. Erickson.
I do not claim to have made an exhaustive study of the
underlying theories that he has. My ideas are based on prac
tical experience, and I came in from the standpoint, not
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originally of rate cases of price fixing, but from an entirely
different angle.
Up to about ten years ago I do not think my firm was
ever engaged in a rate or price-fixing matter, and since then
I do not think we have been engaged in more than one or,
perhaps, two a year; and my interest in the matter has de
veloped originally from the fact that there was a tendency to
value assets, particularly mining properties, on the basis of
estimating the future earnings and then discounting those
values at a given rate of interest.
Now, we have always been advocates of conservatism in
accounting and finance and were satisfied that people were
using too low rates of return in those calculations, and, un
fortunately, some of the States were supporting them—en
tirely for tax purposes—one of the most extreme cases being
Minnesota, which valued on the basis of estimating the future
return, and discounting it at 4 per cent. I was convinced
you could never get people to put money into any business of
that kind on a 4 per cent basis. I was originally interested
in that subject largely for the purpose of convincing our
clients it was not wise to establish any such theories, and later
I became convinced that the same fallacy was being adopted
in the regulation of rates, and I felt sure that the Commis
sions in fixing too low rates were flying in the face of an
economic fact and going to do more harm in the long run
to the public than to the railroads, and that is how I became
interested in value—from this angle.
Q. Now, in the past you have had occasion, I take it, to
audit the books of a good many of the newsprint manufac
turing concerns in this country?
A. Yes, we have done quite a number of them. More of
the other paper than of newsprint, as a matter of fact.
Q. In the recent past you have had occasion to make a
special examination into the accounts of the companies in
volved in this particular proceeding, have you not?
A. Yes, we are doing that now.
Q. And as a result of your studies in the whole field of
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accountancy and of your particular studies of the companies
involved here, have you formed any opinion as to what is a
proper rate of return upon the investment?
A. Well, to state what is a fair rate of return today is a
little difficult question, and the immediate effect of war con
ditions is rather difficult to estimate accurately. Of course,
the answer depends, in some measure, on how you value your
property. If you in valuing your property take the highest
point of the present costs, you do not have to give the same
liberality in return as you have if you take a lower level as
the basis of value. Naturally the two are always linked up
together, but I would say, based on pre-war conditions, a
prospect of a return of 15 to 20 per cent has always been
necessary to attract capital into a business of moderate haz
ards. This, I would say, would certainly not be more than
covered by those rates.
I think that property has to earn that in order to attract
capital into the business. In saying that, I am basing it
largely on my actual experience of cases where even that re
turn has failed to attract purchasers. You would be sur
prised if you had seen as many cases as I have where earnings
which showed approximately 15 per cent had been turned
down by people contemplating buying. I was surprised my
self, because I approached it purely from the professional
standpoint, earlier in my experience. I have seen so many
now that I am convinced of the fact that that is so, and in
recent years I have given a good deal of thought to the
reasons.
I imagine Mr. Wise will want me to state some of the
reasons I have for saying it, entirely from the practical stand
point of experience.
Commissioner Murdock. Let me follow that. Supposing
I came to you and said, “Mr. May, I wish you would go out
here to Podunk, Indiana, and look over a mill out there I
want to buy.” You go and look over the mill and come back
and report to me and say, “They have got $100,000 in that
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mill supported by $10,000 earnings, but my advice is not to
buy it.”
Mr. May. I would say that, but I do not base so much on
my advice as on the number of cases where I reported to
people and they refused to buy.
Within the last sixty days I had a business in New York
that was earning $100,000 a year which had between $600,000 and $700,000 of assets. Those people could not get a
buyer for the property. Finally it was sold for $500,000.
That is an actual case within the last sixty days. People
who have not been through it do not realize it. That is why
I have been concerning myself with trying to explain the
phenomenon.
Commissioner Fort. Do you not consider that now that
condition may be worse largely on account of the war?
Mr. May. As a matter of fact that particular plant had
more opportunities during the war. During the war it will
earn a great deal more than in normal conditions.
Commissioner Fort. You do not think conditions as to
the uncertainty of business, owing to the war, had anything
to do with it?
A. No, I. do not think so.
Commissioner Murdock. As a matter of fact, the answer
you would return to me in that case, Mr. May, would be this:
If the facts were verified, showing it is a sure thing that there
is $100,000 in that mill I have looked over, and I found this
is the maximum earning for several years, but there seems
to be an upward tendency in the mill and I think it is going
to earn more in a few years. That is about the way you
would report to me.
In other words, in surveying the property for me you
would not take merely the present into your consideration,
but you would take a survey of the past and just as near as
you could form a survey of the future as you were able to in
your report to me.
Mr. May. Of course, if I could put my finger on anything
that was earning only 10 per cent and I felt satisfied that it

268

VALUATION

would earn 25 per cent I would say go ahead and buy it,
but, of course, that is a rather different question from the
proposition of fixing a maximum rate of return you are go
ing to allow them to earn in the future.
Commissioner Murdock. I wanted to get it just as simply
as possible.
Mr. May. The more questions you ask the better I will
be pleased, because I do not want to leave any point that is
not clear in your mind if I can help it.
Mr. Wise. You say that 15 per cent return is needed to at
tract capital into an industry of moderate hazards. What
would you say of the paper industry? Does that come into
the class of industrials where' the hazards are moderate?
Mr. May. I would say it was an industry of moderate
hazards although not one of the lowest of that group.
Q. What would you regard as the hazards of the business?
A. Well, first of all, the uninsurable risks; and the second,
which I think has regard to a large part of the industry, is the
fact that it is engaged in a business in one country and sell
ing its product largely in another country, and is, therefore,
subject to the operation of the fiscal policy of the two differ
ent countries and to the elements of government control by
two different governments whose interests may not always
be identical; that is a distinct hazard in the business.
Then there is another equally important hazard in it, and
that is the fact that it takes such a large return in proportion
to the sales. If you have a business with sales of four or five
times the capital, you can always provide the return on capi
tal by a reasonable percentage of the sales, and nobody would
say that is an exorbitant return on your investment, but
when you have to get a large percentage on your sales, people
are always apt to say, “Why, half the selling price is profit, or
25 per cent is profit; that must be too much.” Whereas it is
not at all necessarily so in an industry like this where the
capital is large in proportion to the sales, and 20 per cent
or 25 per cent profit on sales would not be anything like as
remunerative as 2 or 3 per cent profit is to John Wanamaker,
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Sears, Roebuck, or Woolworth, or any of those people.
Therefore, I always feel where they have to have a large
investment in proportion to the sales it detracts from the
attractiveness of the investment.
Q. Well, what is the basis of your calculation for your
return?
A. The investment value of the property. I noticed Mr.
Erickson discusses the question to some extent from the
standpoint of bonds and stocks, and, therefore, I would like
to say that in my view of the case the controlling factor is
the investment value, that is, the total present value of the
investment, and the question whether capitalized by bonds
or stocks does not enter into it in my view of the case at all.
Mr. Wise. Does it make any difference to you how many
times the turnover in that business occurs in a year?
Mr. May. How do you mean?
Q. Sales?
A. I think it does, in this way. The return must be based
on the investment, but if the turnover is small, as I said, your
percentage of profit to sales looks so high that there is always
a tendency to cut it unduly; that is your hazard.
Q. Are you speaking with the idea of only one turnover
of capital per annum in a business?
A. In this business I suppose you do not turn over your
capital once a year. Comparing the agricultural implement
industry and the packing industry, it is much more difficult
for the agricultural implement industry to get a fair return
on capital than the packers, because the same rate of return
would constitute something like eight or nine times the per
centage of sales in the case of the agricultural implement in
dustry that it would in the case of the packers.
Commissioner Murdock. Mr. May is speaking of the
gross sales as contrasted with the capital. He is talking about
the turnover.
Mr. May. Yes, the turnover. The turnover is the rela
tion of sales to capital investment.
Commissioner Murdock. That is, the more rapid the
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turnover, the lower the rate of profit on the investment.
Mr. May. No, I do not say that. I say that theoretically
they should be the same, but practically, because a given
profit is a higher percentage of sales, you have more diffi
culty in getting it. That is one of the hazards of the busi
ness. That is the point I was trying to make.
Commissioner Fort. Well then, in your idea, the profit
should be the same on every sale of a concern that has but
one turnover per annum as the concern that has five turn
overs per annum.
Mr. May. Percentage of investment.
Commissioner Fort. That may make quite a difference.
Mr. May. Of course the percentage of investment should
be the same, although the percentage of sales would be
much higher in the case of the company with a small turn
over than the one with a big turnover.
Mr. Wise. Can you explain that any further?
Mr. May. No, I think that is all.
Q. Now you stated, Mr. May, that as a basis of the return
you take the investment regardless of how that investment is
placed, whether it is in stocks, in bonds, or part in stocks and
part in bonds?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In other words, it is no matter whether one company
has a $50,000,000 and another a $5,000,000 outlay, they are
entitled to the same rate of return?
A. That is my feeling.
Q. I wish you would go right ahead and explain your
position here without my having to prompt you or question
you at all, and testify as to your opinion for a rate of return
on the basis that you have recited.
A. All right. I hope you will interrupt whenever you see
fit.
In the first place, before I start to discuss reasons
for the opinion I want to emphasize two points: first,
I take it that what we are discussing is a maximum price
and that there is no guarantee you are going to get that
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price, and that there is no guarantee of a minimum price. I
think that is a point fairly agreed-upon. In the second place,
I want to emphasize the distinction between the profits that
a business must earn and the profits which can be distributed
to the investors in that business.
A large part of the earnings of every successful company
has to be reinvested in that business, or, as Mr. Schwab put
it once, a dollar for dividends and a dollar for plant, and it
is curious how nearly accurate that is.
In preparing a brief for the Senate Finance Committee
on the excess profits tax payment dealing with that point, I
took at random forty companies, railroads, public utilities
and manufacturing companies and miscellaneous companies,
and when we checked all the figures back that were drawn
at random it showed over a five-year period they would actu
ally distribute in dividends almost exactly 50 per cent, within
1 per cent of 50 per cent of the total earnings in the five
years. So if you happen to earn your 15 per cent or 20 per
cent you won’t be able to distribute year in and year out
more than half of it. That is the first point.
Commissioner Murdock. Mr. May, I do not quite get
that in my mind. What I would like to know is what you
are feeding that 10 per cent to. If you allow 20 per cent
to go in the business and give 10 per cent to the stockholders,
where does that other 10 per cent go?
Mr. May. It goes to build up the business. Of course, it
ultimately accrues directly or indirectly to the benefit of the
stockholder. There is no doubt about that. As long as he
gets only half distributed in cash he feels that the other half
is going to build up the business. It may or may not. Some
do get it.
Commissioner Murdock. The ordinary method, as I have
observed it, is to divert that 10 per cent which is not dis
tributed as dividends into some reserve fund or surplus.
Mr. May. Yes, that is so, but my experience is that a
man is attracted if he thinks he has a fair prospect of being
able to get that 15 or 20 per cent out of the business, half
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in cash and half in equities piling up for the future. That
is the way he sizes it up, as far as my experience goes.
Commissioner Fort. That extra 10 per cent is not dis
tributed in dividends and you do not care whether it is
carried in surplus or a sinking fund or put into new ma
chinery as long as it is carried.
Mr. May. Yes.
Mr. Wise. It is a fact that it is never as such handed back
to the stockholder.
Mr. May. Yes, he has got to leave it in to insure he is still
going to have a cash dividend in the future.
Q. He is simply switching his principal all the time to
insure him of his return.
A. That is right. I have made some examination of the
actual facts. Take the Report of the Commissioner of
Corporations on the investigation of the Steel Industry.
You will find that year in and year out he said that the price
of $28 for steel rails was the fixed price and that it never
varied for years, or that there were very slight fluctuations.
That yielded a profit of 18 per cent on the investment to the
steel corporation, including 18 per cent on the relative in
vestment in ore properties and 18 per cent on the relative in
vestment in transportation facilities, taking ore properties,
transportation, blast furnaces, mills, working capital, all
along the line invested in turning out a ton of steel rails,
that the price of $28 yielded a return of 18 per cent on the
entire capital, and yet, so far as my experience goes, nobody
ever seriously questioned the fairness of the price of steel
rails, and it remained for fifteen years, I suppose.
Commissioner Murdock. Of course, it has been tradi
tional in the United States for thirty years that they sold
cheaper abroad than at home.
Mr. May. That, I think, is one of the things that has
often been said but has never been proved.
Then there is another report, taking the smaller com
panies. If you will refer to the Report of the Commissioner
of Corporations on the investigation of Independent To-
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bacco Industry at the time it was being oppressed by the
Tobacco Trust, as the report puts it. It shows for 48 inde
pendent companies—let me see, I have the exact figures here,
I think—an average profit of 15.9 per cent, and it is rather
amazing to note that the Commissioner drew attention to
that fact as evidence of oppression because the Tobacco
Trust itself was earning 40 per cent.
Then there was another interesting thing that developed
in the same connection some three or four years ago. In the
course of a study of this question my firm took at random
a series of records at our own offices. There were all kinds
of businesses, largely small manufacturing companies, and we
just took them as they came. We said to a man to go and
pick out 200 reports, to take them straight out of the files,
leaving out all public utilities and non-industrial concerns,
pick them out and find out their capital, and we found the
average of those 158 companies was 13.67 per cent. Those
were accounts where we knew a proper provision had been
made for salaries, depreciation and everything, so that we
were dealing with reliable data, and they were just picked
out at random.
Commissioner Murdock. That is
per cent to the
stockholders and 6½ per cent to the business?
Mr. May. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wise. Some of the companies made less than 6 per
cent altogether and others made as much as 24 per cent?
Mr. May. Some of them made a loss as the actual facts
show. Out of the 158 cases there were 70 that earned over
15 per cent. Now these companies, as stated, were selected
in 1913; they were not picked out but just taken at random
in 1913. I thought that for this purpose it would be in
teresting to take as many of those same companies as I could
find and find out what their last report showed. I was able
to find in our office files the corresponding records for 86
of those 158 companies.
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of what year?
Mr. May. The year ending 1916 or 1917. Those 86 com
panies in the earlier period averaged 13.11 per cent, and the
same companies in the later period averaged 20.37 per cent.
I also have the percentage here of the individual companies
showing the different ranges in the earlier period. There
were 16 earning between 15 and 20 per cent and 24 earning
over 20 per cent. There are 40 earning over 15 per cent to
day and there are 7 earning between 15 and 20 per cent,
and 39 earning over 20, making 46 out of 86 that are earning
from 15 per cent, and about 60 per cent of those companies,
between 50 and 60, are companies with a capital investment
of under a million dollars. They are not big trusts, they are
small and medium-sized corporations.
This is another light on the question, and I have prepared
some figures which seem to me particularly illuminating in
view of the fact many of the parties to this proceeding are
Canadian corporations. Now, Canada’s normal source of
supply of capital is Great Britain, and, therefore, it seems to
me that figures showing the return in industry in Great Bri
tain, and in countries capitalized in Great Britain, would be
relevant. The London Economist, which is the best-known
of the financial journals of London, gives each year a sum
mary of the profits shown by corporations whose accounts are
published in its columns during, that year. I have prepared
the figures from those summaries, by industries, leaving out
the railways, public utilities, mines and financial companies
like banks and trust companies. I have had them prepared
under different groups and I have worked them out to show
the percentage of profit to the total capital, whether bor
rowed capital or stock capital, during these years. The aver
ages are as follows: at the end of the year June 30, 1914, the
average of all companies is 11.25 per cent; 1915, 10.32 per
cent. That is when they felt the adverse effect of the be
ginning of the war; 1916, 12.65 percent; 1917, 13.27 per cent.
Commissioner Murdock.

As
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Mr. Wise. How many companies does that represent?
Mr. May. It represents about 650 companies with a total
invested capital of about 550,000,000 pounds sterling.
Q. Good, bad and indifferent?
A. All that are published. I will draw attention to the
breweries, which come at the top. English breweries are
notoriously overcapitalized. They were a very, very success
ful industry. They were capitalized on the basis of their
earning capacity during their palmy days. Undoubtedly
they are overcapitalized. If you leave out the breweries in
any year it raises the average of the rest about one per cent.
In my view they are extremely interesting and I think
relevant as regards this proceeding.
Commissioner Murdock. That is on the aggregate of
these industries, less the breweries, the rate would be for the
year 1917, 14.37?
Mr. May. About that, 14.37,
you leave the breweries
out. Breweries earned only 6.7.
Then there is another significant figure, that is, the earn
ings of our national banks. The reports of the Comptroller
of the Currency show that the earnings of national banks in
the last fifteen or sixteen years—it does not make much
difference what period you take—they averaged 9.7 per cent
on the total capital and surplus invested. Now there is a
really attractive industry, the national bank. Your capital
is in there and you can take it out and liquidate it if you
do not like that kind of investment. It is entirely different
from locking up property in bricks and mortar. They are
not any good unless they be put to some such use as you
build them for. That has always seemed to me a very good
index and it seems to me is entirely in line with the general
conclusion that you reach from studying the industrial busi
nesses, because there cannot be any question as to the attrac
tiveness of a national bank investment.
Commissioner Fort. Except in one respect, double liabil
ity on stock.
Mr. May. That is true.

276

VALUATION

Mr. Wise. What is the percentage of loss in that case?
Mr. May. I think that is the key to the explanation of the
condition that I have been discussing, and what is the actual
reason for that is significant. The actual losses are less than
five-hundredths of one per cent. Yet one of the first things
a man thinks of when he thinks of a national bank invest
ment is the liability of it and the risks he is running, and that
influences his judgment as to the attractiveness of that invest
ment far beyond the mathematical value of the risk, and
that is the clue, I think. That is the clue to the whole thing.
Take fire insurance. Every man is considered lacking in
all business prudence if he does not insure, yet he is paying
double the mathematical value of the risk for the insurance.
Not more than 50 per cent of the premiums paid go to pay
losses. I happened to be talking last week to a Mr. Graham
Harding, who is an assessor for Lloyd’s in London. His
firm have acted for Lloyd’s for 120 years and he was talking
about the business that Lloyd’s do in insuring all sorts of
extraordinary risks, and he said, of course, they make some
spectacular losses, to be sure, but they are making all the
time spectacular profits—because people are willing to pay
many times the mathematical value of the risk.
I think that is the one factor more than any other that ac
counts for the high rate of return that you have got to give
to attract capital into industry. I do not know of any single
factor that is more potent. Now, of course, there is a sugges
tion that grows out of that, namely, that by our system of
distributing securities you can spread your risks and there
fore you do not sustain those losses. In our country there
are two ways of financing industry, practically. One or two
men or a group of men go in and put up all the capital and
control the business or else shares are distributed to the pub
lic. Now if a few men put it in they are the men who con
trol it; and if they go in, the way they look at it is somewhat
like this: Well, we have looked to make a certain profit and
if we make more than that profit it will give us a little more
income, but as we come up the value of the income is rela-
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tively less. If you have an income of $25,000 a year and
increase it to $30,000 you have added $5,000, but you have
not added 20 per cent to the enjoyments you get out of life.
It is just the same as building a steamer. When you get up
to a twenty-knot steamer its costs a lot more money to add a
little speed. The higher you get the less in the way of addi
tional speed you get for your money. That is the way we live,
the more income you get the less you really get out of it for
the additional income. On the other hand, if they should
lose the whole thing, that is a loss that is far more felt than
any small addition to their income, if successful. Therefore,
only a prospect of getting a liberal return attracts them. On
the other hand, if you are trying to distribute to small hold
ers you come up against another factor, that is, the factor in
the high cost of everything in this country, the high cost of
distribution and the high profits of distributors, and that ap
plies to securities and the selling of securities. In other
words, it applies to the raising of money just the same as it
does to the problem of distribution of commodities. There
is the same difference between the prices that the farmer gets
and the price that the consumer pays, and between the cost
of money to the industry and the return on the investment
to the ultimate distributees of those securities. The discrep
ancy is almost as large in one case as in the other. And, of
course, you have got to make things reasonably attractive to
the individual small holder. In this case his risk is not quite
so large. But there is another factor that operates far more
with him than it does with the big investor. When a few
men take hold of a business they do not worry much about
the hazards of bad management. They are generally willing
to admit that they can give good management, but the small
investor has to take the risk of bad management as well as
risks inherent in the business. He sees the possibility of losses
from bad management. So that in the long run it does not
make very much difference which way you go about getting
capital into the industry, because to make it attractive you
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must give just about the same return in the one case as the
other.
Commissioner Murdock. There must be some point,
however, in your reasoning upon this proposition at which
you come to the conclusion that the rate of return is unrea
sonably high. Where does that point arise in your mind?
Mr. May. When you say rate of return unreasonably high,
that is a somewhat difficult question to answer in connection
with competitive business. My thought is that regulation
and protection ought to go hand in hand. If you do not give
any protection you are not in a position to insist on regula
tion. If you give a minimum of protection you cannot insist
on a maximum of regulation. If you fix a minimum return
you can fix a maximum return. If you do not give any
sort of protection at all it is rather difficult for me to see
on what you may base any regulation of return other than a
paramount public interest or something of that kind, of
course. All I can see is that in so far as a regulative body
can control the situation they would not do anything that
was calculated to promote extravagantly high returns, and in
the interest of the consumer, ultimately, just as much as of
the producer, you have got to fix that fairly high if you are
going to make it a maximum. Commissions may be the pri
mary regulators but capital is the ultimate regulator, because
the necessity of attracting capital into enterprise and keeping
capital in enterprise is, after all, the paramount considera
tion; and that, I think, is particularly true when you are deal
ing with an industry that is largely outside of your own jur
isdiction, as you are in this case. You cannot compel capital
to stay in newsprint in Canada by any proceeding in this
case if you fix the return so low as to discourage them from
staying in it.
Mr. Wise. You can compel them to stay in the United
States?
Mr. May. By a gradual extension of the powers of the
Government which might make the return in all industries
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unattractive. I mean by that that they would rather stay
in the frying pan than jump into the fire.
Commissioner Fort. There is another situation there.
You say the voluntary bringing of them into another jurisdic
tion. They may of necessity, if they wish to carry on their
business, be compelled to bring them into another jurisdic
tion because they have not enough demand at home.
Mr. May. If you drive him out of the industry, he can go
out of the industry and, of course, a lot of these water power
companies could turn their service to other uses. They may
have to come in here if they want to stay in the newsprint
business. If they come into the United States and it should
regulate the return in this industry they would be no better
off. If they should go out of the industry they would go into
something else in Canada.
Commissioner Fort. And make a profit?
Mr. May. Yes.
Commissioner Fort. Would you consider an allowance of
5 per cent profit on an industry with two turnovers a year
a fair profit?
Mr. May. No, I do not. Nothing but compulsion or
patriotism, I think, would keep capital in that industry very
long on that basis.
Mr. Wise. Have you given any particular thought in your
work on the question of whether or not in figuring the in
vestment there should be any item included for what is
known as the going value?
Mr. May. Going value or goodwill?
Q. I distinguish between goodwill and going value.
A. All right.
Q. In fixing a price do you think that the goodwill of a .
business is to be considered?
A. Goodwill, as I see it, rests primarily on earning ca
pacity. In determining what the earning capacity shall be
you cannot predicate your action on the capital value of
that earning capacity. I do not think goodwill enters into
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it at all. As to going value in the sense of the value of the
developed industry as compared with the position of an in
dustry that is just completed—a plant that is nothing more
than a plant I think, within reasonable limits—that should
be recognized as part of the investment on which a return
should be figured.
Commissioner Murdock. Mr. May, what is your defini
tion of going value?
Mr. May. I think, as far as going value should be recog
nized in a case of this kind, it would simply represent the
reasonable cost of additional value resulting from the act of
building up the plant from the point where the plant is com
pleted to the point where it has a successful business going.
It is a difficult thing to measure, I admit. In an industry
where there is a big investment like this, of course, there is
the actual expense and loss of return during the prelimi
nary period immediately following the completion of the
plant. That is the best criterion of it that I think suggests
itself.
Mr. Wise. Do you consider it to be a proper form of ac
counting for a manufacturer, in an industry such as this, to
set up a charge for depreciation?
Mr. May. Why, yes.
Q. How long has it been the custom with accountants in
this country?
A. Well, it is a development. It is pretty hard to say. I
know in the early days of my experience here I lost a great
deal of work because I refused to sign accounts as being cor
rect unless they had provided for depreciation. But it is a
development, more or less general, I should say, during the
last ten or twelve years. I would say that the Federal Trade
Commission itself has assisted the accountants a great deal
in spreading the recognition of it, although, to be perfectly
honest, I think perhaps the income tax has done even more
to stimulate the practice.
Commissioner Murdock. It is growing all the time?
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Mr. May. As the tax rate grows, you can. rely on its
growing.
Commissioner Fort. I did not suppose there was any
question about setting up depreciation.
Mr. May. No; I do not think there is.
Commissioner Fort. Nor is there any question either, in
good bookkeeping, as to setting up depletion—
Mr. May. No.
Commissioner Fort. Where at the end of a specified
period of time the industry may be depleted so that there
is not any. Now, is there any other way to provide for the
carrying of the repayment of the 10 per cent to the stock
holders, if you keep on paying dividends?
Mr. May. That is the point.
Commissioner Fort. Take the coal industry. Here is a
coal field, say ten acres square. There is a vein running
through it. The coal company is incorporated for a hundred
thousand dollars. I make that figure because it is small.
The stockholders put their hundred thousand dollars in
there, and at the end of a period of twenty years you have
exhausted your coal, and you have paid out your money in
dividends, and by methods of various kinds, taking care of
your machinery, and so forth; and when you get through,
your machinery is practically junk. Now, what are you
going to pay your capital stock on, if you do not provide for
depletion?
Mr. May. If you pay out all your current earnings, you
are not, strictly speaking, paying dividends; you are paying
out of capital, and it ought to be recognized as such.
Commissioner Fort. Then you would not get any in
terest on your capital.
Mr. May. You should get a fair return plus depletion.
Commissioner Fort. Six per cent does not take care of
your principal?
Mr. May. Oh, no.
Commissioner Fort. If you get six per cent, and at the
end of a period of twenty years your coal vein is exhausted,
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how are you going to pay your stockholders back their
money?
Mr. May. Charge it into the cost, and set aside a fund
for depletion.
Commissioner Fort. Depletion; yes.
Mr. Wise. And they have not all done that?
Mr. May. No.
Commissioner Fort. The result of the investigations we
made here as to the coal industry was that 60 per cent of the
coal mines of the United States charge neither depreciation
nor depletion.
Mr. May. I can believe that is true.
Mr. Plante. They cannot eat the cake and have it, too.
Commissioner Fort. There is a larger percentage on de
pletion, but I take the average as to both.

IV

CROSS EXAMINATION IN Allied Chemical & Dye Corpora
tion v. The Steel & Tube Company of America
(1923)
was a proceeding involving the adequacy of the price
at which the defendant agreed to sell his assets to the Youngs
town Sheet & Tube Company. Mr. May was a witness for
the defendant.
The attack was based largely on the point that the price
to be received was admittedly substantially below the valu
ation of the assets that would be reached on a replacement
basis less depreciation for the capital assets and the ordinary
going concern methods of valuation for the current assets.
In previous discussions, Mr. May had suggested to Mr.
Joseph P. Cotton, of counsel for the defense, that it was a
very common practice to speak of the value of the assets of
the United States Steel Corporation as $300 a share, but that
the market value of the stock ranged around $100 a share,
and inquired whether there was any way in which this point
could be brought out in direct testimony. Mr. Cotton
decided that it could not, but said that it would be all to the
good if counsel for the plaintiff would be led to ask a ques
tion which would bring the point into discussion.
Leading counsel for the plaintiff very obviously declined
to enter into this field when the opportunity offered; but
after he had completed his cross examination, his associate
intimated that he desired to conduct a short examination,
and after a few preliminary questions, developed the follow
ing cross examination.
This
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CROSS EXAMINATION

Q. Have you not observed in the work that you have
done in your profession, that the market value of stocks is
variant from the value of the assets of the Company?
A. Well, that involves determining what is the value of
the assets of the Company, and “value” nowadays certainly
is a term that it is almost impossible to define without some
qualifying phrase. What is “value” is the starting place for
a dissertation rather than something that calls for a definite
answer.
Q. Stock values vary from day to day and sometimes
within a very short time, they vary a very large percentage?
A. Yes, obviously at times the fluctuations are so extreme
as to be—not representative of the permanent values.
Q. For instance, if you could imagine the stock of the
Ford Motor Company upon the market, do you think that
the market value of that stock would be any indication of
the assets of the Company?
A. I think it would be bound to be some reflection of the
assets of the Company.
Q. But it would be not very close to the—
A. I should think it would be fairly close to it. There
would be particularly a case.
Q. How about the Durant Motor Company?
A. I do not know anything about the Durant Motor Com
pany to hazard an opinion.
Q. How about the United States Steel?
A. Well, I think the United States Steel is fairly repre
sentative of the value of its assets.
Q. Is it not a common understanding—well, derived from
their published reports—that the assets behind the common
stock of the United States Steel Corporation is in the neigh
borhood of $300 a share?
A. Well, it depends on what you call value. I think the
fair inference from the fact that over a long series of years
the Steel stock has never approached those values, is an in-
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dication that the market value of the Steel Company’s assets
is not $300 a share of the common stock.
Q. Have you considered the earnings of the Steel Cor
poration, both those that had been distributed, and those
that had been retained and “plowed in,” to use the expres
sion, would the value of the assets of the Steel Company be
in the neighborhood of $200 and $300 a share? .
A. On an earning capacity basis?
Q. Yes.
A. No, I should say decidedly not.
Q. During the existence of the United States Steel Cor
poration in the past twenty years, it has put away among
its assets, a great deal more than its original assets; is not that
true?
A. I do not know whether that is true, but it has put aside
a very large sum.
Q. Well, approximately so?
A. Yes.
Q. And yet that fact has not been reflected in the value
of the stock?
A. It is not reflected in the earnings of the stock today.
Q. You mean by the earnings, the dividends of the Com
pany?
A. No, what the Company earns.
Q. Today?
A. The earnings of the Company today are not com
mensurate with the earning capacity at the formation of the
Company together with a fair return on the amounts that
have been put into the Company since.
Q. Do you mean literally today?
A. I do not mean for the month.
Q. 1923?
A. But I mean for a series of any—over any period long
enough to be representative.
Q. You do not mean 1923?
A. I do not mean at the moment, because I do not attach
much importance to the earnings of a moment.
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Q. Well, the stock of the United States Steel Corporation
is ruling in the neighborhood of par, because it pays only to
the holder, and has paid for the last twenty years only to the
holder, about $5 a year?
A. That is not the sole factor. That is one of the factors.
Q. Is not that the important factor?
A. I would not say that it is the important factor, because
you find the same sort of relation if you take Bethlehem
Steel, for instance, which has been criticized for paying out
too much to its stockholders. On the one hand, there is the
Steel Corporation, which is criticized as not having paid
enough. On the other hand, there is the Bethlehem, which
is criticized as having paid too much, and yet the market
value of the common stock is, I believe, somewhere about the
same fraction of value computed in the way that you have
spoken of, that would give the United States Steel stock a
value of $300 a share; so that I do not think the determining
factor can be the dividend policy. In fact, it is true of all
Steel Companies that I know of, whatever their dividend
policy.
By Mr. Fawsett:

Q. What is true?
A. That the market value of their stocks is only a small
fraction of the value computed in the same way that gives
the United States Steel stock a value of $300 a share.

V

VALUATION AND THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL
REVENUE *

(1924)
Doctor Adams. May I ask you a question right here?
Mr. May. Yes, sir.
Doctor Adams. I think you will agree that a large part
of our difficulty comes from valuation, and that a large
number of those valuations are concerned with capital assets,
so called. Now, at the present time, we have a limited rate
on gain derived from the sale of capital assets, and it is
proposed in the House bill to limit the allowance for losses.
In that connection, my question is this: Assuming that the
action reported in the newspapers by the Senate Committee,
namely, of limiting the rate to 12½ per cent of the gains,
but allowing losses in value; assuming that that goes through,
do you believe that the Government would gain or lose by
eliminating the taxation on capital gains and losses alto
gether?
Mr. May. If they would cut out the limit on losses, they
are bound to lose.
Senator King. Surely.
Doctor Adams. Therefore, do you think that if they
maintain that attitude toward losses, we could simplify the
law indefinitely by abolishing all reference to capital gains
and losses?
Mr. May. Of course, as I think you know, that is a sub
ject that I have been very much interested in. I wrote a
paper on that subject, which you have read, undoubtedly.
My mind has been working toward the solution of it, in
spite of the prima facie arguments in favor of taxing capital
* From Hearings, Senate Committee on Investigation of the Bureau of In
ternal Revenue, 68th Congress (1924), pp. 267-270.
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gains; but from the standpoint of revenue, it would be better
to eliminate taxation of capital gains and allowance of
capital losses.
Senator King. It may be interesting to know that I have
an amendment, as one member of the Committee, to strike
out all of those provisions of capital losses and gains. I
reached that conclusion long ago.
Mr. May. Of course, in all of these changes, you usually
exchange one set of troubles for another.
Senator King. Yes.
Mr. May. But you find the weak points in method largely
by experience, and you do not want to reject a method,
when you have found out its weak spots by experience, with
out very carefully canvassing the weak spots of any alterna
tive that you are going to adopt. It is not difficult to sort of
cast what is really income into the form of a capital gain.
Senator King. There is the danger.
Mr. May. Personally, I do not think that the drafting of
provisions that would put a reasonable limit, that would stop
a great deal of that kind of evasion, would be anything like
as difficult as the drafting of the restrictions under the pres
ent law.
The Chairman. But, after all, that is a question of policy
for the taxing committee, rather than improving the methods
of the Internal Revenue Bureau.
Mr. May. Well, it is on the question of simplification. It
will undoubtedly be a great simplification.
The Chairman. I know; but you cannot afford to
change the whole taxing policy in. order to simplify the
method of calculation.
Mr. May. But I think, if well drafted, it would not in
volve any sacrifice of revenue. That is my general impres
sion.
Doctor Adams. May I ask you, in general, about valua
tions? I ask that because I think that no one thing so con
duces to delay and complexities of tax laws as the necessity
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for valuations. I would like to know, first, if you indorse
that general view?
Mr. May. Oh, yes; that is, a large part of it.
Doctor Adams. It would follow from that, then, that
valuations should be omitted and eliminated wherever pos
sible?
Mr. May. Yes; the more you can do without valuations,
the better.
Doctor Adams. I would like to ask you if you have any
general notion about the reasonableness, the excess or defect
of valuations, made for the purposes of depletion?
Mr. May. Well, speaking for myself personally, I have
always felt that valuations for tax purposes, for mineral areas,
were too high. I mean not only for income tax purposes,
but for local tax purposes.
Senator King. Pardon me, but you know, of course, that
in a great many States they do not tax the property, except
the improvements. It is a tax upon the mineral output.
Mr. May. Yes; but in Minnesota—
Senator King. Oh, yes.
Mr. May. I think the Minnesota valuation of mines has
cost the Federal Government a lot of money, because they
value the mines, as I recall, on a 4 per cent basis.
Doctor Adams. The Michigan valuation?
Mr. May. Michigan was 5 per cent, as I recall, and Min
nesota at one time was on a 4 per cent assessment basis.
They got a very high valuation for the mines. When you
were valuing those same mines for income-tax purposes, and
those valuations were made long before March 1, 1913, in
Minnesota, and you were predicting the calculations on the
assumption that local taxes on those high valuations would
continue, it was very difficult to resist the argument of the
taxpayer that he is entitled to at least as high a valuation
for depletion as he is for the purpose of tax on capital.
That, to my mind, started off depletion valuations on a high
level.
Then, again, there is another factor that is almost impos
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sible to get out of your mind. It is almost impossible for
a man, after a period of inflation has gone, when prices were
high, to get his mind back in the state in which it would
have been on the 1st of, March, 1913, and make a retrospec
tive valuation, which absolutely ignores everything that has
happened since. It is almost impossible to do it, and I think
the tendency, therefore, from that cause also has been rather
upward, on the high side. That is my general theory.
Doctor Adams. In general, if any method fair to the in
dustry can be devised to replace the present discovery de
pletion, which in the case of oil and gas calls for recurrent
and continual valuation, would it not be most desirable to
substitute a different method?
Mr. May. I should say decidedly so.
Doctor Adams. In other words, the valuation in itself is to
be avoided if any satisfactory substitute can be secured?
Mr. May. Personally, I have always felt that it was un
fortunate that that discovery provision got into the law.

VI
THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER REORGANIZATION
OF 1920 IN RETROSPECT *
(1927)

Q. Something has been said here about reserves being
set up there as being, as it proved to be, inadequate, because
some nine or ten million dollars had to be taken out of
operating profits or at least absorbed to pay for some of these
unfortunate commitments for future delivery: will you
elaborate that a little?
A. That, if I may say so, is rather a different question.
That question arises on the balance sheet of February 28th
before you attempt to give effect to the plan.
Q. Yes, that is true.
A. Giving effect to the plan merely substitutes for a com
mitment that will ultimately be payable in cash, an obliga
tion on the part of the commitment creditor to take prior
preference stock to a certain extent in lieu of cash: that all
arises after—I think it will serve to make things clear if I
make that distinction at the outset.
Q. Fine.
A. Before giving effect to the plan at all we had decided
that a reserve of approximately $24,000,000 was needed to
provide for the excess cost of fabric under these commit
ment contracts over any fair market value as of that date, as
at the date of the balance sheet.
We felt that that was a material factor in the financial
position of the company which ought to be reflected in its
balance sheet.
The amount of that reserve was a matter partly of knowl
edge and partly of judgment.
* From testimony in S. C. Tomlinson, et al. v. Clarence Dillon, et al.,
#61,971 Court of Common Pleas, Summit County, Ohio (1927).
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Mr. Thompson. Mr. May, I hope it is not discour
teous to you to ask if in the October 31 statement you
did not under your certificate estimate $19,000,000?
The Witness. $19,000,000 at that time.
Mr. Thompson. And by February 28 that had grown
to $24,000,000; is that it?
The Witness. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. I just wanted to con
nect the two events.
Q. But your October 31 statement was not giving effect
at all to a big, comprehensive scheme of refinancing?
A. I do not think that really bears on it, Mr. Buckner.
Q. I mean Mr. Thompson is wondering if you are wish
ing to say that that item for instance was only $5,000,000
worse as a mere actual fact, quite apart from the prospects
of the company?
A. In the balance sheet of October we merely referred to
it in our certificate. The company was not prepared to rec
ognize it on its books. Mr. Seiberling at that time, par
ticularly, thought that it was merely an accountant’s idea.
I think he did not take it very seriously.
Q. I am anxious to get at the $24,000,000.
A. But the $24,000,000 is comparable to the $19,000,000.
Mr. Thompson. That is the point I wanted to get.
The Witness. Undoubtedly. But as I recall it the
situation had in some respects become worse and the
efforts to get consents and things like that had developed
the existence of more commitments than we previously
had knowledge of. That is what I think accounts for
its being $24,000,000 instead of $19,000,000. Mr. Jackson could tell you more of that than I could. Shall I
resume where I was?
Q. I wish you would.
A. That $24,000,000 was arrived at on a certain basis,
which was the result of a conference amongst our people, a
conference with officers of the company and some of the mer
chandise creditors themselves, I remember myself mention-
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ing it to Mr. Myron Taylor: some views were expressed that
that reserve ought to be larger and other views were ex
pressed that we were going to ruin the company for a hypo
thetical adjustment, the prices might come right back and
there was no need for so much reserve, and if that reserve
were put in the balance sheet it would be impossible to
finance the company at all; certainly if it were made any
larger it would become increasingly difficult if not impos
sible to finance it.
My associates who were engaged on the work put that
question up to me and said that I must make the decision
and assume the responsibility for the firm.
As I say, I talked to Mr. Taylor and I talked to some other
people and discussed it with our people, and it seemed to me
that on the whole $24,000,000 was a pretty fair figure; it
seemed to me that it was reasonably fair to the people who
were being invited to come in to buy bonds on the basis of
this balance sheet; and it seemed to me reasonably fair to the.
people who were trying to save their interest in the business.
If we had had a little more margin to play with I would
have been glad to have seen it some millions larger, but it
seemed to me a reasonable figure, and Mr. Jackson told me
that, using it as a basis, it seemed to him that the company
ought to be able to make some money in the subsequent
operations.
After a fairly extended discussion of it I said I thought
I would assume the responsibility of a balance sheet in which
$24,000,000 was inserted to provide for that element of vital
importance in the financial position of the company.
Q. Did you assume, in finally fixing that $24,000,000 as
a deficit to take care of losses on delivery under contracts at
higher prices, that the company would not have some grief
and would be in 100 per cent condition, or did you have
something else in mind?
A. I realized that probably if they were entirely footloose
they could make new contracts on an even better basis than
that; but that seemed to me to be a reasonably practical view
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of the situation, which left something to be worked out but
did not leave an undue burden on the company.
Q. Do you recall, for instance, whether you included in
that reserve anything at all for carrying charges on deferred
deliveries of rubber and fabric when the company would
ask a man—
A. No, we left that to be cared for as it cropped up.
Q. That would be a very substantial item, of course,
would it not?
A. These general expressions like “substantially” are a
little dangerous, because the figures vary so much here; but
I mean it is a matter of perhaps three or four millions, pos
sibly.
Q. Yes, of course.
A. Which in general one would say were substantial, but
in proportion to some of the figures here involved looks rela
tively small.
Q. For example, in proportion to the deficit as of Feb
ruary 28, 1921, if you had not given effect to the whole
plan of reorganization you say the deficit would have been
$75,000,000?
A. Yes; in proportion to that it is relatively small.
Q. It would be relatively small?
A. Yes.
Q. In fixing this reserve then you were not attempting to
put this company in a condition better than all the other
rubber companies, for instance, under the same conditions?
A. I did not know enough about the other rubber com
panies, but it was just what I say: a reasonable exercise of
business judgment is what I meant to accomplish.
Q. Then that is one item of what you might colloquially
call “grief” that the company out of its operating expenses
would have to take care of. Was there any other item that
might bring some grief to the company that they would have
to take care of as they went along on their way after re
organization that you now remember?
A. You mean in connection with those commitments?
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Q. Yes.
A. I remember it was suggested that in addition to—we
wrote down only the cotton element in the specified commit
ments; we did not attempt to write down the conversion cost.
Q. Although there were a lot of commitments for—
A. Those conversion costs were higher than the conver
sion costs that we agreed on about that same time in respect
to the unspecified commitments.
Q. You knew that there would be some grief there that
the company would have to absorb?
A. Yes, there was some grief; of course no rubber com
pany was going to come into this situation without some
hangovers of that kind.
Q. I understand.
A. And that seemed to us to put them on a reasonably
competitive condition as far as that is concerned, and also
it would be reasonable from the standpoint—provide reason
able protection for the new security holders who were in
vited to come in.
Q. But was that item of conversion something that might
well run into a few million dollars, or do you remember?
A. Oh, yes. As a matter of fact the company, after paying
those conversion costs for a time, as I remember effected
some reductions and ultimately also paid some sums to
cancel the contracts.
Q. In setting up reserves for inventory, what was the basis
of fixing the reserves for the write-down on inventories,
since the value of tires of course had dropped precipitately?
A. We wrote the inventories down; we wrote down rub
ber to a base of 20 cents, which as I recall was approximately
the market at the time that we did it, although before the
actual transaction was consummated it sagged off, the nom
inal market at least sagged off lower, I fancy it was about
17 cents; and the finished goods, the inventory, the cost was
above the selling value; so that we merely reduced them to
the net selling value, on which basis we assumed that the
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company would not make either any profit or a loss on
liquidating those inventories.
Q. When you say they would not make a loss, suppose you
took all the finished goods that were ready for delivery and
you marked them down or you set up a reserve rather, to
account for current market prices: did you allow anything
• at all for the large overhead, the administrative expenses,
etc.?
A. Not the general administration, only the direct selling
costs.
Q. So that whatever the general administration expenses
were, chargeable to selling that inventory, which was then
marked down, that would be another item at least which
would have to be absorbed?
A. Yes, in that colloquial sense.
Mr. Hostetler. In writing a balance sheet like this
of February 28, in April, take for instance on a material
like crude rubber, that fluctuates rapidly, do you use the
market price aS of February 28 or as of the date that
you make it?
The Witness. You ordinarily use it as of February
28.
Mr. Hostetler. In other words, while it is on the
books—
The Witness. But in making a balance sheet for this
purpose, in making a reserve for a future situation, if
there were any substantial fall between the date of the
balance and the date when you gave effect to a new
transaction, you would have to reflect that in some way
in the balance sheet.
Mr. Hostetler. In other words, in these values of in
ventories, raw material and completed, you gave the
best of your judgment in April when you made the
sheet, rather than as of February 28?
The Witness. Yes, that would be so. We did not
attempt to— I mean the markets were to some extent
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nominal; you had to exercise some judgment all the way
around.
Q. Do you remember what market you took for cotton?
You told us you took about twenty cents for rubber, al
though it dropped a little.
A. As I remember it, they used a special grade of cotton,
as I remember it was a thirty-cent base for a certain long
staple cotton, which was their main grade that they used.
Q. In the petition in this case and during the taking of
these depositions the statement has been very frequently
made that the reorganization plan provided an excessive
amount of cash for the company, at least that is my impres
sion. Whether that is true or not, will you give us your
views—it is stated in the petition that the amount of cash far
exceeded the reasonable requirements of the business. From
your connection with this matter, will you give us your view
as to whether or not this plan provided an excessive amount
of cash, that is, the proceeds of the bonds, the proceeds of all
this money that the bankers had to put up, or any other
available source of revenue; whether the amount of cash
was excessive in view of the circumstances that confronted
you in April, 1921: give us your view on that from your
experience and from your special knowledge of this situa
tion.
A. It did not seem to me so at the time and it does not
seem to me so now.
I should think it would be improbable that it would be so,
because there was a lot of work over this plan, with people
having different interests, and some of them very shrewd men
like Mr. Myron Taylor and Mr. Jenckes, to get out of the
banking field; but the fact which has seemed to me to be
most persuasive on that question, a fact which I think com
paratively few people have recognized, that this plan did
nothing more than replace the loss of working capital that
had taken place since August 31, 1920.
Q. How much in round numbers was the—
A. I picked August 31, 1920—
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Q. Give us the amount of cash?
A. —because that was the first balance sheet that we
were invited to consider when we were called into the matter
with a view to arranging the financing.
If you take a comparison of the situation then and the
situation when the plan was issued, you will find that the
plan, leaving out the funded debt altogether, the net work
ing capital under this plan, after the issue of the bonds and
the prior preference stock, is less than the net working
capital shown by the balance sheet of August 31, 1920, after
deducting the bank loans and everything else from that
working capital, although at that time the company had no
funded debt.
You can check up in various ways. The balance sheet of
August 31—
Mr. Thompson. Have you got that with you? We
haven’t heard of that.
The Witness. I haven’t got it with me. That is the
company’s balance sheet of that date.
I am mentioning this only because this is the way it oc
curred to me, because that was the starting point as far as we
were concerned: it does not make a particle of difference
whether you take October 31 or August 31, excepting
the reserves for inventories are made first in the October
balance sheet and none was in the balance sheet of August.
Q. Take it in your own way.
A. But the balance sheet of August 31 showed a surplus
of some $9,000,000; there were certain liabilities like taxes
that were never put on the books until paid, it ought to be
taken off in order to make any kind of a fair comparison:
that would have brought the surplus down to $5,000,000.
When we came to the balance sheet of February 28, the
deficit after providing for inventory reserves and commit
ments had grown to somewhere around $75,000,000.
Now the new plan provided for the payment of debt or
the provision of new capital to the extent of between $74,000,000 and $75,000,000.
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I can give you roughly the compensation of that deficit
which will show how the events have happened. The books
of the company before adjusting for inventories showed a
loss for September and October of approximately $8,000,000
—I am including the subsidiaries.
Q. Yes.
A. Now some part of that possibly would on an accurate
accounting be thrown back of August 31, but it would
not be relatively very important. The books showed an
operating loss including subsidiaries of roughly $13,000,000
for the four months ending February 28. The books
showed a loss for March and April of $5,000,000. So that
over the period of eight months there was a loss of between
$25,000,000 and $26,000,000.
Q. You mean just an operating loss?
A. An operating loss, including the financing charges, of
course: there was a loss of we will say twenty-five—it is be
tween twenty-five and twenty-six million, without providing
for write downs or inventories or commitments.
Mr. Thompson. That is from August 31 to May 1?
The Witness. To May 1, yes.
The inventory adjustments were $18,000,000, and the re
serve for commitments was $24,000,000. Then in our cal
culations we took roughly $4,000,000, the officers’ accounts
which at any rate were frozen, out of working capital, with
out going any further than that, and approximately $2,600,000 that was paid out in dividends in September and Octo
ber, 1920.
If you add those up you get $75,000,000—I get it $75,400,000, which is roughly the amount of new cash that was
provided under the plan. When I say new cash—either in
the form of cash or the extension of liability.
Now of course the position of a company that has a
funded debt of $57,500,000—the position of such a company
in regard to lack of capital is very different from that of a
company which has no funded debt; and this company had
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to operate, as I see it, without any general credit until a new
credit could be built up after the reorganization.
It has never been clear to me how it could seriously be
argued that a reorganization which did nothing more than
replace the working capital that had disappeared in the
period of eight months could be regarded as grossly over
providing working capital.
Q. Just putting back the working capital of eight months
before, is that right?
A. There is another factor that should be taken into ac
count: you see, it was uncertain what capital would be
needed to clean up the capital situation, plants and so on:
during, as I recall, the period from October, 1919, to Feb
ruary, 1921, under the old management some $20,000,000
had been spent on capital account in the way of plants, ex
tensions and so on, while there was no—of course there was
no provision of working capital then to finance any further
capital expenditures than the mere replacement of the work
ing capital.
I want to be entirely fair of course in presenting this, and
therefore I would point out that naturally with falling prices
and the shooting to pieces of the volume of business which
had occurred during the period of or between late in 1920
and early in 1921, the immediate requirements of working
capital were reduced; but clearly the company could not go
on, could not legitimately put out a scheme of this kind
unless it looked forward to regaining something of the posi
tion in the rubber industry that it had occupied—not its
whole position, but some position in the rubber industry for
the new company—and whenever that happened they would
need a greatly increased working capital over their immedi
ate requirements at the time the plan was issued; and of
course, although the prices were low then, if prices subse
quently increased, there would again be a demand for fur
ther working capital.
Q. You mean that the facts here looked forward to an
achievement of success rather than a conservation of failure?
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A. Yes. I think they had to, if they were going to have
any moral justification for putting forward the plan at all.
Q. Exactly. What was the feeling of all of these people,
these merchandise creditors and bankers’ creditors, Dillon,
Read & Company, all the bankers, yourself, Price, Water
house, as to whether or not there would be an opportunity
of an encore here if there was a second collapse?
A. I cannot speak for them, but it is perfectly obvious in
a situation of this kind it is no good trying to make two
bites of a cherry: you have to clean it up once for all. I
think on that everybody will agree.
Q. You did not feel that a second collapse would meet
with such applause that you would all be called upon to
respond to an encore?
A. No, I did not think so.
By Mr. Buckner:

Q. Mr. May, before passing to a new topic I want to
revert to the subject you were discussing just as we ad
journed yesterday. You called our attention to the fact that
the new capital, new money rather, provided by the reor
ganization plan either in cold cash or the cancellation of
obligations, I believe, was something in round numbers like
$75,000,000.
A. Yes.
Q. You pointed out that that $75,000,000 so provided
was no more than the amount of working capital which had
been lost by the company within, roughly speaking, the pre
ceding eight or nine months. Remembering that none of
us is an accountant, will you elaborate a little bit on what
you mean by the phrase “working capital”?
A. By working capital I mean substantially the sum of
money that is sometimes termed net current assets, that is
the excess of current assets over current liabilities.
Q. Current assets?
A. By current assets I mean such items as inventories,
accounts receivable, temporary investments, if any, and cash;

302

VALUATION

and by current liabilities I mean items as accounts payable
and payrolls, current taxes and any bank debts or loans or
any short term obligations of that character.
I distinguish between current assets on the one side and
fixed assets, and between current liabilities and funded lia
bilities on the other.
Q. Take a brick building, would that be working capital?
A. A brick building used in the operation of the plant?
Q. Yes.
A. No.
Q. Take $1,000,000 in Liberty bonds held by the com
pany, would that be working capital?
A. Yes, that would be part of the working capital.
Q. Take $10,000,000 cash in the bank, would that be
working capital?
A. Yes.
Q. Take your finished product on hand ready to be sold,
would that be working capital?
A. Yes.
Q. I suppose that capital would not work unless it could
be sold?
A. Of course every balance sheet of a going concern is
predicated upon the assumption that it is going to continue
to go.
Q. Oh, I see. So that the assumption at least is, if you
got some beautiful tires all ready to sell, especially if they
were Goodyear tires, that they will be sold?
A. Yes.
Q. And accounts payable?
A. Accounts payable, yes.
Q. Predicated upon the theory that people will pay their
debts within the customary time?
A. Yes; with of course due provision for any cases where
that does not appear to be a reasonable presumption.
Q. The percentage of reluctant or discouraged debtors is
usually taken care of by some arbitrary reserve set up, isn’t
it?

REORGANIZATION IN RETROSPECT

303

A. Some reserve more or less arbitrary, according to cir
cumstances.
Q. So that as we would understand it, working capital is
either cash or a very near relative?
A. Yes.
Q. Which could easily be put in the place of cash, is that
it?
A. Less the things that have to be paid out of cash in the
near future.
Q. Less the things that have to be paid out of it, of
course. The evidence shows here that the first mortgage
bonds, for example, bore an 8 per cent coupon and that
every year for 20 years there would be a percentage of those
bonds drawn by lot and redeemed at 120 over the 20 years;
the evidence shows that the debentures I think carried a
coupon of 8 per cent. The prior preference stock carried 8
per cent interest; that the debentures which were sold to the
bankers in place of their debt carried with them stock war
rants, the bankers being required to put up $100 of new
money for every $100 that they were already in for; and,
generally speaking, the plan has been said to be from time
to time drastic or expensive. What was the alternative to a
reorganization on these lines, under all the circumstances
existing in the spring of 1921?
Mr. Thompson. Objected to as leading.
Mr. Buckner. What was the alternative? There is
nothing leading about that.
The Witness. Do you want me to answer?
Mr. Buckner. Yes, what was the alternative?
A. My judgment is that if permanent financing had not
been accomplished just about the time that this was accom
plished, a receivership would have been practically inev
itable.
- Q. Have you any judgment—I do not know exactly how
close you were to what might be called the banking situa
tion: have you any judgment as to whether or not this re
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organization could possibly have been put through on any
other terms than this term, in a broad, general way?
A. I do not think I could say that I was close enough to
answer that question in that specific form.
Q. We are getting that from the bankers but I do not
know how you—
A. I was in general touch and I might have an opinion,
but it would not be a sufficiently well-informed opinion
based upon my own knowledge to justify me in answering
that specific question.
Q. You will stick right to the Price, Waterhouse boun
daries?
A. I want to talk about things that I know about.
Mr. Thompson. Some have not done that, Mr. May.
Mr. Hostetler. No; the lawyers have been very lax.
Mr. Thompson. We will accept it if you will. [Dis
cussion off the record.]
Q. Let us look at the situation after the reorganization:
whatever happened to the bank debts of Goodyear?
A. They were retired under the plan of reorganization
through the operation of the debenture issue.
Q. What had happened to all the obligations that were
owed to the merchandise creditors who had sold cotton and
fabric and machinery and rubber, etc.?
A. In the main, they had been provided for by issues of
prior preference stock.
Q. What was the result of that so far as cash or its
equivalent now in the possession of Goodyear after reor
ganization with which to do business and as to its quick
assets: that is, the net result of that reorganization in that
way?
A. The company started off—I cannot give you the exact
figure except on the footing of the balance sheet that we
used and which I can say that it would have started off at
January 28 if the plan had been consummated at that time,
instead of actually at April, because it is impossible to get
the actual financial position actually at the time the plan
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went into effect, so that I have to make any answers subject
to that modification; the plan will show, but as I recall it
started the company off with approximately $54,000,000 of
net working capital and somewhere around ten or eleven
million dollars in cash.
Q. That is a matter of record, of course.
A. Yes.
Q. Were the terms of this reorganization, the terms of
the refinancing, due to Dillon, Read; Goldman, Sachs; Na
tional City Company; Chase Securities Company and three
other names read by Mr. Thompson yesterday: was it due
to these bankers or was it due to the financial condition of
Goodyear?
A. Well, the major factor in determining the basis on
which finance can be accomplished is clearly the financial
situation of the company that is seeking it.
Q. You spent a lot of time studying, either at first hand
or with your other partners, the conditions in the Goodyear
Company, did you not, before Dillon, Read were in it at all?
A. Yes. I will not say before Dillon, Read were in it at
all. I do not know when they went in. At any rate, when
they went into any specific commitment.
Q. And so far as you know when they were in it at all?
A. Yes. I don’t know when they went into it.
Q. Did you find any evidence out there in Akron that
Dillon, Read had gotten this company in a condition where
on February 28 their balance sheet would have shown a
$75,ooo,ooo deficit?
A. No, I do not say that.
Q. Whose party was that, I mean what had brought about
conditions where a balance sheet without reorganization
would have shown a deficit of $7.5,000,000: what had brought
that about?
A. Fundamentally, of course, it was the general condition
that supervened in 1920 when the general deflation took
place; that is the primary cause. And I think the reason why
it was so severe in the case of Goodyear was that, first of all
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I think that industry was one of the industries that was rela
tively hard hit by the deflation and Goodyear was certainly
the hardest hit so far as I could judge of any of the com
panies in the industry, because apparently it was overex
tended.
Q. That is just what I want to know, why was the Good
year harder hit than the other tire companies?
A. Because it had such an extended commitment posi
tion, that is fundamental, that is the particular manifesta
tion, and if you want to go back of that to more general
causes I can do it, but I want to stick to—that is the impor
tant situation. •
Q. You can use your own judgment in any way—

Q. —in any way that you feel is a proper way to answer
the question.
A. Well, based on my examination of the situation at
that time the real trouble seemed to me to be that Goodyear
was well organized on the manufacturing side, the selling
side and the general development of the business, and there
fore it was able to take full advantage of favorable condi
tions; but it was weak as I see it on the side of control of
purchases, control of finance and general control of accounts.
Those are the weaknesses that become vital and fatal when
you strike real adversity. They were unfortunate in being
weak on that side when they struck a period of exceptional
adversity which hit their particular industry particularly
hard. To put it in a nut shell, I think probably in the
organization, in addition to the manufacturing personnel,
that if there had been a good hard-headed Scotchman that
we would have—
Mr. Thompson. An Englishman would not have
done?
The Witness. No, a Scotchman; a good hard-headed
Scotchman to watch the finances, we none of us would
have been here today.
Q. You have some Scotch partners, have you not?
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A. Yes.
Q. We had one of them here, Jackson: I wanted to ask
him if Price, Waterhouse selected him as treasurer because
he was a Scotchman, but I was afraid he might not enjoy
the comedy. What do you mean by being well equipped for
everything except adversity: what do you mean, why is that
important in a large industry? After all this thing had
grown up into an enormous company, had it not?
A. Yes. But unless you are well equipped for success you
will never make a big success and, on the other hand, if you
are not equipped for adversity you may make a very big
failure. That is really two sides of the picture as I see it.
Q. The Goodyear Company was a fair weather sailor, is
that it, from your examination of the books and the situa
tion: as long as everything went all right they went all right?
A. Yes. I do not think they would listen to the advice
of Horace about taking half your canvas in when more than
a propitious gale fills your sail. I think that is probably
their real trouble.
Q. Was the canvas all out when you went out?
A. I think they were carrying on a bit longer than most
of us would in a race.
Q. And the wind was then blowing, was it?
A. Very strong.
Q. I read you from paragraph 45 of the petition as fol
lows [reading]:
Owing to the large earning power of the Company and
the inherent soundness of its financial condition, within
three months its former debts to banks were funded; its for
mer obligations for merchandise paid in stock; its quick
assets exceeded its current debts by more than ten to one;
it possessed no banking indebtedness, and had over twentythree million dollars ($23,000,000) in cash, bankers’ accept
ances and securities of the United States of America.
Without regard at the moment to the precise accuracy or
otherwise of the amount of cash and ratio of quick assets to
current debts, I want to ask you if the condition described in
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that paragraph, after three months from reorganization, was
due to the large earning power of the company and the in
herent soundness of its financial condition, or was it due to
what the reorganization had brought about in the way you
have described?
A. I should say that it was due to the substantial sound
ness of its financial position after the reorganization had
been effected, and that the effecting of that reorganization
was of course only rendered possible by the belief that the
company had under fairly normal conditions an earning
capacity; but apart from the reorganization, obviously the
company had no inherent financial soundness.
Q. Exactly; of course it would not be reorganized if they
did not believe that the company would pull out if reor
ganized, naturally.
Q. Now will you put your mind on the month of No
vember, 1921, after the reorganization in May, 1921, and
from your knowledge of the situation and from your experi
ence will you tell me whether in November, 1921, the Good
year Company could properly have retired all or any sub
stantial part of its debentures which had been held by the
Blair-Hallgarten syndicate and which were sold in Novem
ber to a syndicate headed by Dillon, Read?
Mr. Thompson. Objected to as leading.
Mr. C. Crawford. I object to it on the ground that
the witness is without jurisdiction to decide the issues
of this case.
Mr. Thompson. I object to it as leading, too.
Mr. Buckner. Answer the question, Mr. May.
A. My judgment, not of course as a legal conclusion, but
as a business man, is that they could not have done so from
a business standpoint, nor do I see how they could have done
so from a moral standpoint: I will exclude the legal stand
point altogether.
Q. Take up first the business standpoint and then take
up the moral standpoint and tell us what you mean by that.
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A. I would rather take them in the other order, if I may.
Q. The other order, all right.
A. These debentures had been issued as a part of a gen
eral plan and for the reorganization of the company which
had been agreed to by a large number of persons in interest,
and through the sale of first mortgage bonds new money had
been brought into the company on the faith of that plan.
Now between the date of the plan and September 30 noth
ing had happened of a favorable nature to the company, as
I see it, that was not contemplated in the plan. The earn
ings had been no greater than those on which the plan had
been predicated. In those circumstances it seems to me that
the company could not well have applied any of the money
that was raised under that plan to the retirement of securities
which were junior to the first mortgage bonds which had
recently been subscribed for on the faith of that plan and
the representations made in pursuance of that plan.
Turning to the—
Mr. Thompson. Now that is the moral side.
The Witness. That is the broad moral side. From
a business standpoint it seems to me that the company
had just had an extremely narrow escape from a busi
ness failure due substantially to a lack of proper pru
dence in finance. Its general credit had been injured,
and one of the first requisites to its future success was
that its general credit should be rehabilitated, and for
that reason more than customary financial prudence
seemed to me to be called for at that time.
In the third place, while the company at that time
had a large amount of cash and securities on hand, its
business had been greatly injured by the unfortunate
events of the previous year, and if it was to be a finan
cial success it had to restore its volume of business,
which would entail an increase in the amount of work
ing capital in the form of accounts receivable and so on,
even though there were a diminution of the amount of
working capital in the form of cash and securities.
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Furthermore, the company’s business rests on raw
materials, which are subject to very wide fluctuations.
They had been through a serious situation caused by
concurrent declines in the prices of rubber and fabric.
If within one or two years they should have struck a
situation where there were concurrent high prices for
rubber and fabric, they might have needed very much
more working capital to conduct their business, even
than they had then had.
Then the company had a lot of troubles that were
not entirely straightened out; that was in the nature of
things; the major troubles were connected with the re
organization, but inevitably there were a lot of things
still to be cleared up. The unspecified commitment
situation was one of some difficulty and uncertainty.
The industry had been going through something of a
change; the type of common tire had altered; the future
of the business—the industry as a whole was in a very
interesting condition, and looking at it from that stand
point it seemed to me that at that time the position of
the cash resources, the potential resource that could be
drawn in at any point where there seemed to be an
advantage to use it, was from the standpoint of all the
security holders of the company far more important
than any saving of interest charges that might result
from the retirement of debts. I know that our people
always felt that a concurrent serious movement in either
direction of the basic raw materials of the industry at
any time within two or three years after the reorganiza
tion might be a source of serious embarrassment to the
company, and they were very fortunate in the fact that
no such concurrent movement took place during 1921,
1922, and 1923. When the fabric situation was a bit
unfavorable the rubber situation helped us out, and
vice versa; but it seemed to me you always had to be
prepared, particularly at that time, for a concurrent
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movement of the raw materials which might have been
very embarrassing.
For all these reasons, in my mind it was perfectly clear
that from any standpoint of either moral obligation or
practical common sense it would not have been an ap
propriate thing for the company to apply its cash re
sources to the retirement of the debentures. Personally
I think they were wise in keeping cash resources, but if
they wanted to apply them to the retirement of debt it
seems to me the only proper use would have been to
retire first mortgage bonds.
Q. As a matter of fact did not the very thing that you
are saying might be on the cards any year actually happen
in 1925 when rubber jumped up like a thermometer, or do
you know about that?
A. Yes, I know something about that, yes; it did happen,
yes.
Q. The company actually had to issue still more securities
in 1925, did it, or do you remember?
A. Yes, it had to issue $15,000,000 of notes, as I re
member.
Q. Do you recall, too, whether or not the fall of the year
is the time when anybody in the tire business accumulates
more cash than it has in the spring of the year, let us say?
A. Yes.
Q. And is this cash a curve or wave, rather, in the tire
business?
A. The fall of the year is the low point of the require
ments for the working capital other than cash, and therefore
you have to have more cash at that time if you are going to
have adequate working capital for the spring season, when
the other demands are greater.
Q. What is the justification, if any, for any industrial
company to have bank deposits drawing banking interest at
3 per cent at a time when they may have outstanding bonds
and debentures drawing 8 per cent?
A. Well, of course, every company must have some cash
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resources at all times. But my experience has been that a
substantial cash reserve over and above the bare require
ments is a real source of strength to any company. You will
find, of course, the Steel Corporation is one of the conspicu
ous illustrations of a company that has always carried very
large cash balances, and the value of it is measured by the
potential uses of the cash as well as the actual uses of the
cash, just as in naval affairs, in Admiral Mahan’s expression,
a fleet in being has a great value quite apart from the ex
istence of its influence on the immediate area in which it is
located.
Q. Let us get down to the spring of 1923, the early part
of 1923. I have in mind, say, the last week in January. I
may say that at that time the company was offered by a
syndicate headed by Dillon, Read & Company the privilege
of buying all or any part of all of the outstanding prior pref
erence stock which in round numbers was about $33,000,000
par value. They were offered the privilege of buying that at
$85.60, which is just what it had cost the Dillon, Read syndi
cate. They actually did purchase $13,000,000 par value at
that discount. I would like to have your views in the same
way as you have given in the debentures as to the propriety
of the company either from a business standpoint or a moral
standpoint, if they are both involved, in purchasing any or
all of that outstanding block of prior preference stock at that
time when they were given the opportunity at that price.
That is about the last week in January, 1923, a little less
than two years after the reorganization.
A. Well, that is a little further away from the date when
I was making a more intensive study of Goodyear, and
therefore I do not feel so well equipped to discuss all the
business aspects of the situation; but I did know about
that incident at the time, and it seemed to me then a very
grave question whether, having in mind the spirit of the
plan of reorganization and not merely its letter, the company
was justified in buying as much prior preference stock as it
did. The first mortgage bonds and debentures were secured
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by agreements which contained various restrictive covenants.
One of those, as I recall, was that no dividends should be
paid on the prior preference stock or any stocks, in fact, to
the extent of more than two-thirds of the surplus accumu
lated subsequent to May 1, 1921. The balance sheet of
December 31, 1922, showed a surplus, as I recall, of very
close to $8,000,000, and two-thirds of that would be some
where under five and a half million, and I have always had
difficulty in seeing how the directors felt justified in retiring
more than could be purchased with five and a half million
dollars from the standpoint of the spirit of the arrangement.
Clearly, retiring prior preference stock, so far as any effect
on the debentures was concerned, was precisely the same as
paying the money out in dividends on the prior preference
stock. I do not know anything about the legal aspects of the
question, but if I had been a director I should have hesitated
a great deal about going further than that in retiring the
prior preference stock. As a matter of fact, I do not think it
injured the debenture holder—
Q. The way it worked out?
A. [Continuing] —as it worked out, and it proved bene
ficial to the junior stockholders undoubtedly and to the rest
of the prior preference stock, so that from that standpoint
you may say that I should have to admit that the directors
took a risk I would not have taken, but that it worked out
very well for everybody concerned.
Q. That is, after the event?
A. After the event.
Q. When you said a while ago that the Seiberling man
agement needed a Scotchman, did you have in mind a
Scotchman that would look ahead or a Scotchman that would
look back after the event?
A. Scotchmen are generally regarded as being good at
looking forward.
Q. A forward-looking Scotchman, as we would say?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, from your thirty years’ experience with appar-
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ently pretty large industries and institutions, do you attach
any importance to the element of management of an indus
trial company?
A. Well, it seems to me obviously the vitally important
element.
Q. Why?
A. Provided of course that you are in a business where
there are some possibilities of success. Why?
Q. Yes. Why is it so important in an industrial concern
or any concern?
A. Well, because when you really get down to essentials
the value of a business depends ultimately on its earning
capacity, and its earning capacity is largely determined by
the character of the management.
Q. [Reading]:

That the accounts of the Goodyear Company were in
such a state of confusion as to require months of work by
certified public accountants to arrive at even a reasonable
approximation of the correct situation.
Was that statement true or not?
A. Well, my information is not very detailed about that,
but the position that was reported to me was that the general
detailed accounting of the company was good.
Q. Yes.
A. But there was not any adequate general control, and
the records on some material—essentials perhaps I had better
say—on some essential features, such as commitments, were
quite inadequate. There was no place in the organization
where you could go and either be given or directed to a
source of information which would be comprehensive. That
was our fundamental difficulty, as I see it. But I would like
to make it quite clear that the general accounting, the detail
accounting, was quite satisfactory.
Q. I understand that.
A. I did not want to reflect oh anybody unjustly.
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Q. I understand that. The point is that the ledger ac
count as to how much the Main Street Garage owed for tires
was accurate, but you seem to refer to something higher?
A. Yes; there was no one that was really on top of the
whole situation from the financial side and had a picture
of it all.
Q. Exactly.
A. This, as I think, was the fatal defect of the organiza
tion. If there had been, I think there would have been an
entirely different result.
Re-cross Examination

by

Mr. Thompson:

Q. Mr. May, United States Rubber and Goodrich were
much older companies than Goodyear, were they not?
A. I do not know the actual age of Goodyear, but as sub
stantial competitors they certainly were.
Q. The growth of Goodyear in volume of business was
very rapid up to 1920, was it not?
A. It was.
Q. And the real, serious trouble, as you have depicted it
to us, was a failure to, have the seer’s vision and to prepare
for the bad days that perhaps a Scotchman would have fore
seen: that is one of the outstanding things, isn’t it?
A. Well, I do not think you needed to be a seer, exactly.
I think my statement would rather be that there had been
undue concentration on development and inadequate con
sideration of the dangers of the business: too much realiza
tion of the opportunities and not enough realization of the
pitfalls.
Q. In other words, the chief executive appears to you to
have been a man with vision and energy in building up a
business, but not possessed of those hard-headed qualities of
a cold-blooded financier?
A. Yes, I think that is true, that he needed—it is very dif
ficult to get that combination of qualities in one man.
Q. He had not equipped himself with the right type of
treasurer: that is what you mean, do you not?
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A. I should think that a strong financial vice-president
would have been what was needed for that business.
Q. And what had happened was that, with too much op
timism probably due at least in part to the rapidity of the
growth of the business, they had committed themselves for
rubber and fabric at prices that turned out to be very un
wise: now that is the real situation, isn’t it?
A. That is the vitally important element in the situation,
undoubtedly.
Q. And as you have very accurately described, that really
was the crux of the trouble that the company was confronted
with in the fall of 1920?
A. Yes.

VII

THE BETHLEHEM-YOUNGSTOWN MERGER SUIT *

(1930)
Q. Why is it these physical valuations, physical appraisals,
to your mind are of so little value regarding the real worth
of properties, the real relative worth of properties, the real
relative worth of two business institutions?
A. Well, in the case of steel industries, the big steel plants
of the country have grown up in locations that were de
termined on the basis of conditions existing a number of
years ago because once you have made your choice of location,
you are more or less committed to it even if it appears years
later the place you would have chosen is another spot. Now,
discussing values, they come under two heads, one the physi
cal valuation and the other the commercial valuation.
Q. Before you proceed suppose you define what you mean
by physical valuation. Possibly we all mean the same thing,
but let us make certain.
A. I think that will appear more clearly as I explain what
seems to me involved.
Court. Involved in the place of the physical structure?
A. Yes, on the so-called physical question I have given a
great deal of time in connection with the railroad rate regu
lation problem, on which I have studied and written. The
physical valuation theory starts on the premise that if the
property did not exist it would be economically wise to re
produce it where it is and as it is.
Q. In kind?
A. Yes. In regard to a very large part of the steel in
dustry such a premise is totally unwarranted. I think every
one will agree there are large parts of the steel industry
* From testimony in Wick & International Shares Inc. v. Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. and Bethlehem Steel Corporation.
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which if they didn’t exist would not be reproduced where
they are located or as they are. Take an extreme illustra
tion: the physical reproduction theory would assign greater
value to a steel plant at the North Pole than one on Lake
Michigan because it would cost more to build it there. But
in a reasonable way there is no doubt that the value of a
steel plant is very largely affected by its location and type
of construction, and it is quite unsafe to assume as a measure
of value that they would be reproduced as they are and where
they are. In this particular case it certainly appears that
the Coatesville plant, for instance, and some of the Mahoning
Valley properties—
Court. Excuse me. You use the illustration of a hypo
thetical plant at the North Pole and one somewhere near
here. Would there be such a disparity if they were both
valued as to their purely physical valuation by one’s advan
tageously comparing it with the other?
A. It depends upon what you mean by their purely physi
cal valuation. If you assume physical cost of reproduction—
Court. I do not, I do not mean that at all.
A. Then your physical valuation is very much what I
would call the commercial physical valuation. The physical
valuation that takes into account the location and advantages
and disadvantages—
Court. I merely mean that taking a plant, physical struc
ture here and one at the North Pole, considering their con
dition of depreciation, that is, their obsolescence, etc., and
their condition as productive physical properties designed
to produce the product for which they were intended—com
paring one with the other regardless of location—
Witness. Regardless of location? The value would be
the same if the buildings were the same and depreciation
conditions were the same?
Court. Yes.
Witness. That being so, that seems to me necessarily
would be a very unsafe guide to property value.
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Court. It is, however, one element that enters into an ap
praisal?
Witness. It is one element that may enter into it, it does
enter into the ordinary physical appraisal.
Court. There are, however, other considerations I under
stand you classify under the heading of commercial?
A. Yes.
Q. So in the understanding of this question of equality
of reproduction costs designed to illustrate there are two
things, first the replacement values: it is higher at the North
Pole than in the Mahoning Valley because it would cost
more to get the material up there to build it. Secondly,
built at the North Pole it would be susceptible of less use
than in the Mahoning Valley and consequently would be
worth less.
A. That is the second part of my view that I hadn’t
reached yet.
Q. Well now, proceed.
A. Now, coming to the question of commercial valuation.
It is perfectly obvious that if you have two identical plants
and one is better located than the other—
Q. Now, if I may interrupt—I don’t want to seem to lead
you—assuming these two plants you speak of having identical
valuations, is that your assumption?
A. That is the assumption, that if they were identical and
in the same state of observed depreciation, or whatever you
would call it, they would still not be of the same commercial
value if one were much more advantageously located than the
other.
Court. To location of raw materials?
A. Yes. Therefore, those factors would have to be taken
into account in what I call commercial valuation. As I see
it there are two approaches to the commercial valuation, the
one is to take the physical value of an ideally located and
constructed plant and then measure the value of a less fa
vorably constructed and located plant by deducting from the
value of the ideal plant an estimate of the capital sum equiv
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alent to the disadvantages of the less favorably located plant.
Perhaps I can make it clear by the use of figures. If, for
instance, the necessary investment in a steel plant of a given
type would run to, say, $100 per ton on the annual produc
tion, and let us say $12 would be the amount necessary to
provide depreciation and a fair return on the cost, then if
you have two plants and one is at a disadvantage to the other
to the extent of more than $12 that second plant is prac
tically worthless. It would be cheaper to scrap it and build
somewhere else than to do anything with it. On the other
hand, if the disadvantage of the second plant as compared
with the first is, let us say, two or three dollars a ton, it is by
no means worthless but is worth less than a more favorably
located plant, one might say 75% of the more favorably
located plant. In my mind that is one way of approaching
a commercial value of some reality for the purposes of the
business man.
Court. For the purposes of comparison?
A. Yes, sir, the disadvantage of that is that it involves a
great many speculations, hypotheses and differences of opin
ion. The other method of approach, as I see it, is to take
What the properties are actually earning if you can assume
the present operation is fairly reflective of their relative
normal earning ability, and capitalize that earning capacity
in the two cases at the same rates, making allowances in that
capitalization both for what would be needed for return on
investment and for what would be needed to be set aside
by the purchaser for depreciation on the price he paid for
the property.
Court. But on that basis would you consider it better,
would you consider these elements of physical valuation or
commercial valuation that would be included in the term
appraisal—do they have any bearing on it?
A. If I may use a homely expression, it seems to me most
of these appraisals are like going around Robin Hood’s barn
to get to a place where you can get to directly with less un
certainty. I think the most outstanding development of the
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financial history of this country is the growing recognition
of the truth which the economists have recognized—that com
mercial value depends upon the probable yield in the fu
ture. The cost of reproduction is only a limiting factor on
value. I think the true definition of value, if I may go into
theoretical and economical definitions, is that the value of
industrial plant is determined by the prospective earning
capacity, with the physical cost of reproduction as the upper
limit. It can’t be worth more than it would cost to repro
duce it. Neither can it be worth less than its salvage value
if it were destroyed. Its actual value is determined by its
prospective earning capacity, and that prospective earning
capacity can best be judged on its actual earning capacity.
I think that truth has become more and more recognized in
all financial practice in the United States in recent years.
I think if you will follow the literature you will see that an
increasing stress on earnings and a diminishing stress on
physical values is by far the most conspicuous feature in
recent development.
Court. Pardon me, yet regardless of its immediate past
earning record the commercial valuation enters into the
appraisal by reason of its probable obsolescence—I am not so
good at these terms as you.
A. I get your point quite clearly.
Court. Or does immediate wiping out of the value by
changes in the arts enter into it?
A. Unquestionably.
Court. Then how when you are making a comparison on
the basis of earnings immediately past, how do you take that
factor of commercial value, which may entirely remove any
earning power for consideration? Am I clear to you?
A. Yes, entirely. I think that is one factor that has to be
taken into account. In any approach I have made to com
mercial valuations along the lines I have indicated I have
always left that to the parties concerned to be dealt with.
Court. Then that is not included in your advice?
A. It is not, it cannot be; that is a question for the people
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who are thoroughly familiar with the industry, essentially.
The point is absolutely sound, there is no question about
that.
Q. And not to anticipate or to lead, but I think it hasalready been testified that you called that factor to the at
tention of the parties at the time you made the oral recom
mendation on the thirteenth of February?
A. I did very pointedly.
Court. But did it enter into the basis of your suggested
relative values of trading of stock or whatever you might
call it?
A. No, what I said to these gentlemen was: This is the
recommendation I would make from the studies of the re
cent past and from what you may call the accounting and
statistical approach. There are certain things you will have
to pass on for consideration, and most important is your re
spective views of the future of the steel industry, and that
is particularly important in this case because you are engaged
in different branches of the industry and there may be a very
marked difference between the prospects in the different
branches of the industry; that is a question on which I would
not undertake to pass.
Court: One more question if you will pardon me? Mr.
Wood?
Mr. Wood. Yes.
Court. So that in your recommendation of 1.2—
A. I prefer to call it one and one-fifth because it was not
made with the decimal accuracy of 1.2.
Court. We will take the vulgar fraction. Your recom
mendation of one and one-fifth to one left for the considera
tion of those using your figures as a partial basis—it was un
derstood it was only a partial basis in your recommendation.
This element or those elements of both physical and com
mercial valuation—
A. It left it to this extent, it left to them the question
how far the prospective developments they could see would
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vitiate a conclusion that was based on the recent past. That
was essentially the point I put up to them.
Court. From your experience in all these mergers you
have detailed, was that wholly a matter for the determina
tion of those in charge of the policies and general operation
of the plants to determine or would it require experts in
the determination of the physical and commercial values
ordinarily known as appraisals?
A. I think that varied according to the number of com
panies concerned and their relative importance. If you have
a group of 15 or 20 companies it is very often helpful to
have somebody from the outside to reconcile the differences.
In my experience where you have one or two or three large
companies they have been able to reach a conclusion with
out outside assistance. That basic question arises in every
merger of importance.
Court. Assuming, however, there were two companies,
that each one had had some thorough examination of the
physical properties and locations of the others—
A. I don’t think really the physical examination of the
properties is so important. A man who has lived in the
industry and had to make his money in the industry, that
is, the successful man, is much better able in my experience
to forecast the future than a looker-on.
Court. And arrive at the obsolescence?
A. The prospective obsolescence.
Court. I mean that.
A. Of course, there is really a difference between a present
obsolescence and a thing which is in danger of obsolescence.
You were looking to the future, Your Honor?
Court. Yes, thank you.

A. Yes, my whole method of approach to problems of this
kind is to try to get someone to approach it from the stand
point of detail and someone else to approach it from the
standpoint of a broad consideration, and it is a matter which
as a senior partner I would rather reserve to myself because
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it involves more mental and less physical work than the
details—
Court. Sometimes we who work mentally would like to
trade with the other fellow.
A. At times, but broadly speaking I think we prefer the
mental exercise, and I was considering the problem from that
standpoint all the time, and by so doing I think I can fairly
say with a fairly broad background in regard not only to
these companies but as to the steel industry as a whole. Do
you want me to—
I would just like to have you go on and state in your
own way.
A. It seemed to me that there were three or four major
points. After all, steel company accounting is among the
relatively simple of the industrial accounting problems. It
is not complex like that of many other industries. There
are only comparatively few problems in it.
Mr. Wood. I hope I don’t have to go into another one.
Court. Everything certainly is relative.
A. I think that is true. You don’t, broadly speaking, in
the steel industry have many difficult inventory problems or
bad debts or problems of that kind. They narrow down
substantially to the general problem, the maintenance and
depreciation problem. That is the only big problem in
every steel comparison or steel audit. Apart from that the
differences between the two companies were largely the dif
ferences in financial structure, which are not so difficult from
a financial man’s point of view.

Q. In comparing the liquid assets of a corporation it
might be important to know something about their current
liabilities, might it not?
A. Yes.
Q. The fact that you had a lot of money in the bank
oughtn’t to make a firm rich if you have a lot of bills you
haven’t paid?
A. That is quite true.
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Q. Now, isn’t it a common thing in examining into the
financial state of a company to regard the current assets as
being more or less applicable to the current liabilities and
the fixed assets to the capital liabilities?
A. That is a common practice.
Q. There may have to be adjustments in specific cases?
A. Yes.
Q. It is true, isn’t it, that the ratio of Youngstown’s cur
rent assets to its current liabilities is higher than Bethle
hem’s at the end of December 31, 1929, notwithstanding
this $50,000,000 of cash?
A. I am not sure about that, but of course Youngstown
is a business that involves a great deal of money locked up
in inventories and consignments and stocks of that kind
which are not in the same category as these Government
securities so far as they are available to meet the debts.
Q. That is a factor to consider, is it not, Mr. May, in de
termining on the value to Youngstown of Bethlehem’s liquid
assets—its need of assets?
A. Youngstown’s need for liquid assets makes this attrac
tive, yes; Youngstown’s need for liquid assets makes this
merger attractive.
Q. Isn’t it true that Youngstown’s current asset position
is and always has been in the last three years stronger than
Bethlehem’s?
A. I don’t think so; it depends somewhat on what you
mean by strength.
Q. The ratio of current assets to current liabilities is
larger in the case of Youngstown?
A. That may have been so; to me that doesn’t demon
strate strength. . . . The point is . . . the excess in the case
of Youngstown is in the form of inventories, which to my
mind is a weakness rather than an element of strength.
Q. And Youngstown has never been in the last six or
eight years embarrassed for lack of cash?
A. No, I mean a comparison of the current assets which
includes inventories is not an index of the relative cash
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position of the two companies because the nature of Youngs
town’s business, particularly through Continental Supply and
the oil field business, involves a lockup of a great amount
in inventories in the field; that is a source, as I see it, of weak
ness rather than strength in the case of Youngstown.
Q. You don’t think Youngstown would have any diffi
culty in any circumstances that are now visible in getting
any cash it might need?
A. No, I am addressing myself to the question of what
constitutes strength and weakness in current assets.
Q. You don’t think Youngstown in a merger ought to pay
any premiums besides for liquid assets?
A. I think the excess liquid assets of Bethlehem are a
factor which they are entitled to have considered.
Q. To the extent that Youngstown—how should they
be considered?
A. If you take the value of a business, the earnings of a
business are the earnings on the property that is necessary
to the business, which include not only the plant which
produces the goods but the inventories which it is necessary
to have on hand and accounts receivable arising from the
business less the accounts payable. When you get a big block
of government securities like Bethlehem has, that is not
necessary to the earnings of the business, the earnings upon
that are not business earnings and are not capitalizable in
the same way as business earnings. That is one of the ele
ments, one which we took into account.
Q. Now, Mr. May, suppose you had a company that was
embarrassed financially, that proposed to merge with Beth
lehem, and that they had bond interest coming due and no
way to meet it, and everybody was standing around wait
ing to see whether the sheriff was going to get them or not
and they would like to have Bethlehem’s cash position, that
matter would be extremely valuable and an inducement, a
strong inducement for them to merge, would it not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. A company of that sort could afford to pay Bethlehem
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a substantial premium for relief, for its cash assistance which
would afford the merging company a financial position?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now the premium value of the cash naturally dimin
ishes as applied to a company whose credit position is strong,
does it not?
A. That is true.
Q. And when you get a company which has paid divi
dends for 25 years and which has largely built or rebuilt
its plant out of earnings, whose credit is good and whose
bonds are selling at five per cent, its cash is worth its face
value, isn’t it?
A. Exactly, and that is all the weight I wish to give to it,
and that is all of the weight I have given it.

Q. Well, when you come to figure out the savings on
bond interest that will be effected when the bonds are lifted
in February, 1930, you are going into the future, are you
not?
A. No, I think not; I think you are giving retrospective
effect to something that has occurred.
Q. Well, giving retrospective effect to something that has
occurred, is about the same thing as looking forward from
the time of occurrence to the future events; it is the differ
ence in the way you state it, isn’t it?
A. I don’t look at it quite that way.
Q. Very well. Now prior to the issue of the Bethlehem—
the 800,000 shares of Bethlehem common stock in October,
1929, it had outstanding 2,400,000 shares of stock, did it not?
A. Yes.
Q. The number of shares outstanding were increased by
this 800,600 issue just one-third?
A. Yes.
Q. The earnings were affected by that, as you give retro
spective effect to it here by $4,565,702, were they not?
A. That is the effect that is given to it, here.
Q. Yes,' well, whatever the proper figure is; now the ef-
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feet of that issue of 800,000 shares of common stock so far
as the earnings per share of the corporation were concerned
was to reduce the earnings per share, was it not?
A. Yes.
Q. And so if you were computing the effect on Bethle
hem—the value of Bethlehem common stock of that issue of
800,000 shares and the application of it to the retirement
of funded debt upon a purely earnings basis—you would
reach a conclusion, would you not, that the total value of the
Bethlehem common stock had not been increased $86,000,000 by the issue of the stock and the application made of the
proceeds?
A. I don’t think so; obviously, if you reach such a con
clusion, there must be some fallacy in it.
Q. Well, the fallacy, if there is a fallacy, or the cause of
the conclusion is, is it not, that we are now considering the
value of the outstanding Bethlehem stock on a purely earn
ings basis?
A. Yes, but if you consider it on an earnings basis you
must consider what the nature of the earnings is, as I said
before; earnings that represent a prior charge can’t be capi
talized at the same rate as earnings that represent a small
equity and the greater the equity the lower the rate of capi
talization that is properly applicable.
Q. Of course, Mr. May, when the corporation issues
800,000 shares of stock and receives $86,000,000 for it and
applies that to the retirement of funded debt, it is getting
value wholly apart from any effect on earnings, is it not?
A. I don’t understand the question.
Q. Well, when a corporation issues common stock and
applies the proceeds to the reduction of its bonded debt, it
is improving its financial structure in the direction of sta
bility, is it not?
A. Yes.
Q. And that improvement in financial structure gives a
value to the common stock wholly apart from the effect of
the transaction on earnings per share, does it not?
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A. Oh, I see, yes, you are right.
Q. Yes.
A. Your point is, as I understand it, that the value de
rived from the issue of the capital stock to retire bonds is
not measured by the mere interest saving it produces.
Q. Exactly.
A. That is right.
Q. And it isn’t reflected by the effect it has on the earn
ings per share of the common stock because it is giving the
common stock value in other directions; that is correct, is
it not?
A. That is true, yes.
Q. But if you take that transaction and consider it purely
on the effect it has on earnings per share, that effect is ma
terially to reduce the earnings per share of the entire
3,200,000 shares?
A. That is true.
Q. So that again confining our consideration to value as
affected by earnings and not—dismissing for the moment
value as reflected in other directions by greater stability and
certainty of yield and so forth—the $86,000,000 added to the
corporation by the sale of this stock is not reflected in the
value of the total outstanding shares on a purely earnings
basis, is it?
A. Well, when you say a purely earnings basis, I don’t
want to quibble with you, that is the last thing in the world.
I want to do, but as I say, when you limit it to an earnings
basis, the earnings basis you have got to employ must vary
according to the character of your earnings and by using a
lower rate of capitalization on the new figure you should get
substantially the same result as you got before, but if you
add to your question “on the basis of capitalizing earning
capacity at a fixed rate” your point is quite correct.
Q. And as long as you understand that you are limiting
your consideration to the effect on earnings, there is no
mathematical absurdity involved in that at all, is there?
A. Well, I don’t think—you mean if you leave out an es
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sential element of the proposition you say there is no mathe
matical absurdity; but the thing that is absurd to me is leav
ing out the essential element of the computation.
Q. All right, the essential element of Basis K is a com
parison of earnings for the year 1929 as adjusted, is it not?
A. Yes.
Q. It is not a comparison of capital structure, is it?
A. The question of capital structure is implicit in it; ob
viously, you could not make a relative computation at the
same rate of capitalization if in one case the stock repre
sented a small equity, and in the other case the entire in
vestment is subject to no prior charge; so that you must be
satisfied that, broadly speaking, there is a relatively fair capi
tal structure before you are justified in making any computa
tion.
Q. Exactly, but there is a difference, a radical difference,
in the capital structure of Bethlehem before the 800,000
shares were issued and its proceeds earmarked for debt re
tirement?
A. There is, yes.
Q. Now, the only interest we have in the effect upon
Bethlehem of that financial operation is its effect on earn
ings per share, is it not, on this page?
A. Yes.
Q. That is correct?
A. Yes.
Q. On Basis K. Nobody is interested at the time of this
merger in a comparison between the present Bethlehem and
the Bethlehem prior to October?
A. Well, you have to take that into account if you are
going to base it on earnings for a period which extends back
of October.
Q. Yes, but. you have to give effect to it as earnings?
A. You have to give effect to it as earnings in an intelli
gent way.
Q. And the effect of it on earnings is substantially to re
duce earnings per share?
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A. That is true.
Q. Now, as you have said in your direct examination, it
would have been most unfair to have compared Bethlehem’s
earnings on the 1,800,000 share basis with those of Youngs
town, that would have been unfair, would it not?
A. That would have been unfair.
Q. That is why you rejected one of these calculations?
A. That is true.
Q. And it would have been unfair until this new common
stock was issued and the proceeds received to put Bethle
hem’s capital structure on a basis which would make a com
parison of earnings relevant?
A. That I think is substantially what I said in my testi
mony.
Q. And that is of course perfectly true?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, you arrive in the first column of Basis K at the
figure $39,948,031 as being the adjusted earnings for Beth
lehem in the year 1929?
A. Yes.
Q. You then divide that $39,948,031 by the 2,500,000
shares and reach an earning per share on 2,500,000 shares—
that is, after the elimination of 700,000 shares—of $15.98 per
share?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, up to this date you are dealing with a purely
hypothetical Bethlehem Steel Corporation of 2,500,000
shares of common stock, are you not?
A. Yes.
Q. There is not and never has been such a corporation?
A. That is true.
Court. It was the only corporation that would be com
parable, however, for the basis of comparison with Youngs
town?
A. This was, as Mr. Crawford says, this was sort of a hypo
thetical presentation of the situation, which I adopted to
arrive at the result that seemed to be fair.
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Q. Now the actual Bethlehem that was going into this
merger was a Bethlehem with 3,200,000 shares?
A. That is true.
Q. 700,000 shares more?
A. Yes.
Q. Now for the actual Bethlehem to have earnings of
$15.98 a share it would have to earn some $51,000,000, would
it not?
A. Yes, I think that seems about right.
Q. It would have to earn $11,186,000 more than $39,948,031?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, to arrive at a figure, a ratio of 1 to 1.203 for the
actual Bethlehem and the actual Youngstown on an earnings
basis, you would have to assume earnings of $11,186,000, if
that is the correct figure, on 700,000 shares, would you not?
A. On an earnings basis, yes.
Q. Did you arrive at the ratio of one and a fifth to one
on an earnings basis?
A. I did up to the point of the 2,500,000 shares and then
I dealt with the 700,000 shares as I stated in my direct testi
mony.
Q. You arrived at a ratio on the basis of earnings?
A. I mean in Basis K, you are still talking about Basis K?
Q. Yes, you arrived at the ratio on a basis of earnings so
far as 2,500,000 shares were concerned, and upon some other
basis or bases for the other 700,000 shares?
A. Yes.
Q. And as I understand you the basis which you used
with reference to the 700,000 shares was not even an esti
mate of future earnings on the amount of capital that you
allocated to the 700,000 shares?
A. That is true.
Q. Now, would you tell me, Mr. May, just what was the
basis that you used with reference to the 700,000 shares?
A. Well, the way I dealt with the 700,000 shares was to
put the question whether Bethlehem stock would have been
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worth materially more or materially less if it had had
2,500,000 shares outstanding and $70,000,000 less cash than
it was worth having 3,200,000 shares outstanding and
$70,000,000 additional cash—and the conclusion that I
reached was that the actual intrinsic value of Bethlehem
was not far away from $100 a share and therefore the
value would neither be greatly increased nor greatly dimin
ished by the change in the situation which I have just re
cited. Now, that is the way I approached it in my own
mind and that is the way in which I presented the question
to the principals at the meeting of February 13.
Q. What I perhaps did not ask for is what I want to get
at and intended to ask for: What were the considerations that
led your mind to the conclusion that the value was not sub
stantially affected by either the presence or absence of the
700,000 shares and the $70,000,000?
A. Because I did not think Bethlehem was worth intrin
sically or statistically or by comparison with other similar
stocks materially more or less than $100 a share.
Q. Well, now you are saying you did not think it worth
materially or intrinsically—you mean by that, Mr. May, do
you mean worth from an asset basis or an earnings basis or
what sort of a basis?
A. Whether you take the elements of value either statisti
cally or marketwise or in comparison with other stocks like
the United States Steel Corporation, for instance, or any of
them.
Q. Well, one way of determining the worth of a corporate
stock, or one factor in determining the worth of corporate
stock, I take it, is security of the investment, the judgment or
estimate of security?
A. Yes.
Q. Another is the rate of return?
A. Yes.
Q. And you give, in considering the rate of return you
give the effect of past earnings, and from the past earnings
try to arrive at an estimate of future earnings?
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A. Yes.
Q. The condition of the industry in which the company
is engaged is another factor?
A. Yes.
Q. Its competitive position?
A. Yes.
Q. And the character of its management?
A. Yes.
Q. It is often materially affected by the position and
standing and connection of the people that have invested
heavily in its stock, those things may affect the value?
A. May affect, yes.
Q. There are a great many considerations. Now from
which of these considerations did you arrive at the con
clusion?
A. Well, I arrived at them as a matter of judgment from
the basis of some statistical comparison with other companies
in the same industry and the market prices and so on; it was
a personal judgment, and I so expressed it to the principals
and suggested that they should also form their personal
judgments.
Q. Well, now the problem that you had as to the $70,000,000 was one of determining what its value to Youngstown
was in this merger?
A. I do not think so.
Q. The fact there was $70,000,000 excess cash as you con
sidered it?
A. I do not think that is the viewpoint at all. I was not
acting for Youngstown; I was acting for Youngstown and
Bethlehem.
Q. I mean the point of view as to what was the weight to
be given in this merger to the fact that there was $70,000,000
excess cash there that you regarded as uninvested?
A. Yes.
Q. Now it is a common financial problem, is it not, Mr.
May, to deal with the effect upon the value of a corporation’s
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security of the presence of uninvested cash resulting from
the sale of stock or securities?
A. It is a question that arises in various negotiations in
financial matters.
Q. For instance, suppose a corporation that has been run
ning along for a number of years wants to raise additional
capital and issues some preferred stock—the people who buy
that preferred stock are interested in the security of the divi
dend, are they not?
A. Yes.
Q. And for that purpose they look at the past earnings
of the corporation, do they not?
A. Among other things, yes, very largely.
Q. And then they give effect in earnings to the presence
of this uninvested capital cash by adding interest at a conven
tional, or earnings at a conventional, rate for that new
capital?
A. Well, without identifying them I don’t know whether
I can say what they do.
Q. It is a common thing for banking houses?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Ordinarily to do?
A. Yes.
Q. That is, for instance—
A. But you would not suggest that was analogous to this
case.
Q. Well, let us see what they do: first they are interested
for the purpose of determining the security of their divi
dends, in determining what the future earnings of that com
pany will be, are they not?
A. Yes.
Q. So they take its past earnings—
A. Yes.
Q. —and figure what the past earnings will yield on the
new security, the new stock that is going out?
A. Yes.
Q. And then they take the proceeds of the sale and per-
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haps use six per cent, add that to the annual earnings, so
that the earnings, on this basis—the company’s earnings as
adjusted for the new capital—are three times the dividend,
or something of that sort?
A. That is a common form of bankers’ representation to
potential investors.
Q. And that is the same thing—the Youngstown stock
holders are being asked to invest in Bethlehem common
stock, to the extent of all the assets, the net assets of the
Youngstown Sheet and Tube, are they not?
A. Yes.
Q. And wouldn’t you think that a reasonable basis for de
termining the value to them on this $70,000,000 of unin
vested cash that are the proceeds of a recent stock issue would
be to add to Bethlehem’s past earnings some reasonable con
ventional figure—I am not trying to commit you to any
particular figure—as a return on that cash?
A. I do not think so at all.
Q. You do not think so?
A. No, I think that would be quite a mistaken point of
view.
Q. You think the way to do it is simply by resorting to
statistical information about steel companies generally and
coming to the conclusion that on the whole, taking one thing
with another and this and that together, a Bethlehem Steel
Corporation with 2,500,000 shares of common stock and
some $39,000,000 of earnings is worth about as much as one
with 3,200,000 shares of stock and $51,000,000, is that right?
A. That is not involved at all, Mr. Crawford.
Q. Well, the fact is that you were commissioned to recom
mend a basis for this merger, or a ratio for this merger, on the
basis of 1929 earnings, were you not?
A. No, I was commissioned to recommend a basis that
would be fair in my judgment and I was instructed—it was
agreed—that 1929 earnings were a fair measure of the relative
earning capacity of the two companies.

VIII
FAIR MARKET VALUE OF STOCK ON JULY 10, 1929 *

(1933)
Q. What in your opinion was the fair market value of
Continental stock and Fidelity-Phenix stock on July 10,
1929?
A. I would say that the fair market value of Continental
stock was in the neighborhood of $55 a share, and I would
take that as the figure that I would regard as most represent
ative of the fair market value. In the case of FidelityPhenix I would say $65 a share.
Q. Now, will you, in your own words, state the reasons
which lead you to assign these two figures as the fair market
values of the two stocks?
A. The first stage is to consider what method one should
adopt in arriving at a fair market value. I have taken the
view that in doing so you should give weight to both the
word “fair” and the word “market,” and the most practical
way of doing so seemed to me to deal with the matter in two
stages: first to consider what would be a fair value computed
by methods usually employed, if there were no market; sec
ondly, to consider the quoted market prices, and from those
two deduce a figure which may be regarded as a fair market
value. In the final stage, one would have to determine how
much weight to apply to the two elements in the calculation,
which in turn involves considering what margins of differ
ence or error there might be in computing value, and also
what is the character of the market by which one has to be
guided as to quoted market values. The quoted market
Value being readily ascertainable, I think it is useful and
* Testimony in Strong v. Rogers, United States District Court for the Dis
trict of New Jersey (November 8, 1933).
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simplest to present the other elements of value first and then
compare them with the market value.
Q. May I interrupt by a suggestion, that you state to the
Court the current market prices on the New York Stock Ex
change on July 10, 1929?
A. The current market price, as I recall, was approxi
mately $90 for the Continental and $106 for the FidelityPhenix. That was merely a matter of taking it off the rec
ord. In arriving at a fair value, if there is no market,
you have to consider what a share of stock represents, what
elements of value it possesses. I think it is generally recog
nized that those elements of value are the assets back of it
and the earning capacity which it possesses or may be ex
pected to possess in the future. Of the two, undoubtedly
the earning capacity is theoretically, and practically, the more
important. You will find, for instance, in the present market
[1933] a number of cases in which securities are selling below
the asset value or liquidating value, as it is sometimes called,
based on current quotations of the assets owned by the com
pany, the reason being in part that there is no way in which
this liquidating value can be realized by the shareholders;
they are merely stockholders in the company, and unless and
until dissolution proceedings take place they don’t them
selves realize the liquidating value.
Now, the question of earning capacity of the stock may be
looked at again from two standpoints: first, there is the cur
rent yield, the current dividend. In this case, both Conti
nental and Fidelity-Phenix were paying dividends at the rate
of $2 a year. If you assume that a stock of that kind should
yield 5 per cent, that would represent a capital value of $40,
and therefore if you said 414 per cent it would be $44 a
share; if you said 4 per cent it would be $50 a share. So that
on the basis of yield there is nothing to suggest that the
value is as high as the figure at which I arrived for the fair
market value, and of course it is very much less than the
quoted market value. However, in all financial companies
it is well recognized that the accumulation of earnings within
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the company are perhaps as important to stockholders as the
distributions. Financial stocks are very largely held by
people who are not dependent on them for current necessi
ties, and they are largely people who are content to have the
companies reinvest a part of the earnings instead of receiving
them as dividends, paying a tax on them and reinvesting
them themselves. So that one has to look behind the divi
dends and see what the earning capacity of the business is.
. . . Now, when you come to the earning capacity, the value
of the stock based on its earning capacity, you have to be
guided by the past, but you have to bear in mind that the
past is relevant only in so far as it affords a fair indication
of what may reasonably be expected in the future. Past
figures have not an absolute significance. Their significance
is wholly dependent upon their being a reasonable indica
tion of the probable future.
Now, in the case of an insurance company, its income is
of two fundamentally different kinds, although the two
sources of income are naturally very closely related. There
is the underwriting income and the investment income.
Q. What do you mean by the underwriting income and
the investment income?
A. The underwriting income is the profit that is made
from the actual profit or loss as it may be that is made from
writing insurance, paying expenses, paying issues out of the
premiums, and there is either an underwriting profit or loss
when the business is concluded.
Q. And an investment income?
A. An investment income is really the major item in the
insurance companies, because the main source of profit in an
insurance company is the fact that it collects its premiums
in advance and pays its losses after the event. So that from
the underwriting business, as from its own capital, it derives
a substantial sum which it can invest and derive income
during the period that it holds it.
Now, the two classes of income stand on different footing.
I think for the purpose of estimating the future from the
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past, so far as investment income is concerned, if the income
is steady or steadily received, latest figures are probably the
best index of what may be expected in the immediate fu
ture, unless you anticipate and provide in advance for some
revulsion such as actually occurred in the fall of 1929, which
for this purpose I do not propose to do.
On the other hand, the underwriting business, the insur
ance business, is essentially a business of averages, and in
order to estimate the reasonable expectation for the future,
you must take an experience over a period of years. Now,
proceeding on that basis, I find from the experience of the
Continental Insurance Company over a period ... of ten
years including 1929 (1929 carries past the critical date and
therefore perhaps should be left out for this purpose), the
profits of the underwriting department are, including ’29,
which was a good year, a little over about 31½ per cent on
the gross premium income; over a five-year period ending
with 1928 the figure is about 3.8; over a nine-year period
it will be less than 3.8. I have thought it fair to estimate
the underwriting profit capacity of this company year in and
year out at roughly 4 per cent on the current premium in
come—on the premium income of ’28—or, say, a million dol
lars a year.
By the Court:

Q. Why did you think 4 per cent fair?
A. The experience over ten years is 3½; the experience
over five years is 3.8; 1928 and 1929 were both good years.
So I thought it was fair to take the little higher figure than
either the five-year or ten-year experience.
Q. Why?
A. Give a little extra weight to the later years when the
experience was high.
Q. It never had reached four?
A. Oh, yes. In ’28 it was considerably more than four
for that single year.
Q. It was? How much was it?
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A. In 1928 it was 10 per cent. It is a very fluctuating
business.
Q. But the average is 3.8?
A. The average is 3.8 over a period of five years, and
slightly less for a period of ten years including ’29. I thought
four was a reasonable figure to take under all the circum
stances, and on that basis I got a million dollars as the earn
ing capacity represented by the underwriting business. Then
the second element—
Q. That is the net?
A. That is the net after losses and expenses.
Q. Expenses are deducted?
A. Yes. The net investment income for 1928, the last
year prior to the merger, prior to the critical date, I think
was about $3,100,000; it was on a rising scale, and I think it
would be fair to take three and a quarter millions for this
purpose as the investment income, which would make four
and a quarter millions for the direct earning capacity of
these companies. However, these companies own interests in
the other companies here, the Fire Buildings and the Ameri
can Eagle Insurance. Those companies were not paying out
to the parent companies the full amount of their earnings by
any means. I think it is a somewhat liberal view to take as
the measure of the earnings of those companies, not reflected
in the figures I have already used, the actual figures shown
by this last exhibit which you handed me. . . . That would
be approximately $750,000 a year. I say that is liberal be
cause it gives the full weight to the exceptionally good un
derwriting experience of the American Eagle Fire Insurance
Company in 1928, but I think that is fair and certainly not
understating a reasonable estimate of the earning capacity
represented by this stock at July, 1929.
Now, adding the three items together, a million for the
direct underwriting, three and a quarter millions for invest
ment income and seven hundred and fifty thousand for earn
ings of subsidiary companies not distributed to the parent, I
get the figure of, say, five million dollars, somewhere between
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four million eight to five million dollars is about the right
figure, I should say. On a million and a half shares of stock,
that is equivalent to—five million dollars would be equiva
lent to $3.33⅓—three dollars thirty-three cents a share.
By Mr. Angell:

Q. You are discussing the Continental now?
A. I am still talking of the Continental. Then the ques
tion is: What is a fair capital value to assign to such an earn
ing capacity? There may be room for some difference of
opinion on that. If you say that such a stock should earn,
whether distributed or not, 8 per cent, you would get a value
of about $48 a share. If you say 6 per cent you would get a
value of about $55 a share, which is figured at—I wouldn’t
say it was my final index of the value of the stock—I think 6
per cent by itself would be too low a rate and therefore $55
on this criterion alone would be too high a figure.
But I pass on next to the consideration of the assets. The
assets of this company consist mainly of its portfolio, its
buildings, and its business. I have had calculated what
may be called a “breakdown value” of the assets of the Con
tinental Company. By “breakdown” I mean valuing the
assets behind the stock, on the basis of the current market
quotations for those assets which, as I will point out, brings
in the market at that point in another phase.
Q. I show you a document, Mr. May, captioned “The
Continental Insurance Company, Fidelity-Phenix Fire In
surance Company, Computation of Valuation of the Capi
tal Stocks of the Companies Based on Market Prices of Un
derlying Securities as at July 10, 1929,” and ask you whether
this is the computation to which you have referred?
A. Yes.
Q. Will you explain this document briefly, Mr. May?
A. This document starts from the capital and surplus
of the company at July 1, as shown by its published state
ments. Its capital and surplus together with the reserve for
market fluctuations, which is only another form of surplus,
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are added together, those being what is sometimes called
the book value of the stock. Then, in the next section of
it, there is an adjustment made for changes in the value of
the portfolio directly owned during the period from July
1 to July 10. That is merely to bring it up to date, from'
July 1 to July 10. Then there are adjustments resulting
from substituting the values of June 10 for the book
values—
Q. July 10?
A. July 10, I mean to say, for the portfolio. Then there
are adjustments of the values of the subsidiary companies,
and some adjustments for proportions of earnings applying
to the ten days; and finally there is brought into account—
there is an amount described which is 40 per cent of the
company’s reserve for unearned premiums on July 1, 1929,
and their proportionate share of the unearned premiums
of the underlying companies. That is the figure which I put
in to represent what may be called the “intangible values” of
the company, in addition to its portfolio, buildings, and so
on. That I would like to amplify a little later.
For the convenience of the Court I have prepared a
further statement which, instead of merely showing the pro
cedure by which this figure is built up, shows the result of
the figure, how much of the value is represented by portfolio,
how much by buildings, and so on.
Q. What are the ultimate figures, valuation figures, a
share, Continental and Fidelity-Phenix, as disclosed by these
statements?
A. Well, this figure gives $55.92 for the Continental and
$69.06 for the Fidelity-Phenix. ... I brought in items
which aggregate ultimately twelve and a half millions in the
case of Continental and ten million eight hundred thousand
in the case of Fidelity-Phenix, under the title of 40 per
cent of underlying premiums to represent the intangible as
sets of the company. . . . The question of those intangible
values may be considered from various angles. One way is
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to take a percentage of the unearned premiums. That is a
method that is common to insurance companies, according
to my experience, because it is peculiar to that business.
The more common way is to take the earnings of the busi
ness and capitalize them, or else to take the earnings and
deduct a fair return on the tangible assets, and capitalize the
excess as representing intangible values. I think that the
Bureau of Internal Revenue has approved of both the second
and third methods.
As a result of tests which I have made, and on the basis
of the figures of earning capacity which I have already out
lined in the case of Continental, I do not think any reason
able method of appraising the intangible values would give
a figure substantially in excess of the figure that I have
taken up as unearned premium. So that in my judgment,
the statement of the $56 represents a full valuation of the
assets and liabilities of the Continental Company, both tan
gible and intangible.
I might mention two or three technical points, just so that
it may not be thought they have been overlooked. Theo
retically, in the Continental there is a large portfolio; it has
a large excess value over its original cost, so that if the
company attempted to realize that value, it would incur very
considerable income taxes as well as other expenses in real
izing those values. I have thrown off that figure. I have
not brought it into account, although it wouldn’t be incon
siderable; it might be two or three million dollars.
Another factor is that the calculations which I have given
are based on the situation immediately before the acquisition
of the Niagara and the Fidelity-Casualty. It will perhaps be
more logical to take the figure mentioned after those acquisi
tions.
Q. Have you those figures, Mr. May?
A. Calculations which I have made show that the effect
would be to reduce both the breakdown value and the earn
ing capacity a share; so that if there were any error in tak
ing the figures prior to the merger, it would tend to produce
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a higher valuation than would be produced if the figures
after the merger were used. The differences are not very
substantial, and it would make the matter much more com
plicated to take the post-merger figures.
I would like now to turn to the Fidelity-Phenix. The
statement of underwriting income for that company shows
that its underwriting experience had been much less favor
able than that of the Continental; for the whole ten years
including 1929 its underwriting profits had averaged only
$350,000 a year, and if the exceptionally good year of 1929
were left out the average would be reduced to about $160,000 a year. So that I think the fair estimate of the earning
capacity of Fidelity in respect of its underwriting could not
be put higher than $250,000 or $300,000 a year—$350,000
perhaps at the outside. Its underwriting income—put it at
$350,000 a year. Then its investment income, net invest
ment income, for 1928 is $2,475,000, and allowing for some
increase for the future it might be reasonable to take $2,750,000 for that. Then we have $750,000 from the subsidiary
companies, the same figure as in the case of Continental, each
company having the same interest in the subsidiary com
panies, and that gives us a figure of $3,950,000 or, say, $4,000,000 as roughly the earning capacity represented by the stock
of the Fidelity-Phenix Company, or we will say $4 a share
on the million shares of stock outstanding before the merger.
That, again, on an 8 per cent basis would represent a value
of $50 a share; on a 7 per cent basis it would represent a
value of $57 a share; on a 6 per cent basis it would give a
value of $66 a share. I have already said that the breakdown
value of the Fidelity-Phenix before the merger works out at
$69 on those figures—I regard $65 as a fair value to attach
to that stock in round figures.
In that case I may say, if you use the post-merger figures,
the effect on the Fidelity-Phenix would be rather more ad
verse than in the case of the Continental.
Q. That is, it would tend to reduce them?
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A. Tend to reduce the figures more in the case of Fidel
ity-Phenix than in the case of Continental.
The Court. You have fixed it in this analysis at how
much?
The Witness. My final figure is $55 for the one and $65
for the other. The breakdown value is $56 and $69.
The Court. Not $65?
The Witness. No, $65 is what I used; taking into account
all the factors, I think $65 is a fair figure. I haven’t changed
that figure—that is a computation based on assets; but I was
taking into account assets and earning power and every
thing.
The Court. You have not now reduced that by the other
elements that you have taken into account?
The Witness. I would say on an asset basis $69, before the
merger; $63¼ would be the asset value after the merger.
The Court. Well, then, where does the figure $65 come
in?
The Witness. That is the composite figure that I finally
arrived at after taking into account assets, earning capacity
and other elements of value.
Q. I handed you and asked that you assume as correct
tabulations which were entitled “Investment Profits and
Rents, Dividends, Interest.” How much weight do the fig
ures set forth in that statement have with you in reaching
your conclusions of the fair market value of the stocks?

A. They play this, they have just this weight: that if com
putations were based on the published figures of the Con
tinental and the Fidelity, without taking into account the
hidden equities of the subsidiary companies, you would get
an undervaluation of the securities; and by placing in those
figures, I have avoided that undervaluation which would
otherwise result.
Q. In other words, a consideration of these figures would
tend to increase rather than decrease your value?
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A. Oh, yes, it would increase it, legitimately, undoubt
edly. If you took the quoted figures without regard to them,
you might underestimate the value of the stock.
Q. But you wouldn’t overestimate it?
A. No, it couldn’t have that effect.
Q. You have testified, Mr. May, that in your opinion the
fair market value on July 10, 1929, of the Continental stock
was $55 and the fair market value of Fidelity-Phenix $65. I
think you also referred to the fact that the current market
quotations on the New York Stock Exchange on that date
were approximately $90 a share for the Continental and
$106 a share for the Fidelity-Phenix. Why do you feel
justified in departing from the market prices to this extent
in fixing the fair market value of the stock?
A. Well, that opinion that the difference is appropriate
in determining a fair market value is based mainly on a
consideration of the character of the market in 1929. In
considering the character of the market we have first of all
to consider its breadth. I would hardly say that the market
in these stocks was broad enough to form an entirely satis
factory basis for determining the sale value of a block of
stock of the size involved in these transactions. It is, how
ever, only fair to say that these stocks being listed on the
New York Stock Exchange had a broader market than in
surance stocks in general. So that I don’t lay so much stress
on the question of the breadth of the market as I do on the
character of the market. Now, I was told that I might
assume that in certain circumstances it might be appropriate
to go beyond the current market quotations to determine
a fair market value. Now, that has been done so far as I
know on a number of occasions in other connections. In
the insurance field it has been done at least three times in the
last thirty years: in the depression of 1907, during the war,
and in the current depression. The Insurance Commission
ers expressly authorized insurance companies to take as the
fair market value of their securities prices in excess of the
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quoted market prices in the periods of depression. Now, it
would seem to me that that rule might fairly be deemed to
work in both directions, and if ever there was an occasion
in which the market might be said to be not fairly represent
ative, because it was too high, I should say it was the market
that immediately preceded the events in the early fall of
1929. Now, I don’t by that mean to say that you can entirely
ignore the market of that period.
Q. You mean in July, 1929?
A. 1929. And carrying the matter a little further, I think
that in the period that culminated in the summer of 1929
there was a steady and, in my judgment then, and I think
events have since proved, probably an excessive appreciation
in the values of securities based on earning capacity. That I
think was true, generally speaking, of companies of almost
every kind. It was, however, much more pronounced in the
case of the group of finance and holding companies than it
was in the case of what you may call primary companies
which were producing income. The extreme examples are
found in some of the investment trusts and in some of the
utility holding companies, such as the Insull group, where
the appreciation in the market value of the holding com
panies far exceeded the appreciation in the values of the
properties which those stocks represented. That, I think,
was true of holding companies; it was true of practically all
kinds of financial companies in some degree, and you can see
it, for instance, in some of the banks, like the Chase and
National City Bank and other big New York banks; and you
can see it, I think, in the insurance companies, particularly
in the insurance companies Whose investments consisted to a
substantial extent of common stocks. Now, in my approach
to the question I have felt that when I gave pretty full weight
to the market appreciation of the underlying assets owned
by these companies, I had given reasonable weight to the cur
rent market, and that the excess of the market value of these
stocks over what I conceived to be the fair market value of
the underlying assets is not in any economic sense certainly
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a fair value, and once you go beyond quotations I don’t see
what you can have as a test of a fair market value except
whether it is within the reasonable range of economic valua
tion. It may be a high economic valuation and still be rea
sonable. But if it gets beyond any reasonable limits, I think
that would be a test that a market was not fair, because it
was too high, just as when securities fell to values that were
only a fraction of the intrinsic values behind them, the In
surance Commissioners and the Comptroller of the Cur
rency and people in offices of that kind felt warranted in
authorizing institutions under their charge to treat as the
fair market value of their securities figures based on some
thing other than market quotations, on the ground that those
market quotations were too low to constitute a fair market
value. I have had considerable experience in dealing with
questions of this kind with the Bureau of Internal Revenue
in connection with income and inheritance tax cases, and on
more than one occasion the Bureau has gone behind market
quotations, even where they were in fair volume, to arrive at
a fair market value. That was true certainly in regard to
transactions in the early part of 1921 when we had a sudden
fall in prices.
Mr. Hanson. Of course, we object to this, Your Honor, as
not binding on the Government or on the defendant in this
case.
The Court. As I understand it, this testimony of the wit
ness is being produced—he is an expert—as disclosing the
manner and method by which he has arrived at the conclu
sions which he has heretofore testified to. Am I correct?
Mr. Angell. That is correct, Your Honor.
The Court. You, of course, will have a full opportunity
to cross examine.
Defendant’s counsel prays an exception, which is
hereby allowed and sealed accordingly.
A. [Continuing.] And that, I may say, was before the Act
of 1924 was passed which expressly required the Commis
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sioner to have regard to the assets of the company as well as
the market quotations for its securities in determining the
March 1, 1913 value, which in any such transaction as this is
the other end of the yardstick. As a matter of fact, as consult
ant for the Treasury and also a member of the Advisory Com
mittee of the Joint Congressional Committee, I participated
in a great many discussions on this question at different times,
and I know the changes of feeling that have been adduced by
different cases on this question of fair market value. Of
course, it is easy to say that the recipient of this stock could
have gone out and sold it. In all such cases where there is a
large block handed out to a number of stockholders, a certain
number of shareholders could have done that successfully
without affecting the market, but probably not the whole or
a substantial part of the whole could have done so without
affecting the market. ... I can’t conceive of any economic
theory on which the market values of these securities could
reasonably have been given a fair value so large as the
market quotations of July, 1929; and in my own mind, I
feel that the situation is largely accounted for by this new
enthusiasm for investment trusts, and corporations of that
kind, which resulted in attributing to holding companies,
security holding companies, values on the market for the
time being greatly in excess of the value of the properties on
which those stocks in fact rested. So that I feel no difficulty,
if I am allowed to exercise any judgment, in saying that in
my judgment the market quotations of July, 1929, for these
securities were not a fair market value, because I can’t in my
own mind discover any process of reasoning which on a fair
analysis of the facts would reach figures approximating the
market values.
Now, in my Exhibit, I have taken forty per cent of the un
earned premiums. Well, now, if you went to an extreme and
took a hundred per cent of the unearned premiums, you
would still be twenty points below the market; and that be
ing so, as I say, if I have any right to go behind the market,
I have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion in my own
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mind that that market was not a fair reflection of the values
represented by these stocks.
Q. In your opinion, Mr. May, why was it that market
quotations in July, 1929, went up so substantially above what
you, having considered the underlying facts of the case, con
sider the fair market value of the two stocks?

A. Well, that is a fairly large question. Do you want me
to limit it to this particular class of stock or do you want
me to discuss the market in general?
Q. No, limit it to this particular class of stock.
A. Well, I think the outstanding factor, as I see it—
Mr. Hanson. What class of stock is he talking about?
The Witness. Well, I will define the class of stocks to
which I think this belongs.
A. [Continuing.] The class of stocks whose assets consists
largely of securities of other companies. That falls mainly
in that group, although it isn’t the outstanding example.
The outstanding examples are the investment trusts and the
purely holding companies.
Q. You are referring to the Continental and the FidelityPhenix?
A. The Continental and Fidelity-Phenix. To my mind
one of the main features was a failure to distinguish between
real income and capital changes in determining earnings, the
capital value of which represents or is a measure of the se
curity value.
Perhaps I can best illustrate it by taking a simple illustra
tion. If you had a company, we will say, that in 1924 was
earning $10,000 a year, in some ordinary business, and from
1924 to 1929 its business steadily improved so that in 1929,
instead of earning $10,000 it was earning $15,000—well, quite
apart from anything else, if that seemed to be a permanent
trend, and, of course, that is a question of opinion on which
the market must decide, it would be reasonable to say that
the value of that stock had appreciated, let us say, from ten
times ten thousand, that would be a hundred thousand, at
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the beginning, to a hundred and fifty thousand in 1929. Now,
during that period there was an influence at work which
tended steadily to reduce the yields on securities of that
kind; or, in other words, to increase the capital value rela
tive to earnings.
In examining the portfolio of this company, I noticed
cases of large blocks of stocks on which the yield had di
minished from about five and a half per cent to three and
a half per cent. Now, in those circumstances, take our com
pany A, whose earnings have increased from ten thousand to
fifteen thousand; the value of its stock would increase be
cause of its increased earnings. It would also increase be
cause of the higher rate of capitalization applied to earnings
in 1929 as compared with 1924. So that that stock might
appreciate from—not from a hundred to a hundred and fifty
thousand, but from a hundred thousand to two hundred
thousand, or a hundred per cent.'
Now, let’s take a company that owns twenty per cent of
the stock of that company. Its holding was worth $20,000 in
1924, and in 1929 its holding was worth at market value, let
us say, $40,000. There was a tendency to treat that increase
of $20,000 as an income of that company which itself could
be capitalized in order to arrive at the capital value of that
company. So that you were getting a sort of a squaring of
the appreciation, instead of an appreciation in direct rela
tion to the earnings; it tended to vary, you may say, as the
square of the increase of earnings. And that is why I think
the general range of stock values of that class of company
was particularly out of line. I want to be entirely fair and
say I don’t regard the insurance companies as an extreme
example of that kind. Of course, if you take some of these
extreme cases, like, well, some of the Insull companies and
companies like the American & Foreign Power, you get a
much more exaggerated rise, but still I think that such a con
dition did affect to a very marked extent securities of the
kind of Continental and Fidelity-Phenix stocks.
Q. Now, in Exhibit P-22, which is the analysis of shares
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and so-called “breakdown value” in the case of Continental,
the portfolio taken at market is $66.79 a share, and the
market prices on the Stock Exchange were around 90?
A. Yes.
Q. Does that divergence between the value of the port
folio and the market quotations indicate in your opinion
the situation which you have just outlined as existing in the
case of the market quotation of the stock of the Continental
and the Fidelity-Phenix?
A. That fact in conjunction with the facts as to earnings,
which I have already recited, led me to that conclusion.
Cross Examination by Mr. Hanson:

Q. And in round figures I believe you used an earning
capacity for the Continental of $5,000,000?
A. $5,000,000.
Q. As representing the average earnings which you sought
to capitalize?
A. Yes.
Q. And those were capitalized by you, I believe, at various
rates?
A. Various rates.
Q. The final rate being used was 6 per cent, was it not?
A. That was the lowest rate, that wasn’t the final rate.
Q. What was your final rate?
A. The way one does things of that kind is to assemble
figures on different bases and then reach a conclusion on the
picture as a whole; that was the method that I proceeded on.
Q. That is, you didn’t select your rate until you knew
what the answer was?
A. If you care to put it that way. I think that is merely
an attack on my intellectual honesty, that’s all.
Q. No, indeed. I am inquiring as to your method of
procedure.
A. I have explained my method of procedure.
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Q. Notwithstanding the fact that this company made $3,000,000, in excess of $3,000,000, on the sale of securities in
1928 and notwithstanding the fact that they had made gains
on the sales of securities in practically all other years since
their organization, you did not include in the earning capac
ity of this company for the year 1928 any amount because of
similar gains?
A. No.

Q. You did not include in the earning capacity of the
Continental any gain carried on the books of account and
records of the Continental or gain reported during the year
1928 to the Insurance Commissioner of the State of New
York because of the appreciation in the value of the assets
which had been purchased in prior years and which were
held throughout the year 1928?
A. That is true.
Q. I invite your attention here in Exhibit M over the
five-year period from, or over the period commencing in 1922
and ending with 1928; I invite your attention to the sales of
securities made during that period of time.
A. Yes.
Q. During that period of time the volume of sales was
almost equal to the entire portfolio of the company, isn’t
that a fact—to the entire portfolio of the company as of 1928?
A. I haven’t checked it—that is broadly true, I should say;
if you take in ’29 it would be true.
Q. During that period of time the profits actually were
realized?
A. Yes—well, substantial profits were realized.

Q. Now, assuming, Mr. May, that the item of $3,220,000,
which you say is the profit which was realized in the year
1928 upon the sale of securities, should be actually included
in the earning capacity of the Continental for the year 1928.
Gan you then compute at the rates previously employed by
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you the valuation of the stocks through capitalization of
earnings?
A. No.
Q. You cannot do it?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. I can make a mathematical calculation, of course, a
mere matter of arithmetic.
Q. That is all I ask you to do.
A. But I couldn’t say the definite result in a value, I mean,
if you take one assumption and apply to it figures based on an
entirely different assumption, the combination of the two
won’t produce a homogeneous result; it will be a meaning
less figure.
Q. You can make the computation, however?
A. Obviously, as a matter of arithmetic.
Q. Will you do so before the court, please?
The Court. How would you establish the rate which he is
going to capitalize this sum at?
Mr. Hanson. I am asking him to use his own rate, Your
Honor.
The Court. Let’s find out what his rate will be.
The Witness. If I used the method at all, I should use
an entirely different rate, but I should not use the method
at all.
The Court. It is a mere mathematical calculation; you
consider the capitalization of appreciation of securities is un
sound?
The Witness. Capitalizing appreciation in valuation of se
curities even if realized as earnings is unsound in principle,
in my mind, so I wouldn’t be prepared to say what rate I
should adopt if I were forced to adopt a principle that I re
garded as unsound.
By Mr. Hanson:

Q. Now, would you say that that method of procedure
would be unsound with reference to a company engaged
solely in buying and selling securities?
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A. Yes, I would think that you would have to value its
stock on an entirely different basis.
Q. Under your computation you gave no effect whatso
ever to the earning capacity obtained through or realized by
the sale of securities—isn’t that right?
A. I don’t regard that as earning capacity that should be
capitalized.
Q. It was a gain, however?
A. It was a gain, yes; a capital gain, to my mind.
Q. A capital gain?
A. A capital gain, economically.
The Court. And what do you mean by that, Doctor?
The Witness. Well, I am trying to restrict myself to an
swering the question.
The Court. Yes, yes.
The Witness. So that I may make my position entirely
clear. If you would like me to—
The Court. But what do you mean by the expression
“economically”?
The Witness. Well, that is the point that I made just now,
that what was going on during these periods was a steady
lowering of the rate of yield on securities. Now, if you take
advantage of that by selling out securities, it doesn’t repre
sent any permanent earning capacity for the future. On the
contrary, the fact that securities are steadily going up during
that period creates a probability that there will be a fall in
the later period, and, as a matter of fact, the insurance com
panies in 1929—I think these and others probably—were carry
ing reserves to provide for that contingency which they fore
saw. The underlying assumption in this method which Mr.
Hanson puts to me is that the rise in securities that was
going on from 1924 to 1929 was going on continuously up
and up. To my mind that is economically—well, I would
say, impossible; certainly, highly improbable. And therefore,
in forming a reasonable estimate of the future, I wouldn’t
predicate any calculation on the assumption that that would
continue indefinitely.
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By Mr. Hanson:

Q. Might it not maintain an even level?
A. But you—
Q. Will you answer that question, please?
Mr. Angell:

Let him answer in his own fashion.

A. It might not—you say, it might not what—maintain
an even level?
Q. The earnings resulting from or through a sale of se
curities.
A. Not unless there was a continuous fall in the rate of
yield on securities.
Q. Well, there had been a fall for some time, had there
not?
A. Yes, and I think that created the presumption that the
longer it lasted, the more likely it was to come to an end.
I mean if you get a barometer rising steadily, for a time, it is
evident that you are going to have good weather, but when
you get it up, right up to set fair, you are pretty sure that
the next change is going to be a fall in the barometer, not a
further rise.
Q. This factor, which you have given no consideration
in your computation, what part did it play in the growth of
the company?
A. It played some part, a substantial part, in increasing
the assets value of the portfolio.
Q. Well, isn’t it a fact that with only a paid-in capital
of $2,000,000 in 1928, there was a surplus of something over
$30,000,000, just because of this very factor which you have
eliminated in your computation?
A. Well, I have given them credit for the increase in the
assets that they produced, but I say that it doesn’t represent
a permanent earning capacity, in my judgment. In 1929, no
one making a forecast for the future would—
Q. Notwithstanding the fact that there had been earnings
each year since the organization of the company, because of
that very fact?
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A. The earnings had increased so rapidly from that source
in recent years that I think there was every reason to expect
a reversal of the trend rather than a continuation of it.
Q. But over a long period of time, the experience of the
company indicated that substantial earnings were to be real
ized from that source?
A. That is true. I mean I don’t want to accept—I take
exception to the word “earnings”: I don’t want to accept that.
Q. Substantial gains?
A. Gains, yes.
Q. And that was actual realized profit?
A. It was an actual realized profit, yes.
Q. Notwithstanding the fact that you are of the opinion
that the gains realized from sales of securities are not prop
erly includable in the earnings of the Continental, such gains
are a really important element in computing the value of that
stock, are they not?
A. I think that if I were attaching any weight—if I were
trying to measure the weight to attach to them—I would, I
think, in 1929, endeavoring to put myself back in that posi
tion, have said that there was more reason to anticipate a re
versal of the trend in the subsequent years, and that there
fore I was giving a full valuation by ignoring the question
altogether.

The Court. In your study of these figures, Mr. May, would
or would it not be proper and logical to take into account
any item based upon fluctuation in the value of money itself?
The Witness. Well, that is really what underlies this ques
tion of gain, Your Honor.
The Court. Well, now, will you clear that up for me? I
think you can do that, so that I will understand these conclu
sions of yours better—if you will explain how the fluctuation
in the value of the dollar has affected this problem we are
dealing with.
The Witness. I don’t think the fluctuation in the value
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of the dollar had very much to do with it at this time. As I
remember, the value of the dollar measured by the cost of
living indices or anything of that kind did not change very
much between, say, 1925 or 1926 and 1928 or 1929. It was a
rather different phenomenon, which, however, operated in
very much the same way; let me discuss fluctuation in value
due to an absolute change in the value of the dollar. It seems
to me that as regards earning capacity, you would have to
leave out, in arriving at the value based on earning capacity
in a period when the value of the dollar was violently chang
ing, you would have to exclude gains or losses in dollars that
were due merely to the realization of securities on the basis,
we will say, of a depreciated dollar as compared with the
purchase price before the dollar had begun to depreciate. If
the dollar had depreciated, however, it might be reasonable
to assume that over a period of years the real earning capac
ity measured by current actual production of income would
increase because all units of value would rise and therefore
sales would increase in price—in this case premiums would
increase in amount, losses would increase in amount, and
it would all be stepped up; so that if we had an earning ca
pacity of $5,000,000, to take these figures, and realized gains
due to depreciation of the dollar of three and a half million
dollars, it would not, in my judgment, be correct to add
those two together and make a calculation. The right thing
would be to say, well, the three million and a half has got
nothing to do with the question, but the five million dollars,
now that the dollar is worth, we will say, sixty cents, will
probably increase in the ratio of one hundred to sixty, be
cause over a term the value of property will increase in terms
of the depreciated dollar, the insurance written on it will in
crease, the losses will increase, the expense will increase, and
no necessity of earning $5,000,000 in future, we will have
earned a larger sum than five, and it will have to be a con
version of the regular current income and have nothing what
ever to do with the purely incidental profits derived in the
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particular period from the conversion of assets which have
been bought on one level of the dollar compared with the
period when the dollar had an entirely different value. I
don’t know as that helps Your Honor.
The Court. Yes, it has.

IX
FAIR MARKET VALUE OF STOCK IN 1930 *

(1934)
Mr. Green. Mr. May, I am going to ask your opinion as to
the fair market value on June 12, 1930, of a block of 1,825,000 shares of common stock of Pacific Gas and Electric. You
have seen the two stipulations that are in this case?
Mr. May. Yes.
Q. And also the additional data read into the record at
the beginning of the trial, namely, the statement of P. G. & E.
stock outstanding at various dates, a New York Stock Ex
change Bulletin and Chart showing the price range of P. G.
& E. common on the New York and San Francisco Exchanges,
and a schedule bringing down through 1933 the figures con
tained in paragraph 25 of the main stipulation.
In addition to that, assume that the P. G. & E. took its
depreciation on the sinking fund basis, and not the straight
line basis; and that if it had taken depreciation on the
straight line basis with the same factors, the amount of its
depreciation would have exceeded that actually taken by ap
proximately $3,681,000 for 1927; $4,484,000 for 1928; and
$3,838,000 for 1929.
Also assume that P. G. & E. charged to construction the
following amounts for general and administrative expense,
and had the following amounts of gross construction:
* Excerpt from testimony in Western Power Corporation v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue (1934). Determination of the fair value in June, 1930,
of a block of 1,825,000 shares of Pacific Gas & Electric Company, being ap
proximately 32% of the outstanding stock.
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Year

......................
1928 ......................
1929 ......................
1930......................
1931 ......................
1932 ......................
1933 ......................

Gross
construction

$25,824,923
20,942,156
41,888,366
44,894,383
23,513,945
9,007,406
4,431,783

General and
administrative
expense charged
to construction

$1,627,633
1,512,864
1,593,105
1,928,329
1,617,257
1,188,559
778,783

And that in 1929 about 40 per cent of the general and ad
ministrative expense charged to construction existed and
would have been incurred regardless of construction; and
that this percentage of the total would tend to rise as the
amount of construction decreased.
Assume further that the plants and properties carried on
the consolidated balance sheet of P. G. & E. at December 31,
1929, in the gross sum of approximately $407,000,000 had a
rate base value, in accordance with the practices of the Cali
fornia Railroad Commission, of about $372,000,000; that in
computing the company’s rate base, there would also have
been included its materials and supplies, and other net cur
rent assets only to the extent of two months’ operating ex
pense.
Also assume that in January and February, 1930, the Cali
fornia Railroad Commission entered orders decreasing the
rates for electricity, effective as of March 1, 1930, which re
duction in rates would amount to an annual reduction of
$3,000,000 for P. G. & E. and Great Western together.
Also assume that Pacific Gas and Electric Company during
the years 1929 and 1930 went into the natural gas business.
I now ask what, in your opinion, was the fair market value
on June 12, 1930, of a block of 1,825,000 shares of common
stock of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company?
Mr. May. In my judgment, the fair market value of such a
block of stock on the facts cited here and assumed, and the
evidence contained in the stipulations, would be in the neigh
borhood of $35 a share, and perhaps somewhat less. [Quota

FAIR MARKET VALUE OF STOCK

363 .

tion on New York Stock Exchange, June 12, 1930, was
61¼-63½.]
Q. Can you give a minimum and a maximum?
A. I should say a fair range would be between, say, $30
and $40 a share.
Q. Will you give us the reasons that lead you to that
result?
A. The way that I approach a question of that kind is that
if you are trying to determine the fair market value, the first
requirement is to determine the market which is available.
The New York Stock Exchange, which is perhaps the first to
suggest itself, is a market in which stocks such as this are
dealt in at retail, and in regard to this particular stock, it
was clearly not broad enough to constitute a market for a
block of anything like this magnitude.
Therefore, I should say that the New York Stock Exchange
quotations have no direct bearing on the fair market value
of a block of this size.
The markets that would be available in normal times
would be what may be called the wholesale distributing
markets, of the large corporate investment markets; corpora
tions which buy large blocks of stocks of public utilities or
other classes of companies, with the idea of holding them as
long term investments.
The wholesale distributing market is, of course, based in
directly on the retail market, allowing for the costs of dis
tribution and the compensation and the risks assumed in
undertaking such an operation; and therefore must bear
some relation to the New York Stock Exchange prices or
to San Francisco Stock Exchange prices.
In June, 1930, the demand by wholesale distributors for
securities for distribution was very limited. They were not
undertaking the hazard of such distribution at all freely.
Our business in that field was almost at a standstill. I
question very much whether the stock could have been sold
advantageously in that particular market. My own judg
ment would be that the large corporate investor would be
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more likely to give a price for a block this size at that time.
Such purchaser is not, I think, in my experience, greatly in
fluenced by current market quotations. The price that he is
willing to pay is determined, rather, by the basic elements of
value, and the inherent merits of the security, so that he
would look at it from the standpoint mainly of prospective
earning capacity.
In the case of a public utility, that involves a number of
questions: There is the question of the rate base. I should
say that the relation between the rate base and the book
values of the property were such that that would not be a
major element in the determination of the price.
Then there is the question of prior charges. They, of
course, tend to increase the earnings in periods of prosperity
on the equity stock to the extent that the earnings on the
money invested exceed the rate of return that has to be paid
to the holders of private securities. In time of adversity,
they operate in the opposite direction.
The Pacific Gas and Electric was, of course, a strong finan
cial company at that date. Then we come to the question
of earnings, which is the critical consideration.
After the purchase of the Western Power Company prop
erties, the earnings of the properties included in the P. G.
& E. System for the three years ending 1927, 1928 and 1929,
would be equivalent to about $2.80 a share on the amount
of the stock that would have been outstanding if the purchase
of the Western Power properties had taken effect at the be
ginning of that three-year period.
Those earnings are computed on the basis of the Cali
fornia Railroad Commission classification, and all who are
experienced in these matters know that such classifications
tend to give higher earnings than the ordinary reasonably
conservative, industrial accounting, largely by reason of the
two points mentioned in your hypothetical question, that
the depreciation is calculated on the sinking fund basis, or
on a relatively low basis—in this case, on the sinking fund
basis which tends to give a low charge during the early years
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of the life of the property and the higher charge as the prop
erty approaches maturity. That is a very important factor,
particularly in property that is expanding, and particularly
if the expansion is likely to be checked; because during the
period of expansion, the depreciation charge is bound to be
relatively low, and it is bound to be relatively high as the
new property in the total becomes smaller. The deprecia
tion charge of Pacific Gas & Electric was to my mind dis
tinctly low.
In the second place, the public utility accounting calls for
capitalizing large amounts of administrative expense which
will be equally incurred, whether there are capital expendi
tures in progress or not; but the general rule in industrial
accounting is to capitalize only such administrative expense
as would not have been incurred had the capital expenditure
not been undertaken.
Taking those elements into consideration, I think one may
say that the excess of earnings of $2.80 over a dividend rate
of $2.00 a share, was mainly traceable to those two causes;
and if the accounts were restated on what you may call an
industrial basis, there would be little, if any, margin during
those three years over the $2.00 dividend rate.
In 1930, the reductions of rate had been put into effect,
and quite apart from that, a person of the type managing
the large investing corporation would assume that conditions
in the near future were not likely to be so satisfactory as dur
ing the three years 1927, 1928, and 1929. That was a period
of marked prosperity, which had been definitely broken in
June, 1930.
I do not think that anybody in June, 1930, would have
apprehended the depth of the depression which has since de
veloped; but I think reasonably prudent men would have
foreseen a substantial recession and would have counted upon
reduction in earnings and probably in dividends.
In such circumstances, it seems to me that a vendor trying
to sell a block of this stock would have to be forced to ac
cept a price of $35 a share on which the dividend would be
t
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slightly less than 6 per cent, and might well have had to take
a lower figure.
That, in a broad line, is the basis of my opinion.
Q. I take it, then, that when you give a range of 30 to 35,
you are allowing for various factors here, are you not?
A. Yes. It is a little difficult to explain exactly. I would
like to make my exact position clear. I am trying as best
I can to judge what a person of that type would have been
willing to pay. In doing so, frankly I have taken into ac
count the fact that public utility securities had, I find at that
time, generally, a value higher than, I think, pure reasoning
would have attributed to them; and that is reflected in the
range of prices I have given. It is not an attempt to estimate
what I would consider the fair market value ought to be, but
what I think the fair market value would have been.
Q. I take it that your own opinion as to what the fair
market value ought to have been would be the lower?
A. Somewhat on the lower side.
On cross examination, a great deal of emphasis was placed
by the opposing attorney on the Stock Exchange quotation,
in an attempt to get Mr. May to admit that these quotations
had some value. However, Mr. May insisted that the quota
tions would be a fair index for small blocks of stock, which
could readily be marketed in ordinary course on the Ex
change, and that the difference was essentially one of the re
tail market as distinct from what might be termed the whole
sale market; and that in a block of the size involved the
quoted market price has no appreciable bearing on the actual
fair value. Moreover, he made the point that “the fair
market value is the value that one could expect to realize
in the market in which the sale would have to be effected.”
After certain other witnesses had testified, quoting a Su
preme Court decision in which a definition of fair value is
given as that which a willing buyer would give to a willing
seller, and both parties being equally informed as to the
merits of the property, Mr. May was again put on the stand
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and asked whether in view of this definition the quotations
on the Stock Exchange would have significance, and Mr.
May answered, “Most emphatically not,” and went on to
say:
I think that they represented the fair market value for
small blocks of stock, on the basis of my definition of fair
market value as being the price which might reasonably be
expected to be realized in the market in which the property
would naturally be sold.
On that basis, I think, for small blocks of stock, and except
in very unusual circumstances, the New York Stock Ex
change prices could be regarded as fair market value; and
that is obviously a rule of practical convenience; but if you
once import into the definition of fair market value the as
sumption that the parties to the transaction are both rea
sonably informed, adequately informed as to the value of the
property, then I would say that the New York Stock Ex
change market quotations do not represent a fair market
value under such a definition, but merely a market value,
eliminating the word “fair”; and for this reason: In the first
place, the amount of information available is quite inade
quate to form the basis for a determination of the true value
of securities; the value of a security depends on the future.
Now, some isolated facts in regard to the past are avail
able, and what inferences may be drawn from those facts as
to the future, is purely a question of judgment; and only
those so intimately associated with the operations or with
the business are in a position to form such judgments.
In the second place, a very large percentage of the operat
ors on the New York Stock Exchange do not take advantage
of the information that is available, so that in the large per
centage of the transactions, one, at least, of the parties in the
transaction is not in possession of even such information as
is available.
In the third place, the large amount of operations on the
Stock Exchange are based on market hunches and tips, and
beliefs in what they are going to do—“they” being a mys
terious group of supposed market leaders which may or may
not exist, but whose actual or supposed transactions has a
very large effect on market quotations.
I, of course, in my business, see a great deal of the inside
of large corporations, and it is a very common experience
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with me to find corporation executives concerned with the
prices at which their stocks are selling, knowing that they
cannot be worth those prices; so that on the basis of the
definition of fair market value, which assumes adequate in
formation on the part of both parties to the transaction, I
would say that the New York Stock Exchange transactions do
not conform to that requirement, and are not therefore in
dicative of fair market value.

On cross examination the opposing attorney tried to show
that there was inconsistency in this view with the treatment
given in balance sheets which were certified. The market
value might be different for balance sheet purposes from that
used for income tax purposes, but as regards Stock Exchange
houses they were dealing on the Stock Exchange and that
would logically be their market.
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PART III (Continued)
VALUATION

X
TESTIMONY IN State of Minnesota v. Republic Steel

Corporation

(1934)
Q. Are you familiar with the terms on which businesses
of various kinds are bought and sold?
A. I have seen different plans, arrangements, and various
bases on which businesses have been attempted to be sold,
and I have sat in on the negotiations in a great many cases.
Q. I will ask you to say whether or not you are familiar
with the method of valuation employed by the Minnesota
Tax Commission? *
A. Yes, I have read that several times.
Q. You have been familiar with that method ever since
its adoption?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, Mr. May, from your experience would you say
that the method of valuation so employed by the Minnesota
Tax Commission is such as to produce a figure which fairly
may be regarded as indicative of a price at which an iron
property of Minnesota would sell at a voluntary sale, for
cash, on any particular valuation date?
A. I don’t want to go into detail—but the general method
is one which is quite familiar in the valuation of any par
ticular property, and I think it does afford a guide to what a
buyer would expect or could afford to pay, or a seller could
expect to get for a property.. Of course the factors would
have to be determined carefully.
Q. Are there any exceptions to the method to which you
would like to call attention?
A. You mean to this precise method?
* See Report of the Minnesota Tax Commission (1932), pp. 46-7.
3

4

VALUATION

Q. Yes.
A. Well, as to the precise method, I would like to make
some criticisms and some reservations.
Q. Yes.
A. I think the method is open to criticism in that it at
tributes the whole profit of mining that is anticipated to the
ore, whereas some part of that profit will be required to
provide a return on the working capital employed in operat
ing and some part will be required to provide a return on
the future expenditures necessary for plant and property,
from the time the expenditures are made until the time
when, under the plan, they are to be recovered from opera
tions. That is, I think, a criticism which is proper. I think,
also, it is probably a little defective in the treatment of
taxes, and it won’t, I think, allow adequately for the taxes
which will have to be paid in the future if the same
general method of assessment and the same general meth
ods of taxation procure into the future. I am speaking
now of the taxes for the later period. That might not
be such an important factor because the amount of taxes
which will accrue thirty years hence will be not of such
great present value. As regards the method in general, I
think it can only be used with the reservation that it does
not indicate value unless conditions—the general conditions—
as of the time at which a valuation is being made are sub
stantially similar to the conditions existing during the basic
period on which the valuation is predicated. That is true
of all valuations, of course. Take an extreme example: It
would obviously have been improper to value—let us say the
brewery industry, immediately after the prohibition amend
ment became effective, at the figure which might be shown
to be the valuation based on a five-year period immediately
prior to the coming of prohibition. That is an extreme case,
but I think this same point has a bearing on this particular
case because I do not think that anyone would say that
conditions generally, either on May 1, 1932—which I
understand is the basic date here—or at any time since then
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have been substantially similar to those in the period from
1927 to 1931, the five years immediately prior to May, 1932.
Those are, generally, the questionable things involved, in my
view.
Q. Have you, in connection with the work you have men
tioned, given any special attention to the rate required in
order to attract capital into an industry or make the pur
chase of any particular business attractive?
A. Yes, my firm and I have given particular study to that
kind of business for very many years.
Q. What in your opinion is the proper method of deter
mination of value and rate of return for an investment in
an iron property in Minnesota on May 1, 1932?
A. Well, as I have indicated, if you narrow it to May 1,
1932, I think any sales made on that date would be made
only on a sacrifice basis, so you cannot approach that on the
line you have in mind; but if, as I take it, what you have
in mind is the appropriate rate, assuming restoration of fairly
normal conditions?
Q. Yes.
A. So I can assume a normal and not a sacrificial basis?
Q. Yes, that is true, I used the date of May 1, 1932,
because that is the valuation date involved here,
A. Yes, I just wanted to make myself clear on the basis
of my opinion. I would say, in my opinion, that ten per
cent was a minimum rate.
Q. You think that ten per cent would be necessary in
order to attract capital into the industry?
A. That would be my judgment.
Q. Now, Mr. May, will you tell us upon what you base
that conclusion?
A. Well, it is really based upon my whole experience of
the last thirty-five or forty years. I am not familiar with a
very large number of cases in which sales of iron ore proper
ties have been made, particularly since the depression, which
to my mind has substantially changed our whole industrial
situation—so I cannot speak specifically of iron ore prop-
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erties from recent experience—but my view, and my ex
perience also, is that generally speaking, business men regard
ten per cent as practically the minimum rate for an invest
ment which involves the hazards of business. One would
have to make an exception to that statement in respect to the
period from 1927 to 1929, when, as the Senate Committee
on the investigation of stock exchanges stated in its recent
report, “the whole country was swept by a fever of specula
tion from which not even the financial leaders were im
mune.” Leaving out of consideration a situation like that,
I think that business men would generally regard ten per
cent as the minimum rate of return subject to business haz
ards. Prior to the depression, I think steel men and engineers
in the steel profession, and many others were disposed to
attach higher values to ore property than would be arrived
at on that basis, and in our negotiations which have involved
doing business with the steel business and the banks, I fre
quently observed a tendency on the part of steel men to at
tach greatly exaggerated value to iron property, and, gen
erally, the bankers have discounted considerably the values
attached to the properties. I think the position as to over
rating of ore properties was in part due to over-stressing the
consideration that mining on the Lake Superior Ranges is
comparatively free from what you may call mining hazards,
as compared with other types of mining industry, but hazards
are of at least three general kinds. There are the hazards
incident to production, which in this case are relatively
small.
Q. You refer to those as mining hazards?
A. Yes, that refers to mining hazards. Then hazards in
cidental to the sale and disposition of the product, and then
there are what you might call the general economic and so
cial hazards, the hazards of changes in social policy involving
such questions as regulation, taxation, tariff policies, and
monetary policies. Different businesses are affected to dif
ferent degrees by different classes of hazards, but the sec
ond and third classes are always present.
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In my experience, business men generally discount valua
tions made by engineers—almost invariably. I think that
is true because engineers are apt to consider only the hazards
that they think they can reasonably foresee, and business men
realize that the hazards which they cannot account for and
readily foresee constitute important factors for their con
sideration. Perhaps I could make a little clearer what I am
trying to say by illustrating from specific cases that have
come under my notice.
Mr. Blu. That is perfectly proper.
A. One striking case that I had in mind is that a few
years ago I had to go down to Chile on business and visit
nitrate plants down there. Now, the nitrate rock lies close
to the surface and the available supply can be estimated ac
curately just as I understand you can estimate, with reason
able accuracy, the available ore on the Mesabi Range. For
merly in England the shares of nitrate companies were quite
a popular investment, and in some other countries also.
When I was down in Chile, which was just before the de
pression had started, they were trying to do something to
save the nitrate industry in Chile. Today it is, I should
say, almost ruined. I noticed the other day the bonds of
one of the companies, six per cent bonds of the Lautaro
Nitrate Company, were selling on the New York Stock
Exchange at 10. Now, that ruin was brought about by
two things, broadly. The first thing that affected the indus
try seriously was the steady increase in the export taxes levied
by the Chilean government, which, ultimately, became larger
than all the costs of operation put together. But the more
important thing was that during the war, Germany was
unable to get a supply of nitrate which was essential in the
production of explosives, and was forced to turn its atten
tion to some way of supplying or getting nitrogen out of the
air; and the nitrates produced in that way are practically
ruining the natural Chilean industry.
Q. Have you other similar examples that you can cover
briefly?
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A. Take the radio, that completely ruined the makers
of pianos, pianolas and victrolas, and seriously affected the
whole music industry. The discovery of a process for mak
ing a substitute for silk out of wood pulp had a very serious
effect upon the silk industry. The copper industry has been
very seriously affected, and it is now in a serious condition as
the result of the development of new low-cost supplies partly
in Chile but more particularly in Africa. It is much easier
to conceive of changes in either metallurgical methods, or
monetary conditions, or tariff policies, or things of that kind,
which might seriously affect the steel industry than it was to
conceive that the nitrate industry would be ruined by the
discovery of methods of getting nitrates out of the air, or the
piano industry would be ruined by the discovery of inven
tions such as the radio.
I remember some years ago, in a railroad case, the claim
of some allowance for risk in the return to railroads was met
by the statement that the railroads were a basic industry, or
a basic enterprise, the prosperity of which was essential to the
country; it could never be dispensed with. Certainly, at that
time, no one foresaw the effect of automobiles and aviation
on the condition of the railroads. Those are the sort of
things that I have in mind that every business man knows are
inherent in any business investment. He cannot say pre
cisely what form they are going to take, but he needs some
compensation for that risk in the rate of return which he
uses to compute the value that he can afford to pay for a
property.
Q. And it is considerations of the kind you mentioned
upon which you base your opinion that a ten per cent rate
of return is appropriate in the case of iron ore property?
A. Strictly speaking, I have gone only sb far up to now—
I have covered only the point as to why some considerable
excess over what you may call the safe rate on money is
necessary to induce people to assume business hazards. How
much that excess should be is the next question, which is a
part of the problem that you have to solve before you can
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fix any particular rate. On that point there are some con
siderations that I think are very important. I have given a
lot of thought to the philosophy of the problems of the risk,
the compensation for risk, and that leads me to the conclu
sion, which observation confirms, that the allowance you
have to make for risk is bound to be substantially greater
than what you may call the purely mathematical value of the
risk.
If you take insurance—we all know that for every dollar
we pay for fire insurance, roughly 50 cents is absorbed in
expenses and the profit of the insurance companies, and only
50 cents is necessary to compensate for the purely mathe
matical value of the risk. Now, that sort of consideration
applies when you ask an investor to take a risk. He wants
something more than the mathematical value of the risk.
How much more is something that depends upon a whole
lot of circumstances; but I should say that he usually ex
pects, like the insurance companies, something like twice the
mathematical value of the risk, and that, I think, has always
been so; and I think as our country becomes more settled
arid less of a pioneer country, that consideration will rather
grow in importance. I think it was Mr. Morgan who said,
“The growth of the country corrects all but the worst mis
takes.” It was true in the earlier years, and there were
prospects of results far exceeding a reasonable estimate which
went a long way to offset the prospects of losses. But as you
get further and further from the earlier stages of develop
ment of the country, that consideration tends to lose force.
I think also the whole system of graduated income tax, for
instance, and taxation of capital gains, and things of that
kind have operated in the same direction. I don’t mean I
disapprove of the policies. On the whole, I approve of them,
but they do have that effect; so that I think today you have
got to give substantially more than the mathematical value
of the risk to an investor to assume a hazard. As I say, those
considerations were rather lost sight of, perhaps, in the days
of 1927 and 1928 and 1929. But the depression has brought
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them back to mind with a vengeance, and I don’t think
people are going to ignore them for a good many years to
come. To my mind, the really important effect of the de
pression on industry—I mean upon the value of investments
generally—is not the current operating losses—those have
been very considerable in a number of cases—but I have a
feeling that people have now come to realize that values,
prior to 1929, were exaggerated, and they are going to take a
very much more conservative view as to what they can afford
to pay for property, and be more conservative in the return
that they ask, if they are going to assume new risks.
Q. Is that all you care to say on that subject?
A. I could talk for a long time, and I have tried to give
the general idea.
Q. Can you tell us, in a general way, how you consider
the percentage should be determined which must be added
to the rate on reasonably secured loans to cover the extra
hazards involved in outside investment, say, in a mine in
Minnesota?
A. Well, perhaps I have pretty well covered that in my
answer to the last question. It comes, ultimately, to a ques
tion of judgment and the position we have. But my own
opinion is that in present-day conditions ten per cent is cer
tainly not a high rate. I should hesitate a great deal to
advise any person to buy an iron ore mine on a prospect
of ten per cent return. But I realize an iron ore mine is not
an individual investment in an ordinary way. I would not
advise any client to figure less than ten per cent in deter
mining the price they can afford to pay for iron ore prop
erties.
Q. Mr. May, can you recall any specific cases of mine val
uations which you think are fairly comparable to the pur
chase of an iron ore property on the Mesabi Range?
A. I don’t remember very many actual sales of mines
in my experience that I consider comparable. Curiously
enough, the only two I can think of as reasonably pertinent
happen to be the first I ever had experience with, and the
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last. The first one in which I was actively concerned was
the sale of the copper mine at Copper Cliff, Ontario, to the
International Nickel Company in 1902. That was a cash
purchase. I worked out the yield on the assumed factors
myself and I remember it worked out just about ten per cent,
on the basis of the proven ore, the current price for nickel
and copper, and current cost of production, and, I think, at
the time there were reasonable grounds to expect that the
price could be increased, the cost probably reduced and a
large additional tonnage would be developed. That was an
important consideration in the case, because the life assumed
was not very many years, so that if additional tonnage were
developed and brought in it would have a considerable
present value.
Q. How did those matters turn out in that immediate
case, Mr. May?
A. All three were realized—the International Nickel got
a very handsome thing out of the investment, although, in
cidentally, I remember that the vendors thought they had
gotten an extremely good price for their property. That was
a case where everybody was satisfied.
The other one is the experience I had in connection with
the Kreuger interests. One of the estates of the Kreuger
group had a large interest in the Boliden gold mine in
Sweden. Our committee made an effort to get the Swedish
government to buy that mine at a generous price as a sort
of relief to the foreign investors who suffered so badly. The
government undertook to give the matter consideration and
appointed a commission. The liquidators appointed experts
to examine the mine. They made a report and gave a valu
ation based, as I recall, on the current price of gold, the
estimation that costs in the future would tend to increase
by about ten per cent which they allowed, and that the
proven ore could be mined out over a period of fifteen years;
applying a discount factor of six per cent, they arrived at
certain figures, and the liquidators offered an option on the
mine at that price to the government commission. The
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chairman of the commission took the view that the offer
indicated that the liquidators had no real desire to sell.
The matter came before our committee and I found that the
two bankers who were associated with me—Mr. Hugh Kind
ersley of London and Mr. Wallenberg, a Swedish banker—
both agreed that if we could get a purchaser who would
accept the experts’ conclusion, except for the substitution
of ten per cent for six per cent, it would be a very advan
tageous arrangement for everybody to effect the sale; and
since I returned from Sweden I have learned that a sale has
been effected on substantially that basis.
Q. How recently is that?
A. Within the last month.
Q. Mr. May, is ten per cent higher or lower than the rate
you would normally use in the case of an industrial prop
erty?
A. Lower, unquestionably. As a matter of fact, in this
same Kreuger matter, I was asked to value a large number
of manufacturing properties of the group in various coun
tries including the United States and countries like Sweden,
Norway, and Denmark, where conditions as to investment
are fairly comparable to the United States, as well as other
countries where conditions may be different, like Czecho
slovakia and Hungary, where values are definitely more
speculative. But in the valuations which I am making I
am not using any rate lower than twelve and a half per cent,
and after consultation with the other members of the com
mittee I find that they share my views.
Q. You are familiar, I take it, with what is generally
known as the analytical appraisal method in arriving at the
valuation of iron ore and other properties?
A. Yes. That is the method that is in general outlined
in the commission’s report.
Q. Would you consider this ten per cent rate that you
mentioned appropriate to use in the computation of the
present worth of profits estimated to be derived from an
iron mine in Minnesota?
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A. That would depend to some extent on the way in
which the factors in the calculation were determined. If the
factors were chosen allowing for all reasonably probable con
tingencies but not making any special discounts for unfore
seen hazards and that sort of thing, I should say that ten
per cent would generally be, perhaps, about the sort of rate,
the minimum rate, but before I expressed a conclusion on a
specific problem I would want to examine the factors in some
detail myself.
Q. Now, you have not heard the testimony that has been
given here or all the assumptions that have been made by
expert engineers. I might tell you that in computing pres
ent worth in this case an exhaustion period of forty years
from May 1, 1932, has been used for iron ore properties on
the Mesabi Range.
A. That is an engineering question on which I would
have no opinion.
Q. Another assumption that has been made is an as
sumed selling price for iron ore based upon the average
Lower Lakes price of iron ore for a statistical period from
1927 to 1931, both years inclusive; what would you say as
to that assumption?
A. That seems to me to raise perhaps two points; the first
is whether the five-year average is a fair basis; it is not an
unfair method in general and would be applicable, I should
say, and be as good a guide as you could get if you are
basing your assumption on the resumption of normal con
ditions, as I said before. The other question is as to whether
the Lake Erie price is a proper figure to take, and no doubt
there may be a question raised on that on the ground that a
large, the larger part, by far, of the tonnage is what you may
call consumer-owned, and therefore the Lake Erie price is
not exactly the same as a price in a market in which the con
sumer and the vendor are unrelated; that question might
arise—I am not an expert on the steel industry—that is, the
tonnage and sales of the steel industry; all I can say on that
is that Lake Erie prices have always been used as the basis of
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valuations that has been employed in merger negotiations
and that kind of thing, and I think in the past they were
accepted by all the parties concerned even though the dif
ferent parties had unbalanced ore positions. But, of course,
few of those mergers went through in their original form,
and in no case were any final prices determined on the basis
of specific valuations of the ore property. Where anything
went through it was the result of a horse trade so that the
only bearing, I suppose, that it has is that they had chosen
that basis, and that they used that as a suitable starting point
even though they had unbalanced positions.
Q. Another assumption that was made here was mining
costs based on this same statistical period.
A. Well, if you assume the sales price within that period,
it is almost inevitable that you assume the costs unless you
have some definite reason for assuming or foreseeing some
change in the costs, because the spread is probably as good a
guide as your sales of ores, that is, as to cost.
Q. If the factors I have mentioned are assumed, would
you consider the rate of discount or rate of return you men
tioned appropriate to apply to the computation of present
worth of the future income from these iron ore properties
in Minnesota?
A. I should think it was appropriate, yes, an appropriate
rate to use for such a purpose.
Q. Mr. May, you are familiar with the so-called Hoskold
formula?
A. Yes.
Q. In applying that formula to the computation of the
present worth of income from iron ore properties here, what
have you to say about the rate of discount to cover the risk
and the rate the sinking fund accumulation should bear?
A. Well, I think engineers generally have used a some
what lower rate of return; in fact, sometimes a considerably
lower rate of return than the ten per cent that I have men
tioned, and have included with it a sinking fund at a rate
assumed for a safe reinvestment of, say, four per cent. I
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would say that certainly if you used a return rate of less than
ten per cent you would have to couple it with a reinvestment
sinking fund rate at a substantially lower figure in order to
get at a basis that would be at all attractive to the average
investor, or to a likely purchaser.
Q. If a ten per cent risk rate or an eight per cent risk rate
were used, what would you consider the appropriate rate
for the sinking fund?
A. Well, if an eight per cent rate be used, the common
thing, I think, and the one being very frequently used by
the treasury, I think, is eight and four. In fact, I think
four per cent is almost invariably used as a sinking fund rate
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, according to my experi
ence.
Q. Would you think, then, that a ten-four combination
or an eight-four combination would be appropriate to use in
discounting the present worth of profits on these iron ore
properties?
A. Well, if I were making a recommendation I might not
insist on the four per cent if the return rate were as high
as ten, but if it were less than ten I should certainly expect
the sinking fund rate to be coupled with it. As a matter of
fact, I think in theory the sinking fund method is perfectly
sound; but—well, in a tax case in which I was interested
one of the Circuit Courts of Appeals, in deciding that a
method of computing of tax including the result of algebra
was not intended by Congress, said that algebra is not lightly
to be imputed to legislators, and I think in the same way
higher mathematics is not lightly to be imputed to business
men. They take calculations from the engineers and ex
perts in whom they have confidence on the basis that those
men consider sound in principle, and then they apply to
them pragmatic tests to see how it is going to work out to
them, and that is what they base their final conclusions on.
I think that is the actual machinery of it. As a rule, they
reach a lower valuation by that method almost invariably.
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Q. I did not understand the last part of your statement;
what did you say?
A. As a rule they reach a lower valuation as the result on
that.
Q. Who reach lower values?
A. The investors.
Q. That is all, Mr. May; you may cross examine, Mr.
Ryan.
CROSS EXAMINATION

By Mr. Ryan:

Q. Mr. May, do these hazard factors which you speak of
always work one way?
A. No, they don’t.
Q. Do you make any allowance for the possibility that
conditions, general economic and social conditions, may im
prove?
A. Well, I think that carries one off into another some
what philosophic angle of the question. If you want me to
discuss it I will be glad to. That is, the benefit that an in
vestor derives if results are better than his expectation are
not so valuable to him as the injury to him if the results
fall short of his expectation. That is a phase of the question
of the diminishing value of wealth. At every stage, as you
grow more prosperous, each accretion to your prosperity is
of comparatively less value than the amount you had before,
so the accretions, the prospect of accretions from the invest
ment standpoint, are not an offset to the prospects of de
crease or falling off. That, of course, is accentuated very
much by the system of graduated income taxes and taxation
of capital gains, particularly from the standpoint of the large
investor. You take the large investor, which is the one
question—you really have two problems in this question, as
I see it. You can consider the large investment, that is one
problem, the large investor. If results are more favorable
than he anticipates, the excess profits, the higher profits are
.taxed at a continually growing rate and capital gains are
taxed without corresponding relief in the case that he has
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capital losses, so that he does not consider that a prospect of
the return being more favorable offsets with him the pros
pect of the results never being attained by an equal amount.
Of course, if you take the small investor and assume a
distribution of your investment so that the risk is spread, you
have a somewhat different problem. There the risk element
is not quite the same, is not so pronounced as it is in the
case of the large investor, but then you come to the high
cost of distribution, which applies not only to commodities
but to securities, so if you try to finance a purchase by dis
tribution among small investors what you save in the risk
element you lose on the higher cost of distribution. That is
the philosophy of it, as I see it.
Q. Your answer has had a relationship to the risk factor
as between gain and loss; as applied to an individual, stated
in dollars, would the same answer be true?
A. No. I would say that the social hazards are distinctly
in the direction of reduced profits, and the social hazards are
more likely—changes in social conditions, broadly speakingare more likely to reduce profits than to increase them. I
think that is true.
Q. Well, the answer is that in your judgment social and
economic changes are likely, more likely to reduce profits
over those you assume than they are to increase profits over
those that you estimate?
A. I think that is particularly true, particularly in what
you may call basic industries.
Q. And why is that?
A. Well, because the tendency is almost constantly toward
increasing taxation; the public spends, and the burden of
taxation is increasing, and also when you get into the basic
industries you are faced with problems of regulation and
additional taxation the moment you begin to show increase
of profit, without any corresponding expectation of relief
if your profits fall off. The more essential an industry is to
the life of the nation the less chance there is of substantial
increase of profit as a cyclical trend, I would say.
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Q. In other words, in the broad, general proposition, it
is your belief that the tendency in the future is that profits
of large industries will be reduced rather than increased?
A. I think that is the general trend one must expect.
Especially in basic industries, I would add to that.
Q. Doesn’t that lead to the view that the expected return
on invested capital will also tend to decrease?
A. Not necessarily, I think. It may to some extent, but
I think that newer enterprises will be more profitable, and
that is where the opportunities for investment will be. And
you are indulging in rather general speculation, but I look
for the movement of capital, of intelligent capital out of the
more basic, what would be regarded as the more basic, in
dustries into the newer industries. That is the trend of in
vestment, I would say.
Q. Capital will go looking for these hazards, will it?
A. What?
Q. Capital will go looking for these hazards, will it?
A. No. It will rather choose to go where the prospects
of gain will offset the hazards that attach to all business.
Q. To what?
A. To all business.
Q. Would you not say that, generally speaking, the new
business, as you describe it, was more speculative and more
hazardous than an established, settled business or a business
with extensive operations behind it?
A. Well, the course of the value of business is something
like the life of man, I think. In the early days it is haz
ardous, and then it comes to the prime of life, and then it
passes out into an older age, and what investment seeks are
industries in the prime of life.
Q. Is that true of basic industries?
• A. Well, I think in industries there is nothing that is
permanently basic, but we come to regard them as basic.
Q. Well, you say that there is no basic industry. You
spoke of the hazards which should be taken up in your ten
per cent return as a hazard incident to sale of the com-
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modity in which your capital is embarked. May not that
hazard work as well in favor of the owner as against him?
A. You mean in the case of the steel industry?
Q. No, generally, I am speaking now, and ask for your
answer in dollars, not the relative value of a dollar to a man
who has a million and the man who is out on the street beg
ging—the dollar?
A. Well, that is a thing that you could not generalize on.
I mean, you would have to consider each industry on its
merits, I would say, in that case.
Q. Well, I understood that generally you calculate these
hazards, and generally in dealing with all business, and that
generally you regard one of those elements of hazards that is
incident to the sale of your product; isn’t that right?
A. Yes, that you may lose your market.
Q. What?
A. The hazard that you may lose your market through
one cause or another.
Q. Yes. Is not a hazard incident to sale, isn’t it likewise
true that there is some likelihood, at least, of an unexpected
gain through increase of prices?
A. Theoretically it exists, but certainly in the steel in
dustry I should think that the probabilities are rather the
other way.
Q. I am talking generally now without reference to the
steel industry.
A. That is a fairly large question. Of course, you cannot
say that any particular rate is generally appropriate without
stating the facts of the particular situation, but if I might put
it in sort of legal terms, I think the average business man
thinks that the burden of proof is heavily on anybody that
undertakes to convince him that he should make an invest
ment on less than a ten per cent return.
Q. Oh, no, no. We are examining into that ten per cent
return; we want to find what it is made up of. It is made up,
as I understood you to say, of these hazards, and the hazards
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are all, in the implication at least, against the investor; now,
is that true?
A. That is not the point. I do not think that to be ac
curate. What influences the decision is not the actual prob
ability as to the hazards, but what the contemplating in
vestor thinks the hazards are going to be. Value is largely
a matter of psychology of the purchaser.
Q. There you are taking one end of the problem exactly
as you do on these hazards. Doesn’t what the seller thinks
have something to do with the transaction?
A. Maybe.
Q. So that the psychology has to include the psychology
of both buyer and seller?
A. Yes, that is true.
Q. And the seller does not think of any of these factors,
does he, of hazard?
A. I think he does, yes. He probably thinks of them
somewhat differently.
Q. He thinks of them from quite an opposite viewpoint?
A. Yes, maybe; to some extent undoubtedly, yes.
Q. If we go off this method of determining values and
steel in psychology we have got to get in to the seller as well
as the buyer?
A. Well, the real problem in industry is to find a buyer.
Q. Is that true with the enormous amount of money seek
ing investment as there is today?
A. Yes, it is true today, distinctly true, today.
Q. It is true?
A. I think capital is less disposed to assume hazards at this
precise moment than it has been for a long time. When I
say “a long time” I mean the period from 1929 down to date.
Business is very reluctant to assume hazards.
Q. Well, business is reluctant to assume hazards?
A. What?
Q. Business is reluctant to assume hazards?
A. Capital. Capital is the word. I say, capital seeking
investment. Capital is reluctant to assume hazards; that is
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why there is so much surplus capital in the country that is
not being employed.
Q. That is due to the existing depression when people
figure there is nothing in sight; isn’t that correct?
A. Yes, they think the future holds more hazards in sight
than it did, we will say, ten years ago.
Q. Will not the state be reached, just how soon nobody
knows, at which this capital now idle in enormous quantities
will seek investment?
A. Yes, it is bound to find some sort of investment ul
timately.
Q. And isn’t this broad proposition true, that doesn’t the
condition of depression and the large amount of idle capital
tend to reduce the returns which an investor can get on his
capital?
A. That may be true on safe investments.
Q. Well, broadly, over any investment?
A. It is curious, but if you take the period of depression
you will find that the spread between the safe return and the
speculative return widens.
Q. Yes, but the safe investment, the absolutely safe in
vestment—
A. Of course, there is no absolutely safe investment.
Q. But between that and the speculative investment there
is competition in some degree?
A. Not always.
Q. In some degree?
A. In some degree.
Q. Not always, but you say there is an increasing spread
due to various factors?
A. Yes.
Q. But they are all dollars, and all dollars are in com
petition so far as investment goes?
A. Well, they are not necessarily in dollars.
Q. What?
A. You mean in the United States?
Q. Yes.
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A. This money that is seeking it is all dollars, yes.
Q. Now, does the relationship of consumer-ownership
have any effect upon the hazards incident to the sale of the
product involved in the particular transaction?
A. I think that takes us off. You can see each one of these
questions would form the starting point for a half hour’s
talk, I think, really, and I do not want to carry the point
too far.
Q. I would suggest that we are talking in generalities all
the way through here, and may we not have a general answer
as to this tendency?
A. Well, I think myself that that brings in another ques
tion to which I have given very considerable thought. I
think the result of this depression is going to be a reversal of
the trend toward integration. I think that this consumer
ownership idea is pretty well demonstrated—I won’t say
“demonstrated,” but I think there is a strong feeling coming
that it has been proved to be fallacious and an unwise policy.
As a matter of fact, I think the length and severity of the
depression is partly due to integration of industry. On this
question,—I do not know whether you want me to follow
it any further or not. I want to answer your question, but
I do not want to start a philosophical discussion,—well, what
is your question?
Q. The question was: Does the relationship of consumer
ownership tend to decrease the risk factor involved in mak
ing sales of the product involved?
A. I don’t think so. To state the thing broadly, I think
the steel companies would be better off if they did not own
the ore properties, and had relatively less investment.
Q. Would a separate corporate ownership, the ones own
ing the mines, be better off if they were divorced from the
consuming steel company?.
A. I do not think so.
Q. Then I take it that the summary is that there is an
element of risk as to price calculated by you as a hazard
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which is not reduced when the buyer of the product has a
fixed, complete market for his product?
A. May I hear that question again?
[Question read.]
A. I didn’t make any specific calculation of hazards, and
I assumed that the whole problem was one of valuation of
property without relationship to its ownership. I didn’t at
tempt to go into the effect on the value of property of its
being owned by “A” rather than “B.”
Q. That is the way we want it gone into.
A. What?
Q. Since we mixed theory with condition, I would sug
gest that we mix them at that point, too.
A. Would you like me to discuss that?
Q. Yes, as to whether or not, generally speaking, where
the relationship of consumer-ownership exists, does not that
fact broadly and generally tend to reduce or limit, reduce
the price hazard in respect to that property?
A. Well, in that case the price hazard is transferred to his
ultimate product. I think the basic thing about the iron
ore industry today is that it is the raw material of a relatively
unprosperous industry.
Q. Mr. May, you say that the steel industry is a relatively
unprosperous industry; do you know about what the rate of
return on capital in the industry is?
A. Well, I base that statement partly on general knowl
edge and partly on some figures that came to my attention
recently as a director of the National Bureau of Economic
Research. Some years ago we induced the Department of
Commerce to accept the view that it was very desirable to get
some figures on profits of industry, and the Department of
Commerce took on its staff Professor Epstein and arranged
for him to have access to the income tax returns and he got
out a lot of figures for a fairly representative sample which
were published as what he called a source book, and from
that material he is preparing a book, and the manuscript was
submitted to the directors of the National Bureau of Eco-
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nomic Research in accordance with the requirements of
that Bureau that every manuscript shall be submitted to the
directors before publication, and, as I recall, his figures cover
a period of 1924 to 1928. During that period the average
earnings of, I think it was 2,046 companies, manufacturing
companies, which represented, as he said, nearly 50 per
cent of the total business of the country in manufacturing,
and those figures showed an average for the five years, 1924
to 1928, on capitalization, including bonded capitalization
and the profits earned before interest, of approximately 10.2
per cent. For the same five years, by way of comparison,
I think the United States Steel Corporation, for instance,
showed an average of somewhere about 7 per cent.
Q. Do you know whether or not those averages would
depart from that appreciably if they were for the period
1920 to 1931, inclusive?
A. I have not got any figures covering the later period,
but my impression is from such figures as were available—
for instance, the National City Bank gets out some figures
which are not strictly comparable to these, for, I think, about
1,300 companies, something of that sort, and their profits,
after interest charges (which makes it not comparable to the
earlier ones); and as I recall it those figures were for 1929,
1930, and 1931, and the relation of the Steel Corporation to
the total of the group was less favorable than for the period
from 1924 to 1928.
Q. Was that true of the other groups?
A. I said the relation. Of course, 1929 was no doubt
better than 1928, and 1930 and 1931 were less favorable than
the average of the five years, but the point I was making is
that the Steel Corporation figures fell off in comparison with
the previous period to a greater extent than the other in
dustries.
Q. I see. Did that change of relationship, in your judg
ment, make such difference? Did that change which you say
for the years 1929, 1930, and 1931 make enough difference
to discredit this figure which I quote from the magazine Steel
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to the effect that, “The weighted average 1920 to 1931 net
profit on invested capital of the United States Steel Corpora
tion was 5.16 per cent.”
Mr. Blu. 5.16?
Mr. Ryan. 5.16.
Mr. Hartley. What years?
Mr. Ryan. 1920 to 1931, inclusive.
A. Well, that comparison is a little bit difficult to make.
I may not understand a part of the difference. I know a
good deal about the Steel Corporation naturally, being the
auditor, and in the calculation which I made the Steel Cor
poration gradually and some time in 1928 wrote off excessive
capitalization, or whatever you may care to call it, in an
amount of $508,000,000. Now, I should imagine that the
Steel magazine figures are before making an adjustment
for that $508,000,000, whereas that capitalization of the Steel
Corporation now being reduced by that $508,000,000, I am
making my calculations on the reduced capitalization.
The Court. Will you read the question, Mr. Re
porter?
The Witness. Perhaps I could restate it, if Your
Honor would like, a little clearer. It is probably not so
clear as it should be.
[Answer read.]
Q. What, in your judgment,—
Mr. Hartley. Has the witness finished his answer?
He seems to be looking at some paper.
The Witness. If Your Honor would like to see the
figure I am referring to, it shows up in the annual re
port.
The Court. If it is important it will probably be in
troduced in evidence.
Q. What I wanted to get at, Mr. May, was—in answer to
this question you stated that the steel industry was an in
dustry, as a whole, with a relatively low rate of return and I
asked what figure you were using to express its rate of return.
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A. Well, you asked me to explain the difference between
the two figures.
Q. Yes, this is another question.
Mr. Blu. Just read it to him, Mr. La Baw, please.
[Question read.]
A. The first figure I had.in mind was that 7 per cent for
the steel industry, as illustrated by the Steel Corporation,
was relatively low.
Q. The figure that you have mentioned as being rela
tively low is 7 per cent?
A. Yes, under normal conditions.
Q. Yes.
A. I don’t mean under depression conditions. We have
always got to be clear, I think, whether we are talking about
today’s conditions or normal conditions.
Mr. Blu. Is that for the period you stated, Mr. May?
The Witness. The 7 per cent is what you might call
fairly normal, perhaps a little high, for the period from
1924 to 1928. It leaves out the recent peak of 1929 and
leaves out the depression years.
Q. And the rate to be arrived at varies with whether or
not you let the statement of capitalization stand at one figure
or whether you write it off and use another figure?
A. Yes. Oh, of course it does.
Q. On what theory or basis was this $508,000,000, if that
is the figure,—
The Court. That is right, Mr. Ryan.
Q. $508,000,000 written off?
A. Well, the report describes it in these words: “From
this surplus there has been appropriated to amortize costs to
the United States Steel Corporation of stocks of subsidiary
companies in excess of their investment in tangible prop
erty.”
Mr. Blu. What report, Mr. May?
The Witness. Well, this is in any report. I have
before me the report for December, 1931, page 20.
Mr. Blu. Of the United States Steel Corporation?
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The Witness. Of the United States Steel Corpora
tion.
Q. What does that mean in language that is understand
able to a person like me, for instance?
A. Well, I think probably it is intelligible to you as it
stands, but what it really means is that the Steel Corporation
paid more for the subsidiaries than the value of the tangible
property those subsidiaries had, and until these entries had
been made, that excess was a part of the capitalization of the
Steel Corporation. They have now eliminated that amount
from their capitalization so that their capitalization now is
based on tangible assets of the corporation without any ad
dition for the excess price paid by the Steel Corporation for
the stocks of the subsidiary companies, shares of the subsidi
ary companies which represent those assets.
Q. Does that report indicate that they have now written
off all those excess values?
A. The language implies that.
The Court. What did it leave the capitalization of
the United States Steel Corporation at the present time,
Mr. May?
The Witness. You mean the total invested capital?
The Court. What they carry.
The Witness. When I say “invested capital,” it is,
of course, the capital stock, the bonds and the surplus.
That amounts now, I think, to,—I can tell you, some
thing over two billion dollars.
The Court. What is the capital stock?
The Witness. The capital stock is $868,000,000 of
common and $360,000,000 of preferred, as I recall.
Mr. Ryan. I want to say I have not had an oppor
tunity to look at this but I have no doubt counsel will
be willing to have the report in evidence.
Mr. Blu. Yes.
Mr. Ryan. Then we will offer that in evidence.
Mr. Blu. You mean the whole report in evidence?
Mr. Ryan. Yes.
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Mr. Blu. I thought you meant that statement that
he was testifying about. I do not think that whole
report of the United States Steel Corporation for any
year, Your Honor, bears on the value of iron ore prop
erty in Minnesota on May 1, 1932.
Mr. Ryan. Of course, I would not want to make it
a part of the record that subsequently would have to be
printed, but I would like to offer it in evidence, with
the view and privilege of referring to any part of it that
might be material and having the Court, in a sense,
take judicial notice of it.
Mr. Blu. Well, I don’t believe that is something the
Court would take judicial notice of.
Mr. Ryan. It will not take judicial notice of it, but
I suggest, to avoid encumbering the record, that it be
admitted in evidence for counsel on either side to refer
to any part of it which they may deem relevant to the
issues in this case.
Mr. Blu. We want to object to that, Your Honor.
We have no objection to cross examination of this wit
ness on the part of the report that is brought out here
on cross examination. Counsel can develop anything
further along the line he is talking about without having
that whole report in evidence.
The Court. The evidence of the witness, and other
witnesses have been produced for the same purpose, has
gone along the line of profit to be made on investment.
I suppose in cross examination anything in the report
that bears on that question may be put in evidence.
Mr. Blu. Well, what part of the report do you think
is material?
Mr. Ryan. I don’t know.
Mr. Blu. I think it should be developed by cross
examination.
Mr. Ryan. I am offering it with a view that we may
refer to any part of it which may seem to us to be
material, with the like privilege on your part.
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The Court. Well, of course, without knowing what
is in the document, if the whole exhibit were received
some of it might not be pertinent to any point in the
case.
Mr. Blu. That is my point.
The Court. I take it you may go through it. later,
Mr. Ryan, when you have time, and re-offer the part
that you wish to have introduced.
Mr. Ryan. That is perfectly satisfactory. The point
is we cannot stop now and go through this report.
The Court. No; the offer may be made later when
you are advised as to what part you want to offer.
Q. Do you know at what rate of interest the steel in
dustry, as represented by the companies of the steel industry,
can borrow money in normal times?
A. No, I could not answer that question. I do not think,
generally speaking, that steel companies are current bor
rowers. They make bond issues from time to time. They
are not currently in the borrowing market.
Q. Do you regard selling and issuing bonds as borrowing
money?
A. Yes, but those are special transactions; we should as
semble the transactions and try to get an average on it. I
could not offhand give an answer to the question.
Q. Could you give us a percentage rate which would
fairly indicate the rate at which the United States Steel Com
pany can borrow money through the sale of bonds?
A. I don’t think the United States Steel Corporation has
sold any bonds for a long, long time.
Q. Have they paid off bonds recently?
A. They have paid off bonds, yes.
Q. Do you know what rate of interest those bonds bore?
A. I think most of them were 5 per cent bonds, but I
don’t think most of them were sold. They were issued
originally as a part of the consideration, a great part of
them, I believe.
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Q. Do you know whether or not any of the steel com
panies have recently issued bonds or paid off bonds?
A. I do not recall any specific figures at the moment.
Q. Is it your impression that all of the bonds which have
been paid for by the steel companies represent bonds issued
in purchase of property?
A. Not all of them, perhaps. I think, as I remember,
there was an issue of bonds by the Steel Corporation early in
its career, about 1903 or ’04, something of that sort, but I
don’t recall. I would not undertake to say, without refresh
ing my memory, what happened.
Q. How long have you been auditor for the United
States Steel Corporation?
A. Ever since it was formed.
Q. From your knowledge of the affairs of that company
can you express an opinion at what rate the company can
borrow money?
A. I would not undertake to express an opinion without
giving serious thought to it. It depends to some extent on
the amount of money. I mean, if they wanted to borrow,
say, up to half their investment in the property, that would
be one rate; if they wanted to borrow up to 25 per cent that
would be another rate; if they wanted to borrow up to 75 per
cent that would be another, if they could do it at all.
Q. You haven’t an opinion as to what any of those rates
would be?
A. I would not offhand say.
Mr. Blu. Do you mean at the present time, Mr.
Ryan, or what period?
Mr. Ryan. Any time.
Mr. Blu. Any time back to 1902?
Mr. Ryan. Any time in normal conditions.
The Witness. That involves too many uncertainties
for me to express an opinion.
Q. I have assumed that a problem of that kind involved
a great many uncertainties. Any values you might put on an
ore body would involve a great many uncertainties.
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A. You asked me how much,—at what rate the corpora
tion could borrow, without any indication as to time or
amount or terms, the length of the loan or anything. That
is entirely a speculative proposition.
Q. I suggest you supply your own qualifications and give
us figures with any qualifications you choose to add to them.
A. For instance, if I say that the Steel Corporation might
have borrowed money in 1924, we will say, you get a dif
ferent factor in ’24; and ’29 and ’34, you get quite different
factors.
Q. Let us say normal?
A. What is normal?
Q. What forms the basis for the calculation which you
have in mind, just individual judgment?
A. No; my judgment as to how investors feel about these
things, and what they know. It isn’t an attempt to deter
mine what investors ought to think; but what I think is the
practical problem of inducing an investor to invest.

Q. You assume, I take it, you expect an investor will
want a rate of return,—the investor in an iron mine will
want a rate of return reflected in a 10 and 4 combination
of interest, meaning a 10 per cent return on his investment
after the payment of all forms of taxes, including his income
tax; is that right?
A. I didn’t say a 10 and 4, if I remember rightly. I said
if you used a rate lower than 10 you would put a sinking
fund, you would combine a sinking fund method with it.
I am just correcting the statement of my position, in your
question, in that answer. I said, if you went below 10, for
instance to 8 per cent—if an investor considered 8 per cent
he would want a sinking fund tacked onto it. But I said
if you got 10 or over you might get him to take it on a
straight basis.
Q. A straight rate of 10 per cent?
A. Yes, without the sinking fund, which you get up to
that.
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Q. Isn’t it a fact that your sinking fund—don’t you in that
calculation increase your rate of return as compared with
any rate lower than the one you used for a sinking fund?
A. I did not contemplate a sinking fund in connection
with the 10 per cent at all.
Q. You just took it Straight 10 per cent return?
A. Straight 10 per cent return; but if you went below
10, then I would say at least you would have to give the
investor the benefit of the sinking fund accompanied with
any lower rate; for instance, I said 8 and 4; that is the rate
that the Bureau of Internal Revenue uses.
Q. Which would give you the higher rate of return on
your investment, a straight 10 or a 10 and 4?
The Court (Judge Freeman). Eight and four?
Mr. Ryan. No; a straight 10 or a 10 and 4.
A. If all your expectations worked out, 10 and 4 would
give you the higher rate. You would get more money out
of it in the end that way.
Q. The sinking fund factor is a charge against the in
vestor, isn’t it?
A. What?
Q. The sinking fund factor is a charge against the in
vestor, isn’t it?
A. Yes, but the straight 10 per cent method implies a
charge against the investor, 10 per cent on what he is getting
back.
Q. You mean 10 and 10?
A. Ten and ten.
Q. Using the same term?
A. Yes.
Q. In that computation there?
A. Yes.
Q. You say reduced; you would not reduce correspond
ingly the two rates if you want, say, an 8 per cent investment
return; you would not think an 8 per cent sinking fund rate
would be proper?
A. As I say, I think the investor takes a more pragmatic
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and simple view of the situation than that. Let me illus
trate that. Perhaps this will illustrate it. This is the way
I visualize the investor looking at it. Let’s suppose a simple
case that is fairly analogous to this case, reduced to simpler
terms rather than complicated figures. Suppose the investor
were asked to buy a mine that was supposed to contain 40
million tons that could be mined a million tons a year, with
a dollar a ton profit; that makes it a nice simple calculation.
Now an engineer recommends that, we will say, as a good
purchase, on a straight 8 per cent basis, 8 and 8 as you call it.
That means he would ask him to pay $11,921,000 for that
property. The way the business man looks at it is, “Well,
how am I going to get that investment back?. On an 8 per
cent basis, if the mine were to last forever it would be worth
only $12,500,000. So all you are going to give me towards
getting back my capital at that amount in addition to the 8
per cent return is 8 per cent on $579,000 a year.” Now, that
isn’t good enough. That is really the way they do things.
That is the way the Internal Revenue Bureau figures it. I
got this wrong, I think, perhaps. I have got some tables
here that I worked out that will show it. Here is one
worked on the 7½ per cent basis, which is what I under
stand usually the State Tax Commission has used on the
40-year life. That gives a cost of roughly $12,450,000. Now,
if that is going to be mined with equal tonnage, the 40
millions, that represents 31 cents a ton. So that the first
year the man gets a million dollars. He gets a million
dollars; he sets aside $328,000. The way it is computed
for depletion on the straight loan basis he carries $671,000
to his income account; that gives him an immediate profit
of 5.57 per tent. That is the way it works out in practice.
The way the investor looks at it is that it isn’t until 20 years
have elapsed that he has got an average rate of 8 per cent
on the money that he has had invested in the property.
Now, investors take a view of investments something like
that the insurance companies take of lives. You can foresee
something for the future, but the farther ahead you attempt
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to see, the less clearly can you anticipate what is going to
happen. Therefore, what sways the investor largely is the
amount he is going to get in the first few years. Certainly in
the case of a 40-year life what he is going to get in the first
20 years of the life is the thing that is vitally important to
him.
Q. That would be the dominating thought of the ordi
nary investor, the mythical investor?
A. I just take that because that is the way the Internal
Revenue Bureau figures his income, and through that that
has become a very customary way of looking at it.
Q. Suppose this mythical investor, bringing it down some
what nearer to earth—supposing the mythical investor has
an enormous investment in steel plant, the value of which
would wholly disappear if his mines were exhausted: Would
the factor of extended future realization of his return weigh
against his disposition to acquire a property with long life?
A. Well, I should say that is perhaps the most important
result of the depression, that the delusion which lies at the
basis of your question has been shattered. This idea of the
necessity of manufacturing companies’ owning their own re
serves of raw materials for indefinite periods in the future
is what has made a great many industries unprosperous and
they are now, I think—I don’t refer solely to the steel in
dustry-recognizing the folly of it and trying to get them
selves out of a position where they are what we used to call
“land poor.”
Q. Am I right in saying that that conjecture is based
upon the theory that reserves which carry longer than ap
proximately 40 years in the future are of no value and
should not be bought?
A. Well,. I think corporations largely are coming to
realize that the attempt to supply their needs even for 40
years in the future is a mistaken policy, that they would be
better off to have reasonably short reserves and rely on the
general market, because what they save on carrying the in-
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vestment in those properties would compensate them for any
likely rises in prices.
Q. But your answer in that respect is influenced by your
judgment that the past policies of the steel owners has been
a mistaken one?
A. Oh, no, I wouldn’t assume that far. It is based on my
reading of the trend of opinion, not only in the steel in
dustry but in other industries. I think there is no doubt—I
don’t mean only business men—but we have discussed this
in purely academic discussions with the National Bureau of
Economic Research, and there is a very interesting publica
tion by Dr. Mills of the staff of that organization in which he
expressed the opinion that one of the main contributing
factors, or one of the important contributing factors, I should
say, to the severity and the length of the present depression
was that through this system of integration and labor-saving
machinery so large a part of the cost of goods had come to
be represented by money that was already spent anyhow. So
that people were willing to sell at uneconomic prices if they
could get back their new costs plus something towards the
money they had already spent; and that, I think, as a result
of all the discussions with the economists and others that I
had, is one of the central facts of the present situation; and
I think it has brought about a general reconsideration of this
whole policy of large reserve for indefinite periods in the
future and the attempt to keep anybody else from owning
potential sources of raw material and all that sort of thing,
and it is not limited to the steel industry.
Q. In part, at any rate, your views as they bear upon this
case are influenced by your belief that the practice in the
future, at least, will be different from what it has been in
the past as respects the acquisition of ore reserves?
A. Yes, with the addition that my belief is based, not just
on a process of reasoning, but based on knowledge of the
trend of thought which I get in my business and other con
tacts.
Q. It is true, is it not, that considering what the buyer
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would pay and the seller would sell for—mythical people—
that there is more or less of a problem to find buyers—that
the pressure is to sell rather than to buy—is that right?
A. Yes. Selling is regarded as the difficult end of the
job, usually.
Q. Doesn’t that relative position between buyer and seller
change from time to time?
A. You mean in regard to the usual property invest
ments? Of course, it changes to some extent, but a buyer’s
market, broadly speaking, in commodities, is more common.
The selling problem is harder more of the time, you see.
That is why salesmen get more than purchasing agents.
Q. That is true as to the specific transactions, but gen
erally speaking doesn’t that relative position of buyer and
seller change with the general economic changes?
A. Yes, undoubtedly.
Q. So that in one year you will have a buyer’s market
and another year you will have a seller’s market?
A. Yes.
Q. Pressure to buy will operate in one year and pressure
to sell in another?
A. Yes. It would, I think, be more accurately stated that
the pressure to buy will operate in one year and the pressure
to sell will operate in n years, n being greater than unity.
Q. The depression indicates that. Aren’t our views
somewhat darkly colored by the recent few years?
A. No; I think that merely leads us to attribute a higher
value to n, if I may put it that way.
Q. You say that a buyer will not acquire—normally—ore
properties unless he can get a rate of return of 10 per cent
after all his taxes connected with the investment, his income
in all respects, are paid. Would you say that it is also true
that a seller would be willing to dispose of his property at
a price which would give the buyer a 10 per cent return on
his investment after paying all taxes?
A. I don’t recall that I said that a buyer expected a return
of 10 per cent after all his taxes.
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Q. What is your statement?
A. I said that the existence of taxes led him to expect a
return of 10. I am not deducting his personal income
taxes—oh, no.
Q. What?
A. I am not contemplating deducting his personal income
taxes in arriving at the sum to be capitalized at 10 per cent.
Q. Your calculation does not involve, the payment of the
Federal income tax in addition to that return?
A. Not to the individual, no, if you are still talking of an
individual.
Q. May I state the question this way: Is it true that the
vendor, the seller, will be willing to sell to a buyer at such
a price as will enable the buyer to make 10 per cent net
return on his investment after paying all the taxes assessed
upon the property in which the investment is made?
A. All the taxes?
Q. Assessed upon the property in which the investment
is made.
A. All those taxes and any other taxes that are incidental
to carrying on the business, differentiating from the taxes
which apply to the individual purchaser.
Q. Then, as opposed to excluding income taxes, you in
clude all other taxes?
A. Yes, I would include among the deductions from the
gross income all other taxes.
Q. And you would think that ordinarily a seller would
be willing to dispose of his property at such a price as would
give to the buyer a net return of 10 per cent on this class of
property over and above the taxes on that property?
A. An expectation of 10 per cent; not an assurance of 10
per cent. That is the whole question, the difference be
tween expectation and realization.
Take the steel industry: An addition to a steel plant is
contemplated. No executive, as a rule, will authorize the
expenditure unless an engineers’ report shows that it may
be expected to produce a saving or a gain equal to 15 to 20
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or more per cent on the expenditure. That is because ex
pectation and realization are two different things, and gen
erally speaking, from the variety of circumstances, realiza
tion falls short of expectation.
Q. In other words, these engineers employed by the steel
company guess that badly?
A. Not only by the steel corporation but all industry,
because conditions change in the situation from day to day.
You take an illustration: People spent money in 1929, ex
pecting it to produce a certain return. They ran into a
period of depression, during which their sales were small,
which has lasted for five years. During those five years im
portant new inventions in the field are developed so that if
they were making the expenditure today they would buy
something entirely different from what they bought in 1929;
yet, because of the depression, they have got little or no re
turn out of that expenditure between 1929 and today.
Those are the things that bring about a difference between
expectation and realization.
Q. And have the engineers so badly miscalculated those
factors that when they suggest that a property can be pur
chased at a 10 per cent return the ordinary business man
says that they are normally wrong, so that they won’t pur
chase unless the engineers’ estimate runs up to what—30 per
cent?
A. In plant extensions, I think 15 to 20 per cent is what
they figure on. Of course, that is more hazardous than an
investment in iron mines because you may not make, as I
say and as I showed in my illustration, your expenditure at
the right time.
Q. Of course, in plant extension or any other expansion
your engineer will at least attempt to calculate obsolescence,
depreciation, and the like, will he not?
A. Yes, but this return would be over and above that.
Q. But I take it that your opinion is based upon knowl
edge of the facts that the ordinary level-headed person deal
ing with that problem, whether he will make that expendi-
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ture or not, will act upon the opinion that the engineer is
so far wrong that he won’t act upon an estimate of the
engineer but will change his calculation to the extent of
doubling their return factor?
A. Well, he expects more than 10 per cent net, of course,
so it is not a question of doubling but of business men dis
counting engineers’ estimates. There is no doubt about
that, and it is not only in business. I remember when I
was in Washington during the war—perhaps this is not rele
vant—the Vice-Chairman of the War Industries Board at
tributed the failure to make proper progress in one of the
important departments to the fact that it was run by en
gineers who didn’t figure on the difficulties which every
business man allowed for after he got his engineering es
timates.

Q. Do you know whether in the books of the Steel Corpo
ration or in any of their reports there is set up the value of
their ore reserves?
A. I don’t think it has ever been set up in the reports and
I couldn’t answer as to the books. I imagine naturally the
books of the iron mines must show some investment figure,
but I don’t imagine it represents the present value. It is
probably some historical figure.
Q. Is there nowhere in their books a showing as to what
their ore reserves consist of?
A. There must be in their records somewhere.
Q. Their records show what they consist of but you be
lieve they do not set up any valuation upon them?
A. Ordinary accounting does not call for valuation of
assets on the books of a corporation. They are carried at
what they cost less amortization to write them off. That
is the normal way. There may be adjustments from time
to time but there is no attempt to reflect the value from
year to year by changes in the figures which they carry on
the books in any business.
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REDIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. Blu:

Q. Mr. May, in answer to some question by Mr. Ryan,
you stated that social hazards were tending or tended to in
crease. Can you give an illustration of what you meant by
that?
A. Well, I would say that a good illustration is the tax
hazard in Minnesota. For instance, if we put ourselves back
in the position of anyone making an analytical appraisal in
say, 1905—he would figure taxes on the basis of the amount
then being paid in the State of Minnesota. He would not
look for the fact that in 1907 a new system of taxation would
be initiated under which assessments of mineral property
would be substantially increased. Again, if he were doing
it in 1911 or 1912—and I had occasion to look into it at that
time—he would have made his calculations on the basis of
the taxes being paid in the period of, say, 1907 to 1911, dur
ing which substantial increase over the earlier periods had
arisen, but he would not have allowed for the enormous
increase in public .expenditures that would occur in the
next ten or twelve years and the enormous increase in taxes.
As I recall the figures, roughly, local taxes from 1907 to
1911—about that period—absorbed from about 12 to 15 per
cent of the earnings of ore mines, as I remember the figures
which I then used; and in the last five years I think, judging
from the Commission’s report, they must have averaged
nearer 40 per cent of the earnings for local taxes. That was
one of the things I had in mind in talking of social hazards,
because that is one of the results of social changes.
And it has always seemed to me that the ore industry is
in an adverse position by reason of the fact that it is neces
sary to send the ore out of the State in order to convert it,
so that the operations and the ultimate conversion are car
ried out in different tax jurisdictions. If nature had only
been kind enough to do for Minnesota what it did for
Alabama, and had deposited coal and limestone so that the
iron could have been manufactured within the State of
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Minnesota, I think that the tax hazard would have been
reduced as the interest of the State would have been in the
whole steel industry, whereas, as it is, the State’s interest is
limited to the ore end of the business.
Q. I was not quite sure as to what your answers were to
some other questions relative to deduction of Federal in
come taxes; is it your opinion, Mr. May, that Federal in
come taxes should not be deducted at all in computing costs?
A. Well, that is a question over which there is a good
deal of discussion. I have discussed that, very often, with
Professor Adams.
Q. Who is Professor Adams?
A. He was formerly of the Wisconsin State Tax Com
mission, and, subsequently, professor at Yale, and principal
advisor of Congress on taxation for a great many years. Dis
cussions of the effect of income taxes and the proper treat
ment of them—that question came up many times. I think
there is a variation of opinion among the tax experts; but
I think my views and Professor Adams’ are the same. To
the extent that any tax is a true income tax you should not
treat it as a cost in calculation. That would cover the
English income tax which, if it is imposed on the corpora
tion in the first instance, is deducted by the corporation from
anything that is paid out—rents, dividends, or anything of
that kind. But, as I look at the question, the corporation
income tax is not a true income tax. It is something of a
hybrid; to the extent of the amount of normal tax of indi
viduals it is a true income tax, because if a corporation pays
that tax and then pays the dividend, the taxpayer gets cor
responding relief; and, personally, I would not treat that
part of the income tax as a cost, although some people might.
As regards the balance, it is not a true income tax. It is
merely an excise tax for the privilege of carrying on business
as a corporation, and as such it is a part of the cost of doing
business.
Q. Mr. Ryan attempted to show that if the property ac
count of the United States Steel Corporation was overstated,
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that the rate of return would or should have been lower.
Have you any reason to believe that the property account
of the Steel Corporation is overstated, or is in excess of the
true valuation?
A. No, I don’t think there is any—I should say what gen
eral test you can apply rather indicates the contrary.
Q. Now, it seemed to me by reason of some of Mr. Ryan’s
questions that there was some confusion over the rate of
return of bonds issued against a Mesabi Range iron ore
property, and the rate of return that would be expected on
the iron mining business. What is the distinction between
those two things, Mr. May?
A. The distinction is that obviously the hazard of the
person who takes a charge on the business is less substantial
—less than that of a man who takes the whole risk of the
business. In rate cases, for instance, there is a very sub
stantial spread between the rate that is regarded by the regu
lating body as appropriate to the investment as a whole, or
the business as a whole, and the rate at which the utility can
sell its bonds. For instance, as I recall, your Commission
here in Minnesota has fixed 7½per cent as a rate for some
utilities. That is not based on the assumption that utilities
can sell their bonds only at 7½ per cent.
Q. Now, you mentioned public utilities; are you familiar
with the rate of return of public utilities, generally?
A. No, I would not say that; I have studied the decisions
as to reasonable rate of return.
Q. Having made such study, what do you consider a rea
sonable rate of return for a public utility company?
A. I don’t think you can say on public utilities. They
vary to some extent—the location and the nature of the
business, and so on. For instance, in Minnesota I think 7½
per cent is allowed, and I suppose that is representative of
conditions in public utilities in Minnesota.
Q. Well, what, generally, are the conditions as far as the
public utility is concerned, compared with the conditions
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surrounding the mining of an iron ore property in Minne
sota?
A. Regulation and a certain measure of protection go
hand in hand, and it is the modern theory of regulation of
utility corporations that they are protected against unrea
sonable competition, and on that basis the return that they
can receive is restricted so that the rate should tend to be
lower than in an industry that is not similarly protected
from competition.
Q. Then, as I understand it from your last statement,
you would consider the rate of return should be higher for
iron ore property than for a utility company?
A. Certainly.
Q. For the reasons you have just stated?
A. Yes.
Q. This morning, I think you were attempting to make
some comparison between a return of capital on a straight
rate and a combination risk rate and sinking fund rate when
you were interrupted with some question: I would like to
have you go into that a little further and explain just what
you were trying to show at that time?
A. Well, what I was starting out to discuss was the point
of view of the ordinary business man toward the engineer
ing calculations and other methods of approach to the ques
tion, and I was starting to take the illustrative case of an
investment in a mine that is going to produce 1,000,000 tons
a year, for 40 years. If an investor bought the mine on
a 7½ per cent basis, that is 7½ and 7½, he would pay
$12,594,000 for it. Now, the first year his receipts would
be $1,000,000. The business man says: “Well, now, if I am
expecting a 7½ per cent return, 7½ per cent on what I
invested, it will absorb $944,550. That really leaves me
$55,000 to set aside towards replacing my capital.” The
engineer replies: “That is true; but if you invest the $55,000
at 7½ per cent you will get your money back at the end of
40 years.”
Q. Seven and one-half per cent or four per cent?
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A. It is the
and 7½. So the business man says:
7½
“I am not going to take the chance. I am not going to take
the chance that I am going to be able to invest money at 7½
per cent, compound interest, continuously, for the next
40 years; 1 can see a few years into the future, I think, but
I cannot see 40 years and I am not going to make a purchase
that is dependent almost entirely, for the return of my money,
on my being able to get 7½ per cent compound interest
30 or 40 years hence.” Now, let me look at it my way: that
is the income tax way—what I would have to pay income
tax on—if I pay $12,594,000 for that mine, my depletion
charge for the first year will be 1/40 of that amount, which
is $314,000. If I deduct that from my million dollars, all
I haye got left for interest is $685,000, which is less than 5½
per cent on my money. And the engineer says, “Oh, yes,
but you will make that up through compound interest be
tween 30 and 40 years hence.” And he says, “Nothing
doing.” That is the position in regard to the method, as
I see it. Now, I have made some calculations comparing
different methods, and they show this: that if you assume
4 per cent sinking fund at the end of, say, 32 years, 80 per
cent of the ore will have been mined, assuming equal pro
portions over 40 years; if you deduct your sinking fund from
your investment, you will still have a net investment of 34
per cent on your original investment, as against 20 per cent
on the ore still to be mined. If you buy on the 7½ per
cent and 7½ per cent basis at the same date, you will still
have 20 per cent of your ore to mine, but you will have 46
per cent of your investment still to get back. Now, business
men are not going to take chances on what is going to hap
pen 30 or 40 years hence, to that extent, and that is why,
when you get down below a rate of 10 to a rate of 8 or 7
or 6 per cent, you have got to attach to it a sinking fund
provision that won’t make the investor depend upon getting
a return of 7½ per cent or 8 per cent or whatever it is on
the reinvestment of what money is returned on his capital.
And, of course, when he says, “I expect a rate; I won’t buy,
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unless I can see an expectation of a certain rate,” what is
in his mind if he does not say it in so many words is what
I said this morning—if I buy a more or less hazardous in
vestment on the reasonable chance of getting more than the
safe rate, I know that I shall not get that excess in every
case; but if I am reasonably clever in making my selection,
and reasonably prudent in changing my investments from
time to time, I may be able on an average to get 6 per cent
instead of getting 4 per cent, on a safe investment, assuming
that I start out with something that seems to hold a fair
prospect of producing 8 per cent. That is what is really in
the mind of the investor, so if you say that because he ex
pects a prospect of 8 per cent it is reasonable to assume that
he can reinvest his return of capital so as to produce 8 per
cent, you are going contrary to the whole basic assumption
upon which the action is based. I think what I have said
would be made clearer by some tables which could easily be
prepared.
Q. You have not prepared any such tables?
A. I have not got them. I am sure it is difficult for any
one to follow the argument without tables.
Q. You stated this morning that profits, in your opinion,
were likely to be reduced in the basic industries in the fu
ture. Now, if that is true, what effect would that have upon
the rate of return which capital would and should demand
to cover the risks involved?
A. It won’t mean that the rate of return sought by an
investor will be reduced. It means that the capital value
of the industry will diminish,

PART IV
REGULATION OF SECURITIES

I
MEMORANDUM REGARDING SECURITIES BILL—
H R 4314

(1933)
I am in favor of a substantial extension through the medium
of a Federal statute of the protection afforded to investors
in securities. I, however, recognize great practical difficulties
and I am not disposed to rate too highly the results that will
be immediately attained.
It is in the general social interest that new enterprises
should be undertaken and it is not, therefore, in the public
interest to make the provision of capital for such new en
terprises unduly difficult.
It is an inevitable result of competition and the progress
of invention that many enterprises new and old should be
come unsuccessful. Indeed, if an attempt were made to
preserve the values of enterprises whose products have been
superseded and at the same time the new and superseding
enterprises were earning a fair return, the result would be
that the burden on the fruits of industry of the contribu
tion paid to those whose claims rest on past savings and in
vestment would become greater than the community would
be willing to bear. For either the total burden on con
sumers would become too great or the share of the fruits
left for those making a current contribution to production
in the form of labor, etc., would become inadequate.
The Congress must face the fact that a substantial per
centage of industrial investment will in any event be lost.
This seems to me (1) to make it the more incumbent on
the Congress to see that investors have the opportunity to
make their investments on the basis of reasonable informa
tion, but at the same time (2) to make it in the highest
degree undesirable for the Congress to assume the responsi
49
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bility of requiring any governmental agency to decide either
what is the true value of any investment security or even
that the information available to the investor is all that is
necessary to enable him to make a wise decision.
Indeed, while it is desirable that such protection as is
practicable shall be given to those who invest in securities
whose value is dependent on the profits earned by the maker
thereof, it is in my judgment even more important to fa
cilitate and encourage investment of small savings in gov
ernment securities and other forms of holdings fraught with
less risks and requiring less financial knowledge and less
constant watchfulness than are necessary to even moderately
successful commercial investments.
As I have indicated, I do not think the immediate prac
tical results of the proposed legislation will be very con
siderable. A large proportion of the buyers of industrial
securities are not investors, though they may think they are.
They are not greatly swayed by the information given them,
but are, I think, more generally influenced either by sales
manship or by general reputation either of the maker of the
security or of the banking house issuing it. I am, however,
hopeful that gradually the dissemination of better informa
tion will bring about an improvement in investment prac
tice.
The problems to be solved in formulating legislation seem
to me to be:
First, to determine the scope of the legislation;
Second, so to define the liability of directors and others
as to impose penalties for fraud or culpable negligence with
out making the burdens so heavy that responsible persons
will refuse to assume them and the business will pass into
the hands of less responsible persons;
Third, to formulate requirements for proper disclosure
by distributors of securities in respect of their compensation
for and interests in the issue;
Fourth, to devise adequate but not unduly burdensome
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provisions for the disclosure of information relative to en
terprises upon which securities are based.
With regard to the scope of legislation, I strongly favor
limiting it, at least in the first instance, to original offerings
of securities, though I see no objection to including in the
provisions regarding such new securities requirements for
proper periodical reports subsequent to the issue. I believe
that the Act should contain exemptions so as to exclude
from it transactions which are not offerings to the public.
Such exemptions require very careful study and I do not
feel that I have any special competence for recommending
what they should be.
The formulation of provisions which will impose proper
penalties on directors and others responsible for an issue
without deterring responsible persons from accepting di
rectorships is a delicate one. It seems to me to be clear that
provisions such as those contained in the original House
Bill under which directors would be responsible for errors
in statements of fact of which they had no knowledge nor
any reasonable means of knowledge would defeat the ulti
mate purpose of the law.
The problem of proper disclosure of interest does not seem
to offer very great difficulty, but this, again, is a feature in
regard to which I do not feel competent to make specific
suggestions.
The disclosure of information is a problem, however,
which presents very great practical difficulties. Among the
most important information is that which is of an account
ing nature, and it is particularly with this branch of the
question that I feel my experience gives me some qualifica
tion to express opinions as to what is essential and prac
ticable and what is not.
The first difficulty that I see in the problem of formulat
ing requirements for information is the impossibility of de
termining what facts are most essential in each case. The
second is, that much which is loosely regarded as matters
of fact is in reality matters of opinion. The third is, that
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the inferences drawn from facts and the opinions based on
them are usually more important than the bare facts them
selves.
In so far as accounting information is concerned, it seems
to me fundamentally important to recognize that the ac
counts of a modern business are not entirely statements of
fact, but are, to a large extent, expressions of opinion based
partly on accounting conventions, partly on assumptions,
explicit or implicit, and partly on judgment. As an English
judge said many years ago when business was far less com
plex than it is today, “The ascertainment of profit is in
every case necessarily a matter of estimate and opinion.”
The most vitally important single factor in the value of
a business enterprise is usually its future earning capacity.
Such earning capacity may be estimated if someone is will
ing to prophesy, but usually the experience of the past is
accepted as the best guide. What income is to be attributed
to an accounting period of the past depends partly on ac
counting methods and partly on estimates. There is no
escape from the use of conventions, because the income at
tributed to any period is not the fruit solely of actions and
transactions within that period, but is affected by actions
and transactions of the period prior thereto and the proba
bilities in respect of transactions in later periods. It is
equally clear that estimates must be made and that they
may prove incorrect even though made in the best of faith
by the most competent persons. For instance, in order to
arrive at the income for a given year it is necessary to esti
mate how long machinery in use will last and to place a
value on unsold merchandise. But machinery capable of
use for years may be rendered obsolete by new inventions
perfected by others, the sale price of merchandise may be
suddenly and vitally affected by, for example, a change in
fashion, a revision of tariffs, development of cheaper meth
ods of production, excessive production, distress selling by
others.
I would, therefore, stress the paramount importance of
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avoiding in the law anything likely to perpetuate the com
mon misunderstanding that balance sheets and income ac
counts are statements of fact, and of doing whatever is pos
sible to bring home to the investor that in formulating all
such accounts conventions and opinions necessarily play an
important part, and that their value depends on the compe
tence and integrity of those exercising the necessary judg
ment. To this end, I should like to see either in the report
accompanying the Bill or in the Bill -itself a declaration of
the purpose of the Bill in so far as accounts are concerned
which should be to insure: (1) that, in balance sheets,, the
assets and liabilities shall be fairly classified; that the bases *
on which the values are determined at which the assets are
carried shall be fairly disclosed, and that a responsible person
or persons shall have expressed an informed opinion that
the balance sheet is fairly presented on the bases indicated
and in accordance with acceptable accounting practice; and
(2) that any statement of income shall be so framed, as in
the opinion of competent and responsible persons, to con
stitute the best reflection reasonably obtainable of the earn
ing capacity of the business under the conditions existing
during the period to which it relates.
Since past earnings are significant to the investor only in
so far as they are a guide to the future, it is desirable to do
what can be done to safeguard the investor against state
ments of past earnings being put forward as evidence of the
value of a security, unless those putting them forward dis
close all knowledge which they may have of changes of con
ditions which have already taken place that would make
such past earnings wholly unreliable as a guide to the pros
pective future earnings. It is perhaps impossible to pro
vide complete safeguards on this point, but I believe that
something can be done in this direction.
The accounting information which should be required
by the statute should, I suggest, include:
* E.g., cost, reproduction cost less depreciation, estimated going concern
value, cost or market, whichever is lower, or liquidating value as of a speci
fied date.
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(1) A brief description of the general principles or meth
ods of accounting regularly employed by the issuer in keep
ing its books and accounts and determining its income and
financial position.
(2) A balance sheet or statement of assets and liabilities
and capital of the issuer of the securities.
(3) A statement of income covering not less than three
years, if the issuer has been so long in business.
(4) A declaration by the chief accounting officer of the
issuer, or by an independent public accountant, that the
balance sheet and statement of income are, in his opinion,
properly prepared on the basis of a fair and consistent ap
plication of the methods of accounting regularly employed
by the company as described under subdivision (1).
(5) Special provisions to cover the case of companies op
erating through subsidiary corporations.
Such requirements would be substantially in accord with
the recommendations of a committee of the American In
stitute of Accountants to the New York Stock Exchange
which was favorably regarded by the Exchange and put in
evidence by the Chairman of the Committee on Stock List
in the course of his testimony before the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency on January 12, 1933. They would
constitute a distinct advance in practice.
Specific suggestions for provisions to be inserted in the
Bill in order to meet these requirements, which I had pre
pared, came to the attention of the Investment Bankers
Association of America and have, I am advised, been em
bodied, substantially as proposed, in amendments which have
already been suggested to the Committees of Congress con
sidering the Bill, as follows (the notes are mine):
Suggested Subdivision of Section

5

Covering Accounting

Requirements

(5) A brief statement of the general principles or methods
of accounting regularly employed by the issuer in keeping
its books and determining its financial position and income.

SECURITIES BILL OF 1933

55

NOTE

This requirement contemplates not a detailed explana
tion of the technical accounting methods, such as is em
bodied in what is commonly known as a “classification” or
“card of accounts,” but a statement of the broad accounting
principles followed by the issuer.
In the absence of some such statement of principles there
is nothing to which a declaration such as is contemplated
in the fourth suggestion regarding the correctness of the
accounts submitted can be related.
The Revenue Acts since 1918 have uniformly laid down
as the general basis for determining income that it shall be
computed “in accordance with the method of accounting
regularly employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer.”
The general nature of the information to be given under
this head is indicated in Exhibit II of the report of the com
mittee of the American Institute of Accountants to the New
York Stock Exchange previously mentioned. Some of the
more important points to be covered are the following:
(a) Upon what classes of property, on what basis and at
what rates provision is made for, or in lieu of, de
preciation;
(b) Upon what basis inventories are valued—whether at
cost or market, whichever is lower, or on some other
basis;
(c) What classes of expenditures are deferred instead of
being charged directly to income account, and what
procedure is followed in regard to the gradual amor
tization thereof; etc.
(6) A balance sheet showing a classified statement of the
assets, liabilities and capital of the issuer at the latest prac
ticable date prior to the filing of the registration statement,
showing on what basis of valuation the several classes of
assets are stated. If the balance sheet is not in accordance
with the general books of the issuer, or with any previously
published balance sheet of the issuer, as of the same date,
information shall be given showing in what respects it dif
fers from said books or such previously published balance
sheet.

56

REGULATION OF SECURITIES

NOTE

While the basis of valuation of assets will be ascertainable
from the statement of accounting methods, it seems desir
able that the basis of valuation should be indicated on the
face of the balance sheet so that the information will be as
readily available to investors as possible.
No reference is made in this subdivision to contingent
liabilities and obligations which may in effect constitute a
liability which seriously affects the financial position. I have
not found it possible to draw a specific provision which would
meet all the possible situations satisfactorily, and I think it
preferable to leave the point to be covered by the declaration
that the balance sheet fairly presents the financial position,
which declaration could not properly be given unless items
of this kind were adequately disclosed in the balance sheet.

(7) A statement with respect to the income of the issuer
for the latest fiscal year for which such statement shall be
available and for the two preceding fiscal years, or, if the
issuer has been in business for a lesser number of fiscal years,
then for the longest practicable period during which the
issuer has been in business; and, if the date of filing of the
registration statement shall be more than six months after
the close of the last fiscal year for which such statement shall
be available, a statement of the income from such closing
date to the latest practicable date.
Such statement with respect to the income of the issuer
shall show the income fairly attributable to each fiscal period
covered thereby. The following items shall be shown sep
arately: operating income; non-operating income; interest
charges; income taxes, and other fixed charges. Items of
income or expense which are of an exceptional character
and are not likely to recur shall, if they affect to a material
extent the net income reported, be shown separately.
If the statement of income has not been prepared in ac
cordance with the general books of accounts of the issuer,
or with any previously published statement of income of
the issuer for the same period or periods, information shall
be given showing in what respects the statement of income
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differs from such books of accounts or such previously pub
lished statement of income.
NOTE

This subdivision and the succeeding one require, I think,
to be amplified to cover the case in which the business to be
carried on by the issuer was, during a part of the preceding
three years, carried on by a predecessor organization or or
ganizations. In such cases, statements of income and changes
of surplus of the predecessor organization or organizations
should be required.
(8) A statement showing the changes in the surplus of the
issuer during the period covered by the statement of income
required under subdivision (7).
(9) A declaration by the Treasurer or one of the principal
accounting officers of the issuer, or by an independent public
accountant or by independent public accountants that the
balance sheet and the statement of income are, in his or their
opinion, correctly prepared on the basis of a fair and con
sistent application of the methods of accounting regularly
employed by the issuer in keeping its books, and fairly re
flect its financial position as of the date of said balance sheet
and its income for the respective periods covered by said
statements of income, except as may be stated in said, decla
ration; and a declaration similarly signed, dated not more
than ten days before the date of the filing of the registration
statement that, as of such date, the signer had no knowledge
of any change since the date of said balance sheet, except
in the ordinary and regular course of business, in the char
acter of the assets or the financial condition of the issuer,
which might adversely affect the securities proposed to be
issued, except as may be stated in said declaration.
(10) Whenever the value of the security is dependent to
a material extent upon the financial position or income of
a corporation or corporations in which the issuer has a con
trolling interest, through stock ownership or otherwise, the
registration statement shall include the same information
regarding the assets, liabilities, capital and income of such
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controlled corporation or corporations (either separately or
collectively) as is required in respect of the issuer by this
subsection, or in lieu of or in addition to such information
in respect of the issuer, consolidated statements (containing
like information) of the assets, liabilities, capital and income
of the issuer and of any or all such controlled corporations
as may be proper in the circumstances of the case.
NOTE

This provision is made flexible so as to meet all the varied
conditions that are encountered, including the cases not only
of controlled companies that are substantially wholly owned,
but also of controlled companies in which there are sub
stantial outside minority interests.

As I have already indicated, I think the Bill might well
contain provisions for periodical accounting reports subse
quent to the issue. I suggest the following:
1. Whenever, while an issue of securities to which this
Act applies shall be outstanding, the issuer shall change the
general principles of accounting employed by it or shall
change in any material way the manner in which practical
application is given to such principles, a full statement of
the change shall be filed with the Commission within sixty
days of the date on which such change becomes effective.
2. Any issuer of securities to which this Act applies shall,
so long as the securities shall be outstanding, file annually
with the Commission within ninety days from the close of
its fiscal year statements in respect of its financial position
at the close of such fiscal year and its income for the year,
in such detail and form as the Commission shall prescribe,
provided that the Commission may in its discretion extend
the time for filing such statements in any case in which it
shall be satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable for the
issuer to file the required statements within the time pre
scribed by this Act; and provided, also, that the Commission
shall not be empowered to require under this section any
information which it would not be empowered to require
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in respect of a new offering of securities under Section 5
of this Act.

The adoption of provisions such as I have suggested
would, I believe, bring the requirements into accord with
the best current practice, and all that would be necessary to
meet the varied conditions that will arise would be to pro
vide for the making of such detailed rules and regulations
as might be necessary to give full effect to these provisions.

II

THE PROSPECTUS AND THE INVESTOR *

(1933)
Securities Act and such discussion of it as is contained
in Professor Frankfurter’s article in Fortune seem to me
quite unrealistic. Professor Frankfurter’s article, by the way,
if regarded as a prospectus under the Act, could readily be
shown to be characterized by misstatements and omissions
such as would make the author of the prospectus liable to the
full penalties of the Act.
The investor who actually relies on specific statements in
a prospectus is a comparatively rare bird. Subscriptions to
new securities from such sources would not supply a frac
tion of the needs of the country. The great bulk of the sub
scriptions come from persons who rely on more general
considerations, such as their belief in the issuer or in the
underwriter. The underlying assumptions of the Act, how
ever, are that every investor relies on the specific statements
made to him, and that if any material statement proves to be
incorrect and he sustains loss, the doctrine of post hoc, ergo
propter hoc, shall be applied and his loss shall be conclu
sively presumed to be due to the misstatement even though
the contrary could readily be demonstrated.
It seems to me that we are embarking on an extremely
dangerous course when we deliberately predicate legisla
tion on assumptions which we know to be contrary to fact.
However, in the present temper it is unlikely that this prin
ciple will be revised in any new legislation, though I am
convinced that it will have to be revised sooner or later—
either by new laws or by the courts. At present, we must
content ourselves with seeking the closest approximation to
The

* From a letter to the late Colonel M. C. Rorty, October 28, 1933.
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justice which is obtainable without complete abandonment
of this underlying theory.
The form which this theory takes is that the Act is based
on the principle of rescission, and it should not, therefore,
be too much to hope that the Act can be amended so that
liability will not extend beyond the point that can be reached
by a reasonable application of the doctrine of rescission. Ob
viously, the doctrine of rescission cannot fairly be applied to
sub-underwriters and dealers except to the extent of the se
curities distributed by them. Nor has it any conceivable
application to experts. It seems to me that the most impor
tant amendment to the Act, therefore, is to limit the applica
tion of the principle of rescission so that: (a) only the issuer
and any issuing house which has put its name on the pro
spectus shall be liable in respect of the full issue; (b) sub
underwriters shall be liable only in respect of securities sold
by them, either directly or through agents; (c) make these
persons liable only to those who purchase directly from them
or to others who purchased within a limited time after the
prospectus was issued; (d) limit the liability of directors
and experts to damages shown to have been due to acts or
default on their part.

III
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933: ITS PEDIGREE *

(1934)
In bringing about a recovery from the depression, the British
nation, so far as I can judge, has not followed methods in all
respects identical with those which we have adopted in an
effort to achieve the same result. While the old economic
order has received a rude shock there, it is not entirely dis
credited. They have not felt that a method of recovery was
outmoded because it has been successfully employed before;
they have not even reached the point of recognizing that only
the young are wise.
Sir George may be interested and possibly gratified to
know that in spite of the general discarding of precedents and
experience, the exponents of the New Deal in their advocacy
of the Securities Act have clung tenaciously to their argu
ment that it was substantially the British law. This has
seemed to me a strange thing—strange that they should re
gard that as a recommendation, stranger still that they should
think its substantial inaccuracy could escape detection. I
have been reminded of a song that was popular about the
turn of the century, when the Anglo-maniac was a favorite
butt for ridicule, which ran somewhat as follows:

If they saw it on the Strand,
They wouldn’t understand, •
But it’s English as you see it on Broadway.

Now, I am quite sure that if in the law courts which domi
nate the Strand, counsel should be so venturesome as to
cite the Securities Act, or a decision thereunder, as relevant
on the ground that that Act was substantially the English
* Excerpt from introductory remarks at a dinner given by the Council on
Foreign Relations for Sir George Paish on April 4, 1934.
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law, the court would fail to recognize the identity. I be
lieve, also, that the English bar and the English legislature
would be quick to disclaim paternity. I entertain the hope
that the enlightenment on this point may reach in Oxford
the distinguished professor who was so largely responsible
for the Securities Act, and may modify the views which he
entertained at the time when he discussed that law in For
tune last August.

IV

LETTER TO THE HON. JAMES M. LANDIS
(1933)
My dear Mr. Landis:

I read your address before the New York Society of Certi
fied Public Accountants with great interest.
I was particularly pleased to note your recognition of the
undoubted fact that accounts are expressions of opinion.
This seems to me to be the only sound starting point for any
regulations relating to accounts or accountants. I agree with
you that, in the past, efforts have frequently been made to
represent accounts as being statements of fact to a greater
extent than they can possibly be, and no doubt accountants
must assume a part of the responsibility. However, some
accountants, including myself, have for years been very in
sistent on the opposite view, and I think that academic au
thorities have had more influence than accountants. Pro
fessor Ripley, with whom I joined issue on the question in
1926, Professor Rorem, and others all have some responsibil
ity for the tendency to regard accounts as statements of fact.
However, the main cause no doubt is what Newton D. Baker
once in conversation with me referred to as “the human
craving for certainty.”
I do not know if you are familiar with the report which
the Committee on Cooperation with Stock Exchanges of the
American Institute of Accountants made to the New York
Stock Exchange in September, 1932, but I enclose a copy,
from which you will see that the limitations on the sig
nificance of accounts was the first point to be emphasized
therein.
Incidentally, while comparisons with the British system
are frequently made, to the disadvantage of our system here,
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I think that so far as the disclosure of accounting informa
tion in prospectuses is concerned, the practice on this side
has for many years been superior to the British practice. Un
doubtedly the gravest abuse here has been in connection
with the employment of high-pressure salesmen, some of
whom made representations not warranted either by the
prospectus or by the facts.
I have myself been asked to make an address upon the
Act before an accounting body; and though I am so con
vinced of the desirability of Federal legislation on the sub
ject that I am reluctant to appear in a position adverse to
any provisions of the law, I confess that I have had a diffi
culty, which your address does not remove, in reconciling
the provisions relating to the liability of experts with any
of the general concepts of law I have had, or in convincing
myself that we, as a firm, can afford to accept the possibility
of ruinous liability involved. It does not seem to me that
the liability can fairly be said to be founded in either the
law of negligence or the doctrine of rescission.
I realize that it is the function of the Commission to ad
minister the law rather than to change it, but I realize, also,
that by wise regulation the Commission can do much to re
duce the risks, and I should very much like at some time to
have an opportunity to discuss with you the general
principle.
Looking at the matter quite objectively, my own feeling
is that the provision is not in the public interest. In dis
cussions of the debt situation, one meets the argument that,
after all, as long as the debt is internal, what is a liability
to one person is an asset to another, so that the net effect
of the existence of the debt cannot be seriously adverse
to the country as a whole. This, however, overlooks the fact
that a bad debt remains a liability of the debtor after it has
ceased to be an asset of the creditor. In the same way, the
seriousness of an indefinite liability to a responsible obligor
is far greater than its value to the obligee or obligees.
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I expect to be in Washington shortly and hope then to
have the pleasure of meeting you and discussing some of
these matters with you.
Yours very truly,
George O. May
November 2, 1933.

V
THE POSITION OF ACCOUNTANTS UNDER THE
SECURITIES ACT *

(1933)
I pass to the subject set for discussion tonight, may
I say a word about a great citizen who belonged to your city
and who was laid away this afternoon. During the War I
was privileged to work closely with him and came to know
him well. He was not an accountant, but his qualities were
those which make men great in any sphere. He had that
devotion to the interests he was called upon to represent
without regard to self that marks the truly professional man.
He had the insight and judgment which enabled him to
penetrate to the heart of a problem, however beclouded it
might be by sophistries or confused by side issues, and to
recognize the worth of men of the most varied types, in the
most diverse walks of life. He had the courage, force and
character that enabled him to follow the course dictated by
his convictions without being greatly elated by praise or
affected by abuse. And above all, he had a great simplicity,
a broad humanity and a generous sympathy which inspired
loyalty and affection and enabled him to elicit from those
associated with him the very best of which they were capable.
We may differ in our ideas about future existence; but there
is a kind of immortality which great men must enjoy through
the influence which they exercise on the lives of those
around them and they, in turn, on others. As one who has
benefited from his influence, I am glad of the opportunity
to pay here and today a tribute to Alexander Legge.
Before

I have been asked to discuss tonight the Securities Act of
* An address before the Illinois Society of Certified Public Accountants at
Chicago, Illinois, on December 6, 1933. Cf. The Journal of Accountancy,
Vol. XLVII (January, 1934). The initial paragraph being extemporaneous
does not appear in the prepared manuscript as heretofore published.
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1933 from the point of view of the accountant. Few, if any,
measures have ever been passed possessing so much impor
tance to the profession, and it is not possible within the
limits of a single address to consider all the questions of
interest to us which it raises. I propose to limit my discus
sion mainly to two points: the liability arising under Section
11 of the Act, and the powers to define accounting terms
and make regulations granted to the Federal Trade Commis
sion by Section 19 of the Act. As I shall point out later,
Section 19 may afford a means of mitigating to some extent
the harshness of Section 11.
No one who has watched closely the developments of the
past ten years can wonder that a securities law should be
enacted, or even be greatly surprised at the form which it has
taken. Nor would it occasion surprise if more recent revela
tions should prove to have made it difficult to bring about
modifications in the Act, or perhaps have created a demand
for still more drastic measures. But to say that legislation
was natural, and perhaps inevitable, is not to approve all its
provisions; and while the Act possesses many merits, the
wisdom of some of its provisions (notably those provisions re
lating to the liability of underwriters, directors, officers and
experts) is open to serious question in the minds, of those
genuinely interested in the protection of investors.
It is a commonplace that extreme measures defeat their
own purpose; but people are seldom willing to give practical
effect to this commonplace. Fifteen years ago, we adopted
a constitutional amendment designed to put an end to ad
mittedly great evils. When legislation enacted in pursuance
of that amendment proved ineffective, we passed more se
vere measures; but as the law became more drastic, its
enforcement became more and more impossible. Yesterday,
we took the final step to reverse the well-intentioned but un
wise action of fifteen years ago. We all realize, however, that
it will take years to eradicate the evils which that unwise
action brought into existence. Surely there is a lesson
here for those who seek to regulate the issue of securities.
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Many who originally supported the prohibition move
ment, including, as I particularly recall, a bishop of the
church, finally became convinced that it should be repealed
on the simple ground that it placed the distribution of liquor
in the worst possible hands. In the same way, a too drastic
securities law will place the distribution of securities in the
worst possible hands.
I cannot believe that a law is just, or can long be main
tained in effect, which deliberately contemplates the possibil
ity that a purchaser may recover from a person from whom
he has not bought, in respect of a statement which at the time
of his purchase he had not read, contained in a document
which he did not then know to exist, a sum which is not to
be measured by injury resulting from falsity in such state
ment. Yet, under the Securities Act as it stands, once a ma
terial misstatement or omission is proved, it is no defense to
show that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the statement
in question or of the document in which it was contained,
or that the fall in the value of the security which he has
purchased is due, not to the misstatement or omission com
plained of, but to quite different causes, such as the natural
progress of invention, or even fire or earthquake. The Se
curities Act not only abandons the old rule that the burden
of proof is on the plaintiff, but the doctrine of contributory
negligence and the seemingly sound theory that there should
be some relation between the injury caused and the sum to
be recovered.
It is frequently suggested that the Act follows closely the
English law; but as one who has followed the development of
the English law for nearly forty years I am bound to say that
whether this statement be regarded as praise or censure, it is
unfounded. None of the departures from ordinary legal
principles to which I have referred finds its counterpart in
the English law. The right of rescission is enforceable only
against the issuer, and before the purchaser can recover
from a director or other person concerned in the issue he
must show that he relied on the prospectus, and then can
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recover only for injury due to the untrue statement which
he proves.
• Finally, as indicating the difference in temper of the Eng
lish law, let me read a section which deals not with this
specific question, but with the liability of directors and
officers to the corporation for negligence or breach of trust:
If in any proceeding for negligence, default, breach of
duty, or breach of trust against a person to whom this section
applies it appears to the court hearing the case that that
person is or may be liable in respect of the negligence, de
fault, breach of duty or breach of trust, but that he has acted
honestly and reasonably, and that, having regard to. all the
circumstances of the case, including those connected with his
appointment, he ought fairly to be excused for the negli
gence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust, that court
may relieve him, either wholly or partly, from his liability
on such terms as the court may think fit.*

The answer of Congress to those who urged that the Eng
lish law should not be followed because it was too severe
and tended to check the flow of capital into industry, was
that of the son of Solomon, who, refusing to listen to the
elders, and following the advice of the young men, said: “My
father hath chastised you with whips, but I will chastise you
with scorpions.” And you will remember that the answer
was, “What portion have we in David? ... to your tents,
O Israel,” and the biblical narrative concludes with the state
ment, “So Israel rebelled from the house of David unto this
day.” So, too, there is reason to fear that responsible people
will refuse to accept the unfair liability imposed on them by
Congress under this Act, and will continue to refuse until
juster provisions are enacted. If they do so, their action can
be regarded only as the course dictated by common pru
dence, and not as indicating factious opposition to the main
purpose of the Act.
If we limit our consideration of the liability provisions
of the Act to their effect on accountants, their punitive char
acter becomes even more apparent. As between an innocent
* Companies Act, Sec. 372 (1).
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but negligent vendor and an innocent but negligent pur
chaser, there may be some consideration of public policy in
favor of requiring the vendor to return what he has received
if his representations are proved to be false in fact although
he believed them to be true. This consideration may be
particularly applicable where the purchaser is a small in
vestor who has neither the ability nor the resources for de
termining the truth which are at the command of the
vendor. It is difficult to see, however, upon what principle
of justice the accountant or other expert whose good faith
is not challenged, but who is held to have failed to live up
to the high standard of care required of him, can fairly be
called upon to do more than make good the injury attribut
able to such failure for the benefit of a purchaser who per
haps did not even know of his existence at the time of the
purchase, and took no pains whatever to investigate the se
curity he purchased.
But even though we feel the provisions to be unjust, we
cannot expect them to be modified merely because they are
unacceptable to accountants. The hope of securing amend
ment lies in demonstrating that they are not in the interest
of the general public, or of the investing public in particu
lar; and this seems to me to be so clearly the case that there
should not be any great difficulty in demonstrating it to openminded people possessing some general familiarity with busi
ness. I believe anyone who will take the trouble to consider
carefully the work of the accountant in connection with new
issues, and the practical consequences of these new provisions,
will be forced to the conclusion that in the public interest
these provisions should be substantially modified.
The services of the accountant in connection with a new
issue, are, broadly, to report upon statements relating to the
financial position and operations of the issuer. The first im
portant point to be noted is, that while the statements in
question rest on a basis of fact, the facts in the case of any
considerable business enterprise are both complex and in
complete, so that any report upon them is predominantly
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an expression of judgment and opinion. To illustrate—the
most important single figure will usually be the profits for a
particular year. Only the slightest consideration is necessary
to bring realization of the fact, that the transactions of the
year are inextricably interrelated with those of earlier and
subsequent years, and that how much profit is fairly attribut
able to a particular year is ultimately a matter of conven
tion and judgment.
The function of the accountant, therefore, is to express an
honest and informed judgment regarding the financial posi
tion and operating results of the issuer according to some
acceptable standard of accounting conventions. It is not
merely a fact-finding function.
We may now consider how this function is in practice dis
charged. While the work of accountants today involves the
use of a large staff, it is obviously impracticable for the ac
countant even with a large staff to examine all the transac
tions of even a moderate-sized corporation. His procedure is,
therefore, a varied one—in some cases, he will make a fairly
complete independent check; in other cases, he will make
tests; in still other cases, he must rely on the records of the
corporation, satisfying himself that they are so kept and
checked as to justify such reliance as a reasonable business
procedure.
In considering, therefore, what degree of responsibility
may wisely and rightfully be imposed on the accountant, one
must start from the premises that: (a) his work is in part in
the nature of confirmation of facts, and in part an expres
sion of judgment; (b) his procedure is necessarily to a large
extent one of testing—he cannot scrutinize every transaction;
(c) his work is necessarily carried on largely through sub
ordinates.
It is clear that the accountant may incur liability under
the Act without being guilty of either moral culpability or
recklessness, if a court holds that either: (a) facts within his
knowledge were presented in such a way as to mislead; or
(b) the tests which he made were not sufficiently extensive
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to justify him in forming a belief; or (c) he was not justified
in forming a belief on the evidence which he examined with
out probing deeper. Furthermore, he will presumably be
liable for any misstatement which may be attributable to the
failure of his assistants to take steps which they should have
taken, even though he instructed them to take such steps and
believed, and had a right to believe, that they had done so.
Surely, if any liability is to be so founded, it should at
least be restricted to the damage shown to have been caused
by the default proved against him or his assistants.
It is unnecessary for me to spend much time in pointing
out how far beyond such a standard of liability the Act goes.
The point has already been fully discussed in the pamphlet
entitled “Accountants and the Securities Act,” which has
been circulated to its members by the American Institute
of Accountants, and in addresses to accounting bodies made
by the Chief of the Securities Division of the Federal Trade
Commission, the Honorable Baldwin B. Bane, on September
19, and on October 30, by Commissioner James M. Landis.
The discussion of the question by the former concluded
with the statement:

Thus both theoretically and practically there is no prob
ability of one’s liability exceeding the aggregate amount at
which the securities were offered to the public.

Commissioner Landis, taking what he seemed to regard as
a more hopeful view, said:
It should be observed that each person whose liability
on the registration statement has been established is respon
sible in damages to any purchaser of the security, whether
such person shall have purchased from him or from some
other person. Theoretically this means that each person so
liable can be held to a liability equivalent to that of the total
offering price of the issue. Practically, of course, no such
large liability exists. Several factors will operate to keep the
liability within much smaller bounds. For one thing, the
value of a carefully floated issue can hardly be assumed to
reach zero. For another, every purchaser would hardly be
likely to bring suit. Again, the issue of liability—generally,
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a complicated question of fact—would be retriable in every
suit, and it beggars the imagination to assume that every
jury faced with such an issue would come to the same con
clusion. Furthermore, each person liable has a right of con
tribution against every other person liable, unless the one
suing is guilty of fraud and the other is not. So that even
eliminating the other practical factors that I have mentioned,
it would be necessary for every other person liable on the
registration statement to be insolvent, in order that one of
them would be affixed with the large theoretical responsi
bility.

These being the views entertained by persons who sought to
reassure us so far as they honestly could, it is quite unneces
sary to consider what has been said by those who sought to
excite our fears. The liability is obviously one that no pru
dent business man would be justified in assuming. And
certainly accountants have no right to be guiding investors
if they are not practical business men as well as technically
qualified accountants.
Let me emphasize again that in order to be subjected to
such a liability it is not necessary that the accountant should
have been fraudulent, or even reckless or incompetent. He
may be held liable merely because of an error of judgment
regarding the extent of the examination which he ought to
make, or through honest error or oversight on the part of a
competent and ordinarily reliable subordinate. And if he
is held liable in an important case, the cost to him may easily
equal the savings of his whole professional career.
I believe that in the case of most accountants—certainly it
is true in that of my own firm—the amount of fees received
from work connected with new financing is a relatively small
percentage of their total annual fees. Why should they
jeopardize not only the earnings from their entire business,
but their savings, in order to undertake work which brings in
perhaps five or ten per cent of their total income?
Every reputable accountant should be perfectly willing to
assume a reasonable liability in respect of injury which can
be shown to be attributable to acts or default on his part, and
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no one would quarrel with the imposition of a liability of a
punitive character in cases of fraud; but only the clearest
and most urgent requirements of public policy could justify
making accountants or other experts liable for damages
which bear no relation either to the injuries they have caused
or the compensation they have received. I am convinced
that no such requirement exists—on the contrary, I believe
that a wise regard for the public interest would rather limit
the financial responsibility of professional men for errors of
professional judgment. This, incidentally, is the policy
embodied in the new legislation on the question of auditors
in Germany,* under which the liability of the accountant
cannot exceed a fixed sum unless fraud is shown.
It is not easy to see upon what theory of law the provision
of the Act is based. Clearly, it is not founded in the ordinary
law of negligence; nor can it be brought within the doctrine
of rescission. It seems to me to be justifiable only on the
theory that any issue of securities in connection with which
a material misstatement is found to exist is a conspiracy, even
though the misstatement is due to oversight or even honest
error. There is nothing in the history of accounting in re
cent years to warrant such an attitude towards the profes
sion or that provision which puts on the accountant the
burden of proving his innocence whenever a disgruntled pur
chaser of securities or striker makes charges against him.
In my judgment, it is always wise to use restraint in im
posing financial liabilities upon professional men for errors
of professional judgment. Such errors, particularly where
they become publicly known, result in serious injury to the
professional reputation of the persons making them, and it
is quite unnecessary to add a personal liability in order to
impress the professional man with the necessity of care and
thoroughness in forming his professional judgments. The
effect of imposing a pecuniary liability out of all proportion
to the compensation paid for the opinion will inevitably be
* Cf. Handelsgesetzbuch (Commercial Code), (1931).
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that those best qualified to express opinions will refuse to
assume the risks involved in doing so.
In the present instance, the risks are multiplied by the
vagueness and uncertainties of the obligations imposed. The
Act makes the accountant liable if the part of the registration
statement for which he is responsible “contained an untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material, fact
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the state
ments therein not misleading, . . .” and in providing that
it shall be a valid defense that the accountant “had reason
able ground to believe and did believe, . . . that the state
ments therein were true and that there was no omission
to state a material fact required to be stated therein or neces
sary to make the statements therein not misleading, . . .”
it prescribes that the standard of reasonableness “shall be
that required of a person occupying a fiduciary relationship.”
What explanations are going to be necessary in order to
comply with these requirements? Let me take a simple case.
The insurance commissioners have on several occasions pre
scribed valuations for securities which were far in excess of
current quoted prices therefor. If one were consulted by
someone to whom one had a fiduciary relationship regarding
a proposed investment in an insurance company, certainly he
would not be content to explain that the securities were
valued in accordance with the schedules of the Insurance
Commissioners without pointing out that these valuations
were substantially higher than those currently realizable on
the market. Suppose, however, that in a balance sheet form
ing part of a registration statement securities were taken on
the basis of the Commissioner’s valuations—would it be suffi
cient to state that fact, or would the accountant be guilty of
omission of a material fact if he failed to make any statement
regarding the relation between such valuation and the quoted
market prices? Again, many public utilities provide for
depreciation on bases approved by state commissions, which
many accountants regard as quite inadequate. Is the ac
countant safe if he states on what basis the depreciation

POSITION OF ACCOUNTANTS

77

provision has been made, without expressing his own con
victions regarding the inadequacy of the provision?
In each of these cases it would seem that the accountant
must be safe on the ground that he is entitled to rely on
legal authority whether his own judgment coincides with the
view of the authorities or not. In many instances, however,
the authority for the practice followed will be accepted cus
tom, rather than specific authorization from a governmental
body; and what is to be the position when the accountant dis
agrees with the custom?
Here let me draw attention to a point which perhaps has
escaped your attention—that the position of the accountant
under the Act differs from that of any other expert. Others
may “report” and be liable only for the truth of the state
ments contained in their report; the accountant is called
upon to certify, and is liable for the truth of the statements
certified, not merely for the truth of the statements con
tained in his certificate. Under a strict interpretation of the
law, the accountant would seem to be liable if part of a
statement covered by his certificate is held to be untrue or
misleading, even though he, in his certificate, disclaimed re
sponsibility for that particular part of the statement. It
may be said that such an interpretation would be unreason
able; but it is certainly no more unreasonable than the ex
plicit provision that his liability is not to be measured by
the injury caused by his act or default. Further, it may be
merely the reflection of the not infrequent view that an
auditor should give no certificate whatever unless he can
vouch for the complete truthfulness of the statement certi
fied.
The fallacious view is quite widely held that the work of
the accountant is purely a fact-finding function, and that
when his work is completed he is in a position (if it has been
properly performed) to make findings of definite and in
controvertible facts. The Special Committee on Coopera
tion with Stock Exchanges of the American Institute of Ac
countants, whose membership has included partners in sev
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eral of the largest firms in the country, became convinced of
the extreme importance of correcting this too common mis
apprehension, and in a report which it made to the New York
Stock Exchange in September, 1932, it stressed this point as
the first on which the Stock Exchange should concentrate in
its effort to bring about more enlightened investment. It
began its report with the following statements:
It [the Committee] believes that there are two major
tasks to be accomplished—one is to educate the public in re
gard to the significance of accounts, their value and their
unavoidable limitations, and the other is to make the ac
counts published by corporations more informative and au
thoritative.
The nature of a balance sheet or of an income account is
quite generally misunderstood, even by writers on financial
and accounting subjects. Professor William Z. Ripley has
spoken of a balance sheet as an instantaneous photograph of
the condition of a company oh a given date. Such language
is apt to prove doubly misleading to the average investorfirst, because of the implication that the balance sheet is
wholly photographic in nature, whereas it is largely histori
cal; and, secondly, because of the suggestion that it is pos
sible to achieve something approaching photographic accur
acy in a balance sheet which, in fact, is necessarily the reflec
tion of opinions subject to a (possibly wide) margin of error.
It then proceeded to discuss the problem in some detail; and
in concluding the report and making certain recommenda
tions, it offered this comment:

. . . But even when all has been done that can be done,
the limitations on the significance of even the best of ac
counts must be recognized, and the shorter the period covered
by them the more pronounced usually are these limitations.
Accounts are essentially continuous historical records; and as
is true of history in general, correct interpretations and
sound forecasts for the future cannot be reached upon a hur
ried survey of temporary conditions, but only by longer re
trospect and a careful distinction between permanent tend
encies and transitory influences.
I was extremely glad to note that Commissioner Landis,
in his address to which I have referred, recognized the point
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which I have been trying to emphasize, in the following para
graph:
Much also depends upon the method of expression, for
what should appropriately be expressed as inferences or de
ductions from facts and hence as opinions, are too often ex
pressed as facts themselves and hence for the purposes of
legal liability, whether at common law or under the Act, be
come facts. It has been said, and very rightly in my humble
opinion, that most of accounting is after all a matter of
opinion. But though this may be true, I have still to see
the case of a prospective investor being offered a balance
sheet and having it carefully explained to him that this or
that item is merely an opinion or deduction from a series of
other opinions mixed in with a few acknowledged facts. Ac
counting, as distinguished from law, has generally been por
trayed as an exact science, and its representations have been
proffered to the unlearned as representations of fact and not
of opinion. If it insists upon such fact representations, it is,
of course, fair that it should be burdened with the responsi
bility attendant upon such a portrayal of its results.
I have read the entire paragraph because it seems to me
to have a double importance. In the first place, it indicates
an appreciation on the part of a member of the Commission
of the point that accounts are not statements of fact; and
such recognition is fundamental to the development of any
sound regulations relating to accounts and accountants. In
the second place, it emphasizes the danger which accountants
run in putting forward as facts what are really expressions
of opinion.

That the danger is not exaggerated by the Commissioner
is apparent from a consideration of the Ultramares case.
That case would apparently have been finally decided in favor
of the accountants by the Court of Appeals of New York
if the accountants concerned had not stated as a fact that
the balance sheet which they certified was in accord with the
books of the Company. Doubtless they thought this was a
fact, and doubtless it was a fact in the sense in which they
meant the language to be interpreted, that the balance sheet
was in accord with the general books. But Chief Justice
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Cardozo decided that a court might properly regard the lan
guage as implying an agreement between the balance sheet
and the books as a whole, and there were books which con
tradicted the general books. Obviously, upon such an inter
pretation, whether a balance sheet agreed with the books
must always be in reality a matter of opinion (if for no other
reason because no accountant can be sure that he has seen all
the books that exist), and obviously even if the statement
were made as one of fact, no one was injured by it, for no
one would lend a nickel on the faith of a statement that a
balance sheet agrees with the books. Nevertheless, such is
the mysterious nature of the law, this point was sufficient to
result in an order for retrial.
In the last sentence which I quoted from Commissioner
Landis, he seemed to imply, although he did not specifically
say, that the portrayal of accounts as statements of fact had
been made by accountants. I am not sure that this is so. Ac
countants may be subject to some blame for not having done
so much as they might have done to resist the tendency of
other people to regard accounts as exact statements of fact,
but I think that they themselves have almost invariably put
forth their reports as expressions of opinion. Both here and
in England, the words “in our opinion” have for years been a
standard phrase in accountants’ certificates. As long ago as
1913, Dickinson, in his Accounting Practice and Procedure,
commented on the phrase at length. His comment began
with the statement: “Every balance sheet must be largely
a matter of opinion,” and ended with the sentence:

So far from weakening the certificate, they [i.e., the words
“in our opinion”] may rather be considered as strengthening
it, in that they imply that the signer has given his certificate,
not with foolhardy assurance, but with a realization of the
inherent impossibility of saying, absolutely, that one balance
sheet is correct and any other incorrect.*

And while very little testimony was given on behalf of ac
countants before the committees which considered the Securi* Arthur Lowes Dickinson, op. cit., pp. 236-37.
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ties Act, the little which was given included this colloquy
between the members of the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency and Colonel A. H. Carter, who was, I be
lieve, the only accounting witness:

Mr. Carter. I mean that that statement itself should have
been the subject of an examination and audit by an inde
pendent accountant.
Senator Gore. Before filing?
Mr. Carter. Before filing.
Senator Gore. Is that patterned after the English system?
Mr. Carter. Yes, sir.
Senator Reynolds. Together with an opinion.
Mr. Carter. That is all they can give; that is all they can
give. That is all anyone can give as to a balance sheet.
Senator Wagner. Well, basically, are not these facts that
have got to be alleged rather than an opinion?
Mr. Carter. Under the terms of the bill it has to be given
under oath. I do not see that anyone can certify under oath
that a balance sheet giving many millions of dollars of assets
is as a matter of fact correct. He can state his opinion based
upon a thorough investigation.
But whatever they have been represented or supposed to be,
accounts are not mere statements of fact, but represent the
application to facts of judgment and accounting principles.
Truth in accounts is not, therefore, a simple matter of cor
respondence between fact and statement—accounts are true if
they result from the application to the relevant facts of
honest judgment and reasonable accounting principles. The
question that should really be put to the accountant is not
whether the balance sheet is true, but whether it is fair
—fair in the accounting principles on which it is based; fair
in the way in which those principles are applied to the facts;
and fair in the way in which the results are presented. These
are matters of opinion.
The Act stresses the obligation to state every material
fact necessary to make the registration statement not mis
leading, and among the material facts in relation to any ac
counts none is more material than the fact that the accounts
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themselves and the certificate required from the accountant
in relation to those accounts are, and must of necessity be,
expressions of opinion. Indeed, the Act, in speaking of
truth in accounts without some such qualification is itself apt
to mislead investors, in the same way as was Professor Ripley’s
reference to a balance sheet as an “instantaneous photo
graph.”
At this point, I should like to suggest that Section 19 can
be used to clarify and modify the provisions of Section 11.
Clearly, only action by Congress can remove the fundamental
and, as I feel, insuperable obstacles to the free acceptance by
accountants of appointments under the Act; obstacles which
have been created by the imposition of a liability bearing no
relation either to the injury caused by the accountant or the
compensation received by him. If, however, this major
difficulty could be removed, the remaining problem could
probably be solved by judicious use by the Commission of
the powers conferred on it under Section 19.
Under that Section, the Commission has power for the
purposes of the Act to define accounting terms used therein
and to prescribe the method to be followed in the prepara
tion of accounts. It seems to me highly desirable that under
the provisions of this section the Commission should define
what constitutes a “true” balance sheet or a “true” profit and
loss statement. Such definition would, I think, necessarily
follow the general line that I have indicated. Accounts
would be held to be true if they represented the application
of honest judgment and acceptable methods of accounting
to all the relevant facts which were known or ought to have
been known to the person preparing or certifying them at
the time of preparation or certification. I suggest, also,
that the Commission should supplement the definition by
indicating that accounting principles would be deemed ac
ceptable which are either (a) prescribed or approved by gov
ernmental authorities to which the issuer is subject; or
(b) sanctioned by common practice, it being recognized that
in many instances alternative methods are sanctioned; or
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(c) are inherently fair and appropriate. It should be empha
sized that principles will not be regarded as reasonable un
less they are mutually consistent and are consistently applied.
The point may be urged that what must be shown in order
to avert liability is not that the balance sheet or profit and
loss account as a whole is true, but that the statements of
fact contained in it are true. Balance sheets and profit and
loss accounts are not, of course, couched in the form of state
ments of fact; but a description with an amount set opposite
it is fairly capable of being judged as a statement of fact.
The common heading: “Land, buildings, plant and ma
chinery, at cost,” with a figure set opposite, seems at first
blush to be a simple statement of fact; but in practice, what
is fairly to be regarded as cost will often be a difficult matter
of opinion, and always the question remains whether any,
and if so, what amplification of the heading is necessary to
make the statement not misleading.
You may think that I am being technical; but may I re
mind you that our own accumulated savings may be at stake
in this matter, and also that the highest court of Massachu
setts held not many years ago that a statement was false,
and that its falsity gave rise to liability on the part of those
signing it, on the sole ground that a reserve for depreciation
had been shown under the heading “Reserves” on one side
of the balance sheet instead of being deducted from the assets
on the other. It was only after this decision that the law of
Massachusetts was amended by the insertion of this proviso:
“. . . provided, that if a report of condition as a whole states
the condition of the corporation with substantial accuracy,
in accordance with usual methods of keeping accounts, it
shall not be deemed to be false.”
I am convinced that to make the Act practicable in its
working it is essential that some general ruling, of the tenor
I have suggested, as to what constitutes truth in accounts
shall be put forward by the Commission. As I have indi
cated, such a statement would serve the double purpose: first,
of tending to prevent the investing public from attaching
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undue significance to accounts; and, secondly, of preventing
accountants from being harassed or penalized through un
duly technical interpretations of the provisions of the law.
I would not have you think that in this discussion I have
exhausted the points in the Act which are of interest and
importance to the profession. I should have liked to discuss
at length the provision by which the burden of proof is
thrown upon the defendant; the opportunities that the Act
offers to blackmailers; the absence of any provision by which
those unwarrantably attacked can recover the costs of their
defense; and other features which seem to me to require
amendment if a just balance is to be struck.
In conclusion, I desire to say that I am in full sympathy
with the general purposes of the Act, and that the criticisms
which I have offered of some of its provisions are not merely
inspired by a narrow self-interest, but rest upon the pro
found conviction which I expressed at the beginning of this
address, that unduly drastic measures defeat their own pur
pose and are not in the ultimate interest of those whom it
is sought to protect. I should be extremely sorry if the effect
of the Securities Act should be to place the distribution of
securities and all the work attendant on such distribution in
the least responsible hands.
I think, also, that in any discussion of the Act, we as ac
countants owe a duty to small investors to point out that the
ordinary vicissitudes of business make commercial securities
necessarily hazardous and unsuitable for the investment of
small savings, and that even if a securities act diminishes the
hazards in some respects, it cannot change their essential
character. A realistic view would recognize the necessity for
some governmentally fostered system for the safe investment
of small savings; a broad market, subject to requirements for
frank disclosure with penalties not unduly drastic attaching
thereto, for what may be termed “business investments”; and
some medium, entirely divorced from the idea of invest
ment, for the gratification of the seemingly ineradicable in
stinct for gambling.

VI
THE OPPOSITION TO ANY AMENDMENT OF THE
SECURITIES ACT *

(1934)
is, surely, as important that legislation should be based on
adequate and reliable information as that investment should
be so based; and those who undertake to present information
in support of legislation are chargeable with a fiduciary stand
ard of care as justly as those who present information in order
to sell securities. A survey of articles in support of the Se
curities Act and against any change therein reveals more
than one which fails to live up to this standard—indeed, one
might say that if such articles were prospectuses coming
within the provisions of the Act, many of the authors would
incur serious liabilities. No doubt all these authors are
perfectly honest in their purpose (though this is a more
charitable view than they appear to take of those who are
opposed to them), and the question that I raise is, whether
their articles are free from misstatements or omissions of ma
terial facts which by the exercise of a fiduciary standard of
care they could have avoided.
I distinguish between those parts of such articles as are
frankly argumentative and those which purport to be state
ments of fact. Partial statements in argument indicate only
that the writer is an advocate and not a disinterested witness.
In discussing the provision which relieves the purchaser
from proving reliance on the prospectus, it is not unreason
able to argue that the purchaser relies indirectly, if not di
rectly, on the prospectus or registration statement if his pur
chase takes place shortly after the issue is made. But surely
it is a material fact that the Act will indulge the same
It

* A letter to the New York Times (January 28, 1934).
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presumption even though the transaction takes place long
afterwards when the presumption has become wholly un
reasonable. Again, in discussing the provision of the Act
which permits recovery of the purchase price of the security
and absolves the plaintiff from the burden of distinguishing
between injury due to material misstatement and injury due
to quite unrelated causes, it is true to say that the burden
of separation would often be difficult for the plaintiff to sus
tain. But here again it would seem to be a material fact
that under the Act the defendant’s liability remains even if
he is willing to assume the burden and is able to prove con
clusively that the injury sustained had nothing whatever to
do with the material misstatement complained of. However,
incomplete statements on such points merely indicate how
difficult it is for a partisan to avoid omissions of material
facts which tell against the cause in which he wholeheartedly
believes.
The points with which I am principally concerned are
those which relate to the English Companies Act. No argu
ment in favor of the Securities Act has been more stressed, or
probably carried more weight, than the argument that the
Act is substantially the English Companies Act modified to
suit American conditions. To the impartial student the
differences between the two Acts must, I believe, seem more
significant than the points of resemblance; and when those
opposed to any revision of the Securities Act talk about
differences in conditions which justify its greater harshness,
they seldom mention the very material difference in condi
tions that in England the successful defendant can recover
compensatory costs and, where necessary, obtain security
therefor, before the suit against him is proceeded with.
While recommending innovations alleged to be based on
English practice, and imposing burdens and liabilities
hitherto unknown to the law of any country, the framers of
the Act might well have introduced this measure of pro
tection.
Most of all do the two laws differ in spirit. The difference
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in spirit is implicitly admitted in an article which was read
into the Congressional Record of January 12 in the state
ment, “In substance, the Securities Act is the English Com
panies Act, modified to come within the constitutional power
of the federal legislature to regulate interstate commerce,
and to recognize the fact that in England, except for a very
unusual Hatry or Kylsant, the distribution of securities is a
decorous, traditional business, offering its wares only to in
stitutions and wary family solicitors, while in the United
States it has been a high-pressure racket that jangled every
housewife’s doorbell.” Is this really so?
The limitations on the federal legislative power are no
doubt sufficient to account for some of the differences be
tween the two laws, but perhaps the most striking instance
of the kind is that the English law does, arid the American
law does not, attempt to deal with the evil of “jangling the
housewife’s doorbell.” Section 356 of the Companies Act of
1929, which begins: “It shall not be lawful for any person to
go from house to house offering shares for subscription or
purchase” completely negatives any suggestion that the Eng
lish law was designed to meet a situation in which securities
were bought only by institutions and family solicitors—a
suggestion, incidentally, which no one who had read the
Greene or the Macmillan report, or even had been present
in an average English household when the morning mail
arrived, would have dreamed of putting forward. The whole
argument of the writer quoted and of others who have ad
vanced the same contentions rests upon a statement as fact
which a mere perusal of the English Act would have proved
to be incorrect. In England, as here, the major evil has been
this “jangling of the housewife’s doorbell”—not the inade
quate or misleading prospectus.
Indeed, it is the undue concentration on the prospectus,
and the fact that Congress whether through inability or by
design did not deal with the evil of high-pressure salesman
ship or make any provision for publicity in respect of the af
fairs of the issuer subsequent to the issue, that form the
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broadest ground for criticism of the existing law. Of course,
if provision had been made for subsequent publicity, it
would have been impossible to maintain the legal fiction
that the purchaser of a security relies on the prospectus even
though he buys long after the prospectus has ceased to have
any real bearing on the current value of the security; and
this fiction is an essential part of the scheme whereby the
liability of those concerned in an issue is continued for ten
full years.
Among the principal provisions of the Securities Act
which are criticized are those which deal with the burden of
proof; those which permit rescission on account of mis
statement or omission in the registration statement in cases
in which the assumption that the purchaser relied either
directly or indirectly on the prospectus or registration state
ment is obviously contrary to fact, and also in cases in which
his loss is due to circumstances in no way related to any such
misstatement or omission; and those provisions which make
experts and others liable for sums entirely out of all propor
tion to any injury caused by acts or omissions on their part.
None of these provisions can be justified either by English
precedents or by any difference in conditions between Eng
land and the United States.
One of the most noteworthy differences between conditions
in the two countries is that the strike action which disfigures
our system is comparatively rate in England. This is due
to a variety of causes, of which the fact already mentioned
that in England a successful litigant recovers compensatory
costs from the unsuccessful party is one. To protect honest
issuers so far as practicable against such suits is as much a
part of the problem of just legislation as is the protection
of the investor against the dishonest or negligent issuer.
But the framers of the Securities Act seem to have ignored
this phase of the problem. The inordinate expansion of the
content of the registration statement, any material misstate
ment in which gives rise to a cause of action; the vagueness
of some of the vitally important provisions; the conferring of
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concurrent jurisdiction on federal and state courts; the ab
sence of any provision for the recovery of compensatory costs
by the successful defendant; the creation of conclusive pre
sumptions in favor of the purchaser, which will often be con
trary to demonstrable fact; and the imposition of liabilities
bearing no relation to injury caused, combine to constitute
an invitation to those who bring suits in the hope of being
bought off, which no one who is invited to assume responsi
bilities under the Act can afford to ignore.
The appeal to British experience inevitably includes refer-.
ences to Hatry and Lord Kylsant, but it is seldom explained
that neither was charged under the Companies Act. The
writer to whom I have referred speaks of the interpretation
of the British Act “in the celebrated Lord Kylsant case.”
The facts are that Hatry pleaded guilty to forgery and con
spiracy to defraud, and the charges against Lord Kylsant were
brought under the Larceny Act of 1861, which antedated
not only all the laws for the protection of investors, but even
the first effective general limited liability company law—that
of 1862. The Royal Mail Company was not formed under
the Companies Act. In the interests of historical accuracy
it may be added that the basis of Lord Kylsant’s conviction
is incorrectly stated in the same article.
It is interesting to note that an article (anonymous) ap
peared in the London Economist of January 6, much of
the argument in which is identical with that of the article
read into the Congressional Record. Needless to say, how
ever, it did not contain the incorrect statements regarding
things English to which I have drawn attention.
Now, these are errors and omissions which, it would seem,
could have been avoided by a fiduciary—or even a reasonable
—standard of care, and they are made by experts in dealing
with a relatively simple matter. Is it unreasonable, then,
that other experts, conscious that they might unwittingly be
betrayed into error in dealing with the far more complex
affairs of large corporations, should be reluctant to accept the
liabilities, bearing no relation to any injury attributable to
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their errors, which the Act would impose upon them? The
contention sometimes advanced that such reluctance is in
spired by unworthy motives, or is part of a conspiracy, has
a familiar, unconvincing ring.
Are we likely in the long run to do better by continuing
the extreme measure enacted under great provocation and
even more certain to produce hardship and injustice than
to accomplish its beneficent purposes, than by limiting the
law in the first instance to provisions which are clearly just
and endeavoring to cope with further problems which arise
in ways that will be consonant with justice? The answers
to this question will differ according to the views taken of
the Act. Those who see in it a medium for the punishment
of bankers, or a step towards the goal of financing industry
by Government, will answer “Yes.” Those who regard the
purpose of the Act as purely remedial and constructive will
be bound to answer “No.”
Amendment of the Act is opposed by some on the ground
that to admit publicly any defect in a part of the Adminis
tration’s program would invite attack on the whole of it.
This attitude is strangely at variance with that of the Presi
dent himself in the announcement that he was going to try
new measures and would be ready to retrace his steps or
change his course whenever he might be convinced that he
had gone too far or was heading in the wrong direction.
It is to be hoped that this more courageous policy will pre
vail, and that modifications of the Securities Act may be ef
fected which, without weakening of the provisions relating
to fraud or wilful misstatement, will afford some protection
against blackmail and will at least limit the liability for
honest error to the damage fairly attributable thereto.

VII

TESTIMONY ON THE NATIONAL SECURITIES
EXCHANGE BILL *
(1934)
Mr. May. I do not wish to deal with the strictly stock
exchange regulation features of the Bill. That is outside
my province. I. wish to limit myself to a subsidiary but still
important part of the Bill, the provisions regarding accounts
and reports. That is principally Sections 12, 17 and 18 (b).
Practically my whole point of view is based on the fact
that accounts are necessarily the result of the application of
accounting conventions and judgments to facts and are not
pure statements of fact, and I think any sound legislation on
these points must give more weight to those considerations.
The Chairman. Do you favor the idea of providing for a
uniform system of accounting?
Mr. May. I do not, Senator, as I will come to later. Not
at the present time, certainly.

The point that I wanted to bring home to the Committee,
or emphasize to the Committee, is that accounts for a short
period, while they are useful to people who deal in securities,
may easily be given an exaggerated importance and thereby
result in more harm than good to the small man, with whom
I imagine you are particularly concerned.
My feeling on this question, I think, must be very much
that which the Committee feels in regard to the larger sub
ject. You want to do everything that you can to make buy
ing and selling securities, particularly by the small man,
safer and surrounded with more information. But you must
realize that all you can do will not reduce the risks that he
* “Stock Exchange Practices,” Hearings, Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, 73rd Congress, Part 15, pp. 7175-83.
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is bound to run very greatly, and there is always the danger
that by legislating you create a feeling of confidence in the
securities that are offered which legislation cannot possibly
impart to them.
Now, that is the thought that is in my mind. I attach
great importance to accounts, but I think there is always
a danger that people will attach too much importance to
them, and I think undoubtedly a large part of the stock
markets of 1929, the outrageous prices that were reached
then, was attributable to the basing of values on large earn
ings for short periods of time, which were not representa
tive of the permanent earning capacity of the business.
Whilst I think, therefore, that you should do what you can
to give investors ample information, you should not do it in
a way that can possibly encourage them to attach more im
portance to accounts than they properly deserve.
The specific suggestions that grow out of that, first of all,
are in Section 12, which provides for audited quarterly
statements. Personally I have never favored the sugges
tion that has been made that the Stock Exchange should uni
formly require quarterly statements. In a great many cases
they are helpful. In some cases they are more apt to be mis
leading than helpful. That is particularly true in the case
of companies where inventories play a very large part in a
determination of their results. The difference in the inven
tory valuation at the beginning or the end of a quarter may
make all the difference between a profit and a loss. That is
true, for instance, of packing houses and leather companies
and the like.
So that I would suggest that a provision should be left in
the bill so that the regulating body could dispense with the
quarterly statements in any case where they thought that the
publication would not be in the public interest.
Senator Townsend. Would you suggest semi-annual state
ments or yearly statements?
Mr. May. Personally, I was going to suggest the second
point, Senator; if I may go on—I would strongly oppose
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audited quarterly statements, although it may seem to be
against my interest as an accountant to take that position.
But my opposition is not because of the expense, although
that would be considerable. It is not because it would
delay the publication of the quarterly statements—and if
they are to be published at all they ought to be published
promptly. It is because of the thing that I have just been
emphasizing, that if you certify them people will think that
they are something absolute and accurate, that they can rely
on implicitly; whereas, being for a short period, they must
necessarily be arbitrary and estimates.
Therefore, my suggestions on that would be to eliminate
the provisions for quarterly audits and to provide a power
in the regulating body to dispense with quarterly statements,
particularly in any case in which they might think it was ex
pedient.
Now, I think myself, as far as audits are concerned, that an
audited statement once a year ought to be sufficient. But
there is one very practical consideration which I would like
to bring to your attention. I think the Committee has an
opportunity. to do a very useful thing by a very simple
measure, quite apart from the general purposes of the Bill.
If the amount of auditing required were expanded as this
Bill would necessitate, it would tax the resources of the ac
counting profession. The great difficulty of the present
position is that nearly all companies end their year at De
cember 31, and if the amount of work to be done at Decem
ber 31 were so enormously increased as this Bill would
increase it, then I do not think it would be within the
capacity of the accounting profession, by any reasonable ex
pansion, to take Care of that work within a reasonable period
after the end of the year.
And to meet that situation, I would like to suggest that
there should be a discretionary power so that not all audit
ing statements Would have to be at the end of the calendar
year. I suppose convenience for tax purposes and so on has
led a lot of companies that used to close their year at other
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periods to turn to the calendar year. A few still stick to some
other period. The large packing houses close their accounts
at the end of October. Well, September and October would
be a much more natural time for the automobile companies
and the tire companies to close than December 31. The
railroads all used to close at June 30. Now they have all
shifted to December 31; June 30 is a much more natural
time.
I would like to see introduced into the Bill a provision
which would help to distribute the work of auditing over
the year. I think it would enormously increase the value
of the audit to the investor. It would increase the effi
ciency of the audit. It would reduce the cost, and it would
be infinitely more convenient to all the regulating bodies
and statistical people who have to study audited accounts
when they come in, and under present conditions get them
all in a bunch at the end of the first two or three months of
the calendar year.
That is a very small and noncontentious suggestion, which
I think would have very great practical consequences for
good.
Senator Kean. Would not it be just as well to have them
all come in on the first of July as June 30?
Mr. May. If you could get them distributed. Of course,
the ideal thing would be to have a quarter on the 31st of
March, a quarter on the 30th of June, but you never could
get that. But I think if you left some flexible provision in
so that the regulating body could work it out as might seem
to the general interest, that would be a very helpful measure
which would have a general advantage quite apart from the
provisions of this particular Bill.
Mr. Saperstein. As the Section now stands, Mr. May,
there is no date fixed for the filing of those statements, and
that matter is left to the discretion of the Commission.
Mr. May. I understood that it was fixed as far as quar
terly audited statements were concerned.
Mr. Saperstein. It does not indicate upon what day. It
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says simply that they shall file with the Exchange or the Com
mission in accordance with rules and regulations to be pre
scribed by the Commission and in such form and in such
degree as the Commission may by rules and regulations pre
scribe in the public interest. That more or less leaves it for
the Commission to indicate upon what dates these shall be
filed, does it not?
Mr. May. Of course, if you require quarterly statements
subject to the reservation that I have suggested before, and
provided that once in each year, under regulations of the
Commission, quarterly statements should be audited, that
would satisfy us. I want only to suggest the idea. The exact
form you take is a matter that is a simple matter of drafts
manship. That is the point I had on Section 12.
My point on Section 17 is on exactly the same ground.
Quarterly statements, particularly, are very largely matters of
judgment. If the investor is to get the benefit of that at all,
he should get the reports promptly; and, that being so, I
think it is not right or wise to impose a penalty for errors,
either of judgment or of fact, in statements prepared under
those conditions.
I would like to see the provisions of Section 17 limited to
misrepresentation in statements. I think, as a broad ques
tion of public policy, it is not wise to impose liabilities on
the basis of errors of judgment or of fact, where the facts
are not definitely known and where judgment necessarily
has to be exercised in order to reach a conclusion. That is
the suggestion that I have on Section 17.
The Chairman. Most of these corporations make at least
annual reports for their own benefit, do they not?
Mr. May. There should be an annual report, of course,
sir. But I think, as a matter of fact, if I am not going too
far afield, that a quarterly statement really is a part of what
I may call the “paraphernalia of speculation” rather than
the machinery of investment. It is a very striking thing. I
do not think that there is any doubt that in Europe there are
relatively more investors in securities and fewer speculators,
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The speculators do their speculating on the race track, and
they have lotteries to a greater extent. It is a very sig
nificant thing that statements more frequent than annual
are practically unknown in Europe.
When this question came up I cabled to my associates in
London on this question and asked them how far quarterly
statements were known in London. They said they did not
know of any company that ever published a quarterly state
ment. One or two published half-yearly statements, but the
great majority published them only annually.
I cabled to my associates on the continent of Europe and
they said, “Neither we nor any of our friends whom we have
consulted know of any corporations on the continent that
publish statements more often than annually.”
I do not think that is a mere coincidence. I think, as a
matter of fact, a quarterly statement serves a useful purpose
to the intelligent investors, and it is useful to the person who
is stirring up speculation. I think, particularly, if you had
audited quarterly statements you would be imposing a very
heavy financial burden. The cost would be quite consider
able. It would be practically on the investors in corpora
tions for the benefit of speculators in securities, if it bene
fited anybody at all—which I do not imagine is quite the line
that you are endeavoring to follow.
Mr. Saperstein. It was suggested by the previous witness
that one of the dangers inherent in Section 12 was that the
information contained in these statements might be appro
priated by competitors in this country or in foreign coun
tries. Is there anything in your experience that would lend
color to that suggestion?
Mr. May. Of course there is a certain weight in that
always, but I think, generally speaking, that a little too much
weight is attached to that. That has been a ground of
opposition in England to the publication of any results. I
think business men are naturally secretive. Of course the
point has merit. I do not think you should require informa
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tion in too great detail. I would not attach very great im
portance to it, and I do think that when a corporation tries
to get the benefit of greater liquidity for its securities by
creating a market for them, it has got to pay some price for
it; and reasonable publicity is part of the price.
The Chairman. What are your objections to a uniform
system of accounting?
Mr. May. That is a subject that I have given a great deal
of thought to. The fact of the matter is that accounting,
especially industrial accounting, is essentially a matter of
judgment, and you cannot put judgment in strait-jackets.
In the second place, uniformity, if I may say so, is illusory;
it does not exist. Take the railroads and regulated corpora
tions generally, and you will see a manual an inch thick, con
taining detailed specifications as to where everything from
a toothpick to a locomotive shall be charged; but then you
will find that the large maintenance accounts and the large
loss and damage accounts, and so on, are distributed over the
year or more than a year on the basis of a budget estimate,
and they do not represent actual expenditures at all. So that
you do not get the uniformity and you do not get the de
tailed accuracy that you think you do.
Take a large matter like depreciation. The variation in
practice under a uniform classification is notoriously wide.
The only safe thing is this: You have got to rely on judg
ment, and judgment ought to be attended by responsibility
for the consequences that ensue. If you have uniform ac
counting it has got to be prescribed by somebody on the
basis of general principles, and without any knowledge of
the specific cases to which it will be applied. Rules are laid
down by people who have no responsibility for the conse
quences that ensue, either legal or moral. That is one of
my great objections to it. My other objection is that uni
formity means a uniformly low standard. That is neces
sarily so. You cannot compel anybody to be conservative.
Laws can lay down only minimum standards. It requires
recognition of moral and ethical responsibilities to get any
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thing higher than that; and I have no doubt in the world
that the result of the regulation of railroads and public
utilities has been to make their accounting less conservative
than that of business corporations generally. I think any
accountant who has studied the subject would agree with
that view. Certainly that is true in my own experience
with railroad accounts and business corporations which I
audit. I think it is bound to be so. You would get a super
ficial uniformity which is not real. People are misled; the
general public are misled into thinking that accounts are
uniform and that the accounts of different companies are in
fact strictly comparable when, as a matter of fact, they are
not.
The Chairman. I would like to have you illustrate that..
I can get your general view, but if you will illustrate it, it
will make it a little clearer. I do not think I quite under
stand it unless you can illustrate it.
Mr. May. When I first started in the practice of account
ing in New York, nearly 40 years ago, nearly all the rail
roads, when they laid down heavier rails in the place of
lighter ones, charged the whole cost of the rails into operat
ing expenses. Now they are required to show the excess
weight of the old rails over the previous rails in capital.
That is theoretically defensible, but it is practically unwise,
in my judgment. All the way through the distinction of
what shall be charged to capital and what shall be charged
to expenses, which is the fundamental question of all ac
counting, the whole tendency of regulated accounting has
been to throw things into capital instead of throwing them
into expenses.
Senator Kean. Would you not think that charging the
difference between a light rail and a heavy rail to capital,
since the rates of the railroads are based on their capital, is
against the public interest?
Mr. May. You touch the point. In the case of regulating
bodies, of course, it ties into the whole question of regula
tion, and I agree with you, Senator, that it is an indispen
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sable adjunct of the system of regulation, but nevertheless
that particular effect of it I think is unfortunate, even if it
is inevitable. When you get into general business you do
not have the same considerations of rates based on capital
structure, and I think only the unfortunate consequences
would persist and the benefits would not be derived. That
is my view of it. I have given the subject a great many years
of thought.
Senator Kean. In other words, the piling up of capital
in public utilities and in the railroads makes the capital so
high that they can go to the commissions and demand higher
rates than they otherwise would be able to charge?
Mr. May. That is one phase of it, Senator. But of course
the elements on which the rates are based are: (1) return on
capital, and (2) the actual expenses incurred. At the same
time it increases the amount they get by way of return on
capital, it decreases the amount they get as operating ex
penses.
I think it is getting rather far afield, but I would be glad
to pursue it, if it would be of interest.
Senator Kean. I think it would be interesting.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. May. The system of regulation has inevitably tended
to bring about that result, coupled with the theory of valua
tion which has practically prevailed in the Supreme Court
decisions. The position has been like this. When a public
utility or a railroad, or whatever it might be, put in its claim
for its rate base, it added a whole lot of expenses like over
head expenses, which in ordinary practice are charged off
into expenses, and it took off only what was called “observed
depreciation.” Now, regulating bodies were in the position
of being forced to accept that by the Supreme Court de
cisions; if they at the same time allowed these companies to
charge the same kind of expense into operating expenses
and to charge off larger depreciation, they would be making
the public pay twice, and therefore, as they could not pre
vent them from going into capital, because of the Supreme
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Court’s decisions, they said, “All right, you must take it out
of expenses”—which was the only alternative left to them,
and the result has been, as I say quite confidently, that the
accounting of public utilities and regulated corporations
generally is less conservative than that of business corpora
tions; and it is because I am not convinced of the benefit of
regulation. Uniform accounting would bring everybody
down to the standard of the lowest, which is the standard
which can be logically established to be the minimum—the
fear of that is why I am opposed to uniform accounting. Of
course it would make things much simpler for us.
Senator Kean. If they charge it off in operating expenses,
that is one charge-off for that year. When they put it into
capital account it goes on forever?
Mr. May. That is true.
Senator Kean. Therefore it is a continual charge against
the public?
Mr. May. That is true.
The Chairman. Are you discussing Section 18?
Mr. May. That is the section that gives the power to pre
scribe uniform accounting. That is what I was coming to
next.
I think those are the points that I wished to deal with,
and I wanted to come down rather than to make a pre
pared statement, because this is a subject that is much better
developed by questions, and I thought if there were any
questions that you wished to ask I would like to answer
them, because my only object is to be helpful. I am not
here in the interest of anybody. So far as the accounting
profession is concerned, your Bill would apparently create
a lot of additional work, so I would not be popular in the
profession if I came down here and opposed it too strongly,
perhaps. But I have tried to look at the public interest.
Mr. Saperstein. Is it your suggestion that Section 18 (b)
be eliminated altogether?
Mr. May. I think so. As I understand, the Department
of Commerce is at this time, through a very able committee,
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studying the whole question of uniform accounting. It is
a very large subject, and it does not seem to me to be directly
relevant to the main purpose of this Bill. I think it is a
subject that would be better studied on its merits and dealt
with, if at all, in that way, on the basis of the results of a
study such as the Department of Commerce is now making.
That would be my view of the matter.
The Chairman. If we had a uniform system, it would be
much simpler for the accountants, would it not?
Mr. May. Yes; but the real value of accounting is a
matter of informed and independent objective judgment.
If you are going to just follow mechanical rules you can get
into very, very disastrous situations by doing so. I think
anybody who has had any practical experience will say that.
Senator Kean. It would be physically impossible, almost,
would it not, with many of these large companies dealing all
over the world, to make inventories every quarter?
Mr. May. In the case of some of these companies it would
be absolutely prohibitive.
Senator Kean. For instance, take the Bell Telephone Co.
I think you audit them, do you not?
Mr. May. No; we do not.
Senator Kean. Do you audit the Steel Company?
Mr. May. That is not so difficult. We happen to be
discussing the question with the Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey just now in regard to what an annual audit might cost.
Senator. Kean. What kind of a figure did you give them,
if I may ask?
Mr. May. I told them it was so enormous that we could
not make any commitment. But I should say an annual
audit of the Standard Oil of New Jersey would probably cost,
with all its several hundred companies included, certainly a
quarter of a million, possibly more.
Senator Kean. A quarter of a million each time?
Mr. May. Yes. That would be doing it the quickest pos
sible way. It would be doing it at the end of the year and
not working on it all the way through. I should say the
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cost of quarterly audits would probably be at least three
times that of an annual audit. I think $750,000 for the
Standard of New Jersey would be a very low figure for quar
terly audits. The consequence would be that of course the
interval required after the statements are prepared by the
company, for the completion of the audit, would make the
quarterly statements almost out of date. They would be
merely able to get the June statement out unaudited by the
time they could get the March statement out audited.
Senator Kean. That is one of the things I wanted to get
at, that with many of these companies a public audit would
probably not be finished much before the next audit began.
Mr. May. There is an old Latin statement which applies
very well to quarterly statements. A quarterly statement
that comes out promptly is valuable, but if they come out
too late—
The Chairman. If it is convenient to you, the Committee
would be very glad to have you submit a memorandum on
this subject.
Mr. May. I would be very glad to do so, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. We will put it into the record.

VIII
THE NATIONAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE BILL *
SENATE

2693

MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE

ON BANKING AND CURRENCY

(1934)
response to the request of the Chairman made at the con
clusion of my testimony before the Committee on March 8,
I submit a memorandum regarding the suggestions which I
then respectfully offered. These suggestions were briefly as
follows:
In

12:
(a) Insert a provision enabling the regulating body to dis
pense with the filing of quarterly statements in any case or
class of cases in which it might deem such statement likely to
be misleading or the filing thereof undesirable for any other
cause.
(b) Limit the requirement of certified statements to. the
filing annually of one balance sheet and one statement of
income and profit and loss for a full year.
(c) Make the provision regarding certified statements suffi
ciently flexible to permit of the distribution of the auditing
required so far as possible over the year in such way as may
be most desirable in the general interest.
section

17:
Limit the liability under this section to cases in which the
issue of false or misleading statements is shown to have been
wilful.

section

Note: The provisions in this section regarding the measure of damage seem
open to criticism, but if the liability is limited to wilful misstatement this
point becomes of minor importance.

* Cf. Testimony, Hearings, “Stock Exchange Practices,” op. cit., pp. 7183-88.
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SECTION 18:

Strike out Section 18 (b), or amend it so as to limit the
authority of the Commission to the power to prescribe what
information shall be set forth in balance sheets and earnings
statements.
Of these suggestions, that looking to the distribution of
audit work more evenly over the year is put forward because
on the basis of a long and wide experience I am convinced
that the adoption of this simple proposal would add very
greatly to the efficiency of audits and enable them to be con
ducted at lower cost and prove generally convenient to all
those who are concerned with the study of audited accounts
after they have been issued. All the other suggestions are
inspired by a profound conviction of the importance of rec
ognizing in any such legislation that accounts are not state
ments of fact, but necessarily represent the results of the
application of accounting principles and judgment to facts.
The misconceptions on this point have been so widespread
that it may be worth while to present an illustration which
will emphasize the point I have made. I take one from the
field of motion pictures, which has now become an impor
tant branch of industry. The income of a motion picture
producer is, of course, derived mainly from rentals, and is
largely dependent on the cost of the picture and the length
of its run. In connection with the production of the picture
many stage properties are required which may or may not be
useful in other productions, so that the cost may or may not
be chargeable in total against the picture for use in which
they are purchased in the first instance. The studio will
naturally have large overhead expenses which must be appor
tioned between the pictures which have been or are expected
to be produced during the year. Some principles have to be
adopted for apportioning this overhead expense, and there
is need for the exercise of a considerable amount of judg
ment in applying the principles and dealing with such ex
penditures as those for stage properties. Supposing the cost
of the picture to be satisfactorily determined—what propor
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tion of this cost is to be charged against each dollar of rental
received?
In the early days, the simple rule was adopted that all
rentals were applied against the cost until the cost was re
covered, and thereafter all rentals were profits. Obviously,
such a result was conservative but quite unscientific. If the
picture as a whole produced a profit, some part of each
dollar of rental received should be deemed to be profit.
After careful research it was discovered that the. earnings of
the ordinary picture followed a more or less well-defined
curve, being naturally greatest in the early days of presenta
tion and gradually tapering off to zero at the end of, perhaps,
two years. Consequently the practice became general (and
has been recognized by the Bureau of Internal Revenue) of
computing the income on the basis of writing off the cost of
the picture against the rentals on the basis of such curves.
Clearly, however, there is even greater need for the exercise
of judgment in determining the precise shape of the curves
to be used, and naturally when this has been done the ex
perience of every picture will not conform to any such curve,
so that constant watchfulness and the exercise of constant
judgment is necessary to insure proper statements of income.
The need for judgment in selecting and applying account
ing principles or conventions which I have shown to be
necessary in this case is necessary in greater or less degree in
almost every business—certainly in every case in which either
the exhaustion of fixed property or the carrying of inven
tories is an incident of the business. It is not true of only
complex businesses. I chose for illustration on another occa
sion the case of one of the unemployed who engaged in the
business of selling apples on the street corner and continued
in it for only four days, and showed that the same situation
(of course, on a small scale) existed in that case.
There is no dispensing with judgment in the preparation
of accounts. Obviously, those most intimately associated
with the business possess in the highest degree the knowledge
which is necessary for the exercise of judgment. But they
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are not disinterested. The method of audited accounts
which involves in the first instance the preparation of ac
. counts by the officers of the company who are most familiar
with its operations, and the examination thereof by qualified
independent accountants possessing a wide general knowl
edge of business and able to take a disinterested and objec
tive view of the position is, I believe, now generally recog
nized as the best combination that has been evolved for pro
ducing satisfactory accounts.
In so far as principles of accounting are necessary for the
purpose, I think corporations should be allowed to exercise
judgment provided that they recognize certain fundamental
principles which are so well established that they may fairly
be given general application, and provided, also, that these
principles are definitely laid down and consistently fol
lowed. This method of dealing with the problem, I note,
has recently been recommended by the Twentieth Century
Fund as a result of its survey of the Stock Market (Stock
Market Control by Evans Clark and others, page 174).
Care must, however, be taken to limit the requirements of
auditing so as to avoid making them unduly burdensome on
the corporations and the investors therein.
With these general observations, I will proceed to a dis
cussion of the specific suggestions which I have made.
12:
It follows from what I have said that there is room
for error or difference of opinion in regard to the earn
ings of a business corporation for any period, and, broadly
speaking, the shorter the period the greater relatively be
comes the possible margin of error. The extent thereof will
vary with different businesses; it will be wide in any case
in which inventories are large in proportion to profits, par
ticularly if the inventory consists mainly of commodities
which fluctuate in value. Thus monthly or quarterly state
ments of earnings of a packing house or a leather company

section
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are of little value and probably as likely as not to be mis
leading unless accompanied by very full explanations.
It is sometimes urged that such statements are at least
valuable because comparison with the corresponding period
of a preceding year can usefully be made. But unless much
more than the bare results are published, this will not neces
sarily be true. Innumerable illustrations could be cited to
demonstrate this point. I will take only one—a comparison
of the earnings of a corporation engaged in the sale at retail
of winter clothing for quarters ending in December and
March, respectively, with the corresponding figures for the
preceding year may be quite misleading if in one year winter
has come early and in the other, late, so that in one case
business was delayed until after January 1 which in the other
case matured in December.
I have always been opposed to the suggestion that the
New York Stock Exchange should make the publication of
quarterly statements a uniform requirement for listing, and
therefore I urge that power at least should be given to the
regulating body to waive such a requirement in any case
in which it believes that to do so would best serve the public
interest.
If quarterly statements are to be published, I feel strongly
that it is the duty of those who are seeking to help the public
to emphasize the fact that while such statements may have
value, that value is distinctly limited. This, for two reasons
—first, that as I have already pointed out, allocations of
profits to short periods of time can only be approximate and
arbitrary; and, secondly, that the value of securities depends
on the future, and that statements of past results are valuable
mainly as they afford an indication of the reasonable expec
tations for the future, and profits for a quarter or other
short period are an entirely unsafe basis on which to rest
an estimate for the future.
The Committee is naturally anxious to do what it can to
put those possessing inside information and the members of
the general public as nearly as possible on an equality in
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dealing in securities, but it is faced with the insuperable
obstacle that the advantage of the insider rests upon the fact
that he has knowledge and qualifications for estimating the
future which are not possessed by and cannot possibly be
extended to the general public. His advantage is not that he
knows what the past earnings have been, but that he can
judge what future earnings are likely to be—and no one
would suggest that corporation executives should be com
pelled by statute to prophesy.
To require that quarterly statements should be certified
by accountants would be to ascribe to them an importance
which they cannot possibly. merit. This is the principal
reason which leads me to suggest the elimination of this
requirement from Section 12. Other reasons are, that to
require that quarterly statements should be audited before
being published would involve a substantial delay in the
presentation of figures which owe a large part of any value
they possess to their timeliness, and that it would involve a
very heavy burden of expense. I have no means of estimat
ing how great this burden of expense would be, but it would
certainly run to very large figures. I should not regard this
as a fatal objection, but I should regard the expenditure
as not merely wasted, but as actually being devoted to an
undesirable end.
I believe, however, that in this matter the Congress has an
opportunity to take a very simple but very effective step to
improve present audit practice. The most serious problem
which the auditors of the accounts of listed corporations have
to face is that audits are required at the close of the fiscal
year, and that the great majority of corporations end their
fiscal year with the calendar year, with the result that there
is an enormous congestion of work in a few months. The
existence of this condition adds to the cost and detracts from
the efficiency of audits, and it could easily be avoided by a
simple provision such as I have proposed.
In many industries, December 31 is a most unnatural time
for closing the accounts. In a few instances, this fact has
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been recognized and another closing date has been selected—
thus the packing houses generally close their accounts at the
end of October. But assumed convenience in income tax
affairs and similar considerations have led many corporations
to adopt the calendar year as their fiscal year, although ac
counts for a period ending at some other date would be more
informative. The natural closing date for automobile and
tire companies would be September 30 or October 31. For
merly all the railroads closed their accounts at June 30. A
discretionary provision such as I have suggested would admit
of distribution of the work of auditing more equally over
the entire year, thus not only reducing the cost and in
creasing the efficiency of audits, but contributing to the con
venience of the exchanges and regulating bodies and others
who are called upon to scrutinize audited accounts when
issued. I recognize that in the past audits of corporations
other than financial institutions have usually been made at
the close of the calendar year, but any inconvenience that
might result from a change in this respect would be trivial
in comparison with the advantages to be derived from a
better distribution of the work of auditing over the entire
year. Of course, the requirement of quarterly audits as pro
posed in the bill would itself result in the equal distribution
of work over the year which I regard as so desirable, but
only at an undue expense to the corporation and the in
vestors therein.

17:
I urge that the liabilities imposed by Section 17 should
be limited to cases in which the issue of false or misleading
statements is shown to be wilful, because I am convinced
that it is contrary to the public interest to impose such lia
bilities for honest error, either of fact or of judgment. Par
ticularly is this true in respect of statements which are so
largely matters of judgment as quarterly statements of profits.
It is notorious that sometimes the most truthful statement
may be the most misleading because of the unwarranted in
ferences to which it gives rise.
section
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In the long run, the main part of the financial burden
imposed by this Section will fall upon the corporation—that
is, upon the investors—whereas the benefits thereof would
accrue mainly to speculators, and I do not believe it is wise
to place burdens on investors for the benefit of speculators.
The provisions of the Section relating to the measure of
damages seem to me to be open to serious objection because,
as has already been pointed out to your Committee, they
would enable damages to be recovered which would bear no
relation to the damage actually suffered, and this seems to
me to be a vicious principle, particularly if it is to be ap
plied to cases of honest error, either of fact or of judgment.
If the Section is limited to cases of wilful misrepresentation,
I do not suppose anyone would be concerned over a possible
undue liberality in the measure of damages.
section

18:

I now turn to Section 18 (b), which confers on the regulat
ing body not only the power to prescribe the form in which
accounts shall be presented, but how profits shall be com
puted.
I have said, and it cannot be too often repeated, that ac
counts necessarily represent the result of the application of
appropriate accounting principles and judgment to facts.
Upon the soundness of the judgment employed first in choos
ing and then in applying the guiding principles depends the
value of the resulting accounts. Sound judgment can be
based only on intimate knowledge and ample experience,
and its exercise should be attended with responsibility. I
believe the provision is unwise in so far as the Sub-section
would vest the right to exercise this judgment in a commis
sion which would have no responsibility, legal or moral, for
the consequences that might ensue, and would necessarily
lay down general rules which might or might not fit the
specific cases to which they would have to be applied. I
recognize that similar powers have been vested in the Inter
state Commerce Commission and other bodies; but while our
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theories of rate regulation probably necessitated some such
procedure in the case of railroads and other public utilities,
the results are to my mind none the less unfortunate because
they may have been inevitable.
In the first place, the idea that uniformity can be attained
and the exercise of discretion rendered unnecessary by rules,
however detailed, is entirely illusory. Today, after more
than a quarter of a century of intensive development of the
accounting classifications of the Interstate Commerce Com
mission, it is still possible to produce widely different ac
counting results from a slight difference in the form of treat
ment of substantially identical transactions. Moreover,
under those classifications, while manuals running to hun
dreds of pages exist in which the treatment of innumerable
items large and small is prescribed in meticulous detail, it is
still necessary to allow the railroads to determine the
monthly charges to many important operating accounts on
the basis of budget estimates of future expenditures. In re
spect of other important elements, such as depreciation, the
practice of regulated companies still varies widely. Mean
time, the uninformed public assumes a uniformity and a
comparability between accounts of different railroads and
utilities which does not exist and can never be attained.
In the second place, uniformity necessarily means a uni
formly low standard—indeed, laws can do no more than lay
down minimum standards; higher standards can come only
as the result of the recognition of ethical and moral obliga
tions. The accounting standards of the majority of indus
trial corporations with which I am acquainted are distinctly
more conservative than those of regulated corporations.
In 1932, a committee of the American Institute of Ac
countants, as a result of a study of the general question,
rendered a report, a copy of which was put in evidence, be
fore the Senate Committee by the Chairman of the Commit
tee on Stock List of the New York Stock Exchange on Janu
ary 12, 1933. In that report, the Committee recommended
to the Exchange, inter alia, to use its influence:
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To make universal the acceptance by listed corporations
of certain broad principles of accounting which have won
fairly general acceptance, and within the limits of such broad
principles to make no attempt to restrict the right of cor
porations to select detailed methods of accounting deemed
by them to be best adapted to the requirements of their
business; but:
(a) To ask each listed corporation to cause a statement of
the methods of accounting and reporting employed by it to
be formulated in sufficient detail to be a guide to its account
ing department; to have such statement adopted by its board
so as to be binding on its accounting officers; and to furnish
such statement to the Exchange and make it available to any
stockholder on request and upon payment, if desired, of a
reasonable fee.
(b) To secure assurances that the methods so formulated
will be followed consistently from year to year and that if
any change is made in the principles or any material change
in the manner of application, the stockholders and the Ex
change shall be advised when the first accounts are presented
in which effect is given to such change.
(c) To endeavor to bring about a change in the form of
audit certificate so that the auditors would specifically report
to the shareholders whether the accounts as presented were
properly prepared in accordance with the methods of ac
counting regularly employed by the company, defined as al
ready indicated.
I believe that this method of approach to the problem
would prove more practically effective than an attempt to
institute uniform accounting. I understand, however that the
Department of Commerce is at the present time conducting
a study into the whole question of uniform accounting and
uniform statistics. Legislation on the subject does not seem
to me to form an essential part of a law the primary purpose
of which is the regulation of stock exchanges and stock ex
change practices, and I would urge that Sub-section 18 (b)
should be eliminated and the whole question dealt with on
its merits in the light of full information such as I trust will
be developed through the inquiry to which I have referred.
Respectfully submitted,
March 10, 1934.
George O. May

IX
INFORMATION FOR INVESTORS
THE TASK OF THE NEW SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION *

(1934)

the encouraging signs of the times are the first official
actions of the Securities and. Exchange Commission and the
public statements of its Chairman, which indicate a disposi
tion to deal with the problems entrusted to the Commission
in a practical manner and with a desire to be helpful to the
investor rather than to stress the punitive and restrictive
possibilities of the law.
The importance of the Commission’s attitude is obvious.
Admittedly, the possibilities of more substantial recovery
turn largely on the extent to which the demand for capital
goods can be stimulated. There is no question as to the
magnitude of the potential demand for such goods. In con
versation recently, an executive indicated that in his own
industry, three or four hundred million dollars could ad
vantageously be spent in modernizing its equipment. How
ever, the easy days in which new construction could be
financed from undivided profits have come to an end. In
the main, new construction waits on new financing; new
financing, in turn, awaits the revival of confidence, and noth
ing is so essential to a revival of confidence as an administra
tion of the new laws relating to security issues which will
not subject corporations to excessive burdens nor the honest
and well-informed executive or director to unreasonable
hazards.
The new Commission would seem to be tactically in an
extremely favorable position to give the needed impulse to
business. It is an entirely new body and is therefore unAmong

• An unpublished memorandum written in 1934.
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fettered by precedents—at the same time, it includes in its
membership two former members of the Federal Trade
Commission, who must be thoroughly familiar with the
problem and with the impracticalities of the procedure re
quired under the Securities Act of 1933. The Commission
has been granted by Congress power to make rules which
will not only bind but protect—indeed, the provision
whereby persons acting in good faith in accordance with
any regulations of the Commission are protected even
though the regulations shall subsequently be revoked or
held contrary to law, is potentially at least the most im
portant amendment contained in the Act of 1934.
The difficulties of the task of the Commission must not,
however, be underestimated. The greatest of all difficulties
is to disabuse the public mind of the idea that regulation
can secure safety of investment, and to protect it from the
promoters of corporations which have no past and very little
future, and who found it much easier to comply with the
Securities Act of 1933 than did the established business cor
porations. Another is to make the public realize what ac
counts can and do mean, and what they do not and cannot
possibly signify.
In the matter of earnings, for instance, what the investor
would really like to know is what the business is going to
earn in the future; but all that it is possible to tell him is
what the business has earned in the recent past, according
to a method of computation which is necessarily based
largely on estimates and conventions.
Ideally, the proponents of an issue, who should have made
a sufficient investigation to enable them to judge for them
selves how far results of the past are likely to be reproduced
in the future, should give to the potential investor the bene
fit of their judgment on this point. When an issuer volun
tarily gives information regarding the past he, unless he
indicates otherwise, impliedly represents to the public that
he regards the . experience of the past as a reasonable indica
tion of the probabilities for the future. When, however,
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such information is given under the compulsion of a statute,
obviously there is not the same implication. The Act, by
way of alternative, contemplates that the issuer shall give a
mass of supplementary information which would supposedly
aid an intelligent investor in forming an opinion of his own
on this vital point. The defect of this procedure is that the
potential investor, who has not the ability to make an ex
haustive study nor a financial interest that would justify him
in doing so, may be left in a position of attempting to dis
cover a needle in a haystack.
The Commission must expect that any regulations which
it may put forward will be met with criticism from two sides:
issuers of securities will complain that the regulations call
for useless information; while potential investors will com
plain that the resulting statements afford no clear or simple
guide to the merits of the investment. Experience has, it
is believed, already demonstrated the desirability of curtail
ing the volume of the historical information to be embodied
in the registration statement; but what is even more needed
is a procedure under which it would be possible for issuers
to select that part of the information still required, which
they might regard as most vital, and furnish it to potential
investors, without incurring penalties for doing so. The
fact that further information would be on file with the
Commission, and the existence of organizations created for
the purpose of analyzing such information, should form an
adequate protection against any gross abuse of such a pro
cedure in connection with reputable issues. In the long
run, whatever statutes may do, the investor will have to
depend very largely upon the character of the management
of the enterprise in which he proposes to invest, and the
character of those upon whose recommendations he makes
the investment. The whole purpose of securing information
in regard to enterprises in which investment is contemplated
is to form a basis for inferences and judgment. Unless the
inferences and judgment are wisely formed, the mass of
underlying information is valueless, if not misleading. It
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is the quality and the emphasis rather than the quantity of
information that is important.
It is to be hoped that the Commission will receive the
hearty cooperation of those best qualified to be helpful in
the performance of its task, and that its rulings will be re
ceived sympathetically. We have made great progress from
the early days of 1933, when it seemed as if justified indig
nation at then recent revelations had created a determina
tion to punish bankers and to produce a law which not even
the most ingenious lawyer could evade, which somewhat
obscured the interests of investors and the needs of the
country’s industries.
It is to be hoped and expected that the Commission will
not be led astray by the deceptive promise of uniform ac
counting, especially in view of the thoughtful and convinc
ing discussion of this question contained in the report of
the Committee on Statistical Reporting and Uniform Ac
counting for Industry to the Business Advisory and Planning
Council for the Department of Commerce. It will no doubt
use all its great influence to bring about by voluntary action
as great a degree of uniformity in different industries as is
obtainable, and will insist on consistency from year to year
in the accounting of each corporation subject to its regula
tion. Here again, however, we have the position that if an
issuer voluntarily uses a method of accounting, he implies
to the investor that it is a fair way of determining profits
as a guide to the future; but if he uses a method under com
pulsion, he makes no such implied representation.
There is little doubt that the fantastically high prices of
utility securities during the boom were partly the result of
a belief that public utility accounting, being under regula
tion, must be more reliable as a guide to investors than other
accounting. The fact, as students of the question are aware,
is that public utility accounting was and is far less conservative than that of the responsible industrial concerns which
offered their securities to the public. It is today possible
for a regulated utility to use in the sale of securities state
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ments of account which conform to the regulations of the
body to which they are subject and are therefore acceptable
under the Statute, but which would and should be rejected
if proffered to the Securities and Exchange Commission by
an industrial corporation.
The utterances of the Chairman of the Commission sug
gest that it will face in a realistic spirit each of its three major
tasks, viz.:

(1) To frame regulations which will give investors rea
sonable information about respectable issues without
placing undue burdens on the issuers;
(2) To make harder the work of those who seek to ex
ploit cupidity by worthless issues;
(3) To educate investors to discriminate between securi
ties and to appreciate both the value and the limita
tions of investment information.
It should not be forgotten that the evils of the pre-depres
sion period were mainly connected with high-pressure sales
manship, and that except in the important respect of dis
closure of the interests of those concerned in the issue, stand
ard prospectus practice here was probably better than in any
other important financial center. The Investment Bankers’
Code has done much to curb the evils connected with highpressure salesmanship and has helped to bring about a fa
vorable Situation for the creation of a sound system of dis
tribution of securities.

X

DISCUSSION OF COMMISSIONER LANDIS’ PAPER BY
GEORGE O. MAY
AT THE MEETING OF THE AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION

ON OCTOBER 9, 1935

I did not have the opportunity of knowing what Mr. Landis
was going to say until I came here this morning, so that
what I say may probably be very disjointed.
The last note that Mr. Landis struck impressed me as
much as any. Many of us differ as to the wisdom of the
scheme of the Securities Act, but I think all those who have
been in touch with the administration of it have been im
mensely impressed with the understanding, the cooperative
spirit and the efficiency with which it has been administered
by the Commission of which Mr. Landis is now the head.
That, to my mind, is the great hope, because we account
ants all know that a system is usually less important than
the way in which it is administered. A good comptroller
can make a success of a bad system and a bad comptroller
can make a mess of the best system that can be devised.
I have seen, with regret, Mr. Kennedy leave the Com
mission, and my great fear is that we may not continue to
have the benefit of the services of men like Mr. Landis as
long as we should like. There is always a call for such men,
and how long they will resist the call is hard to know, but
certainly I think I speak for all those who have to do with
the Commission in saying that I hope Mr. Landis will stay
as long as possible, because he has that great quality which
is essential in his work: that if he reaches a conclusion on
purely intellectual premises, he is quite willing to modify
it in the light of actual experience, and has no hesitation
in changing his mind. We have had to change our minds,
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and it has been very nice to find the Commission was also
willing to change its mind.
Those who came in at the beginning and realize the prob
lems are the ones who can do the most efficient work in de
veloping the administration of this task along the lines that
are essential if it is to be a success.
I particularly welcome what Mr. Landis said about a
shortened prospectus. In one of my discussions with the
Commission I suggested that the first thing to be determined
was the maximum useful length of a prospectus, and as much
material as could be fitted in that should be chosen, with the
rest eliminated. I think there is something in the thought.
If we can find some way of permitting a short prospectus I
think that would meet a lot of the criticism today because
one criticism today is, I think, on the lack of emphasis in a
prospectus.
Mr. Landis spoke of the importance of facts. I would
slightly modify his statement and suggest that the implica
tions that are drawn from the facts are the really important
things. The fact that a company earned $1,000,000 last
year is of very little importance to the future investor unless
it implies there is a prospect of its earning $1,000,000 in
another year. That is where the prospectuses of today are
deficient as I see it; they do not place any emphasis on
the essential points. There is a great deal of good informa
tion in the prospectus; there is no doubt about that. There
is even more that is good in the registration statement.
There is more brandy in a plum pudding than you could
put in a liqueur glass, but if you want to get a stimulant
you would be wiser to drink a glass of brandy than to at
tempt to digest a plum pudding; and if Mr. Landis can
develop a procedure in which those who want a glass of
brandy can get it, and those who want a plum pudding can
take it and pull out their own plums, I think that would be
a great step forward.
Mr. Landis spoke about accounting, and I think he was
a little optimistic in suggesting that it was only the ignorant
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or small investor that was still under the belief that book
values of assets could be realized without question. I think
the belief is much more widely spread than his remarks sug
gested. I welcome one thing the Commission did par
ticularly, and that was its emphasis on such points as that,
and on the fact that accounting cannot be a rigid and in
flexible thing but requires the exercise of judgment, and
must change as conditions change.
In connection with another matter which I am dealing
with, I came across two decisions of the Supreme Court
which emphasize how even in law, opinions change. In
the famous Knoxville Water case the Supreme Court talked
about the necessity of providing for depreciation of prop
erty as it occurs. That was in 1909, but if you go back to
1878—or 1876—you will find the Supreme Court saying that
it is a matter of common knowledge that people seldom set
aside any provision for depreciation, and in a case in which
a railroad sought to deduct depreciation in an accounting
with the Government, it flatly denied the right to do so and
said that only the actual amount expended could with any
propriety be deducted or charged against earnings.
Personally, I have always regretted that in the presenta
tion to Congress and to the country of the questions involved
in the Securities Act more emphasis was not placed on the
inherent dangers of what we are pleased to call investment,
and the fact that the degree of hazard in seasoned enter
prises is not going to be very materially affected by the dif
ference between the kind of requirements that we have now
and the requirements that used to exist. I wish more had
been done to discourage speculation, and I am rather afraid
that the tendency of the Securities Exchange Act is to en
courage speculation, and I think that is a bad thing. We
are always in a hurry. We want radical solutions and we
want quick results. Those characteristics, and the habit of
issuing questionnaires (which I think is one of the most per
nicious practices that has developed), are some of our na
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tional habits that seem to me to be reflected to a large extent
in the present Securities Act.
The Securities Act is defective, as I see it, in that it com
bines two inconsistent theories: (1) enacting numerous spe
cific requirements, and (2) adding a general requirement
that all material facts shall be stated. The moment you
require a whole lot of information to be stated, you take
the emphasis and implications off those statements. In the
old days no respectable accountant was willing to certify to
the statement of earnings for a prospectus for the past three
years, let us say, unless he believed that those three years
were a reasonable indication of what might be expected in
the future, and I think that an issue that put forth a state
ment of that kind implied that was a reasonable indication
of what might be expected in the future. When you are
required by law to give the three years’ figures, that implica
tion no longer exists, and I think what you are giving to
the investor in the way of additional information you are
largely taking away in the form of depriving him of the
benefit of judgment as to the implications of figures which
are often far more important than the figures themselves.
I would like in concluding, if I may, to mention one more
point. It relates to the Securities Exchange Act. I fear
that the attempt to tie together the Securities Exchange Act
and the Securities Act—the annual report and the prospectus
—is going to have many very unfortunate effects. It is again
emphasizing the point of view of the speculator rather than
the investor. The annual report is essentially historical,
and the prospectus is a statement put forward deliberately
to induce people to buy. The annual report is not so in
tended. It is a report of stewardship by the stewards of a
business. The attempt to convert it into a new edition of
a prospectus is, to my mind, fraught with very serious dan
gers, and I think ought to be given a great deal of considera
tion. Prospectuses, I think, will become less informative if
that policy is pursued, because already one finds a disposi
tion on the part of executives to be unwilling to present

122

REGULATION OF SECURITIES

figures in a prospectus in any different form from that pre
sented in an annual report. In the old days the standard
practice was to make such adjustments as were necessary to
convert figures in an annual report which were part of a
historical statement into figures that were appropriate in a
document designed to sell securities. • I would like to em
phasize very strongly the difference between an annual report
and a prospectus in that respect, and urge it should be kept
constantly in mind in any regulations under the Act.
I will conclude my remarks as I began them, if I may, by
asking you to believe that nothing that I have said is in
tended to be in the nature of hostile criticism of the acts
of the Commission. I think I can speak for all of the ex
perts with whom I have been in touch in saying that we
regard its administration as highly efficient and sympa
thetic. My only fears are: First, that we may not be able
to retain the services of those who are now giving us such
excellent service; and, secondly, that there is always a danger
that the efficiency of administration may blind us to defects
of the law or the system that is being administered. I stress
those two notes because I had a good deal of opportunity
to see the working of the Revenue Act of 1917, which, as
it left Congress, was about as unworkable a piece of legisla
tion as was ever presented to an administrative group. A
very able group of volunteers, called together by the present
Secretary of Commerce, and headed by Dr. Adams, whose
services in the field of taxation we can never too highly
praise, undertook that administration and did a perfectly
remarkable piece of work. Then the emergency passed and
those men went out of office. The administration fell into
less competent hands—into the hands of people with less
interest in accomplishing something really worth while, with
the result that much of the work of that early group was
reversed or destroyed. The damage was mitigated in that
case because it was a tax bill for only a single year, but it
brought home to me very strongly the dangers that are in
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herent in, allowing an unsound system to continue because
it is being well administered.
While I think there is much that is good in the Act, there
is much yet to my mind that needs to be eliminated, and I
trust that Mr. Landis and his colleagues will remain in office
at least long enough to make the changes which I am sure
they, better than most people, must realize to be necessary.

PART V
TAXATION

A. GENERAL
I
THE TAX MAZE *
(1925)

I
Maze.—A structure consisting of a network of winding
and intercommunicating paths and passages arranged in be
wildering complexity, so that without guidance it is difficult
to find one’s way in it.—Oxford Dictionary.

erection of the statue of Alexander Hamilton in front
of the main Treasury Building in Washington raises the
question who is to occupy the corresponding position in re
lation to the new Treasury Annex, devoted to the uses of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. The action of Congress on the
Mellon tax plan last year suggests that the claims of the
present Secretary would not—at this time, at least—be favor
ably considered. It may be that, rather than undertake the
invidious task of passing on the relative claims of presentday statesmen, such as Representative Volstead and Secretary
McAdoo, it would be safer to resort to classical mythology.
A dethroned Bacchus is the first idea that suggests itself, but
for a Bureau that includes the Income Tax unit as well as
the Prohibition unit is there not at least as strong a claim
to be made for Daedalus? And it was the same Congress
which by the Volstead Act dethroned Bacchus that in its tax
law outbuilt Daedalus. In maintaining its supremacy Con
gress has been at this disadvantage: that the labyrinth of
Daedalus was designed only to entoil new victims, none of
whom escaped to return and make a second attempt to solve
its intricacies, whereas Congress had to prepare for advenThe
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turers who. would return year after year. It must be ad
mitted that hitherto Congress has been extraordinarly suc
cessful in introducing new complexities with sufficient fre
quency to preclude any possibility of victims’ acquiring
familiarity with its maze; but is it right to ask or even to
permit Congress to continue this effort indefinitely? Should
not Congress now attempt to achieve something of the
breadth and simplicity of the architecture of Athens, instead
of continuing to emulate the complexities of Crete?
Those who are compelled to study the tax maze find in it
an extraordinary series of contradictions. One of the most
striking is seen in the lengths to which Congress goes on
some points to define its purposes and to avoid leaving any
discretion to the administrators of the law, and in the enor
mous range of discretion left to the administration on other
points, with utterly inadequate provision made to ensure
that such discretion shall be exercised on adequate informa
tion and competent advice. Pages of an Act are devoted to
explanations on such points as when an organization is a
reorganization and when a dividend is not a dividend, and
most specific rules are laid down for the guidance of the
Commissioner on such matters, yet a brief clause in the Act
may be the sole authority of and the sole limitation on the
Commissioner in dealing with subjects of vast importance.
That the impossibility of dispensing with discretion in
administration is realized by some in Congress, but not by
others, is indicated by the following colloquy between mem
bers of the Senate Committee investigating the Bureau of
Internal Revenue:
Senator Couzens. But we want to know what the ques
tions are at issue so we can pass a law to cover such cases,
instead of leaving it discretionary.
Senator Ernst. I tell you, Senator, you will not be able
to pass a law or laws that will cover all the questions that
will arise in these cases, even though you pass laws from now
until the end of time.
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II

In the Act of 1918, in which the rates of tax ran as high as
82.4 per cent on corporations, deductions were authorized
for a reasonable allowance for depreciation, based on the
value of property at March 1, 1913. This simple clause im
plied the making or approving by the Commissioner of valu
ations of practically all the depreciable business property in
the United States that was in existence at March 1, 1913: a
problem in valuation far greater and of far more immediate
and practical effect than the valuation of the railroads, on
which the Interstate Commerce Commission and the rail
roads have spent upwards of ten years and upwards of
$100,000,000 without completing the task. A provision for
the amortization of the cost of war facilities entailed the
even more difficult task of deciding what these facilities
would be worth at some time in the future, and under con
ditions not easily capable of anticipation.
A clause allowing a deduction for depletion of natural
resources implied a similar task of valuation as at March 1,
1913, in relation to the entire natural resources of the coun
try; and in the Act of 1921 this task was complicated by the
allowance of a further deduction in determining the taxable
income from operations of oil and mining properties, in
respect of the appreciation in value resulting from the dis
covery of minerals in hitherto unproven areas. This allow
ance not only ran counter to the whole general theory of the
law and placed the industries concerned in a specially fa
vored position, but it also created an administrative task of
the utmost difficulty.
The discretion given to the Commissioner in regard
to methods of valuing inventories involved the decision
whether millions of dollars should be accounted for as in
come in years in which they would be subject to a tax of 50
per cent or more, or in years in which they would be subject
to little or no tax.
The burden of dealing with these problems was imposed
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on a Bureau that had been formed only a few years earlier
and had been administering a tax so low—1 or 2 per cent—
as to be a matter of comparative indifference to taxpayers.
Yet Congress created no new machinery to enable the Bureau
to cope with its enormously increased burdens and responsi
bilities.
Not only do these and similar problems in taxation in
volve in the aggregate billions of dollars, but there are a
large number of individual cases in which millions or tens
of millions are involved. In such cases the taxpayer can
afford to lavish money and skill on the study of every phase
of the case, and on the development of a form of presenta
tion that will bring out the strong and minimize or conceal
the weak points. Consider for a moment the way in which
these cases are finally decided: on the one side the taxpayer
with millions at stake, familiar with every strength and
weakness of his position, advised possibly by an expert whose
compensation is contingent on results and who is therefore
personally interested in the outcome to the extent of tens or
hundreds of thousands of dollars; on the other side, the
Government representatives without the skill, the time, or
the organization to develop the case adequately, serving for
a low salary, with little prospect in the way of promotion,
with no interest in the result of the controversy except to
avoid prejudicing their position in the Bureau—unless, per
chance, there be hope of appearing some day on the other
side of the table for other taxpayers—and possessing no ele
ment of strength except the power of decision. It is in
evitable that, in a large number of cases, either the Govern
ment’s representatives will be overborne by the weight of
the taxpayer’s case, which they are unable to answer, or that,
realizing this inability but feeling that it may be due less to
the validity of the taxpayer’s contentions than to the inade
quacy of the Government’s means of refuting them, they will
fall back on their power of decision and take an arbitrary
position without attempting to justify it. In either case it
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is unlikely that even approximate justice will have been
done.
It would be idle to suggest that the blame rightly attaches
to Congress in all the many cases in which the Bureau of
Internal Revenue has been subjected to legitimate criticism,
just as it would be unfair to ignore the large amount of ear
nest, intelligent, and often really admirable work that has
been performed in that Bureau.
In the circumstances outlined, however, a Senatorial in
vestigation was hardly needed to show that the administra
tion of the law has been far from perfect, or to prove that
the administration has resulted in gross inequalities between
taxpayers. It was obvious from the first that this must be
so, but no more obvious than that the high tax laws were
bound to operate with gross inequality, even if they could
be perfectly administered. For instance: capital is a factor
in producing income in almost every business activity, its
influence varying in degrees by infinitely small gradations
from practical insignificance to paramount importance. Yet
in the Excess Profits Tax Law (1917) Congress attempted
to draw an arbitrary line and to divide businesses into two
classes, those in which capital is a material income-producing
factor, and those in which it is not. Not only so, but it
actually enacted the law in such a way that the minimum
tax—8 per cent—fell on income derived from every business
falling on one side of the arbitrary line of cleavage, and the
highest rate of all—perhaps 60 per cent—fell on those busi
nesses which happened to lie just on the other side of the
line. In doing so it enacted a provision which was bound
to create the grossest inequalities.
All this, however, while regrettable, was largely inevitable
and, viewed in its proper perspective, constitutes only one
of the minor injustices of war. Why one taxpayer should
retain 40 per cent and another 80 per cent of the profit he
made out of the war is a trivial question compared with the
question why either should retain any profit when the soldier
in the line suffered hardship, injury, and possibly loss of
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life, for a mere pittance. The only possible answer is, in
both cases, that those measures had to be adopted which
seemed at the time most likely to expedite the winning of
the war and the termination of the whole series of injustices
that were its inevitable accompaniment. What is both re
grettable and preventable is that six years after the Armistice
so many of the important tax-controversies should be still
unsettled, and that, in regard to personal income taxation
at least, our law should still operate in the same hit-or-miss
fashion, and with inequalities almost as great as any that
existed at the height of war taxation.
In liquidating the assets of a business the course most com
monly followed is to realize in the ordinary way as much of
the assets as can be disposed of within a reasonable time,
and then to get rid of the remnants by some unusual and
sweeping procedure. This analogy might well have been
followed in the settlement of war taxes; and there is little
doubt that even now the disposition of the outstanding tax
cases of the war years on broad lines would prove far more
beneficial, both to the Government and to the taxpayers,
than the continuance of the present weary process, and
would be likely to come just as near a theoretically correct
solution. Competent and disinterested advisers have re
peatedly suggested in the past the constitution of a commis
sion of high quality and large powers to dispose of all pend
ing tax-questions relating to the war years, and the sugges
tion still holds the field, as presenting the best prospect of
a satisfactory solution of this problem which the war has
left us.
. The settlement of large tax-cases calls, not for fine distinc
tions and meticulous accuracy, but for breadth and soundness
-of judgment based on wide experience, and for courage; and
it would have been advantageous to taxpayers and the Gov
ernment alike if the major cases could have been dealt with
promptly and finally by a body possessing those qualifica
tions. The number of cases in which taxpayers have paid
substantially more in taxes for the war years than they were
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prepared five years ago to pay is undoubtedly small com
pared with the number of cases in which they have paid, or
will pay, far less than they would then gladly have paid in
final settlement. Taxpayers in the aggregate have probably
lost as much in expense and in diversion of thought and
effort to tax matters as they have saved in taxes, and the
country as a whole is the poorer, not only for this wasted
effort, but for the demoralizing effects of tax controversies
as they are now too often conducted.

III
As regards current taxation: while the problems of valua
tion which have been referred to still remain, their impor
tance in the case of corporations has become much reduced
since the tax on corporations has been stabilized at the rela
tively low level of 12.5 per cent. In the field of personal
income taxation, however, the rates of tax are still high
enough to make the inequalities in its incidence a serious
matter for those affected.
Here again is contradiction. One observes how wide the
net is cast to catch even the smallest of fish, and next one
observes how large are the holes through which even the
big fish may escape.
The chief executive of a foreign company who passes
through the United States on his way around the world is
held up at his port of embarkation and, because during his
stay in the country he has devoted a few days to calling on
agents or customers of his firm and discussing business with
them, is told that he must pay income tax on a correspond
ing proportion of his annual salary, as being income derived
from sources within the United States. He might be par
doned for characterizing our system as closely approaching
conformity to the first two definitions of Euclid, and con
sisting of a law having length without breadth, administered
by persons having position but not magnitude.
A nurse, not yet naturalized, who upon going abroad with
her employer finds that in case she might not come back she
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must pay fourteen dollars income tax, which she is assured
will be refunded to her if she returns, and who is told on
her return that there is no appropriation out of which her
payment can be refunded, may not unnaturally feel that
the United States is engaged in a rather petty business.
Nor, surely, could any doubts regarding the meticulous
care with which the law is administered survive a reading
of the recently published decision which, first holding that
a cash allowance to an officer for uniforms was income to
the recipient and the cost of the uniforms not an allowable
deduction, went on to specify that epaulets and campaign
bars were business expense, but cap devices and chin-straps
were not.
Such cases indicate how wide is the net and how small the
mesh. On the other hand, the recent publication of tax re
turns is in itself a sufficient demonstration of the size of the
holes.
No one familiar with American business or social life, who
has given even the most casual perusal to the published lists,
can entertain any longer the belief that our present incometax law possesses the basic justification of an income-tax sys
tem, that it levies taxation substantially in accordance with
ability to pay. Any inferences that might be drawn from
the published lists regarding an individual taxpayer might
be wholly unfair, because under our system an individual
of large regular income may have been liable for only a very
small tax, by reason of capital losses or other factors deter
mining his tax liability. But when name after name has
set opposite it a tax figure which is ridiculously small in
proportion to the obvious income and ability to pay of the
taxpayer, even the most ardent advocates of the policy that
has inspired our laws must admit that those laws have not
up to now been effective in taxing large incomes with any
thing like the degree of universality and equality that is
necessary to justify their existence and continuance.
Though the recent publication of tax returns has led to
a clearer and more general realization of the inequalities of

THE TAX MAZE

135

personal income taxation, it was not needed to demonstrate
their existence. As Secretary Houston said in his annual re
port for 1920;

Tax returns and statistics are demonstrating what it
should require no statistical evidence to prove . . . the fact
remains that to retain such rates in the tax law is to cling to
a shadow while relinquishing the substance.
While the rates when he spoke were higher than those of
today, his comment is still largely applicable. But though
Secretary Glass and Secretary Mellon have taken the same
stand, Congress has refused to heed their advice and has
continued to impose high rates of tax which in fact are,
broadly speaking, not paid as contemplated by Congress, ex
cept by those whose income is earned and those possessors
of investment income who are unwilling to adopt ordinary
methods of avoidance.
It may be worth while briefly to consider some of these
methods.
IV

Apart from the creation of trusts, the three principal meth
ods of avoidance are, perhaps: investments in tax-exempt
securities; losses, real or artificial; and the transfer of prop
erty to corporations that pay few or no dividends. The crea
tion of trusts seems to stand on a somewhat different footing
from the others, since it does involve the taxpayer’s divesting
himself of property, or at least of the income from property,
though it may be in favor of a near relative.
Of the three remaining methods of avoidance, investment
in tax-exempt securities is the surest, in that the protection
it affords is based on the Constitution, and therefore the tax
payer resorting to it is not under the necessity of keeping a
weather eye constantly lifting for any action of Congress that
might affect his status. On the other hand, though the cost
is small in proportion to the tax saved in the case of a
wealthy man, it is nevertheless substantial.
Hence, while many prefer the freedom from both anxiety
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and tax which tax-exempt securities afford, and are willing
to pay the price, others prefer to risk hazards of the tax in
an effort to secure immunity at low cost. And those who
determine thus to venture into the labyrinth readily find
daughters of Minos who know something of its secret and
are willing to aid them; though, warned perhaps by the fate
of Ariadne, they may insist that their reward be ample and
well assured before that aid is given.
The success which has attended such efforts in the case of
owners of investment income is notorious, and seems to have
aroused the envy of some who have paid a higher price for
immunity from tax by going into the tax-exempt field. Thus
we have the spectacle of occupants of the invulnerable shelter
of the tax-exempt stimulating and endeavoring to direct the
attack on those who have found other and more precarious
shelter.
In the law of 1924 Congress largely deprived the second
method, that of taking losses, of its efficiency by limiting the
saving in tax in respect of losses to 12.5 per cent of the loss;
before doing so, however, it limited the tax on capital gains
to 12.5 per cent, thus abandoning the attempt to levy high
surtaxes on this form of income.
The third method, of transferring property to corporations
which pay few or no dividends, continues to flourish, not
withstanding that it has been the special objective of the at
tack of a large section of Congress. Each new Revenue Act
has contained a new provision for taxing undistributed
profits, but there is little reason to think that even the latest
effort will prove generally effective.
It will be observed that these various methods of avoid
ance, as well as the limitation of tax oh capital gains to 12.5
per cent, ease the burden on the capitalist, but afford no
means of escape to those who derive their incomes from their
own efforts or the products of their own brains, and not from
accumulated capital. Indeed, among the many contradic
tions found in the law, perhaps the most striking of all is
that under legislation admittedly framed, not with an eye
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single to fiscal requirements, but with the avowed purpose
of striking at the rich, the burden of the tax should in actual
operation fall most heavily on earners who have little or
nothing in the way of accumulated savings; and that special
relief should be granted, not to those who are adding to the
wealth of the country by their researches, their inventions,
and their toil, but to the beneficiaries of unearned increment
and to those whose profits are derived from the exhaustion
of the natural wealth of the country. True, Congress in the
Act of 1924 pretended to give relief to earners, as urged by
Secretary Mellon, but the relief was so paltry as to be a
mockery.
Some optimists may think that patient revision of the tax
laws would in the course of time suffice to make the present
high rates generally effective and equal in their incidence;
they can, however, have little conception of the actual work
ing of this laborious process of trial and error. A hole in the
law is detected and a provision is enacted for the purpose of
stopping that hole. To the extent that the provision is re
troactive the action taken may prove immediately effective,
and as our tax laws from 1913 to date have been retroactive
to the extent of a minimum period of six months in the case
of the law of 1924, and a maximum period of fourteen
months in the case of the law of 1913, the extent of this effec
tiveness may be considerable, though its justice may be open
to question.
The first effect of such a provision—aside from possible
retroactivity—is a temporary suspension of the class of activi
ties aimed at, while the tax lawyers, who include in their
numbers some of the keenest minds in the country, decide
on a modified course of procedure that will avoid the letter
of the provision. Once such a procedure is developed, it
quickly becomes common property among the class affected.
The Government, however, remains in ignorance of its adop
tion, perhaps, until it comes to light two or three years later,
in the course of the review of the returns in which the effects
of the new provisions of the law were expected to be made
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manifest. When this happens the dreary round begins again,
and it will continue so long as Congress refuses to recognize
what successive Secretaries of the Treasury of both parties
have pointed out—that it is attempting the impossible.
The various revisions of Section 220 imposing a tax on un
distributed profits have caused stockholders much anxiety
but little or no taxes, and there are large groups of rich men
on whom the high surtax rates have been not a direct but an
indirect burden. Undoubtedly the indirect burdens have
been substantial. One form of the burden is the loss of
income resulting from substituting tax-exempt securities for
other forms of investment yielding higher returns, another
the cost of advice on methods of avoidance. Another form
occurs where the taxpayer transfers his property to a corpora
tion; in such cases the difference between the normal tax on
individuals of 6 per cent and the corporation rate of 12.5
per cent together with the capital-stock tax, which has been
estimated to be equivalent to a tax of 1.5 per cent on income,
may be regarded as in some measure a commutation of the
surtax rates, and the amount, say 8 per cent, is not incon
siderable.
In this case the corresponding benefit does accrue to the
Government, and the taxation of corporations at a rate sub
stantially higher than that on individuals is perhaps the most
practically effective measure for higher taxation of the rich
that Congress has adopted, though not primarily designed for
that purpose.
Undoubtedly, also, the reduction of the tax on capital
gains to 12.5 per cent has resulted in large sums being taxed
at that rate which had avoided, and would have continued
to avoid, taxation, at the regular surtax rates. Taxpayers
controlling sources of income who were unwilling to take
steps that would subject them to high surtaxes have consum
mated transactions that have resulted in their receiving as
capital gains substantially what they were unwilling to re
ceive as regular income. The capital gains reported in re
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turns of over $1,000,000 in 1922 were greater than the entire
net income reported in such returns in 1921.
Apart from their indirect effects and regarded solely as sur
taxes, however, it is not putting the case too strongly to say
that the higher rates have been as capricious and generally
ineffective in their incidence as personal property taxes ordi
narily are. So far as they have been effective they have fallen
—and still fall—most heavily on earned income. Indeed, as
advisers such as Dr. T. S. Adams pointed out to the com
mittees in charge of the 1924 Bill, the reduction of 25 per
cent in respect of earned income, which was urged by Mr.
Mellon, would not have put its beneficiaries in a preferred
position, but would merely have helped to redress the dis
crimination against them which in practice resulted from the
law of 1921 and continues today.

v
The question has been and will be asked, why the high
surtaxes should not be made more generally effective. It is
impossible to deal fully with this question in a short article,
but the basic reason is the elusive and Protean character of
income. When and in what amounts income arises from
a series of transactions are largely questions of opinion and
business practice—questions, moreover, which cannot be sat
isfactorily answered unless the substance rather than the
form is allowed to control the decision.
Great Britain attains a certain measure of success by re
stricting its taxation to recurring income, and laying down
only very broad principles, which are administered by a
highly trained and relatively well-paid civil service, vested
with a very wide discretion. We, in reaching out for more,
aiming perhaps at a higher ideal have only too often, in
Secretary Houston’s language, “grasped the shadow and
missed the substance.”
Further, the attempts to set forth in legislation what pre
cise transactions of a non-recurring character give rise to tax
able income result mainly in the great bulk of essentially
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similar transactions taking a slightly different form, not cov
ered by the letter of the law.
If the maximum tax on individuals were reduced to a rate
reasonably close to the corporation income-tax rate, whole
sale avoidance would cease, simplicity would become pos
sible, and the law would acquire that substantial equality of
incidence and that universality which it now so completely
lacks. Such a policy, it is believed, would be entirely com
patible with the fiscal requirements of the United States and,
like the reduction in tax on capital gains to 12.5 per cent,
would bring under the surtaxes large amounts of income
which up to now have escaped them.
Even, however, if surtaxes be substantially reduced, we
should recognize that in some future emergency high taxes
on income may become a national necessity, and should en
deavor to put our income-tax system on a basis which would
enable high tax-rates to be levied more simply, more equi
tably, and more effectively than has been accomplished under
recent and existing laws.
Prohibition of future issues of tax-exempt securities is
clearly one of the first and most important requirements to
this end. No part of the nation’s wealth should be in the
position in which tax-exempt securities now are, that of be
ing immune from taxation in any national emergency, how
ever great.
A marked advance would also be made if a clearer concep
tion and a closer agreement could be reached on just what
is income and when it emerges. At present commercial and
accounting ideas on these questions are at variance with the
judicial decisions, with some economists holding still differ
ent views. Much of the inconsistency and vacillation in the
income-tax administration may be attributed to differences
between the legal and the accounting schools of thought, and
to fluctuations in the degree of influence exercised by mem
bers of the two schools.
Our general theory of income taxation differs very ma
terially from that of the much older British system, with
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which comparisons are most commonly made; but there is
little reason to suppose that the differences are the result of
careful consideration leading to the conviction that our
methods are sounder, more practicable, or better adapted to
our conditions. If our legislators found their inspiration
in England, the home of the income tax, it must have been in
the maze of Hampton Court, not at Somerset House.
Great Britain, it must be realized, possesses a number of
natural advantages in imposing income taxation, such as the
single Parliament, the absence of any constitutional limita
tions, the compactness and homogeneity of its territory; it
also has the advantages of experience and a long-established
civil service of high quality arid traditions. Further, its
income-tax system antedates the modern industrial develop
ment, which, therefore, in its growth has adapted itself to an
existing income-tax scheme, whereas we are imposing an
income-tax law on an already highly developed industrial
and commercial organization. Those who have studied the
proceedings of the last British Commission to report on in
come tax will appreciate how important a factor this is con
sidered to be by British income-tax authorities. In these cir
cumstances, the fact that British taxation has been restricted
as it has possesses a special significance. It is only fair to
point out that our freedom from tradition perhaps makes us
more ready to deal with new issues in novel ways; and that
our tax law, for instance, seems to be a distinct advance over
the British on such matters as relief from double taxation,
reciprocal exemption from taxation of international trans
portation, and taxation of income from international trade
in general.
At present our law is being developed by court decisions
dealing with single aspects of the question, the taxpayers’
views on which are usually presented fully and skillfully with
a view to securing the decision and without regard to the
effect on the law as a whole. The Government’s counsel have
neither the time nor the technical advisers to enable them
to present such cases in their proper relation to the whole
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subject of income tax, if indeed they are able to present the
particular aspect involved in any given case with a skill or
thoroughness approaching that of their opponents.
Court decisions, moreover, are governed largely by earlier
decisions, rendered in a comparatively early stage of our com
mercial development and under conditions wholly unlike
those now existing.
If the income-tax law could be taken out of politics and a
body created in which the legislature, the administration,
the interested professions—law, engineering, and accounting
—the business world, the economist, and the individual tax
payers could all be represented, a new and sounder under
standing of the problem might be attained, which would be
of permanent value to the country.
If we cannot revise our income-tax system on its present
lines so as to make it reasonably equitable and simple, and
so as to rid us of methods of avoidance that are demoralizing
to taxpayers and that make a mockery of the law, let us seek
some new approach to the whole question. No better time
could be selected for such a search than the present, when the
country is prosperous and the Treasury overflowing, and yet
the memories of the problems of war taxation are fresh in
our minds.
VI

Summing up these reflections, the chief evils of our in
come-tax situation are, perhaps: the unsettled taxes for the
war period, an unsound surtax system, and a law that at
tempts to be too specific on some points while leaving far
more important decisions on other points to the adminis
tration—these last two leading to bewildering complexity, to
wholesale and successful avoidance, and hence to gross dis
crimination.
The suggestions to which they lead are neither novel nor
revolutionary; they are, first: that even now a commission
to clear up the old war taxes would be desirable; second: that,
unless and until surtaxes at the present rates can be admin
istered with a reasonable degree of equality and generality
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of application, they should be reduced to a level at which
those essentials of a sound tax system can be attained; and
third: that the issue should be taken out of politics and a
highly competent, nonpartisan body should be created—quite
distinct from any body created to deal with the war taxes—
in which the various elements of our community interested
or able to make valuable contributions would be represented,
to study the whole subject and to suggest revisions of our
general scheme to make it simpler and more effective, and
particularly to fit it for the strains that may require to be
imposed on it in some great emergency in the future.
To accomplish this end we. must impart breadth to the
law instead of making it an ever longer and more intricate
maze. If, further, we could revise our civil service, so as to
make it appeal to men of greater magnitude than we can
possibly hope to attract and hold—except in a small number
of cases—under our present system, we should have laid the
foundations of a sound income-tax system, which would be
the mainstay of the Federal fiscal policy in normal times and
would be invaluable in times of emergency. The only losers
would be those “taxperts” who look forward to a long run
of the present tragi-comedy, in which they may profitably
play the role of Ariadne to the Daedalus of Congress.

II

THE TAXATION OF CAPITAL GAINS *
(1922)
treatment of capital gains under a steeply graduated in
come-tax law constitutes one of the most difficult problems
in fiscal legislation, as is sufficiently evidenced by the changes
contained in successive revenue acts, impartial students of
the subject will, it is believed, agree that the present state
of the law is not satisfactory, and among the remedies which
are receiving consideration is the abandonment of the taxa
tion of capital gains and of the allowance of capital losses
as a deduction from taxable income. In Great Britain,
where capital gains have not heretofore been taxed or capi
tal losses allowed as deductions, the question is being debated
whether some change in the law is not necessary on account
of the avoidance of taxation of what is essentially income
by clothing it in the garb of capital. The time, therefore,
seems opportune for a discussion of the problem.
The

1. THE NATURE OF CAPITAL GAINS

By capital gain is meant the profit upon the realization
of assets otherwise than in the ordinary course of business,
this profit being the excess of the proceeds of realization over
the cost of the property realized.
In considering the proper treatment of capital gains under
an income-tax law, it is desirable to keep in mind three
different causes which may make a capital gain possible.
These are:
(1) Change in absolute value due to natural growth or
similar causes.
(2) Change in relative value of property in comparison
with other property, due to external causes.
* Harvard Business Review, Vol. I (October, 1922). Cf. below, pp. 319-335.
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(3) Change in the money value of property due to depre
ciation or appreciation of currency.

In most cases, of course, a capital gain is due to a combi
nation of these influences, some perhaps operating in a fav
orable, others in an unfavorable, direction. All three, for
instance, operating favorably might be found on the sale
in the spring of 1919 of a privately owned barrel of whisky
bought as new whisky in 1913. There would be first the
increase in absolute value due to aging, second the increase
in relative value due to the legislation enacted in January,
1919, and third the increase in money value, common to
nearly all property, resulting from the expansion of currency
and credit during the war.
Looking at the problem from the standpoint of principle,
the gain due to the first cause is clearly only a special form
of investment income and therefore naturally comes within
the purview of an income tax. Gains due to the second cause
are real gains, and therefore fairly taxable, even if not ordi
nary income. Indeed, if discrimination in favor of earned
income as against investment income is well founded, it
may well be argued that these gains from unearned incre
ment should be regarded as less entitled to consideration
than ordinary recurring investment income.
Gains from the third cause are more apparent than real.
There would seem to be no true income or gain from sell
ing property at double its cost, if everything which can be
bought with the proceeds is also selling at double its former
price. This has been a common situation in recent years and
has been complicated by the factor of involuntary sale or
realization. In recent tax laws attempts have been made to
meet it: first, by replacement fund provisions under which
no taxable profit is deemed to be derived from an involuntary
sale if the proceeds are put aside to be employed in replac
ing the property; and, secondly, by the provisions in the 1921
law permitting exchanges of property without any liability
to taxes as a result thereof.
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IL RELATION OF CAPITAL LOSSES TO TAXATION OF CAPITAL
GAINS

As a practical proposition it would be impossible to ana
lyze every capital gain into its component elements and ap
ply different rules to different elements. In particular it
would be a hopeless task to convince the average taxpayer
who had completed a transaction showing a loss, that he
should pay a tax on the transaction because the loss was
found upon analysis to be made up of an increase of value
due to the first or second of the three causes above mentioned
and therefore taxable, offset by a larger loss arising from
the third cause and therefore outside the scope of the tax
law.
The alternatives, therefore, are to tax all gains or to ex
clude all gains, except such as can be covered by simple
rules. In considering the question whether capital gains
should be taxed, the successive points which arise are:
(1) Is it in principle desirable to tax capital gains?
(2) If so, should capital losses be allowed as a deduction
from taxable income?
(3) If both the first and second questions are answered
in the affirmative, how serious are the dangers of
evasion and how far is it practicable to guard against
them?
It must be understood that the danger of avoidance is not
disposed of by excluding capital gains and losses from the
scope of the income tax, as is evidenced by the movement in
England already referred to. A majority of economists
would probably take the view that capital gains are not a
proper subject for taxation under the guise of an income
tax. Apart from this technical point, however, it would seem
that in principle capital gains would form a most appropri
ate subject of taxation, and the Supreme Court has held that
they can be taxed as income. Some theoretical considera
tions have already been briefly recited. Among other rea
sons which would have weight with a statesman as well as
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with a politician is the fact that the great accumulations of
wealth by individuals in the country have largely been the
result of capital gains, and the salary- or wage-earning
classes might quite naturally feel that they were being un
justly discriminated against if they were taxed on their sala
ries or wages and the large capital gains of the very wealthy
should escape taxation. Moreover, even if the taxation of
capital gains be regarded as necessarily involving the allow
ance of capital losses, it would seem that treating both on the
footing of income would ordinarily be expedient in a de
veloping country in which naturally the capital gains would
far exceed the capital losses. This proposition is, however,
subject to the important qualification that it holds only so
long as the form and degree of taxation are not such as to
discourage the realization of gains and encourage the taking
of losses, and thus to cause a serious disturbance of the
normal balance between gains and losses.
Turning to the second point, while it may seem that in
justice the rules regarding gains and losses in a tax law
should be as nearly as possible similar, it may be recalled
that this principle has not usually been applied in our in
come-tax laws. Even in the case of ordinary business, until
the enactment of the present law, a taxpayer who made a
profit on trading in one year and an exactly similar loss in
another paid tax on the profit and obtained no relief in re
spect of the loss. As regards losses not incurred in the tax
payer’s trade or business, the Act of 1913 allowed no deduc
tion and the Act of 1916 allowed a deduction only to the
amount of the gains of a similar character included in the
same return. The tax rates under these Acts were, how
ever, small as we now reckon tax rates, and the problem
becomes difficult only when taxes are large. In 1917 when
the maximum rate of tax was increased from 15 to 67 per
cent, the limitation on the deduction of losses contained in
the Act of 1916 was continued; but in 1918 when the maxi
mum tax was still further increased to 77 per cent, all limita
tions on deductions of capital losses were removed.
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Even under this law if a taxpayer pursued the even tenor
of his way undisturbed, taking capital gains or capital losses
as his judgment of present and prospective values dictated,
and entirely uninfluenced by tax considerations, he was not
in the position that tax relief resulting from a loss was ex
actly equivalent to the tax burden resulting from an equal
gain. Such a taxpayer, if he incurred losses, was thereby
relieved from surtax at the rates he would have paid on
his regular income; if on the other hand he made a profit, he
paid surtaxes at the higher rates applying to income in ex
cess of his regular income.
Thus, to take the case of a man who had a regular income
in each of the years 1919 and 1920 of $50,000 and sold one
investment at a capital loss of $20,000 on December 31, 1919,
and another at a capital gain of $20,000 on January 1, 1920;
in 1919 he paid on an income of $30,000 a total tax of $3,890,
in 1920 on an income of $70,000 a total tax of $16,490, to
gether $20,380. If, however, both transactions had fallen
in the same year he would have paid on an income of $50,000 in each year a tax of $9,190; a total for the two years
of $18,380, and his capital gain, therefore, cost him in taxa
tion $2,000 more than he saved on his capital loss though
the tax rates were the same in both years.
However, this discrimination against the taxpayer was of
relatively minor consequence compared with the whole
sale loss to the Government resulting from the fact that
taxpayers liable to heavy rates of surtax very generally re
frained from taking profits, but not from taking losses. It is
impossible now to estimate the loss of taxes which resulted
from this disturbance of the normal policy of investors, but
it must have been enormous. At the same time transfers
which were desirable from the broad standpoint of public
welfare were retarded or prevented. Men of advanced years,
who were anxious to turn over their business affairs to
younger and more vigorous men, were deterred from doing
so by the tax which would have fallen upon them in the
event of a sale, and in innumerable ways the ordinary course
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of business was affected by the artificial restraint on sales at
a profit and the encouragement of sales at a loss.
To meet some phases of the problem, extensive new pro
visions were introduced in the Act of 1921, mainly in two
forms: (1) the limitation of the tax on capital gains in the
case of investments carried more than two years to 12½ per
cent, and (2) provisions under which capital assets could be
exchanged rather than sold without any tax being incurred.
Under this law the rule that what is sauce for the goose is
sauce for the gander invoked by taxpayers in support of the
removal of the limitation on deductible losses in 1918 was
waived in favor of the taxpayer. Logically, the converse of
the first provision just referred to would have been that a
taxpayer sustaining a capital loss should pay the ordinary
tax on his regular income and deduct therefrom 12½ per cent
of the amount of his capital loss. The Act, however, permits
him to save the maximum surtax he would otherwise have
paid. Thus to use the same illustration as before, under the
existing law a taxpayer with a regular income of $50,000, a
capital gain of $20,000 in one year, and a capital loss of $20,000 in the next, pays over the two years $2,800 less than if
both transactions had occurred in the same year.
In the case of the very wealthy, therefore, the present law
makes it distinctly advantageous to take capital gains one
year and pay a maximum tax of 12 per cent thereon and take
capital losses in another year, saving the maximum surtax to
which the taxpayer would otherwise have been liable.
The position in regard to the exchanges is even more un
favorable to the Government. A taxpayer holding stock of
the A. B. Company desires to dispose of it and reinvest in
the stock of the C. D. Company. If the present market value
of the stock of the A. B. Company is less than its cost to him
he sells this stock and buys the stock of the C. D. Company
and is entitled to a deduction from his taxable income of the
loss on sale. If, however, the market value of the stock of the
A. B. Company is above cost, he arranges an exchange of this
stock for stock of the C. D. Company with a cash adjustment
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and under the law he derives no taxable gain and therefore
pays no additional tax.
From this brief summary it will be seen that in less than 10
years the relation between the provisions regarding capital
gains and those regarding Capital losses has been changed
from one of marked disparity in favor of the revenue to an
even greater disparity in favor of the taxpayer. Probably,
every change has operated to the detriment of the revenue
except to the extent that legislation has been retroactive and
heavy taxes have been levied on transactions which would
never have been consummated if a change in the law had
been anticipated. Retroactive legislation, however, is not
a desirable practise; and while it was doubtless justified in a
time of world warfare, it should be banned for the future,
like many other practises developed during the war.
The above history of legislation since income taxes be
came possible on March 1, 1913, suggests that though the
disparity in favor of the taxpayers may be lessened, it would
not be practicable, even if desirable, to restore the old dis
parity in favor of the Government. It will be assumed,
therefore, that if capital gains are to be taxed, capital losses
must be allowed as deductions on at least an equal basis.
Though specific provisions may facilitate tax avoidance or
make it more difficult, the Treasury in dealing with all such
problems suffers from the fundamental disadvantage that
it is the taxpayer who not only decides the time and the form
of transactions giving rise to capital gains or losses, but
exercises the option whether they shall take place or not. To
use a military analogy, the initiative, whose value in war
fare is universally recognized, is always with the taxpayer.
The Treasury has its fixed defences; the taxpayer moves only
after careful study of these defences, and it is not surprising
that the Treasury, with a defence impregnable against a
frontal attack, often finds itself helpless against an envelop
ing movement which attacks it in the flank or rear. This
disadvantage is increased by the fact that the distinction be
tween ordinary income and capital gain is often a fine one,
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and a slight change in the form of the transaction may throw
it into one class or the other. If, therefore, the Government
decides to tax capital gains and allow capital losses as deduc
tions, the taxpayer can refrain from taking gains but may
take losses. If on the other hand the Government should ex
clude capital gains and capital losses from the scope of the
income tax altogether, there is danger of transactions which
essentially give rise to income being cast into such a form
that the gain would technically be held to be a capital gain.
How fine the distinctions are, and incidentally how unex
pected may be the results to the Government and to the tax
payer of any action outside the ordinary course of business
in a time when tax laws are rapidly changing both in form
and in degree of severity, is very well illustrated in the case
of the Phellis or du Pont case. This case and the Rocke
feller-Prairie Oil and Gas case decided by the Supreme Court
at the same time, constitute two of the most complete, and in
amounts involved the most considerable, of the Pyrrhic vic
tories of the Treasury in tax litigation. The point at issue
was not, of course, whether the transaction involved resulted
in a capital profit or in a profit in the nature of ordinary
income, but what might seem a much simpler question,
whether it resulted in any profit at all.
III. THE PHELLIS CASE

The amounts involved in the Phellis case are so large and
its features so striking as to make it worthy of detailed con
sideration.
The facts are briefly that the E. I. du Pont de Nemours
Powder Company of New Jersey in 1915 transferred all its
assets to a Delaware company in consideration of debentures
and stocks of that company, and retaining debentures of the
Delaware company equal to the par of its common stock
(approximately $30,000,000) distributed to its common stock
holders- two shares of Delaware company stock for each
share of New Jersey company (or an aggregate of $60,000,000). The market value of the Delaware company’s stock
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at the date of distribution was $347.50 per share. The Su
preme Court has now found that this distribution was a divi
dend taxable to the stockholders of the New Jersey com
pany, and by this decision has added to the taxable income
of 1915 an amount of approximately $210,000,000, or nearly
5% of the total taxable income disclosed by all the indi
vidual tax returns of that year.
The five judges of the Court of Claims agreed in the view
that in substance there was no income to the stockholders
of the New Jersey company because the stock of the Dela
ware company represented the same property and business
as the stock of the New Jersey company had previously repre
sented. This view was supported, however, by only a minor
ity of the Supreme Court, the majority finding that both in
substance and form the stock of the Delaware company con
stituted real income to the stockholders of the New Jersey
company.
In passing, it may be remarked that while each of the
courts looked beyond the form and discussed the substance
of the transaction—one finding that in substance there was
no dividend, and the other that the whole of the stock of the
new company at its market value constituted a dividend—in
neither Court was a third alternative discussed which seems
most accurately to reflect the substance of the transaction.
This alternative is that the stock of the new company repre
sented substantially what the old stock had previously repre
sented, and that the old stock, .which after the transaction
represented only an equal amount of debentures of the new
company, was the real dividend. In substance the position
of the stockholder after the transaction was almost identically
the position in which he would have been placed had the
New Jersey company created $30,000,000 of debentures and
issued them to the common stockholders by way of dividend,
or even if it had sold $30,000,000 of debentures at par and
paid the cash to its stockholders. After the transaction, the
stock of the old company represented to the stockholder of
the old or New Jersey company something severed from
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the du Pont property and business which he could realize
without reducing in any degree his proportionate interest
in the general du Pont assets.
The controversy extended over six years, during which
anyone who was a stockholder at the time of the reorganiza
tion and who subsequently sold a part or the whole of his
stock in the Delaware company was unable to determine
whether under the income tax law he had made a profit or
loss by doing so. If, for instance, such a stockholder sold 10
shares of the Delaware company’s stock for $2,000, the trans
action would on the Government’s theory result in a de
ductible loss of $1,475. If, however, the Government’s
contentions were overthrown, the result would be a taxable
profit of a rather greater sum. The Government having
won, it is interesting to consider what this victory has gained
for it and what has been, or will be, the cost.
The keynote of the decision by which the Supreme Court
held that stock dividends were not taxable was perhaps the
statement that a stock dividend provided nothing out of
which the stockholder could pay a tax without parting with
some portion of his interest in the corporation. Assuming
that the taxpayers who were called upon in 1921 to pay sur
taxes on the profits which they are deemed to have made in
the transaction of 1915, should have had recourse to the sale
of their stock to provide funds with which to pay their tax,
what will their position be?
The market value of the stock of the Delaware company
was at the time of the decision roughly par. Any holder who
received his stock as a dividend in 1915 pays tax in that year
on the basis of a value of $347.50 a share, and if he sold
in 1921 he is entitled to claim a loss on sale in 1921 of
$247.50 a share. In 1915 the normal tax was 1 per cent and
surtaxes beginning at incomes of $20,000 ranged from 1 to
6 per cent; in 1921 the normal tax was 8 per cent and sur
taxes beginning at incomes of $5,000 ranged from 1 to 65 per
cent. It will be apparent, therefore, at once how great the
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advantages of the decision to a taxpayer may be. Taking by
way of illustration the case of a married man without de
pendents whose income apart from the dividend in 1915 or
sale of stock in 1921 was $7,500 in each year, and assuming
that he held 10 shares of the New Jersey company’s stock and
received 20 shares of the Delaware company’s stock as divi
dend in 1915, and that he sold this stock in 1921 at $100 a
share, it will be found that the dividend does not bring him
into the surtax class for 1915, so that he has no additional tax
to pay for that year, but the loss of sale in 1921 reduces his
taxes for that year from $320 to $2.
Multiplying the figures twenty-fold and taking a man
whose income was $150,000 in each year and whose original
holdings of the New Jersey company’s stock was 200 shares,
it will be found that the addition of the dividend to his in
come for 1915 increases his taxes for that year by $5,950, and
the loss on sale in 1921 decreases his taxes for that year by
$51,650.
The full effects of the decision are not reflected even in
these figures, as had the opposite decision been reached there
would have been a taxable profit instead of a loss on any
sale of stock in the Delaware company. Presumably the de
cision will also involve considerable saving of tax to the
Delaware company.
No doubt some stockholders had sold a part or all of their
stock prior to 1921 and in other cases the stock is held by
persons who would not, and perhaps could not, without diffi
culty, sell any great proportion of their holdings. The cost
of the victory to the Government will therefore probably not
come near its potential limits.
It is, however, reasonably certain that the cost to the
Government in the form of taxes lost will enormously exceed
the additional taxes recovered as a result of the decision.
One is tempted to ask questions like those of the children
in Southey’s poem “After Blenheim,” and one finds no
answer except Kaspar’s:
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But what they fought each other for
I could not well make out.
But everybody said,’ quoth he,
‘That ’twas a famous victory.’
A similar analysis of the Rockefeller and Harkness cases
would lead to a similar conclusion.
The claim of the Government was at best largely technical,
since it could not be said that the du Pont stockholders real
ized true income from the transaction in an amount ap
proaching the two hundred millions which the Court held
must in law be deemed to be derived therefrom. The case
turned on the special facts of a very unusual transaction and
established no new principle, and the net result of upholding
the Government’s contentions was bound to be a loss of
revenue. It is surprising, therefore, that the Government
did not accept the verdict of the Court of Claims.
The position after this decision and the stock dividend
decision (Macomber v. Eisner) would have been most unsatis
factory if Congress had not in the Act of 1921 provided in
substance that no income should be deemed to be derived
from corporate reorganizations.
The interest of the case, in relation to the subject of this
discussion, lies in the evidence it affords of the room for wide
difference of opinion concerning the income-producing effect
of a transaction, even if the question is considered with re
gard to its substance and not merely to its form. The room
for difference of opinion on the question whether some of
the complicated transactions of modern corporate finance
produce income in the narrower sense, capital gains, or no
gain or income at all, is obviously even greater.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

Study of the subject over a period of many years has
led the writer to the conclusion that while either course is
fraught with danger and tax avoidance on a large scale is
bound to continue as long as high rates of surtaxes are main
tained, the losses of revenue involved in the taxation of capi
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tal gains and the allowance of capital losses as deductions
from taxable income are on the whole greater than those in
volved in the opposite course; and further, that the margin is
so great as to outweigh the consideration that in principle
it is preferable to tax capital gains. Neither the war period,
with its extravagant gains and unmerited losses, nor the
period of readjustment immediately after the war was an
opportune time for a change of policy in this regard. As,
however, we get back to more normal conditions, such a
change seems worthy of the most serious consideration, more
especially as the existing law in remedying defects of the old
law has created new opportunities for tax avoidance from
which the Government is bound to suffer very heavily.
If capital gains and losses are in general to be excluded
from the scope of the income tax, safeguards will be neces
sary to prevent a wholesale escape from taxation of income
by conversion into capital form. It is believed, however, that
three provisions would be sufficient to prevent the great
bulk of such evasion, namely:

(1) That where a capital gain or a capital loss arises in re
spect of an asset, which from its nature is subject
to a natural increment or decrement in value, any
gain shall be deemed to be income to the extent of a
reasonable return on the investment for the period
during which it has been held. Conversely, the na
tural decrement should be allowed as a deduction
from taxable income.
(2) That where property is disposed of within, say, two
years of its acquisition, the transaction shall be
deemed to be a trading transaction and not a capital
investment.
(3) A provision under which the tax would be levied
on the sale of stock of corporations, particularly pri
vate corporations, where it might appear that there
was a profit which was attributable to the accumula
tion of undivided profits by the corporation and that
the sale was made to avoid the imposition of the tax
which would be assessed on such profits if distributed
as dividends.
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Of the three provisions it is believed that only the third
would offer serious difficulty in its formulation, and it should
readily be possible to surmount these difficulties with the
assistance of a group of persons familiar with business prac
tise and with tax procedure.
Doubtless the adoption of this suggestion would involve,
the definite abandonment of a large amount of revenue which
the Government ought some day to receive, but it is not be
lieved that the sacrifice of revenue which the Government
would otherwise be likely to receive would approach in
amount the increase in revenue that would result from
the elimination of deductions for losses.
Tax avoidance on a substantial scale would doubtless con
tinue even if the suggestion were adopted, but this is bound
to be true under any law so long as the extreme surtaxes
now in force are continued. Most students of the subject
are in agreement with the views expressed by the Secretary
of the Treasury in his letter to the Chairman of the House
Committee on Ways and Means of April, 1921, that the
immediate loss of revenue that would result from the repeal
of the higher surtax brackets would be relatively small, and
the ultimate effect should be an increase in the revenue.
Congress apparently clung to the outworn idea that such a
repeal would result in a loss to the Treasury for the sole
benefit of the rich. It will, however, ultimately be forced
to recognize the shortsightedness of its policy, especially
having regard to the existence of the huge volume of taxexempt securities.
In justice to the present Congress one must recognize that
not only is the problem an extremely difficult one, but it is
made more difficult by the sacrifice of sound principles to
political expediency in the original adjustment of income
taxation to war necessities. Given a business world organ
ized largely in the form of private companies which are prac
tically incorporated partnerships, a world in which business
transactions may readily be cast into different forms so as to
produce ordinary income or capital gains as may be the more
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advantageous and given also a huge volume of tax-free se
curities; under such conditions the combination of a low
normal tax on income of individuals and corporations with
very high surtaxes is neither equitable nor effective. This
is equally true whether capital gains and losses are treated
as entering into the determination of income or not. The
form of tax avoidance changes to meet either rule. The
only real solution is to reduce the disparity between normal
taxes and surtaxes.
Had the Congress recognized these facts in war time and
raised the normal tax and the lower range of surtaxes to
higher levels as urged by the Treasury, it would have been
possible later to make reductions all along the line. It is
not surprising however that the present Congress should
look askance at a proposal to increase the normal tax and the
lower surtaxes and reduce the higher surtaxes. Though in
reality such a scheme would be sound finance and benefit
the entire community, it seems on the surface too much like
a scheme to relieve the rich at the expense of the relatively
poor to be expedient from the standpoint of party politics. It
is certain, however, that the high surtaxes will prove increas
ingly ineffective and injurious the longer the present system
is continued.
In the meantime, it is believed that the revenues can be
increased, tax avoidance greatly diminished, and greater
equity secured by the abandonment of the rule of taxing of
capital gains and, conversely, of allowing capital losses as a
deduction from taxable income.

III

TAX-EXEMPT SECURITIES

(1923)
(1) TAX EXEMPTION AND THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE *

report on tax-exempt securities which has been pre
pared by the committee on taxation of the Chamber of Com
merce of the State of New York and which is to be considered
at the meeting of the Chamber tomorrow is a singularly un
convincing document. That the committee should report
adversely upon the Constitutional amendment prohibiting
the further issue of tax-exempt securities was not wholly un
expected, but it is to be hoped that the Chamber will not
adopt the resolutions suggested unless stronger arguments
can be adduced than are to be found in this report.
The Chamber certainly owes it to itself to insure that
whatever action it takes shall be based upon broad and
statesmanlike grounds, and not upon such narrow consider
ations as are embodied in the committee’s report. That docu
ment deals with the question of tax exemption as if it were a
minor problem in arithmetic, and both its statement of the
problem and its arithmetic contain egregious errors. For
example, it compares the position of the holder of $1,500,000
of 4 per cent tax-free bonds with that of a man whose income
of $60,000 is wholly taxable, and reaches the conclusion that
the former, by foregoing 1 per cent interest on his invest
ment in return for the tax-exemption privilege, incurs a
sacrifice of $15,000, while the latter’s sacrifice is only $11,940.
Clearly, however, the comparison of the bondholder should
be made with a man whose income after taxes amounts to
$60,000; that is, with a man whose income is roughly $80,000.
The

* An editorial contributed to the New York Evening Post (January 31,
1923).
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In that case his taxes would amount to $19,940, compared
with the sacrifice of $15,000 by the bondholder. The cor
rection of the committee’s arithmetic completely destroys
its conclusions and makes the case cited really an argument
against tax exemption.
This case, however, is not a common one. Ordinarily the
taxpayer will invest in taxable securities up to the point
where tax exemption becomes really profitable, and in taxexempt securities for the rest of his capital. A comparison
of such a case with that of a savings bank investing the sav
ings of the poor in State and municipal securities brings
out clearly the way in which tax exemption operates to re
lieve the large taxpayers at the expense of the less fortunate.
The question, however, involves much more than the elimi
nation of minor inequalities in taxation. Perhaps that de
fect alone would hardly be sufficient to justify invoking the
complex machinery for amending the Constitution. Nor
does the case rest mainly on the argument that it encour
ages municipal waste and unwise extension of municipal
enterprise, though this argument should appeal to members
of the Chamber who “know the blighting influences of Gov
ernment ownership,” as another report to be considered at
tomorrow’s meeting states that they do. It is indeed disturb
ing to note that issues of municipal securities have increased
over 300 per cent in ten years, while the issues of railway,
industrial, and public utility bonds have increased only
about 70 per cent.
The strongest argument for the abolition of tax exemption
is to be found in the principle that in a democratic state
it is altogether wrong that any substantial part of the coun
try’s wealth should be immune from taxation. A body which
indorsed conscription of men in war time should hesitate to
take the stand that billions of the nation’s wealth should be
free not merely from conscription but from taxation in time
of war.
If the Chamber finally decides to come out for tax exemp
tion it should make it clear that in reaching its conclusions
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it has had due regard for these and many other broad con
siderations in favor of the amendment which have been
brought forward by such of its advocates as R. C. Leffingwell,
former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and the Daven
port committee. It should certainly not base its action upon
any such narrow, and incidentally inaccurate, statement of
the case as is contained in the present committee’s report.
(2) TAX-EXEMPT BONDS AS ISLE OF SAFETY *

I regret that the Chamber of Commerce, in view of the
clearly expressed doubts of its committee on finance and of
the Secretary of the Treasury regarding the correctness of
the premises on which the committee on taxation based its
report on the tax-exemption amendment, did not yield to
the request of a large percentage of the members in attend
ance for an opportunity for fuller and more adequate dis
cussion of this important question. Had I secured the
floor, as I endeavored to do, I should have given specific
illustrations to show that these doubts were well founded.
I should, however, have urged that the question be decided
on broader grounds.
With the “States rights” phase of the question eliminated
by the form of the amendment now proposed, views on the
question of preventing future exemption should depend on
the view one holds regarding the general principle of taxa
tion on the basis of ability to pay, particularly as embodied
in a graduated income-tax law and on the degree of faith
one retains in American democracy in its attitude towards
the institution of private wealth.
If you regard private wealth in the United States today
as being in the position, as it were, of Holland; if you believe
that it is constantly threatened with inundation by the waves
of radical legislation and is protected only by the dikes built
by the founders of the Constitution, you naturally regard the
income-tax amendment adopted in 1913 as having swept
away one of the main dike systems. It follows that you re• A letter to the New York Evening Post (February 6, 1923).
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gard tax exemption as an inner dike system which, when the
surrounding fields of commercial wealth are inundated, will
preserve an island of refuge in which so much of private
wealth as is represented by public securities may still find
safety. You may have doubts whether as the tide rises the
dike will be of more avail in resisting it than Mrs. Parting
ton’s mop, but you are determined to fight grimly to main
tain the dike to the last moment. It would seem, however,
that those members of the Chamber who belong to. this school
of thought should have opposed the second of the resolutions
offered by the committee on taxation, which condemns the
extension of tax exemption to farm loan bonds and similar
securities; surely their aim should be to enlarge the borders
of their island wherever possible, and there is the added
consideration that by throwing a sop to the farm bloc they
might secure some support from it in maintaining the dike.
The income tax is comparatively new to us but is an old
institution in England, and in earlier days a similar school
of thought existed there and included many eminent men
such as Pitt and Brougham, the latter of whom characterized
graduation as “a gross and revolting absurdity.” The his
torian of the English income tax who cites this expression
and others offers the comment: “As time went on it became
increasingly evident that the old unreasoning position could
not be maintained in the face of modern and more scientific
doctrines of taxation.” And however the Chamber of Com
merce may be divided on the question, opinion in the coun
try at large seems to be overwhelmingly in favor of the grad
uated income tax; indeed, it is difficult to see how the neces
sary taxation during the war could have been levied had the
income-tax amendment not been adopted.
This is not to say that the manner in which the income tax
was availed of was wholly satisfactory. I share the view that
the high surtaxes are unwise from every standpoint. It is
not, however, surprising that Congress should have used
the new medium, which had become available only shortly
before the war, with more zeal than discretion during that
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emergency, and the wisdom of a more moderate use of the
principle of graduation is likely to receive increasing recog
nition. However that may be, if we are to have a graduated
income tax at all, exemption of any particular form of in
vestment of private wealth from its operation is contrary
to the underlying principle of the system, constitutes dis
crimination in favor of unearned as against earned income,
and (the report of the committee to the contrary notwith
standing) is financially unprofitable to government.
It is impracticable within the limits of this letter to ana
lyze the committee’s report in detail, but such analysis
would show that the report utterly fails to meet the point
made by the Secretary of the Treasury in his letter to the
chairman of the committee, as follows: “To one purchaser the
exemption may be worth little or nothing and to another
purchaser who pays the same price the exemption may be
worth the equivalent of 10 or 11 per cent on the taxable
security.” If, as Mr. Mellon and Mr. Kelsey both suggest,
the maximum surtax should be reduced to 25 per cent, this
disparity would be reduced, but it would still be substantial.
In that case the true yield of a 4 per cent tax-exempt security
would range from 4 per cent to a savings bank or exempt
investor up to 6 per cent to investors subject to the maxi
mum surtax. I do not think, however, we could afford to
regard with equanimity the prospect of the wealthy investor
receiving from the State an effective rate of interest half as
high again as that paid to the less fortunate citizen. Secre
tary Mellon does not overstate the case in saying that “grad
uated additional income taxes cannot be effective when there
exists side by side with them practically unlimited quantities
of fully tax-exempt securities available to defeat them.”
In considering this question too much regard should not
be had to the conditions of the moment. The outstanding
lesson we learned from the last war was the necessity and the
practicability of conscription of man power on a large scale;
we also learned that a great war imposes a strain on the ma
terial resources of the combatants far beyond that which it
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had been supposed any nation could bear. If we should be
come involved in another great war, conscription of man
power would undoubtedly take place on an even larger scale
than in the recent war, and certainly every dollar of the
national wealth should be as available for the national de
fence as every man will have to be. This, however, cannot
be accomplished unless steps are taken to insure that as the
special privileges now existing in the form of tax exemption
expire they shall not be renewed, and that no new exemp
tions shall be created.
(3)

TAX-EXEMPT BONDS AS BURDEN ON PUBLIC *

In view of the first paragraph of my recent letter to you,
I feel bound to accept the invitation extended by Mr.
Kelsey in his letter appearing in the same issue to criticize
the figures appearing in his committee’s report and the infer
ences drawn from them.
The committee’s whole report is vitiated by an assumption
which is contrary to all experience and probability. It as
sumes that the rich man who buys tax exempts buys them
blindly, whether it is profitable or unprofitable for him to do
so. The fact is that most rich men have investments with
which they are identified and which they could not and
would not convert into tax-exempt investments, and the
taxable income from these sources is more than enough to
bring their incomes up to the level where the purchase of
tax exempts becomes highly profitable.
The investor who has no business interests and an absolute
freedom of choice in investments studies each investment
carefully and buys taxable securities or exempt securities, as
expediency dictates. It is only natural that he should do
so, particularly as there is a wide range of gilt edge securities,
including Government bonds, outside the class of exempt
securities. The case on which the committee bases its com
putations—that of a man whose income is wholly derived
from tax-exempt securities—is therefore so uncommon that
* A letter to the New York Evening Post (February 9, 1923).
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any general conclusions drawn from it are valueless. In the
days of slavery there were, I believe, slaves who refused free
dom when it was offered to them, and such cases go quite as
far. towards proving that slavery was a desirable institution
as the committee’s illustration does towards showing that tax
exemption does not operate to relieve the rich from taxation.
Space will not permit of my discussing every point upon
which I believe the committee has fallen into errors of fact
or inference. I will therefore take a single case and will
choose the point which the committee evidently regards as
the most important—that which deals with the argument for
the constitutional amendments, stated by it as follows: “It is
said, though, that there is a great social reason why the issue
of tax-exempt securities should be abandoned, that they are
the means by which the rich unload the burdens of taxation
on the poor. In fact, the whole agitation seems to be
founded on this false premise. . . .”
The committee’s counter-argument is in two parts: first,
“the opposite is true until you get to incomes exceeding
$60,000 a year . .
and secondly, “when it comes to equaliz
ing the burdens between the two classes of incomes above
the $60,000 mark, if it is important to do it, it can be
accomplished by a reduction in the surtaxes, and that could
be done and still leave the maximum surtax at not more
than 25.”
Upon the first point, it is difficult to see how the poor are
in a position to unload burdens on the rich through the
medium of tax exemption so long as there is no compulsion
on any individual to buy tax-exempt securities. The com
mittee’s concern is unnecessary, and they may rest assured
that the rich who buy tax exempts do it because they find it
to be profitable.
Upon the second point, the committee assumes that the
holder of 4 per cent tax-exempts forgoes from ½ per cent
to 1 per cent in interest in consideration of the exemption.
If this is so, the exemption costs him from 11 per cent to 20
per cent of the income he would receive if the security were
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not exempt. The Federal tax rate is more than 11 per cent
upon all income in excess of $14,000 a year, and more than
20 per cent upon all income in excess of $30,000 a year.
Upon the committee’s own assumption, therefore, exemption
of income in excess of these levels clearly constitutes relief
to the holders at the expense of someone else. The excep
tional case used as an illustration by the committee is, as
already stated, so uncommon as to be negligible.
Finally, how far can the burden on the possessor of earned
income and the holder of tax exempts be equalized by the
reduction of the surtax to 25 per cent? With 8 per cent
normal tax this would make the burden on the earned in
come subject thereto 33 per cent, and the burden on the
income from tax exempts is, by the committee’s own assump
tions, not more than from 11 per cent to 20 per cent. It
is apparent that earned income would still be subject to
a burden from 65 per cent to 200 per cent greater than that
on tax-exempt income. The committee, however, says “not
more than 25 per cent.” There is much virtue in the “not
more,” for to effect equalization the maximum surtax would
have to be reduced to 12 per cent or 3 per cent, according
to the spread assumed between taxables and tax exempts.
At this point the committee’s position stands revealed as
the common position of opponents of the amendment:
“Abolish the surtaxes or leave us tax-exemption as ah avenue
of escape from them.”

IV
SCIENTIFIC TAX RELIEF *

(1923)
of some relief from taxation for earned income
should recognize that it is hopeless to secure the reduction
of surtaxes by any clear, uniform, and universal measure of
revision. The possessors of earned income should therefore
try to devise indirect forms of relief similar to those which
have robbed the surtaxes of their terrors to possessors of in
vestment income and yet have enabled them to escape from
the monotony of tax-exempt investments.
For instance, a provision entitling the possessor of earned
income to make a deduction from his gross income in respect
of the exhaustion of his natural life would with a sympa
thetic Natural Abilities Division afford a large measure of
relief. If it is objected that the value and the term of life
of an individual are incapable of determination, it is sufficient
to answer that the difficulties are no greater than those in
the determination of the quantities and values of the natural
resources of the country, which the taxing officials have met
and solved so nonchalantly and without hardship to the tax
payers. As the development of the natural abilities of its
citizens is even more important to the country than the
opening of new oil wells, Congress should recognize the
justice of a “discovery” clause which would permit of the
exhaustion allowance being increased if the taxpayer should
develop hitherto unsuspected ability to make money. A raise
of salary received by a man who has held his position more
than two years might be subject to a maximum tax of 12½
per cent in the same way as gains on investments held for
that length of time.
Advocates

* An editorial contributed to the New York Evening Post (November 8,
1923).
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Doubtless the opportunities now accorded to the owner
of investments to reduce his taxes by incorporating himself
could, even under the present law, be made available to some
extent to the worker. It would not seem unreasonable, how
ever, in view of the difficulties in his case, to request Congress
to enact a provision that every individual earning an income
which would subject him to an average tax of 12 per cent or
more should be deemed to be incorporated and be assessed
under the provisions relating to corporations. Many pos
sessors of earned income have poor relations or have intimate
friends who have suffered losses, and in such cases permission
to make a consolidated return would prove helpful.
These are only a few of the methods that suggest them
selves, but they are presented to the possessors of earned
income with the suggestion that there is far greater hope of
relief in provisions such as these, the exact consequences of
which Congress cannot readily perceive, than in any clear
and unequivocal reduction of taxes.

V

THE INCOME TAX: SECRETARY MELLON’S
PROGRAM *

(1923)
R. Green, Acting Chairman,
Committee on Ways and Means,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

Hon. William

My dear Mr. Green:

Having been a student of taxation for many years and hav
ing had the opportunity in various capacities to acquire some
familiarity with the actual working of the income-tax laws,
I venture to write you in advocacy of the program recently
outlined by Secretary Mellon. Many of the suggestions con
tained in the Secretary’s letter will, I imagine, be immediately
understood and approved. The reasons underlying the sug
gested rearrangement of surtaxes on the higher incomes are,
however, probably less generally appreciated, and I would
like to submit some considerations bearing particularly on
that recommendation.
The argument that the high surtaxes divert capital from
productive industry and encourage municipal extravagance
by unduly stimulating the market for tax-exempt securities
is unquestionably sound. It is, however, becoming of less
relative importance for the reason that tax avoidance is grow
ing more rapidly and is less limited in scope than tax exemp
tion. I believe the time has come when justice to the earners
who cannot resort to tax avoidance, and to those possessors
of investment income who do not resort to it, requires either
that the present extreme surtaxes shall be made generally
effective, or, if that be impossible, as it has proved to be up
* Cf. The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XXXVII (January, 1924).
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to the present, that the rates shall be reduced to a point
where substantial enforcement becomes practicable.
I believe the conclusion is fully warranted that the taxable
income reported today in the highest surtax groups is not
more than between 10 and 20 per cent of what it would be
but for tax exemption and deliberate tax avoidance. If
earned income could be excluded from the computation, the
percentage on the remainder would fall to still lower
figures. ...
Surely the continuance of the present high surtaxes is in
defensible. . . . The present situation is not due mainly to
defects in the form of the present law, although some defects
exist which could be remedied with benefit to the revenue.
The difficulty lies far deeper. The distinction between capi
tal and income is at best difficult to draw, and the complexi
ties of modern business have greatly enhanced this difficulty.
Tax laws must be specific and according to well-settled rules
of construction must be interpreted strictly—any ambiguities
being resolved in favor of the taxpayer. The form of every
business transaction, and indeed whether the transaction
shall Or shall not take place, is determined by the taxpayer,
and his decision is reached with a knowledge of the tax law
and is usually framed so as to produce the greatest possible
profit after taking taxes into consideration.
, The difference in taxation between corporations and indi
viduals alone creates an almost insoluble difficulty. The ease
with which incorporation and disincorporation are effected;
the difficulty of making laws and regulations governing cor
porations which will apply with equal justice to the large
public corporation and the small private corporation, which
practically represents an individual fortune, and the further
fact that between these two extremes there are innumerable
gradations, so that it is impossible to draw hard-and-fast lines
and to treat corporations on one side of the line in one way
and corporations on the other side of the line in another—
these and other such conditions make it impossible for legis
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lation ever to do more than temporarily check the increase of
tax avoidance, so long as the inducements to tax avoidance
are so compelling as they are today in the case of all those
possessing more than a very moderate income.
If it were possible to lay down a few broad principles and
leave the administration of the surtax to the discretion of a
highly competent taxing authority which could be governed
by the substance rather than the form of the transaction, it
might conceivably be possible to administer the surtaxes on
the present scale with some measure of efficiency. This is,
however, impossible and under any other conditions the form
rather than the substance inevitably determines the tax, and
the form is selected by the taxpayer so as to defeat the tax.
The continuance of the high surtaxes, therefore, means an
unedifying contest of wits between the tax avoider and his
advisers on the one side and Congress and the Treasury on
the other—with all the advantages on the side of the tax
avoider, and with those who are unwilling, or, like most
earners, unable to avoid taxes, caught between the two and
bearing the brunt of the conflict. Congress must legislate
in advance and on broad lines to meet all conditions. The
tax avoider acts after Congress has taken its position and
deals with specific proposed transactions, capable of infinite
variation in form and time to meet the rules laid down by the
legislature. Naturally the result of the conflict is as disap
pointing to the Treasury as it is demoralizing to the tax
payer.
Whatever may be possible in time of war, all experience
shows that it is impossible in times of peace to levy surtaxes
on any such scale as is now in force with any degree of
efficiency or with any approach to equity. I am convinced
that readjustment of the surtaxes will ultimately benefit the
revenue as well as the business of the country and will make
taxation far more equitable. I hope, therefore, that your
Committee will favorably regard the Secretary’s proposals
on this as well as on other points.
November 26, 1923.
Respectfully,
George O. May.

VI

SOME ASPECTS OF TAX AVOIDANCE *
(1924)
Recognition of the truth of Secretary Mellon’s statement
that the high surtaxes are steadily becoming unproductive
appears to be gradually dawning on Congress. In some
quarters this recognition is evidenced mainly in a display of
indignation that men or even natural laws should fail to con
form to the ideas of Congress.
Recently a senator characterized as “little short of actual
disloyalty to this republic” the truism repeated by a wealthy
man, that wealth always seeks to avoid what it regards as ex
cessive taxation.
Now we can all agree that in an ideal republic every man
would conduct his affairs and pay his taxes according to the
intent of the law-making body, and no one would change his
business conduct as so to reduce his taxes in ways not con
templated by the legislature.
In this ideal republic, of course, the tax would be admin
istered not upon technicalities and nice interpretations of the
letter of the law, but upon broad considerations of equity
and regard for its spirit. And above all the legislature would
frame the tax law with an eye single to the apportionment
of the inevitable burden among the citizens of the republic
in the most equitable way that could be conceived.
So long, however, as the guiding principle in the allocation
of the tax burden is political advantage and the assignment
(in the first instance, at any rate) of the maximum burden
to the minimum number of voters; so long, too, as the rule
governing court decisions is that quoted by the Supreme
Court recently from an English decision:
* An editorial contributed to The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XXXVII
(March, 1924).
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If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter
of the law, he must be taxed, however great the hardship may
appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the
crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject
within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however ap
parently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise
appear to be.
So long as these conditions continue, is it not a little naive
for anyone to expect those ^t whom the measures are aimed
to make no move either to defend themselves or to escape
from the impost?
The more serious aspect of the situation is that the next
phase is apt to be an ill-considered attempt to assert the dig
nity and power of Congress.
If one law fails to produce the result the legislator desires,
let another more drastic be enacted. Its practical efficiency
will probably be no greater and it will almost assuredly do
much harm to many at whom it is not directed, but for the
moment it will satisfy the outraged dignity and serve the
political fortunes of the legislator who has pledged himself
to the policy of making the rich pay without passing the tax
on to others, natural laws and all other opposition to the
contrary notwithstanding.
The professional man whose means of protection or escape
are meager views the situation with deep concern, realizing
that measures which the capitalist would probably, be able
gracefully to avoid would be likely to fall in their full weight
upon him.
The ostensible beneficiary of such measures, too, would,
if he appreciated the situation, be equally concerned because
unsound schemes of taxation are sure in one way or another
ultimately to prove injurious to the general community.
Much of the tax is passed directly on to the community;
the demand for tax exempts stimulates improvident state and
municipal expenditures, which in turn increase local taxes
falling on everyone; the interest rate on issues not exempt
is increased and the increase ultimately reflected in costs and
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prices. Thus and in innumerable other ways do men and
economic forces “conspire” to defeat the efforts of Congress
to run counter to natural laws.
In this connection the following extract from the examina
tion of a witness by the English House of Commons is of
interest:

Q. How is the assembly composed? What kind of
people are the members; landholders or traders?
A. It is composed of landholders, merchants and artificers.
Q. Are not the majority landholders?
A. I believe they are.
Q. Do not they, as much as possible, shift the tax off
from the land, to ease that, and lay the burden heavier on
trade?
A. I have never understood it so. I never heard such a
thing suggested. And indeed an attempt of that kind could
answer no purpose. The merchant or trader is always skilled
in figures, and ready with his pen and ink. If unequal bur
dens are laid on his trade, he puts an additional price on his
goods; and the consumers, who are chiefly landholders, finally
pay the greatest part, if not the whole.

The examination took place in 1766, and the witness was
Benjamin Franklin.
The Ways and Means Committee, though retaining the
25 per cent deduction of tax on earned income, proposes to
treat all income under $5,000 as earned, and all over $20,000 as unearned; in other words, the Committee has con
cluded that anybody can earn $5,000 and that nobody is
worth more than $20,000 a year.
As a recognition of the economic fact that the earner has to
set aside out of his income capital to provide for himself in
his old age,.whereas the possessor of investment income is
under no such necessity, the Committee’s action hardly merits
consideration, however interesting it may be as indicating the
result of introspection and personal experience of its mem
bers. Its maximum effect would be to save the earner about
$400 a year under the present scale of taxes, and $300 a year
under the suggested Mellon scale. Such sums set aside annu
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ally for twenty years at 5 per cent would provide capital sums
which would yield perhaps $500 or $600 a year thereafter.
The relief is in substance insignificant but being nominally
large (25 per cent) may deprive taxpayers of real relief in
some other form.
The salaried, professional, and artist classes whose hopes
were raised by the Secretary’s letter may well say with Mac
beth:

And be these juggling fiends no more believ’d
That palter with us in a double sense:
That keep the word of promise to our ear,
And break it to our hope.
Many will regard this language as equally applicable to
those members of the House who voted to continue tax ex
emption as a refuge for the rich, while vigorously demanding
high surtaxes.
The opponents of the constitutional amendment differed
on the question of how much the exemption feature saves in
interest to the issuers of tax-exempt bonds. Clearly, how
ever, this saving is trivial compared to the saving of tax
to the rich buyers. Whether it is a little more or a little
less than the Treasury estimated is of slight consequence.
The greater it is, the more savings bank investors are being
mulcted for a privilege that is valueless to them; the smaller
it is, the less the wealthy are paying for a privilege that is
most valuable to them.
The vital point is that it is entirely contrary to the prin
ciples of a democratic state that an amount of wealth increas
ing, it is estimated, at the rate of something like a. billion
dollars a year, should be completely beyond the reach of the
taxing power, however great a national emergency may arise.

VII

METHODS OF TAXING WAR PROFITS COMPARED *
DIFFERENCES IN SPIRIT OF LEGISLATION WHICH CAUSE ENGLISH

INDUSTRY TO ACCEPT A HIGHER RATE THAN IS PROPOSED
HERE

(1917)
In the discussion of the pending finance bill reference is fre
quently made to the taxation of war profits in England. In
general the position is stated to be that in England 80 per
cent of the excess profits are taken by the government, and
there is, broadly speaking, no complaint, whereas here it is
claimed that substantially lower rates of taxation will work
incalculable harm to industry.
The statement as to England is, I believe, true, and the
question, Why should there be such a wide difference in the
attitude of business men toward taxation on the two sides of
the Atlantic? is a fair and pertinent one. I do not think
the answer is to be found, in any difference of degree in will
ingness to make sacrifices, but that it is to be found wholly
in the difference in the methods and spirit governing the
determination of taxable profits in the two cases.
The English law proceeds on the theory of giving the tax
payer a liberal pre-war standard and dealing equitably with
special cases, and with this basis assured the manufacturer
has no valid ground for objection to taxation of his excess
profits, however high it may be.
A comparison of the pre-war standards allowed shows that
in England the manufacturer is given a choice of two years
out of three, each of which was a prosperous year in Eng
land. To protect the manufacturer in any special cases
where the three years in question were not prosperous ones,
• A letter to the New York Times (August 28, 1917).
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two alternatives are provided—either a choice may be made
of four years out of six (if during the three years’ period the
profits of the business were 25 per cent below normal) or a
reasonable rate of return on capital may be claimed as the
pre-war standard. The rate is fixed by the law at a minimum
of 6 per cent in the case of corporations, but a specially con
stituted board of referees has power to increase this rate in
any given industry, and in practice the board has increased
the rates allowed to 9, 10, 12, and in some cases 22½ per
cent.
The finance bill now pending in Congress, on the other
hand, fixes arbitrarily as the pre-war standard the average of
the three years of 1911, 1912 and 1913, an average which is
undeniably subnormal in many industries, including such
important industries as steel and leather, and without al
lowance for the fact that standards of values have completely
changed since that period. The only alternative allowed
is the average rate of earnings in the industry in which the
corporation is engaged, which may give relief in a few cases,
but does not meet at all the cases of whole industries which
suffered from depression during the three years in question.
As to the determination of taxable profits, the pending
finance bill bases the taxation on the returns for income tax,
subject only to adjustments in respect of dividends received
from other taxable companies. The result is that in many
cases taxpayers are denied the full deduction for interest
which they have paid, they are required to pay tax on profits
outside the regular course of business, and in other respects
are taxed on a sum exceeding their true income. No pro
vision is made for dealing with special cases where the law
operates harshly.
On the other hand, the British excess-profits tax law pro
vides for modifications of the methods employed in ascer
taining income for ordinary income tax purposes. It sets
up special rules for determining the profits, but gives power
to the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or the Board of
Referees to modify these provisions in any case where it seems
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to them proper to do so by reason either of specific condi
tions recited in the act, such as the postponement by reason
of the war, of repairs; exceptional depreciation or ob
solescence of assets employed in connection with the war;
or the necessity in connection with the war of providing
plant which will not be wanted for business after the war;
or by reason of “any other special circumstances specified in
regulations made by the Treasury.’’
Whenever a case of hardship is established the Treasury
shows a willingness to provide for it in such regulations.
For instance, it was recently represented to the Treasury that
the method of valuing inventories, having regard to the rise
in prices during the war and probable fall thereof on the
conclusion of the war, would result in injustice, and the
Treasury, after conferring with leading accountants, issued
regulations to cover the case. These regulations provide that
after the termination of the last excess-profits period every
corporation shall be given time to liquidate its inventories
and shall have the right to adjust its returns for the last
taxable year so as to take up in that year any loss that may
subsequently have been sustained on such liquidation of
inventories.
Another important feature of the British law which is
entirely absent from the pending finance bill is its treatment
of fluctuating business. If a corporation’s profits largely
exceed the pre-war standard in one year and fall short of that
standard in the succeeding year, the corporation receives a
corresponding refund of excess profits tax paid on account of
the first year.
Another vital difference between the two bills is the pro
vision as to the payment of the tax. Under the pendingfinance bill the tax is payable at the same time as the income
tax. Many corporations which are making large profits
have those profits in the form of increased inventories, ac
counts receivable, and even plants, and not in cash, and such
corporations will be seriously embarrassed to meet the large
tax payments required.
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Under the British law taxes are payable two months after
assessment, but the commissioners have power to allow pay
ment to be made by instalments in such sums and at such
times as they may fix, and in practice the commissioners have
dealt liberally with the taxpayers under these provisions
where they were satisfied that hardship would result from
demand for immediate payment.
These are only some of the more important differences
between the provisions of the two measures, but they are
sufficient to indicate the difference in the underlying prin
ciples, and this difference is an essential factor in any com
parison of the attitude of our manufacturers with that of
the British taxpayers.

VIII
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE BRITISH INCOME
TAX LAW *

(1924)
It is impossible in the brief space available to discuss the
whole subject assigned to me in any detail. I have therefore
thought it might be useful to try to answer a question re
cently asked by the Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee, in the hope that the answer might incidentally
be suggestive of ways in which our own tax administration
might be improved. Early in 1924 Chairman Green ad
dressed an open letter to Dr. Adams in which he asked the
question, Why Great Britain could collect surtaxes on the
scale on which the United States is attempting to collect
them, and do it successfully, and yet the United States could
not do it.
I shall attempt to answer that question. I would say that
the answer is twofold. First, there are many reasons, polit
ical, legislative and administrative, why Great Britain should
be able to do it; and second, it has not done it.
I will not attempt to discuss all the advantages they possess
and I do not mean to say that they have nothing but ad
vantages, but they have some striking advantages. Some of
them are so universally recognized that I shall not do more
than mention them, but others not so well recognized I
would like to discuss very briefly.
First among the political advantages possessed by Great
Britain I should place the executive responsibility for tax
legislation instead of the separation of the executive and
legislative responsibility that we have here. In the second
place, I should mention something that perhaps is not so

* Proceedings, Academy of Political Science, Vol. XI (May, 1924).
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fully recognized, the advantage that they possess in dealing
with all legislation in one parliament. Take, for instance,
the question of corporations. I should say that the greatest
opportunity for avoidance of taxes here is by artificial transac
tions between individuals and corporations. In England,
the control of corporation legislation rests with the same
body that levies the taxes, and they have dealt with the
corporation law so as to coordinate it with the tax law. If
we could do that here, the stopping of the holes would be
a much easier task than it is at present. The third political
advantage is that the British have no constitutional limita
tion and no basic date such as March 1, 1913, which is a con
stant bugbear to anybody who has to frame tax laws here.
Fourth, they have no tax-exempt securities. I do not think
it is necessary to discuss that advantage; it has been so freely
discussed heretofore.
Turning to their legislative advantages, I would place
first their unwillingness to enact legislation until they are
satisfied that the administrative problems involved can be
successfully met. The English excess-profits tax in 1915,
which was a brand-new experiment, was held up for a con
siderable time awaiting assurances of that kind, and the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, in introducing it, pointed out
that the machinery was as important as anything else in
increasing taxation, and he went on to say that unless their
whole tax proposals were to be a fiasco, they must see that
the burdens which they were laying on the body charged
with the administration of the tax were not greater than that
body could successfully bear. I say without the slightest
hesitation that this point was not considered at all in the
law of 1917 in the United States and not adequately in the
later laws, and that the burden that has been placed on the
Bureau of Internal Revenue in this country has been far be
yond the ability of any administrative body to perform.
That, I think, is one of the main reasons why Great Britain
has had relatively better success with high taxation during
the war than we have had. Another factor that has con
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tributed to their success, I think, has been their willingness
to risk unpopularity, to recognize that the bulk of the taxes
must fall ultimately on the bulk of the people and to place
the burden on the many directly instead of trying to place it
in the first instance on the few. Great Britain during the
war went as high as a thirty per cent normal tax and never
made the surtax more than one hundred per cent of the
normal tax, whereas here we have been attempting to work
with an eight per cent normal tax against a sixty-five per
cent surtax, and we are coming down now to proposals of
•four per cent normal tax, twelve and one-half per cent cor
poration tax and fifty per cent surtax, a scale of relations
that in my judgment makes satisfactory administration abso
lutely impossible.
The third advantage they have is in simplicity. The
British excess profits tax law, with its appendix, occupied
about fifteen pages and remained substantially unchanged
during the war. They have accomplished that largely by the
different way in which they have dealt with the hard case and
evasion. We have attempted to do it by rigid rules which
have made our laws complicated and yet have not succeeded
in making them effective or equitable.. They have been
able to do it by leaving discretion to meet hard cases to
apply the law so as to prevent avoidance.
That brings me to the final legislative advantage which
they have and which has made use of this discretion possible;
that is the creation of appeal bodies, independent both of
the tax-collecting organization and the taxpayer. They have
the local commissioners, and during the war they had also
a board of referees, men of very high standing, serving with
out compensation, whose decisions, generally speaking, were
accepted, if not gracefully, at least without open complaint
by taxpayers.
I had the opportunity of discussing this subject with one
of the important officials of the English system quite re
cently, and he told me how much they as administrative
officers valued the services of the local commissioners and
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now freely they used them in dealing with the hard cases.
The commissioners, more swayed by sympathy than officials
would be, may decide a case on what they think are the
equities. The surveyor of taxes, who is the man directly
dealing with the case, says, “Well, I will not accept the
principle, but I am not prepared to appeal,” so the case is
decided without establishing a precedent. By such pro
cedure Great Britain has been able to ease the burden of
the tax so as to make the collection substantial and yet not
impose undue hardship, and so as to reduce the inequity
between taxpayers.
First of the administrative advantages of the British in
come tax law is, naturally, that they had had an income tax
for seventy years in England before the war broke out,
whereas our income tax system was only four years old when
we suddenly ran into the period of very high taxes. That
advantage, with all that it means in the way of a civil service
that has been built up with high traditions and a splendid
morale, coupled with the Government’s concern that the
administrative problems should be solved before any tax
law should be enacted, has been a tremendous one.
The second advantage—it may be a question of opinion
but I think it is an advantage—is in their system of decentral
ization to some six hundred surveyors’ districts, in a small
country like England, where we centralize everything in a
large country like ours. Then again, the system of appeals
to an independent body to which I have referred is a very
useful administrative aid. Finally, under that head, I would
mention the fact that their laws have been so drawn that
there is very little valuation necessary and there are no highly
artificial and speculative concepts to be administered such
as our so-called discovery value.
The problems of valuation that have been put on the
Bureau of Internal Revenue in connection with discovery
value, depletion, depreciation, capital gains, amortization
and other items constitute a burden of valuation far greater
than the task of the Interstate Commerce Commission in
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valuing the railroads of the United States. The Interstate
Commerce Commission and the carriers have spent some
hundred millions and ten years in the task of valuing the
railroads, and still the task is by no means finished. The
Bureau of Internal Revenue has been struggling with a
greater problem of valuation with no such organization and
without any general recognition of the enormous task that
they were trying to perform.
I have given some of the reasons why I -think Great Britain
should be able to collect very large surtaxes relatively more
effectively than we can. And now I come to my second point
—that it has not done it. I have already explained that at no
time has the surtax more than doubled the normal tax,
whereas here we have had and talk of having surtaxes eight
or ten or twelve times the normal tax. In five years they
raised nearly as much by income and profits taxes as we
did, but the percentage of the total represented by surtaxes
was only about two-fifths of the percentage represented by
surtaxes in our case,* this in spite of the notorious fact that
surtaxes here have largely been avoided. Instead of citing
Great Britain as an example, Chairman Green might have
cited it as a contrast. For two policies could hardly differ
more than their policy of a high normal tax (twenty-five to
thirty per cent) combined with a surtax of about the same
rate and our policy of a small rate of normal tax and surtaxes
running up to many times that rate.
In my judgment any attempt to combine such rates as a
small normal tax of say four per cent, a tax of twelve and
one-half per cent on corporations and a fifty per cent sur
tax, with all the facility for incorporation and dissolution of
corporations, and with the control of corporations vested in
states entirely independent of the federal government that
* In the five years ending March 31, 1922, Great Britain collected £2,728,000,000 in income and profits taxes of which £218,000,000, or rather under
eight per cent, consisted of surtaxes. The returns in the United States for
the five calendar years 1917-1921 showed total income and profits taxes of
$14,774,000,000 of which $2,894,000,000, or about 19.6 per cent, were surtaxes.
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is levying the income tax, creates an administrative problem
that cannot be solved with any great degree of equity or
efficiency. I do not think the administration of our Bureau
of Internal Revenue has been by any means perfect, but I
must say that to me the sight of Congress investigating the ad
ministration of the tax law is the very height of irony, for
whatever the responsibility of the administration may be, it
is insignificant compared to the responsibility of Congress
for unsound tax legislation and for imposing burdens on
the Bureau without any recognition of the administrative
problem involved and without any attempt to provide the
machinery or to pay the men necessary to carry it out with
a reasonable degree of efficiency.
The main responsibility is, and I think always has been
since the war taxes started, on Congress. Look back at the
law of 1917, an ill-conceived compromise between the House
Bill and the Senate Bill, which was handed to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue to administer. It was three months or
more after the Bill was passed before even the chairmen of
the committees responsible for the Bill in Congress could
feel any assurance that it was possible to administer it, and,
as everybody knows, it was administered by strong-arm meth
ods, by the adoption of regulations which were in many
cases of very doubtful correspondence with the language of
the law. Until Congress faces the problem of administra
tion, which it has never seriously considered, and provides
some tax legislation which is devised scientifically and with
due regard to the administrative problems entailed, it is
quite impossible to get efficient tax administration.
Just one more point, there is hardly a provision that has
seemed more clearly necessary to justice than the application
of the same rule to capital losses as has been applied to
capital gains. Yet that was rejected in the Senate last year,
and the Senate Finance Committee has thrown it out of the
bill again. Such a policy seems to be a policy of high taxes,
so that the people at large may think that Congress is putting
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the burden on the rich, with holes by which the rich may in
fact escape. “High taxes and plenty of holes” is a system
that is inefficient, inequitable and demoralizing, and makes
tax-paying not a function of the ability to pay, as it should
be, but a function of the conscience of the taxpayer.

IX

DOUBLE TAXATION *
(1926)
Double taxation is one of many subjects which have as
sumed much increased importance as a result of the war.
Nor is the increased importance due solely to higher rates
of taxation, though the imposition of taxes running up to
more than 50 per cent has created situations in which double
taxation of income amounts to practical expropriation. An
other serious factor is the change in the fiscal situation of
the leading countries which the war has brought about.
Countries which before the war were in position to supply
their own requirements of capital or even had a surplus
for investment abroad, have become borrowers; other coun
tries have found themselves not only in a position to invest
abroad but almost compelled to do so. Our own country
could hardly maintain its policies of restriction of imports
through high tariffs, exportation of surplus food products,
collection of foreign government debts and the building up
of a merchant marine, without making foreign investments
to balance the international account.
Again, lack of confidence in domestic finance and deprecia
tion of currencies have created a demand for foreign invest
ments even in countries whose capital resources are inade
quate for their own requirements; and in the most stable
European countries anxious investors having seen the dis
astrous consequences of war on the strongest of states, have
felt it was unwise to put all their eggs in a single basket,
and have invested part of their capital abroad.
The setting up as separate nations of what were formerly
parts of a single kingdom, which remain more or less eco-

* Foreign Affairs, Vol. V (October, 1926).
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nomically interdependent, as in the case of the succession
states of Austria, is still another of the many contributing
influences as a result of which the subject has assumed very
real and general significance.

I
The problem arises mainly in relation to income and in
heritance taxes. In its international aspects double taxation
of income is by far the most important phase of the ques
tion, but in our own country double taxation of inheritances
by the States has created a particularly unsatisfactory situa
tion. Attempts to deal with the problem have been made
in domestic legislation in our own and foreign countries, and
through international conferences—notably those conducted
under the auspices of the League of Nations—which have
resulted in a number of international conventions for the
mitigation of the burden.
Dealing first with the activities of the League of Nations,
since these have included authoritative studies of the the
oretical and practical aspects of the problem, the question
was discussed at the Brussels conference (1920) and referred
to the Provincial Economic and Financial Committee. In
accordance with the request of this Committee, Sir Basil
Blackett, of the British Treasury, submitted two interesting
memoranda—one dealing historically with British income
tax practice, and the other with the purely economic ques
tion of the effects of double taxation on foreign investments.
In September, 1921, the Financial Section of the League in
vited a group of economists consisting of Professors Bruins
of Rotterdam, Einaudi of Turin, and Seligman of New.
York, and Sir Josiah Stamp of London, to prepare a report
on the subject. The group made in April, 1923, a full
report dealing first with the economic consequences of
double taxation on the equitable distribution of burdens
and on the flow of capital, and second with the possibility
of relieving or mitigating its evil effects either by domestic
legislation of states or by international agreements.
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The Committee next brought together a group of tech
nical experts, requesting them to examine both this problem
and the collateral problem of tax evasion from an administra
tive point of view. These experts used as a basis the report
of the economists, which they characterized as a masterly
report of inestimable value to them, and adopted resolutions
that embodied the principles which in their judgment should
govern the formulation of conventions for relief from double
taxation. These resolutions were set forth with extended
comments in a report published by the League under date
of February 7, 1925. This report was brought to the atten
tion of the International Chamber of Commerce, which had
been continuously interested in the subject, and that body,
after extended examination through a Committee headed
by Prof. T. S. Adams, expressed its substantial agreement
with the experts.
The next step was to ask the same group, enlarged to in
clude representatives of other countries, to draft types of
conventions of either a general or a bilateral character for
the purpose of giving effect to the principles agreed on.
The enlarged group met in Geneva in May last, but the
session then held was occupied largely in securing agreement
on principles on the part of the many new members, and it
was not found possible at that time to do more than prepare
preliminary drafts of conventions which are to be considered
at an adjourned session to be held in October.
II

Double taxation of income arises from the fact that a tax
may logically, and can effectively, be levied either where
the income arises or where the recipient resides. In our own
legislation both these principles are applied, and in addition
a tax is levied on our own citizens even if they reside abroad
and their income is derived from foreign sources.* The
English income tax, the oldest of those in existence, though
* In the 1926 law exemption was granted to non-resident citizens in respect
of earned income from foreign sources.
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it is in the main a personal tax, nevertheless taxes the income
of non-residents derived from English sources. As a practical
matter, it is hardly conceivable that any state which levies
an income tax would wholly relinquish this source of
revenue.
The question of the ultimate disposition of the burden
of a tax on income from domestic sources, levied upon non
residents, was considered at length by the economists selected
by the League. In the case of a country seeking to borrow
capital from abroad, a tax levied on the interest from the
loan secured is likely to be thrown back either directly or
indirectly on the borrowing country. Where, however, for
eign capital is seeking to exploit the natural resources or
commercial opportunities of a state, the tax on the income
which that capital earns is not likely to be passed on.
As a logical consequence, countries whose natural re
sources are relatively large in proportion to the foreign in
terests of their residents are apt to stress the principle of
taxation according to the source of income (especially as
there would be strong political objection to the exemption
of foreigners from a tax to which citizens engaged in similar
enterprises would be subject); while the great capitalist
countries are equally insistent on the principle of taxation
according to residence.
The technical experts in their resolutions drew a distinc
tion between taxes which are independent of the status of
the taxpayer and those which are determined by such status;
between impersonal taxes and personal taxes, or, using the
French terms, between impôts réels and impôts globals.
They suggested that the former should be levied only in
the country in which is found the source of the income, and
the latter only in the country of residence (domicile) of the
recipient of the income. The practical value of the distinc
tion has been questioned, and it must be admitted that the
modern income tax is usually in some respects a personal
and in other respects an impersonal tax.
In applying the distinction the experts laid down the gen
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eral principle that taxes at progressive rates should be re
garded as personal taxes, and should be levied only by the
state of domicile. Acceptance of this principle would mean
that no state would levy surtaxes on non-resident individuals
on income derived from sources within the state, either
with reference to their total income from all sources or with
reference to their total income from sources within the state.
Both the United States and Great Britain at present at
tempt to levy surtaxes on non-resident aliens on the basis
of their total income from sources within the taxing country.
There is, however, reason to believe that such attempts are
not very productive, and on practical as well as on theoretical
grounds the two countries might well, under reciprocal
agreements, forgo such surtaxes. The administrative diffi
culties of effecting collection are great, and in any case in
which the sums involved are sufficient to warrant the expense
the taxpayer can make these difficulties practically insuper
able by measures such as the interposition of a foreign cor
poration under his ownership and control between the
source of the income and himself.
Apparently also, though this is not perhaps absolutely
clear from the report, the experts considered that no state
should levy on the profits of an enterprise owned by non
residents taxes computed at progressive rates, even if the
scale were established entirely without regard to the status
of the owners. This question is one on which American and
British practice have differed sharply.
The British laws have proceeded on the principle that
the ability to pay, which is the broad justification of the
progressive income tax system, is a purely individual matter;
and while income taxes are collected in Great Britain from
corporations as a matter of administrative convenience, the
system of relief is so arranged that if the income of a corpora
tion were wholly distributed and the income of every in
dividual shareholder were nevertheless still below the exemp
tion limit, the shareholders would in the aggregate be en
titled to recover an amount of tax equal to the tax payable
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in the first instance by the corporation. We have adopted
the view that not only may corporations properly be sub
jected to an income tax as separate entities, but the prin
ciple of ability to pay may properly be applied to them
through a scale of graduated taxes without regard to the
status of their shareholders. This was the vital difference
between our excess-profits tax and the British. Whatever
may be said on the question of principle, it is highly improb
able that states in which the most important enterprises are
being exploited by non-residents will in practice forgo ‘the
right to levy graduated taxes on such enterprises.
It should be added that the experts clearly recognized
that the principles laid down by them were not likely to be
immediately and universally adopted, and made suggestions
for procedure in cases where the states could not see their
way to accept these principles in their entirety.

III
The experts next proceeded to lay down rules for deter
mining the sources of income. These rules have been ap
proved by the International Chamber of Commerce and are
substantially similar to those embodied in our own Federal
legislation. Income from real estate (or mortgages thereon)
and income from agricultural enterprises are attributed to
the country in which the property is situated; earned income
to the country in which the services are rendered; income
from business to the country where the business is conducted
—an apportionment to be made if the business is carried on
in more than one country, provided that in each there is a
real establishment and not a mere agency. Incidentally, the
experts recommended as a concession to practicability that
maritime navigation undertakings should be taxed in only
one country, namely, that in which the effective control was
exercised—a provision similar to that in our own statutes
exempting on a basis of reciprocity the earnings from ship
ping registered under a foreign flag. Some shipping inter
ests have urged that this rule should be accepted as based on
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principle rather than on expediency. It is difficult to see
how such a contention could be situated, though the fact
that shipping income is earned mainly on the high seas
and the extreme difficulty of making any satisfactory appor
tionment thereof between states seem amply to justify the
experts’ recommendation.
In regard to interest on bonds, deposits and current ac
counts the experts suggested that:

The state in which the debtor is domiciled shall, as a rule,
be entitled to levy the schedular tax, but the experts recom
mend the conclusion of agreements whereby (particularly
by means of affidavits and subject to proper precautions
against fraud) reimbursement of, or exemption from, this
tax would be allowed in the case of securities, deposits or
current accounts of persons domiciled abroad, or whereby
the tax would be levied either wholly or in part by the state
in which the creditors are domiciled.
They thus recognized the right of the debtor country to im
pose the tax and the practical consideration that the tax is
likely to be passed back directly or indirectly to the debtor
country.
The resolutions of the experts did not deal with inherit
ance taxes at length, but merely indicated, that the rules for
income taxes were applicable mutatis mutandis to them.
While the theoretical discussion was proceeding, substan
tial progress was being made in negotiation of treaties for
the mitigation of double taxation. In June, 1921, a con
vention was signed at Rome between Austria, Hungary,
Poland, Italy, Jugoslavia and Rumania. A large number of
bilateral conventions have been entered into, Germany,
Italy, Austria, Switzerland and Sweden being among the
parties to them.
The bilateral conventions which have been negotiated
have followed generally the lines of the experts’ resolutions.
An interesting exception, however, is the convention be
tween Great Britain and the Irish Free State, which adopts
the principle of residence and ignores the source of income.
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Turning now to the consideration of internal legislation,
the question of double taxation within the Empire appears
to have been raised in the British Parliament as early as
1860, but it was not until the heavy war taxes came into ef
fect that an attempt was made, in 1916, to alleviate the hard
ship. The question was discussed at an Imperial war con
ference in 1917 and was exhaustively considered by a Royal
Commission in 1919, and that Commission laid down the
principles which in its opinion should be the basis of any
sound solution of the problem. The Commission also con
sidered the question of double income taxes in relation to
foreign countries but did not see its way in the existing cir
cumstances to recommend any change in the British prac
tice. British measures for relief have therefore, with minor
exceptions, been limited to double taxation within the Em
pire.
In our Federal practice the question of double taxation
was dealt with as soon as it became at all serious. The
specific provisions enacted have exhibited much the same
characteristics as our income tax laws in general. In many
cases the spirit of the provisions has been broad, and, indeed,
liberality has at times become prodigality. On the other
hand, specific provisions have frequently been arbitrary and
impracticable, and too often the administration has been
productive of irritation and expense to taxpayers, rather
than of revenue to the Treasury.
Since 1918 the law has contained provisions under which
taxpayers might make a deduction from their United States
income taxes in respect of income taxes paid in other coun
tries. Such provisions were the more necessary because of
our practice of imposing the tax on citizens irrespective of
residence or the source of the income. We could hardly
tax our citizens representing American business abroad on
their income earned where they were residing, without sub
stantial relief in respect of taxes paid in that country.
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The allowances made have not always been based on wellestablished principles of taxation; at times they have been
obviously excessive. For instance, under the 1918 law a
citizen resident in the United. States could deduct from his
United States tax all taxes paid to foreign countries on his
income from sources therein, even though such taxes ex
ceeded the domestic tax on the foreign income in question.
Thus, if his American rate were 20 per cent and one-third
of his income were from foreign sources and subject to a
foreign tax of 60 per cent, he would pay no American tax at
all. A rule involving such sacrifice by our Treasury of taxes
on income which was derived from American sources was
quite uncalled for, and it was changed in 1921.
By a curious oversight an even more anomalous situation
existed under the 1918 law, as a result of which a domestic
corporation might in effect exclude from its gross income
dividends received from a foreign corporation and yet de
duct from its American taxes any taxes levied on those divi
dends by the foreign country. This error was also corrected
in 1921.
The principle of allowing a credit against the American
tax for foreign taxes paid has from the first been extended to
taxes paid by foreign subsidiaries of a domestic corporation.
The rules laid down in the statutes for computing the credit
in such cases have however been, and still are, unsatisfactory
and impracticable.
Ever since 1918 any allowance for foreign taxes to a resi
dent alien has been conditional on his own country’s grant
ing a similar credit to citizens of the United States residing
in that country. The general theory of reciprocal exemption
is entirely sound, but our form of procedure is open to the
objection that it requires foreign countries to conform to a
method of exemption which we have devised, instead of to a
method mutually agreed upon. This objection has particu
lar force in a case such as that under our 1918 law, where
our scheme was theoretically unsound and extravagant. It
was not reasonable that a resident alien should be denied all
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relief under that statute because his own country did not
grant relief to the same unreasonable extent as ourselves.
The law surely might have provided for relief either to the
same extent as our citizens were relieved in his country or
to the extent of the relief granted by us to residents who
were citizens, whichever might be the lower.
In 1921, as already noted, exemption from United States
income taxes was granted to foreign shipping on a basis of
reciprocity. This broad-minded provision, which undoubt
edly involved a sacrifice by our Treasury greater than the
immediate gain to our shipping interest, has been availed
of by the principal maritime countries.
It is probable that any further steps in the direction of
relief from double taxation which we may take will be in
the same form. With our growing interests in foreign coun
tries it would seem wise to adopt a liberal policy. There
are activities other than shipping to which similar treat
ment might be given, and we might be well advised to offer
exemption of non-residents from surtaxes on a reciprocal
basis.
Incidentally, we should assuredly be wise to modify our
attitude towards non-residents in the matter of returns,
penalties and other matters of procedure. At present we
proceed on the theory that it is the duty of everyone the
wide world over to be familiar with our law and to file a
return under it if he has income from an American source as
defined by us, whether he has an agent or office here or not.
Our laws levy the taxes on “every individual” and require
a return from every individual having net or gross income
from American sources in excess of specified limits, and our
regulations interpret the language literally. Penalties are
provided by law, and the regulations apply these provisions
to residents and non-residents alike. The penalties collected
from non-resident aliens must have been trivial, but the
trouble, annoyance and expense occasioned by these provi
sions has been considerable. The English courts, construing
provisions which required “every person” chargeable with
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supertax to make a return and made “every person” failing
to make such a return liable to a penalty, held that a non
resident alien was not required to make a return nor liable to
the penalty. The Lord Chancellor, Viscount Cave, said
(Whitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue) it was not
easy to understand “by what right such a penalty could even
in express terms be imposed” and concluded that the pro
vision could not have been intended to apply to such a per
son. Lord Phillimore said he was sure it was not the duty
of a non-resident and undomiciled alien to know English
tax law, and Lord Dunedin said:

The next step lay with the appellant, and he made no
return, and I agree that the penalty section is inapplicable.
For the appellant is not subject to the jurisdiction of the
English Court, nor has the British Parliament power to en
join him personally to, do anything.
These views seem eminently reasonable, and it is much
to be desired that the Treasury or the courts should interpret
our law similarly or that Congress should modify it to the
same effect. At present we are merely creating precedents to
no profit, which may be followed by other countries to the
detriment of our citizens.

v
Our State income tax laws are not—with few exceptions—
unduly burdensome, though the methods of apportionment
of income are in some cases intricate and unsatisfactory.
It is in the field of inheritance taxes that our States have
acquired unenviable fame.
The situation cannot be better stated than in the language
of the President’s address to the conference called at his
suggestion, which met at Washington on February 19, 1925:
There is competition between States to reach in in
heritance taxes not only the property of its own citizens,
but the property of the citizens of other States which by any
construction can be brought within the grasp of the taxgatherer. A share of stock represents a most conspicuous
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example of multiple inheritance taxation. It is possible
that the same share of stock, upon the death of its owner,
may be subject to taxation, first, by the Federal Government;
then by the State where its owner was domiciled; then by
some other State which may also claim him as a citizen; again
in the State where the certificate of stock was kept; in the
State where the certificate of stock must be transferred on
the corporation’s books; in the State or States where is or
ganized the corporation whose capital stock is involved; and,
finally, in the State or States where this corporation owns
property. All this means not only an actual amount of tax
which may under particular circumstances exceed 100 per
cent of the value of the stock, but the expense, delay and
inconvenience of getting clearances of the States who claim
a right to tax the property is a serious burden to the heir who
is to receive the stock. Particularly is this expense dispro
portionate to a tax paid by a small estate which has but a
few shares of stock. In many cases the expense alone must
exceed the total value of the shares which it is sought to
transfer. Looking at it from the standpoint of State revenue,
I am told it is probable that the full cost to executors of
ascertaining the tax and obtaining the necessary transfers
is in the aggregate nearly as much as the tax received by the
States upon this property of non-resident decedents. Here,
indeed, is extravagance in taxation.

As the President emphasized, the burden of expense and
trouble was in many cases more serious than the tax. By
the transfer of personal holdings to a corporation formed for
that purpose, and by other means, large taxes outside the
State of the residence of the decedent could usually be
avoided. The amount of tax thus became dependent on
the foresight and ingenuity displayed by the decedent rather
than on any ability to pay. Calculations made showing pos
sibilities of taxes amounting to 100, 200 or even 300 per
cent of the estate were merely mental exercises of the expert.
Since the President’s speech was delivered, various events
have improved the situation. By the Federal Tax Law of
1926 the credit for State taxes against the Federal tax was
increased from 25 per cent to 80 per cent of the latter. Next
came the decision of the Supreme Court in the Frick case
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which declared invalid a tax on tangible personal property
without the State, and held that the State of residence must
allow the tax on corporate stocks owned by the decedent
levied by the State of incorporation as a deduction from the
value of the gross estate in computing its tax. This was
followed by another Supreme Court decision which held
invalid a tax on the transfer of stock of a foreign corporation
owned by a non-resident, based on the ground that the prop
erty of the corporation was mainly within the State.
Important States such as New York, Connecticut, Penn
sylvania, and Massachusetts, have enacted laws containing
reciprocal exemption clauses, and conferences of the tax
ing authorities of these States have been held in an effort
to make such provisions effective. What the League has
been seeking to bring about in the international sphere has
thus been happening in our own interstate field.
VI

In any review of the measures relating to double taxation
which have been taken since the war, it must be constantly
kept in mind that the period has been one of unexampled
difficulties in the field of government finance. Allowing
for this fact, the progress made cannot be regarded as un
satisfactory. The efforts of the League of Nations have
borne and are bearing fruit.
The United States by reason of its prosperity and its in
creasing foreign investments should be the leader in the
adoption of broad and liberal policies in this field. Not
withstanding the amelioration of the situation in the recent
past, much remains to be done to put our State taxation
on a fair and sound basis. There is room for improvement
in our Federal law though even more in our methods of
Federal tax administration. A Federal inheritance tax, for
instance, is still levied on stock of a corporation owned by
a non-resident decedent if either the corporation is organized
under the laws of one of our States or the stock certificate
is physically in the United States at the time of the death.
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Surely we might, on a basis of reciprocity, grant exemption
in such cases; at least we might adopt a single test of liability.
The President’s criticisms of the States in this respect are
justly applicable to the Federal Law.
The United States has hitherto declined to join in the
work of the League of Nations, but if bur apprehensions
preclude us from following the same precise path, we have
at least taken some steps along parallel lines. We have the
opportunity and it is to our interest to keep pace with, or
even move ahead of, other nations and to offer reciprocal
relief to any that are prepared to advance with us. The fact
that some of the best informed students of the subject are
among those whose judgment on tax questions is most highly
valued by Congress gives some grounds for hope that we
shall not neglect our opportunities and duties.

X

FEDERAL TAX LEGISLATION IN 1935 AND IN 1936 *
In June, the country was surprised by a Presidential mes
sage recommending heavy additional taxes on large incomes
and inheritances and new taxes on corporations. The pro
posals came late in an exhausting session; the amount of
revenue they were expected to realize was admittedly trivial
in comparison with current deficits; the importance asserted
for them was purely social. They were supported by a
Treasury memorandum which was freely quoted by the
President and which contained highly questionable economic
doctrines, obvious misinterpretations of statistics, and dis
turbing administrative proposals. Hurried legislation re
sulted, the form of which was determined mainly by reluc
tance to repudiate the President and a desire to escape from
the heat of Washington. The new provisions were not to
take effect immediately, and it is intimated that the new
Congress will be asked to repair some of the more obvious
defects of the hasty enactment. It is opportune, therefore,
now to reexamine the recommendations and the memoran
dum by which they were supported.
The proposals were put forward as calculated to improve
the distribution of wealth. Everyone who feels any social
consciousness would like to add to the well-being of the
mass of our people. Those in political life have no monop
oly of this praiseworthy desire, though they are sometimes
more concerned with creating the impression that they are
doing something to bring about an improvement than with
the actual results of the measures which they advocate. Even
the best-intentioned reformers, also, are apt, in the lan
guage of the great English economist, Alfred Marshall, “in
* Reprinted with Addenda, from “The Voice of Business” number of the
New York Sun (January 4, 1936).
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their anxiety to improve the distribution of wealth to be
reckless as to the effects of their proposals on the production
of wealth.” And it is noteworthy that neither in the Presi
dent’s message, nor in the Treasury memorandum, nor in
any other official presentation of the question to Congress,
is the effect of the proposals on the production of wealth
so much as alluded to.
This points to the real criticism of the proposals. That
criticism is, not that the proposed taxes, particularly those
on inheritance, were incapable of strict enforcement and
therefore bound to result in inequality in their application;
nor that the amount of revenue they would raise was rela
tively unimportant and that in the long run they would
probably affect the revenue adversely. These are minor,
though probably just, criticisms. The real criticism is that
the proposals were calculated to destroy to a large extent
the source from which the capital which is the life-blood
of our industrial system has in the past been drawn, and
that they failed to meet this objection or to indicate any
alternative source of capital.
The importance to the great mass of our people of the
continuance of a flow of capital into industry can scarcely
be exaggerated. Perhaps I may quote what I said upon the
question before the Senate Finance Committee: *

It is generally recognized that one of the most vital
needs of an industrial community is an adequate supply of
capital to be invested in new enterprises.
A little thought will convince that to keep our people
busy, development of new industries must be on a constantly
increasing scale. In the next generation, we must create
new industries exceeding in magnitude the motor, radio, and
other industries created during the last thirty years. Now,
in the course of such development large losses of capital
will be incurred. Professor Allyn Young, one of our great
est economists, used to say that he doubted whether, taking
all enterprises together, there was such a thing as profit; that
losses equaled profit over a reasonable rate of interest. The
important consideration for our people is what effect the
* See below.
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proposed taxes will have on the supply of capital for these
purposes.

In England, Sir Josiah Stamp has estimated that roughly
twenty per cent of the national income is required to be
reinvested in industry in order to maintain a healthy prog
ress, and has pointed out that the maintenance of this flow
of capital into industry is vastly more important to the peo
ple at large than the question in whom the nominal owner
ship of the capital shall be vested. Mr. Justice Holmes has
emphasized the same truth.
Statisticians of the right wing and those of the left wing
may argue whether the amount which could be added to the
weekly income of the less wealthy by a distribution of the
excess income of the wealthy would be more or less by a
dollar a week. They will agree that the amount would be
small, and trifling in comparison with the improvement in
well-being of the people at large that has in the past been
produced and can again be produced in a generation or less
from the employment of capital in the development of new
inventions and new large scale industries, which in the
President’s own words bring “many things within the reach
of the average man which in an earlier age were available to
few” or, one might add, in many cases to none.
The omission to deal with these aspects of the question
cannot be attributed to their novelty or to a dearth of evi
dence. Economists like Taussig, Carver and Adams have
repeatedly emphasized the point that, while progressive taxa
tion can be applied up to a certain point, once legislators
“pass beyond this limit—apply progression so sharply or
limit inheritance so narrowly that accumulation is seriously
affected—and you must supply ways of filling the gap.” Pres
ident Wilson, in 1919, said:
There is a point at which, in peace times, high rates of
income and profits taxes discourage energy, remove the in
centive to new enterprise, encourage extravagant expendi
tures and produce industrial stagnation with consequent un
employment and other attendant evils.
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In England, the question has been the subject of extended
study by a committee of high quality, which in 1926 made
a report known as the Colwyn report, which is regarded as
perhaps the most authoritative pronouncement on the broad
question. This report is of particular significance because
for years proponents of higher income and inheritance taxes
have pointed to England as the country where the very rich
really paid high taxes compared to which ours were moder
ate. In its report, the Committee, after indicating its full
acceptance of the principle of ability to pay as a guide in
taxation, said:

But there is a complementary aspect which imposes a
check on the application of the ability to pay principle. . . .
The larger the income, the more room is there for savings;
and the State, when putting a heavy tax on incomes with the
greater margin, has to consider the risk of doing too much
damage to savings. . . . The graduation now existing in
this country, whether or not it has proceeded too far in the
ultimate interests of society, has certainly been checked by
the fear of entrenching too heavily upon the essential sup
ply of capital. . . . We conclude with regard to the supply
of capital from individual and corporate savings, that in
dustry has suffered materially from the effect of high Income
Tax and Super-Tax. This remains true, when full allowance
has been made for the proportionate application of revenue
to the large payments on account of the National Debt which
accrue directly or indirectly to the benefit of trade (§§ 333,
373, and 444).

When this report was written, the maximum combined
rate of income and super-tax was 50% and the maximum
rate of estate tax was 40%, and it is pertinent to point out
that not even the minority of that Committee recommended
rates approaching those proposed in the bill which the House
passed to give effect to the President’s proposals.
The considerations which led the Committee to reject
higher graduated taxes are strengthened in our country by
two considerations which do not apply in England—first,
that they do not tax capital gains and therefore the man who
risks his capital has the opportunity of making non-taxable
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gains as well as a taxable income, whereas here we tax both
incomes and gains, though we make no corresponding al
lowances in respect of losses; and secondly, that there is no
isle of refuge for wealth in England corresponding to our
tax-exempt securities.
The three commonly recognized main sources of capital
for the creation of new and the expansion of old enterprises
are private savings, corporate savings, and the State. In his
discussion of the proposed additional taxes on corporations,
the President said: “We should likewise discourage unwieldy
and unnecessary corporate surpluses,’’ which indicates that
he did not propose that the main reliance for the supply
of capital should be put on corporate savings. In any event
the depression has made great inroads on corporate savings.
A recent bulletin (No. 55) of the National Bureau of Eco
nomic Research states that “The situation revealed is a dark
one. In the aggregate, the drain in the form of losses and
dividends for the period 1930-1933 exceeded the corporate
savings of the entire post-war decade.’’
The proposal that the State should supply capital for in
dustry was therefore implicit in the Presidential message;
and it is surely a just criticism that the real issue which
should have been presented to our people was not whether
they desired slightly to improve the distribution of wealth,
but whether they desired to substitute a system of industry
initiated, financed and controlled by the State for the system
of privately financed industry under which we have lived
and progressed for generations. If such an issue is once
squarely raised, it is hardly conceivable that the common
sense of our people will not lead them to recognize that a
system of private enterprise, subject to the checks and con
trols of government, is preferable to conduct of industry
by government—or, to speak realistically, by politicians.
Apart from the power which the control of capital gives,
the benefits flowing from accumulated wealth which the
nominal owners thereof can retain for themselves are ob
viously limited, and from a national point of view insignifi
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cant. Hence it is that the selfish creator of wealth unwit
tingly benefits his fellow men, while the well-meaning re
former urging a redistribution of wealth is likely to do his
fellow men only an injury.
Anyone who will read carefully the sympathetic discussion
of The Christian Ethic as an Economic Factor contained in
Sir Josiah Stamp’s social service lecture in 1926 will be
forced to agree with his conclusion that “In centering our
teaching and our hopes upon the point of redistribution to
produce greater well-being we are ‘barking up the wrong
tree’ and diverting attention from the more real and power
ful remedies.”
The attack on great wealth was, it may be noted, based
on the very fact that it was turned back into production. It
was not that wealth ministered to private extravagance and
waste—the complaint was that large estates were not being
squandered; that the old saying that wealth was dissipated
in three generations was being falsified.
The Treasury memorandum quoted by the President fur
nished statistics purporting to support this view, saying that
“even informed observers were startled at the tendency to
concentration, and the rate of concentration indicated by
the 1933 returns ... in the face of generally declining in
comes, and in spite of the bank holiday and other events
of that year, the number who reported net taxable incomes
of $1,000,000 or over more than doubled, having increased
from twenty in 1932 to fifty such persons in 1933.”
The charitable view of this statement is that it was penned
by someone in the legal department of the Treasury un
versed in the interpretation of statistics. Statisticians know
that the significance of our statistics of large incomes is prac
tically destroyed by the inclusion in income of capital gains
and the frequent changes in the law relating thereto. A
man retires from active life and sells at a profit of a million
dollars a business which represents a lifetime of creative
effort. Thereupon, he makes his appearance (for one year
only) among the possessors of an income of a million dollars,
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alongside the man who draws an income of a million dollars
a year from industrial bonds.
Changes in the law are constantly occurring. Thus, 1932
was the last year in which capital net losses were allowed
as a deduction, and 1933 the last in which capital gains could
be taken on the basis of a relatively moderate flat tax—hence
there were special incentives to take losses in 1932 and gains
in 1933; devaluation, and the inflation market in the latter
year added to those gains as measured in devalued dollars.
Thus it is found, as was to be expected, that the incomes of
over a million dollars in 1933 were made up largely (actually
to the extent of almost exactly one-half) of net capital gains,
whereas the same groups in 1932 had reported net capital
losses of about a million dollars.
It was obvious that the Treasury’s interpretation of the
1933 statistics could not survive the publication of the
statistics for 1934. Nevertheless, it was a little surprising to
find the Bureau of Internal Revenue interpreting the Statis
tics of Income for 1934, recently published (which showed
a large increase in aggregate income and a marked decrease
in the number of million dollar incomes) as evidence that a
great redistribution of wealth had taken place since 1929.
The statistics form no basis for such a wide generalization,
but the indications are that the conclusion drawn from a
study of the national income from 1914-1926, published by
the National Bureau of Economic Research in 1930, is still
true, and that “there is practically no tendency towards the
putting of more income into the hands of the extremely
opulent sections of the community.”

Whenever the rate of tax on the transfer of property is
made so high that the margin left to the taxpayer becomes
small in proportion to the margin of possible error in the
valuation of the property, the practical result is, inevitably,
taxation at the discretion of the taxing authority. When
the Treasury, in its memorandum, admitted that cases would
arise which “will require sympathetic administration on the
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part of the Bureau if hardship is to be avoided," it merely
stated in blander language the truth that the adoption of
the President’s proposals as embodied in the House Bill
would have put large estates at the mercy of the Treasury.
As an example, the supposition that Mr. Henry Ford
would leave his interest in the Ford Motor Company to
Mr. Edsel Ford was taken in the discussions before the
Senate Finance Committee. Under the House Bill, and
upon the assumptions made by the Treasury representative,
the tax that would have been payable by the estate and the
beneficiary on such a transfer as is assumed would have ap
proximated 90% of the value of the stock. Now, of three
equally competent valuers, one would be quite likely to
place the value of the stock at a figure 20% above and an
other 20% below that reached by the third. A tax of 90%
levied upon 120% of the fair value would, of course, amount
to 108% of that value. On the other hand, a tax of 80%
of the true value would be 72%. Assuming, however, that
the tax was levied on the true value, and that ten years were
allowed for payment, the annual instalment (ignoring in
terest) would be, roughly, 9% of the value of the stock be
queathed. Now, assuming that the stock paid dividends
equaling 10% on the assessed value, surtaxes under the
House Bill would have absorbed 75% of such dividends,
leaving an amount equal to only 2.5% on the original valua
tion available to pay the annual instalment of tax which, as
already stated, would be 9% of the original value. Ob
viously, such a tax could not be collected, and the only ques
tion would be at what point could a figure be reached which
the beneficiary would be willing to pay and the Treasury
to accept.
It would be a gross mistake to suppose that such problems
would arise in only a very few large cases. Even if the
amounts involved were reduced to only two or three per
cent of those assumed in the case of Mr. Ford, the annual
dividends from the stock bequeathed would, after deduction
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of surtaxes, still fall far short of the amount required under
the House Bill to pay one-tenth of the taxes annually; and
it may be added that in these computations all questions of
interest, state taxes, etc., are ignored, though in the aggre
gate they constitute a substantial additional burden.
That differences in legitimate opinion as to value would
probably be far greater than has been supposed in the fore
going illustration is apparent from innumerable contested
cases. To mention only one, which involved the value of
the stock of the Ford Motor Company itself: Some years ago
the Treasury fixed the fair value of this stock at March 1,
1913, at somewhat less than $3,600 a share, and held that
all the proceeds of sale in excess of that basic value were
taxable. After protracted hearings, the Board of Tax Ap
peals fixed the value at $10,000 a share, and the Treasury
accepted its decision.
Now, we must assume that both of these valuations were
made in good faith; indeed, on the basis of some personal
knowledge of the case, it may be said that at least some of
the officials of the Bureau of Internal Revenue believe that
the value fixed by it was too high, though it proved to be
barely one-third of the value fixed by the Board. If such
legitimate differences of opinion as to value exist, can a
system which levies taxes of 60% or 70%, or even more,
upon such valuations, be wise or sound?
Fortunately in the Senate the proposed new inheritance
taxes were eliminated and the law regarding valuation was
liberalized so as to mitigate somewhat the extreme effects of
the excessive estate taxes, but the law as passed was never
theless economically and socially unjustifiable.
Before leaving the question of inheritance taxes, refer
ence may be made to the regret which many will feel that
Federal taxation should have made this further advance into
a field which they believe should be left to the States. How
ever, so long as the Federal Government continues to bear
large burdens which seem to belong more properly to the
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States, it can hardly be criticized for invading also their
revenue preserves.
It cannot be said that the President’s proposals in regard
to corporations were supported either by evidence or by any
sound principle of taxation. The statement that “The drain
of a depression upon the reserves of business put a dispropor
tionate strain upon the moderately capitalized small enter
prise” is neither inherently reasonable nor in accord with
experience—on the contrary, there is much more reason to
think that the large corporations are so constantly in the
public eye as to make it impossible for them to resort to
economies which could be effected by smaller companies
without difficulty. The conclusions drawn by the Treasury
from unanalyzed statistics are at variance with the results
of more thorough studies, such as those of Epstein. But
schemes of capitalization, and fiscal policies, have doubtless
had more influence than size upon ability to withstand the
depression.
The statement, “We have established the principle of
graduated taxation in respect of personal incomes, gifts and
estates; we should apply the same principle to corporations,”
completely ignores distinctions which have been pointed out
so frequently and insistently that it cannot be supposed that
the President’s advisers were unaware of them. However, it
would be unfair to judge the proposals on their fiscal merits,
for they are avowedly a part of a larger campaign against
bigness.
The recommendation of an amendment which would per
mit the Federal Government to tax the income of subse
quently issued state and local securities, and the taxation by
state and local governments of future issues of Federal se
curities, is no doubt entirely sound from a purely tax stand
point; but even this recommendation would carry more con
viction if it were made at a time when Government ex
penditures were being prudently limited and the budget bal
anced. The administrative proposals of the Treasury met
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with no favorable response from the Congress and need not
be discussed here.
Our tax structure today includes an unsound income and
inheritance tax scheme resting on an absurdly narrow base
(less than seven per cent of the national income paid out to
individuals paid even a normal tax in 1933) and imposing
rates that are unwise and in some cases unenforceable.
Among minor schemes, we have the linked capital stock
and excess-profits taxes, which, though described as “rather
clever,” are certainly neither wise nor fair—for there is no
justice in the assumption, which underlies them, that profits
are excessive if they represent more than a moderate return
upon the current value, at the bottom of a depression, of
the capital invested in a business; and we have taxes levied
on corporations, partly because of hostility to corporations
and partly because this method disguises the burdens that
ultimately fall on the individuals who constitute the elector
ate. No such structure can sustain the burdens which bal
ancing the budget will entail.
The defects of our tax system are not chargeable to any one
administration nor to any one Congress. The period of pros
perity was the appropriate time for creating a system with a
broad base and low rates of taxation which could be adapted
readily to the needs of more difficult times. When the de
pression came upon us, new taxation, which would have bal
anced the budget, was rejected as politically impracticable.
The proposals of last June, by carrying to lengths never be
fore contemplated the false doctrine that the rich can be
made to pay without burdening the less wealthy, made in
finitely more difficult the task of creating a sound basis for a
balanced budget, which must be faced before long if we are
to be spared from the bitter awakening that follows the first
pleasant dreams produced by Government spending and
inflation.
Sound finance today obviously calls for the lowering of
rates of taxation in the higher brackets and a real stiffening
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of the rates in the lower brackets, accompanied by a reduc
tion of the exemptions. But a combination more unattrac
tive politically can scarcely be conceived. There is danger
that if the task is faced at all, some device which throws the
added burden of taxation less obviously on those with small
means will be preferred, though economists may urge the
critical importance of bringing home directly to the people
the cost to them of Government expenditures.
Measures designed to create a greater degree of social
security will make a broader basis of taxation even more im
peratively necessary. And surely the people at large, who
are to benefit from such measures, would prefer to pay their
fair share of the cost during their earning years. They
would not be willing to accept private charity, and, logically,
they should not be willing to accept public charity, but only
benefits during sickness, unemployment or old age out of
funds to which they have themselves made their just contri
bution. The idea that such schemes should be financed by
levies on the rich is demoralizing as well as impracticable.
England, with less natural resources, has been able to
balance its budget during the depression, though it has gone
further than we have in social legislation, because of the
broad basis of its tax system and its repudiation of the false
notion that the rich can be made to pay the bulk of the
taxes. Statistics show that in 1928 England raised a far
smaller proportion of its revenue from taxes on income and
property, including inheritances, than we did, and that since
that time it has made only small increases in the scale of
taxation, a large part of which has already been remitted.
Today the highest income tax rate is 60% compared with
our 75% and the highest estate tax rate 50% compared with
our 70%. In 1930, the last year for which satisfactory com
parisons can now be made, less than 6% of our total Federal
income taxes were collected from persons with incomes of
under $10,000; while England collected about 40% of its
total from persons with incomes below £2,000. The report
made last year by Treasury representatives on the English
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system shows that an income of $100,000 concentrated in one
individual there paid 2½ times as much as the same income
distributed equally between ten individuals; here, it paid
seven times as much even before the 1935 law was passed.
Much the same thing is true of inheritance taxes.
There is no hope of a balanced budget until a drastic cur
tailment of expenditures has taken place and we have an
Administration and a Congress willing to face the fact that
the bulk of the taxes must be paid by the mass of the people.
It is too much to hope for either in an election year. In the
meantime, some minor but important improvements might
be effected.
First among these I would put the abolition of the tax
on capital gains; or, if that is deemed too much of a sacri
fice to sound principle, the substitution of a flat tax not large
enough to act as a deterrent to sales of capital assets. I be
lieve this alternative could be adopted without causing any
serious loss of revenue, and with wholesome effects on the
general situation through the encouragement of sales, other
wise likely to be withheld from the market for tax reasons.
In the second place, the principle admirably stated by the
Democratic Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee in
1918, that what is, in fact, a single economic unit ought to
be taxed as a unit, should be restored and the consolidated
return again permitted; the tax on intercompany dividends
should also be eliminated. If these two steps are not to be
taken, at least the provisions relating to non-taxable reor
ganizations should be amended so as to permit corporate re
adjustments between affiliated companies to be effected with
out tax. Unless this is done, duplication of taxation as a
result merely of the change of a long-established policy in
the tax laws will result.
The indefensible linked capital stock and excess-profits
taxes should be eliminated; a straightforward tax, designed
to raise an equivalent amount would be more statesmanlike
and infinitely less harmful in its direct and indirect effects
than this exhibition of tax-craft.
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Such changes as these would do something to arrest the
decline in respect for Federal taxation, which today is too
generally regarded as having reached a stage where justice
and fairness to the large body of taxpayers have been lost
to sight in reprisals against practices which, whatever their
merits or demerits, are being followed by only a small num
ber of those on whom the burden of such reprisals falls.
ADDENDUM I

Administrative Proposals of the Treasury
In the foregoing article, considerations of space made it
necessary to omit discussion of the administrative proposals
of the Treasury; but, although these proposals met with no
favorable response from the Congress, they were of such a
disquieting character that it seems worth while to append a
brief comment upon them. They related to the Board of
Tax Appeals and to the Courts.
In regard to the Board of Tax Appeals, the Treasury
memorandum said:

The device of permitting a litigation of tax first and pay
ment afterwards, with no security, or penalty or disadvantage
whatever for the delay is proving so costly as to present a
challenge to effective enforcement.
It is stated by a retiring member of the Board of Tax
Appeals that since 1926 the Government had lost two-thirds
in amount of its cases before the Board of Tax Appeals, the
average tax case involving a deficiency of $28,000.
This brief description of the existing system is inaccurate.
The Treasury has and uses the power to require payment
or bond for payment in any case in which it has reason to
feel that the eventual collection of the tax in any case pend
ing before the Board might be jeopardized. And since any
judgments in favor of the Government carry interest, it is
incorrect to say that there is no penalty or disadvantage what
ever to the taxpayer for the delay. To an impartial observer,
the fact that the taxpayers had succeeded in two-thirds of the
cases before the Board might seem to be evidence of the need

LEGISLATION IN

1935

215

for continuance of the present system, in order to protect tax
payers from oppression by the Treasury. Only a belief in its
fitness to exercise autocratic power can explain the contrary
view expressed by the Treasury.
In respect of the Courts generally, the memorandum
stated:

When the time comes to consider more fully administra
tive provisions, consideration should be given to settling
valuation questions wherever they arise in tax administration
in some manner other than by litigation. The litigation
method of determining values is too technical, slow and un
certain.
If we could interpret this comment as looking to the crea
tion of a body of some such character as the English Tax
Commissioners, independent of both the taxing authority
and the taxpayer, we might perhaps derive encouragement
from it. But the Board of Tax Appeals, itself, was the out
growth of such a suggestion; and the fact that the Treasury
now regards the procedure before that Board as a challenge
to effective enforcement makes such an interpretation quite
improbable. The only alternative would seem to be a grant
of final power in the matter of valuation to the Treasury,
to be exercised by it “sympathetically” whenever sympathetic
treatment seems to be called for. Admitting the defects of
the legal apparatus for determining values, the Courts possess
one advantage which more than offsets any which the Treas
ury may be presumed to have, namely, that their attitude
is purely .objective. In theory, the Treasury may recognize
that it has a duty to be just to taxpayers as well as to collect
revenue, but in practice it takes the position that its mission
is to collect revenue, and that it is for the taxpayer to protect
himself.
ADDENDUM II

Some Considerations Relating to the Taxation of Capital
Gains
I. The present system of taxing capital gains without al
lowing equivalent relief in respect of capital losses is plainly
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inequitable. It therefore inspires disrespect for the law and
affords a plausible moral justification for tax evasion. As
between the alternative of allowing deductions for losses or
abolishing the tax on gains, the latter alternative is sounder
in principle and is steadily becoming more and more ex
pedient from the fiscal standpoint.
II. At an earlier stage of our development, the argument
that capital gains would normally greatly exceed capital
losses went a long way to offset the consideration that whether
a gain or loss should be taken lies with the taxpayer, so that
the normal relation between capital gains and losses is liable
to be violently disturbed whenever it is made advantageous
for the taxpayer to take or to refrain from taking one or the
other. Today, with the exploitation of the natural resources
of the country as far advanced as it is, and with the prospect
of growing social demands adversely affecting capital values,
there is no reason to anticipate that the normal tendency,
even if unaffected by tax considerations, would be to produce
an excess of gains over losses.
III. The enactment of heavy inheritance and gift taxes has
largely destroyed the argument in favor of taxation of capital
gains that, in the absence of such taxes, unearned increment
escaped all taxation. Capital gains are in the main either
lost or added to capital. If they are lost, it is entirely un
just that the gains should be taxed but no relief given in
respect to the losses; while, if relief is given, the fact that
the taxpayer can choose the time of taking gains and losses
will result in a reduction in taxes in respect of losses which
will exceed the increase in taxes as a result of gains. To
the extent that capital gains are added to capital, the Govern
ment now collects a substantial tax when that capital passes
by gift or bequest—consequently, there is not the same argu
ment as there would be for taxing gains as gains.
IV. The taxation of gains with equivalent relief in respect
of losses produces additional revenue when it is least needed
and impairs revenue when the need is greatest.
V. Taxation of capital gains also creates highly artificial
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markets, through causing sales which would otherwise take
place to be withheld from the market. Unquestionably, this
factor is operating to a very considerable extent at the pres
ent time.
VI. The abolition of the taxation of capital gains would
make possible the elimination of the extremely complex pro
visions for non-taxable exchanges and reorganizations, which
constitute one of the most difficult branches of income tax
practice and administration. It would greatly facilitate the
corporate readjustments necessary to bring about the reduc
tion in the number of holding companies which the Admin
istration and the Congress seem to regard as highly desirable.

TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE FINANCE
COMMITTEE, AUGUST 7, 1935 *
Senator King. Will you state the capacity in which you
appear, Mr. May?
Mr. May. I appear as an individual, primarily because of
my interest in tax matters. I was connected with the Treas
ury during the war and later was a member of the Advisory
Committee to the Joint Congressional Committee on Taxa
tion. I am senior partner in the firm of Price, Waterhouse &
Co.
I wish to speak very briefly on the question of the effect
of the proposed taxes added to the existing taxes upon those
not directly subject thereto. I do not propose to touch on
the effect on the persons subjected to the tax except inso
far as that is necessary to indicate the probable effect on the
great majority of our population who will not be directly
subject thereto.
It is generally recognized that one of the most vital needs
of an industrial community is an adequate supply of capital
to be invested in new enterprises. A little thought will con
vince that to keep our people busy, development of new in
dustries must be on a constantly increasing scale. In the next
generation, we must create new industries exceeding in mag* Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1935, pp. 303-10.
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nitude the motor, radio, and other industries created during
the last thirty years. Now, in the course of such development
large losses of capital will be incurred. Professor Allyn
Young, one of our greatest economists, used to say that he
doubted whether, taking all enterprises together, there was
such a thing as profit; that losses equaled profit over a rea
sonable rate of interest. The important consideration for
our people is what effect the proposed taxes will have on the
supply of capital for these purposes. Obviously, this phase
of the case is far more important than the amount of revenue
which is expected to be derived therefrom.
In a generation, according to the Treasury’s estimates, that
yield would not be greatly in excess of the deficit for the
last year. Economists, even those who favor practically con
fiscatory taxes on wealth, recognize that such taxation will
destroy the principal source of capital for new enterprises,
and that if the community is to continue to exist in any
thing like the present scale of living, a new source for such
capital must be found.
So far as I am aware, no study of the effects of such legis
lation on the supply of capital has been submitted to the
Congress or any of its committees. The subject was very
exhaustively studied over a period of 2 years by an English
committee on national debt and taxation headed by Lord
Colwyn, which made a report dated November 15, 1926,
which is rated, I believe, as perhaps the most authoritative
pronouncement on the subject available.
Senator King. Do you know whether our committee, of
which Mr. Parker is a member, and who made a rather
extensive study of the taxation system in Great Britain,
took cognizance of Lord Colwyn’s report?
Mr. May. I have not had the pleasure of seeing Mr.
Parker since that report was made; I could not tell. I have a
copy of it here if you would like me to leave it.
Senator King. I wish you would leave it with the secre
tary. I would like to examine it.
Senator Gore. How large is it? Could it go in the record?
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Mr. May. It is a very big document [handing volume to
Senator King].
Senator King. Is that the only copy you have?
Mr. May. I have another one in my office.
Senator King. Have you any objection to leaving that
with the Committee?
Mr. May. I would be very pleased to leave it.
Senator King. Thank you.
Mr. May. This report is regarded as perhaps the most
authoritative pronouncement on the subject available.
They started, as I do, with the assumption that graduated
income taxes and inheritance or estate taxes were necessary
and proper, and that the limits on such taxes should be either
the limit of ability to collect them or the limit at which the
injury to the community would be greater than could be
compensated by the collections. In the course of the report
they said:

Money in the free disposition of the citizen has a utility
to the State as well as to himself. Saved and invested, it sup
plies the financial and industrial needs of the community.
The special utility to the community only begins when the
greatest utility to the individual has ceased. The larger the
income, the more room is there for savings; and the State,
when putting a heavy tax on incomes with the greater
margin, has to consider the risk of doing too much damage
to savings.
And elsewhere they said that the effect of an estate tax
was substantially the same.
Again they said:

Any taxation which unduly diminishes the reward of
entrepreneurs for taking pioneer risks is in that respect a
source of harm to the community.
At the time when the report was written, the maximum
rate of income and super-tax was 50 per cent and the maxi
mum rate of estate tax was 40 per cent to which was added
an inheritance tax which, in the case of direct descendants,
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was only 1 per cent and in no case exceeded 10 per cent.
That is the same as today.
In their conclusion, the committee stated:

We conclude, with regard to the supply of capital from
individual and corporate savings, that industry has suffered
materially from the effect of high income tax and super-tax.
This remains true, when full allowance has been made for
the proportionate application of revenue to the large pay
ments on account of the national debt which accrue directly
or indirectly to the benefit of trade.
Of course, under the present proposals, there would be no
compensating benefit from the reduction of the national
debt. Everyone realizes what a problem the proposed taxes
would create in a case such as that of Henry Ford, but it is a
gross mistake to assume that the difficulties would arise in
only a few extreme cases like his.
I notice that Mr. Jackson, in his testimony yesterday, esti
mated the value of Mr. Ford’s holding in Ford Motor stock
at $354,000,000. He said, quite fairly, that that was an ex
ceptional case, but I think that in fairness he should have
added that substantially similar results would ensue if the
figures were only a tenth of those assumed by him.
In fact, they would be almost confiscatory if the figures
were reduced to a bare 1 per cent of the figures in the Ford
case. Since reading his testimony in the press, I have made a
comparative table showing the results of the application of
the proposed taxes to a case similar to that of Mr. Ford, us
ing first, values of $350,000,000; second, values of $35,000,000; and third, values of $3,500,000, the last being 1 per cent
of the Ford figures, roughly. They show that if Mr. Ford left
stock in the Ford Motor Co. having a value of $350,000,000
to his son, and the estate and inheritance taxes were payable
over 10 years, without interest, and the stock received by
Mr. Edsel Ford paid 10 per cent dividends annually, the net
yield of those dividends, after deducting the proposed sur
taxes, would amount to only 28 per cent of the annual in
stallment of one-tenth payable on the taxes.
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I think that is a point that was not clearly made in Mr.
Osgood’s presentation. He overlooked the fact that the tax
would fall on the beneficiary and not on the Ford Motor
Car Co., and you could raise money only on the stock, and
you could get money to pay the tax only by dividends on the
stock, and those dividends would be subject to these heavy
surtaxes.
I have the table here; you might be interested to see the
figures.
(The table referred to is as follows:)

Statement showing effect of existing estate state tax and
proposed inheritance tax on an estate consisting of stock of a
corporation left to a single beneficiary (son), assuming the
value of the estate to be (A) $350,000,000, (B) $35,000,000,
and (C) $3,500,000, and assuming (1) that the taxes could be
paid in 10 annual installments and (2) that dividends on the
stock may be expected at the rate of 10 per cent per annum
on the valuation, and that the proposed surtax rates will be
payable thereon (State taxes and interest on deferred pay
ments of estate and inheritance taxes ignored).
(A) Valuation of estate...................................... $350,000,000
Estate and inheritance taxes thereon........ 312,970,750
Annual installment of tax, 1/10..................
31,297,075
Annual dividends........................................
Surtax thereon..............................................

35,000,000
26,091,000

Balance for payment of estate and in
heritance taxes............................
8,909,000
Per cent of estate and inheritance taxes
that could be paid out of dividends and
inheritance taxes that could be paid out
of dividends annually..........................
2.8
(B) Valuation of estate......................................
35,000,000
Estate and inheritance taxesthereon..........
29,470,750
Annual installment of tax, 1/10..................
2,947,075
Annual dividends........................................
Surtax thereon............................................
Balance for payment of estate and in
heritance taxes...............................

3,500,000
2,481,000
1,019,000
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Per cent of estate and inheritance taxes
that could be paid out of dividends an
nually.............................. .....................
(C) Valuation of estate......................................
Estate and inheritance taxes thereon... .
Annual installment of tax, 1/10..................
Annual dividends........................................
Surtax thereon............................................
Balance for payment of estate and in
heritance taxes............................
Per cent of estate and inheritance taxes
that could be paid out of dividends an
nually ........................................................

3.5
$3,500,000
2,031,168
203,116

350,000
185,000

165,000
8.1

Mr. May. Briefly summarizing this statement, the valua
tion of the estate is $350,000,000; estate and inheritance tax
thereon, $312,900,000; the annual installment of the tax,
one-tenth, $31,297,000; annual dividends, $35,000,000; sur
taxes thereon, $26,000,000; leaves a balance for the estate
and inheritance taxes of $8,900,000, which is 2.8 per cent
of the total charges, or 28 per cent of the annual installment
of the tax.
Senator King. Did you take into consideration the taxes
that might be imposed in the various States?
Mr. May. I have left out the State taxes, interest on de
ferred tax, and everything of that kind.
Senator King. If they paid all of those, there would be
nothing left.
Mr. May. When you get to 2.8 per cent, it does not make
very much difference about the rest. It amounts to practical
confiscation.
Senator Gerry. Was there not a suggestion made in the
House in the hearings, if I recollect, that it can be worked
out of income?
Mr. May. I believe Mr. Jackson did make that statement.
But you see what that involves. You work it backward. You
have, roughly, $31,000,000 of an annual installment to pay,
and if you are going to pay that out of dividends, you have
to have enough dividends to pay 75 per cent surtax and still
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have $31,000,000 left, and that means you have to have four
times $31,000,000 in dividends, and that is $124,000,000 in
dividends on the stock valued at $350,000,000, or, roughly,
35 per cent.
If a stock was going to pay 35 per cent, you would not get
the Treasury to value it at par. I think you would have
difficulty in getting them to value it at 10 times the annual
earnings, which is the figure I have used in my calculations.
But as I say, that is a quite exceptional case, and that might
be dealt with as a special situation; but when you divide the
figures by 10 and come down to $35,000,000, you find that
after the dividends have been paid and the surtaxes deducted,
what is left is no more than 3.5 per cent on the amount of the
tax. So that if the tax was paid over 10 years, it would be
only 35 per cent of the annual installment of the tax.
And finally, if you get down to an estate which is 1 per
cent of the size of Mr. Ford’s—
Senator King (interposing). That is, three and a half
million?
Mr. May. Yes. The annual installment of tax would be
$203,000, and the balance that would remain out of the
dividends after paying the surtaxes would be $165,000. So
you would be able to pay 80 per cent of your annual install
ment, or 8 per cent of the total taxes. Those are the figures
in the case of a $3,500,000 corporation.
Senator King. Supposing you had no dividends?
Mr. May. Then you would be out of luck.
Mr. Jackson also said that he thought this could be
financed by a bond issue, and people would be glad to
finance a bond issue. On $350,000,000, the taxes would be
89.5 per cent.
Mr. Jackson’s experience with underwriters may be more
favorable, although I think it is probably less extensive than
mine; but I have never found a bond house that was able
to underwrite a bond issue for 90 per cent of the value of the
property, and I doubt if his hopes are well founded, and I
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doubt if anybody is going to try the experiment with a
$350,000,000 issue.
Senator Gore. Could we not tax these underwriters if they
did not do it? [Laughter.]
Mr. May. If the figures were reduced, as I say, to one-tenth
of the figures used in the Ford case, the percentage borne by
the net income on the stock bequeathed to the annual in
stallment of taxes would not rise to more than 35 per cent;
and even if the figures assumed are only 1 per cent of those
in the supposed Ford case, the income from the stock be
queathed would fall substantially short of paying the annual
instalment of the taxes. In either case of the first two as
sumed, the beneficiary would be better advised to let the
Government take the property for the taxes and buy it from
the Government on the best terms he could get, rather than
pay taxes amounting, as they would, to from 84 per cent to
89.5 per cent of the Treasury’s valuation.
In the first two cases, the beneficiary would be in little
better position to pay the tax if he owned large amounts of
other property in addition, for 90 per cent of all such addi
tional property would be taken in taxes.
Further, in each of these cases a 10 per cent overvaluation
would make the tax practically 100 per cent of the real
value.
Another point I would like to make is that I do not believe
that anybody could value the Ford estate holdings within a
margin of 15 per cent one way or other from a given figure,
or a total spread of 30 per cent.
If they put the valuation of that stock 10 per cent too high
and taxed it at 90 per cent, that is 100 per cent of the true
valuation.
That I think is one of the great points that has perhaps not
been so fully stressed before your Committee as I would like
to see it stressed—the importance of valuation in connection
with this matter, and the wide range of difference of opinion
that exists in respect to valuation.

LEGISLATION IN

1935

225

At this point I would like to quote some illustrations to
show the difficulties of the problem of valuation. I would
recall, first, a case in which I was personally concerned, in
which the District Court found as a fact and was upheld by
the Circuit Court of Appeals in doing so, that the fair market
value of an insurance stock was $55 a share on the day on
which it sold on the New York Stock Exchange at $90, on the
basis of which figure the Treasury proposed to tax the trans
action.
In the case of the Tex-Penn Oil Co., the Board of Tax Ap
peals said:

Our problem, then, at this point is to determine the “fair
market value, if any” of the 1,007,834 share block of Trans
continental stock. In determining the deficiencies in these
cases, the respondent used a fair market value of $47.55. He
has now abandoned that figure and asserts that the stock had
a fair market value of $12 per share ... we have deter
mined that the fair market value of this stock of Trans
continental Oil Co. received by petitioners in the transaction
before us was $7 per share.

Now, ignoring the Commissioner’s first valuation in this
case, it is obvious that a tax of 60 per cent, let alone 90 per
cent, would amount to more than the total value found by
the Board of Tax Appeals.
Another case which is perhaps pertinent is the case which
involved the valuation of the Ford Motor Co. stock itself,
the valuation of that stock as of March 1,1913. In that case
it was to the interest of the Government to put the value low.
The Commissioner claimed that the value of the stock was
$3,547.84—marvelous accuracy—a share. Eventually the
Board of Tax Appeals found that the tax value was $10,000
a share or very nearly three times the figure fixed by the
Commissioner.
The competent and honest estimates of the. value of a busi
ness may vary 15 per cent to 20 per cent from a prior figure.
To levy taxes which leaves a residuum less than the reason
able margin of error is unsound taxation.
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The report of the House hearings contains a copy of a
letter written by the Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee
on Internal Revenue Taxation suggesting extraordinary
measures to meet the hardships imposed on the estates of
decedents who died in 1929, because of changing values.
That was under a statute levying a maximum tax of 20 per
cent. Even under that statute, it was frequently found to be
impossible to collect the full tax so that valuation had to be
arbitrarily reduced or a compromise worked out. Under the
proposed bill that would be the normal case in respect of any
considerable estate. The rates in the bill would in such cases
be only nominally enforced. Taxation would, in fact, be at
the discretion of the Treasury, as possibly limited by liti
gation.
I would like to draw attention to another consequence that
would flow from such taxation, that is, that capitalists would
be forced to spread their capital over numerous enterprises
so as to avoid the effects that come if their capital is locked
up in a single enterprise, with the result that our system of
businesses owned by small private groups would disappear.
The separation of beneficial ownership from control would
be accelerated instead of being checked.
Senator Gore. That is the worst defect in our whole
structure, as I see it now.
Mr. May. But the really vital objection to the measure is
the effect it would have on savings and enterprise and, ulti
mately, upon employment and taxable income of the future.
It is difficult to see why capitalists should undertake new
enterprises if the proposed burdens were added to the
burdens of the existing laws, so long as any alternative might
be open to them. Here there is the alternative of tax-exempt
securities, which would at least avert surtaxes, and provide
liquid funds to meet estate and inheritance taxes.
The disastrous effect of the general result now and on
future enterprises is incalculable. To adopt the policy re
flected in the bill without having first reviewed this alterna
tive is rather like drawing water from a tested reservoir into
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a cistern known to be leaking, and to do so without provid
ing some other source of capital seems to me with all respect
to be improvident. I am reminded of the words of a great
English economist, Alfred Marshall, referring to the social
reformers who, as he put it, “in their desire to improve the
distribution of wealth are reckless as to the effect of their
schemes on the production of wealth.”
Senator King. Mr. May, please state for the record your
experience in connection with taxation and revenue meas
ures generally, and particularly measures relating to in
heritance and estate taxes.
Mr. May. My experience has not been so much with in
heritance and estate taxes, because they were not so active at
the time that I was engaged; but I was in the Treasury dur
ing the war and I made a trip to England on one occasion
at the request of the administration to study the English sys
tem while I was there; and later I was a member of the Joint
Congressional Committee, and I have been in consultation
with the Treasury Department very freely during the last
20 years; in fact, the first contact I had was with the present
Secretary of State when he drew the first income tax bill, and
I sat down with him and discussed the problems that pre
sented.
Of course, in my business work I have a very close contact
with taxation, although I do not specialize in it personally.
That is handled by one of my partners, but I see it and its
effects on business in a very decided way.
Senator King. Price, Waterhouse & Co. has to do with
estates and with business generally, and their accounts and
investigations?
Mr. May. Oh, yes; we do a very large amount of account
ing business in such fields.
Senator Gore. Mr. May, we have heard a good deal said
about the sharing of the wealth. In all of what you and
Mr. Osgood have said, don’t you think that is rather con
servative?
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Mr. May. “Sharing” is not the word that I would have
selected.
Senator Gore. That is the point.
Mr. May. I think it is an entire fallacy to believe that this
would be a revenue producer, if you take account of the taxes
that would be destroyed as well as the taxes that would be
received. If you do that, I think it would be a net loser.
The taxes that are received will show, they will show up in
the return, and those that are lost will not be computed.

XI
THE PROPOSED GRADUATED TAXES ON UNDIS
TRIBUTED CORPORATE PROFITS*

I am going to discuss today the proposals made by the Presi
dent and now before the Congress for graduated taxes on
the undistributed profits of corporations. I am not going
to discuss the details of the pending measure because they
are likely to be changed. I intend to discuss only the prin
ciples, and I want to talk about them from various stand
points such as those of practicability and justice; the ad
ministrative problems presented; and above all, the economic
consequences their adoption would be likely to produce.
In view of the fact that comparisons between our system and
the British are very frequent, and that some years ago I
made a study of the British system at the request of the
then Administration, I shall try from time to time to illus
trate some of the points I make by comparison between our
methods and those employed in Great Britain.
My approach to the question is entirely non-political—in
fact, I have never been affiliated with any of the political
parties. My interest in the subject is a part of my general
interest in the whole question of taxation, which developed
when I was in the Treasury during the war and had some
thing to do with the difficult problems of taxation which
were then presented. Even prior to that time, I had taken
some part in the formulation of the income tax law of 1913.
Since the war, through service on the Advisory Committee
to the Joint Congressional Committee, and in other ways,
my interest in the subject has been kept alive and active.
The new proposals may be divided into two distinct parts:
the first contemplates determining the tax on corporate
profits in so far as they are distributed according to the tax
* A lecture before the School of Business Administration of the University
of Buffalo, April 7, 1936 (slightly revised).
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status of the individual who receives the dividend. This is
the same principle as is followed in England, and there is
much argument in its favor, although I am not prepared to
say that I should be willing to accept the principle in its
entirety, and I think that from an administrative standpoint
the method of giving effect to it now proposed is open to
very serious objection.
The second half of the proposal is a steeply graduated tax
on profits of corporations which are not distributed. This,
I believe, is a principle new to the tax systems of the world.
Before I discuss the present proposals I should perhaps
give you a little of the background against which they have
to be considered. At the present time, our tax system in
cludes a small normal tax (4 per cent) and graduated sur
taxes rising to 75 per cent on individual incomes; a tax on
corporate incomes, into which last year a very limited ap
plication of the idea of graduation was introduced so that it
now runs from 12½ per cent to 15 per cent; we have also a
combined capital stock and excess profits tax which was in
troduced in 1933. Under the latter scheme, each corpora
tion chooses its own valuation for its capital stock and pays
an excess-profits tax based on the relation between its profits
and the capital stock valuation it has itself fixed. The idea
is that if a corporation tries to save money on one tax it will
get caught on the other. The merit of ingenuity has been
claimed for this tax, but I think that is its only possible
merit; and one of the sound features of the present proposal
is that it contemplates the abolition of this undesirable
excrescence on our tax system.
In order to bring the new proposals into a clearer light it
may be useful to compare the rate of tax paid on a given
amount of income, the beneficial interest in which belongs
to a taxpayer who already is in the highest bracket, under
three different conditions: First, every hundred dollars of
additional income earned by him directly pays a tax of
$79.00; second, each hundred dollars of income earned on
stock of a corporation which he owns pays a tax of $15.00;
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third, if a hundred dollars of income is earned on a stock
which he owns and the balance remaining after payment
of the corporation income tax is distributed to him, the total
tax paid on it is $78.75. The disparity between the tax in
the second and third cases obviously creates an incentive
for persons in the high income brackets to allow income
earned on stock which they own to remain undistributed.
It is this fact which underlies the present proposal. The
vital question is whether the remedy proposed is a sound
one and, frankly, I do not think it is.
You will readily perceive that the problem grows out of
the wide disparities between the normal rate of tax on in
dividuals, the rates of tax on corporations, and the surtaxes
oh individuals; and at this point I might refer to British
practice, because there the problem is less acute, for the
simple reason that the disparities between the different rates
of tax are less. In England, the normal rate of tax on cor
poration. profits and the normal rate of tax on individual
incomes are identical—at the present time, 22½ per cent,
which is five and one-half times our normal tax on indi
viduals and half as much again as our maximum corpora
tion income tax. The maximum surtax there is 41¼ per
cent, which is not much more than one-half of our maximum
of 75 per cent.
England makes no attempt to interfere with or influence
the freedom of public companies in the distribution of
dividends. The advantage to the national economy of the
reinvestment of profits in industry is apparently deemed
sufficient to outweigh any loss of surtaxes. A solution of our
problem which would take the form of a closer approxima
tion to the English rates would, I believe, be sounder from
every point of view than the proposal now before Congress.
You are all no doubt familiar with the graduated tax on
individual incomes, and I should like, therefore, to point
out that there is no analogy whatsoever between the grad
uated tax on individual incomes and the proposed graduated
tax on undistributed profits of corporations, I am entirely
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in sympathy with the principle of graduated taxes on in
dividual incomes, though I believe we have carried the idea
in practice further than is desirable in the economic interest
of the country, or is advantageous to the revenue. This
graduation is based on the theory of “ability to pay” or, per
haps, rather on that of “equality of sacrifice.” The thought
is that a rich man can well afford to pay not only more tax,
but a larger proportion of his income in taxes than the poor
man, most of whose income is required to meet the neces
sities of life.
The proposed graduated tax on undistributed corporate
income rests on no similar principle. It is what may be
called a “pressure tax,” designed to compel a course of action
which the Administration or the Legislature thinks desir
able. It operates by imposing a very heavy penalty or tax
upon those who do not follow the course of action desired
by the Legislature. I shall develop this point more fully
later. For the present, I merely wish to emphasize that any
supposed analogy between a graduated tax on undistributed
profits and a graduated tax on individual incomes is entirely
specious and false.
I have already said that our existing system undoubtedly
creates an incentive to withhold profits from distribution,
and in such circumstances it is inevitable that profits should
in some cases be withheld from distribution which ought to
be distributed. This fact has long been recognized by the
Congress, and for many years our laws have contained pro
visions for special taxation in cases in which it appeared that
profits were being withheld for the purpose of avoiding the
surtaxes. These provisions have been gradually made more
drastic, and certainly today they provide the Bureau of In
ternal Revenue with a far more powerful machinery for
dealing with abuses than, for instance, does the English law.
It is, I think, a common mistake to assume that our cor
porations generally distribute a smaller proportion of their
profits than those of other countries. The only country
with which it is readily possible to make any sort of com
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parison is Great Britain, and I think the evidence shows
clearly that our companies, even in times of prosperity, dis
tribute in the aggregate a larger percentage of their profits
than do English companies. Not only so, but it is an un
questioned fact that during the depression American cor
porations have distributed dividends in excess of their cur
rent earnings to an amount exceeding the profits withheld
from distribution in the preceding ten years. It therefore
cannot justly be said that in the aggregate our corporations
withhold more than they should. As I have said, there are
unquestionably some corporations which could properly dis
tribute far more than they do, but I believe the present law
provides adequate machinery for dealing with those cases—
if not, let the machinery be strengthened. If there will be
some cases which it will not be possible to reach, we should
not allow resentment over this fact to lead us to adopt meas
ures that are economically unwise and unjust to the great
body of corporate taxpayers.
While abuses undoubtedly exist, there is no room for
doubt about the fact that the amount of profits withheld
from distribution in order to save taxes is a relatively small
proportion of the amount of profits that normally remain
undistributed. The present proposal, however, contem
plates treating all withholding of profits from distribution
alike, whether they are actuated by a desire to avoid taxa
tion, by statutory requirement, by contractual obligations,
or by honest belief that such withholding is essential to the
continued existence of the enterprise.
Since the proposals have been before the Congress, amend
ments have been suggested in the House Committee to
modify the application of the principle in cases where it
would be manifestly improper for the profits to be dis
tributed; but in their latest appearances before the Com
mittee the representatives of the Treasury have insisted that
there should be no exception whatever from the scheme of
taxation which they have put forward.
It cannot be denied that a universal application would
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produce serious injustice and do great harm to important
parts of our economic system, and it is a fair question to ask
what are the arguments that can be advanced in favor of
proposals Which are bound to have such an effect. Though
the measure was proposed originally as a means of meeting
the so-called ordinary deficit in the budget for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1937, it is apparent that it would not serve
this purpose—indeed, it is a practical certainty that it would
lead to reduction of tax collections for that particular year.
The loss of taxes on corporations would be felt immediately
—the gain from additional taxes on individuals would, in
the main, not be realized until 1938, if then.
Incidentally, I may say that I believe the estimates of
probable revenues are excessive. I am convinced that they
do not make adequate allowance for the changes affecting
tax liability which such a measure inevitably brings about.
For instance, reclassifications of capital stock or transfers
of property from taxable individuals to charitable institu
tions might vitally affect the calculations. If I were convinced
that the measure would produce a large increase of taxes I
might be. willing to support it even though I regarded it, as
I do, as a bad tax. I think we are today in the position not
.that half a loaf is better than no bread, but that almost any
taxes are better than none, because the alternative is infla
tion, which will do more injury to our people than even the
worst of taxes.
If the purpose of the measure is not primarily an imme
diate increase of revenue, what motives have led to its being
advanced at this particular time? Obviously, an election
year is a most inopportune time for reforms in our general
system of taxation. Sound tax proposals are seldom palatable
to the great majority of the people, and an election year is
apt to produce proposals which are popular in their appeal
rather than sound in their principles, and which disguise
rather than minimize the burden which really falls on the
people at large.
It would be quite easy to make out a case that these pro

UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS TAXES

235

posals are deliberately socialistic in intent. Last year’s high
taxes on inheritance, as proposed by the President, might
fairly be said to have been designed to strike a heavy blow
at private savings as a source of supply for the capital of
industry. This, it might be said, is an equally heavy blow
at corporate savings as a source for such capital. Now, there
are only three important sources for the supply of capital,
which is the life-blood of industry; namely, private savings,
corporate savings, and the State. If you. eliminate private
savings and corporate savings, the only recourse for a supply
of capital is to the State, with the inevitable sequel that the
State wall control industry. In the present unprecedented
depression, the State has had to come to the aid of industry
to a substantial extent. If corporations are compelled by
taxation to distribute all their surpluses in times of prosper
ity, it is inevitable that in any subsequent period of depres
sion when they suffer losses they will be compelled to resort
to State aid to a far greater extent.
But while the motive which actuates some of those who
are supporting the present proposals may. be socialistic,
others, particularly in the Treasury, are, I think, supporting
them for a somewhat different reason. I have spoken of the
cases in which the present laws were abused, and I think
some persons in the Treasury have their eyes glued on those
cases, and in their attempt to penalize the small group of
gross abusers of the law are willing to adopt measures which,
they believe, would add to the burdens on that group; and
lose sight of the injurious effects which such measures would
have on the large body of taxpayers. The welfare of the
many is lost to sight in the attempt to punish or thwart the
few whose actions have doubtless in a substantial, but still
relatively small, number of cases been anti-social.
Others are actuated, I believe, by a still different motive
—concern about the power that is exercised by corporate
wealth—and believe that the measures proposed, by decreas
ing or arresting the growth of corporate wealth, will lessen
this power.
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There is no doubt that the power of . corporate wealth has
at times been abused; but in the world as it is constituted
today, great power must be entrusted to some individuals,
and it may be questioned whether the situation would be
improved by transferring the power now vested in those
who administer large corporations to persons in the political
world. If our. present industrial system is judged by its
abuses, no doubt it stands condemned; but, equally, if our
political system were judged by its abuses, it could not sur
vive a single day.
I turn now to consideration of the practical aspects of the
measures proposed. This problem lies in the field of in
come taxation. It is a very common mistake to think of in
come as something very definite, simple and easily ascer
tained. Of course, when a man is living on a salary his
income is well defined; but the income of a complex business
is an extremely difficult thing to calculate. In practice, all
calculations of it are provisional, and based on conventions,
judgments and assumptions. What we call income today is
income only on the assumption that certain things will hap
pen in the future. Take a simple case: Suppose you are
offered $25 for performing a task that will take three days,
you to get nothing unless you complete the task. Well,
you work hard and satisfactorily and do one-third of it the
first day. In one sense, you have earned one-third of $25.
But suppose something happens on the second day to pre
vent your completing the task. You have earned nothing.
What is the true view of the situation—did you earn $8.33
the first day and lose $8.33 the second day, or did you earn
nothing on either day?
That is a simple illustration of what runs through the
whole determination of income. There is great room for
legitimate difference of opinion whether a certain amount is
income of one year or of another. Even under the existing
tax law a great deal of injustice and hardship results from
the fact that the taxpayer really thinks an amount is income
or a deduction from income in one year, and the Bureau of
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Internal Revenue decides that it belongs in another. The
taxpayer, let us say, claims a deduction in 1933. Later, the
Bureau says: “No; that should have been taken in 1932.”
You cannot take that deduction in 1933, and you cannot get
any relief in respect of 1932 because that year is statute
barred.
One must recognize that there is bound to be a certain
amount of injustice under any tax law; but the object of the
taxing authority should always be to try to frame tax meas
ures so as to minimize that injustice. One of the simplest
ways of doing that in the case of income taxation is by uni
formity. If you have substantially the same scheme of taxa
tion and substantially the same rates year after year, it does
not make very much difference whether an item is taxed in
one year or another. But if you have a constantly changing
system of taxation, or if you have the rates of tax going up
and down or steeply graduated, then the allocation of profits
between years becomes a matter of great importance and
great unfairness may result—either to the benefit of the tax
payer, or, more often, to his detriment.
Here, again, I should like to refer to English experience.
Their system of taxation has remained substantially un
changed for many years except during the war. The war
naturally led to a general rise in the rate of taxation, but I
believe it is true that for the last dozen years, which cover
the whole period of the depression, the English tax system,
in principle, has remained unchanged and the rates of tax
have varied very little. The income tax on corporations,
which is the general normal income tax, has varied from a
low of 20 per cent to a high of 25 per cent. That is a rela
tively small change, and in England it has not made a great
deal of difference whether items were put in one year or an
other. During the same period our rates have varied greatly
and, as I have explained, our system of taxation, itself, has
been changed, and now we are contemplating another radical
alteration in the system.
In the case of individual income takes, steep graduation
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does exist in England. The amount of the tax payment
may vary considerably according as a particular item is added
to the income of a year in which the taxpayer was in a low
bracket, or to that of a year in which he was in a much
higher bracket; but in relation to individual incomes the
principle of graduation is, broadly, a just one, resting as it
does on the principle of “equality of sacrifice,” and in Eng
land graduation, though steep, is restricted within far nar
rower limits than with us.
In the present proposals, however, the graduation rests on
no sound principle and is extremely steep, and the argument
based on the fact that it will inevitably create gross injustice
gains strength accordingly. The virtual certainty of in
justice is strengthened by certain technical facts.
The first is that the tax is to be levied on the basis of
profits as determined under the income tax law. Now, in
business practice, there are many reservations which no pru
dent man can fail to make before arriving at the amount
properly available for distribution, but which are not de
ductions for tax purposes until the loss in respect of which
they are created is actually sustained and measured. In the
second place, under our system we have what I regard as a
most unfortunate practice of treating as income capital gains
—gains on the sale of property not in the ordinary course
of business. That practice produced a large amount of tax
in the boom years, but the corresponding deductions for
losses caused a great loss of revenue after the break of 1929,
with the result that we now have in the law the very unjust
provision that gains are taxable but losses are not deductible
except to a very limited extent. So you have this possibility
—a company might make a large capital gain in one year
and a large capital loss in the next, but under the proposed
law it would be liable for a heavy tax unless it distributed
more than its actual income, whether or not you include
capital gains and losses in the computation of income.
Another unfortunate phase of our system which makes this
question of allocation to years vitally important is an ad
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ministrative problem. The Bureau of Internal Revenue
has to employ a number of agents to check tax returns. It
has to find some way of judging whether the men are effi
cient, and unfortunately the most obvious test is how much
additional taxation the agent has caused to be assessed.
That being so, an agent who is charged with the task of
examining returns for a particular year has an incentive to
make the income for that particular year as large as he can—
whether the increase is achieved at the expense of a cor
responding reduction of the income of another year is im
material from his standpoint. I know from actual experi
ence that this system has resulted in reallocations between
years that have often been quite unreasonable—sometimes
unjust to the taxpayer, and sometimes unprofitable to the
revenue. The possibilities of injustice inherent in this sys
tem of judging efficiency will become greatly enhanced if
a steeply graduated tax is applied to the undistributed por
tion of corporate' profits.
I come, now, to the vital question of the probable eco
nomic effects of these proposals. First, if I may, I will read
to you by way. of preface, a few words from testimony which
I gave before the Senate in the Hearings on last year’s tax
bill:

A little thought will convince that to keep our people
busy, development of new industries must be on a constantly
increasing scale. In the next generation, we must create new
industries exceeding in magnitude the motor, radio, and
other industries created during the last thirty years. Now,
in the course of such development large losses of capital will
be incurred. Professor Allyn Young, one of our greatest
economists, used to say that he doubted whether, taking all
enterprises together, there was such a thing as profit; that
losses equaled profit over a reasonable rate of interest. The
important consideration for our people is what effect the
proposed taxes will have on the supply of capital for these
purposes. Obviously, this phase of the case is far more im
portant than the amount of revenue which is expected to be
derived therefrom.
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It seems to me that this bill, if it operates in at all the
way in which the Treasury expects it to operate, will have a
most harmful effect on the supply of capital for industry, and
particularly on the development of new industries.. Busi
nesses differ radically in their character. I will not try to
classify them, but will take two extremes. There are com
panies which are in a stage of development—they are en
gaged in creating a new industry or in developing a new
idea. At the other end of the scale are businesses in what
may be called a liquidating stage—either because the nature
of the business is liquidation in itself, or because they have
seen their best days and are gradually passing out of exist
ence. The outstanding case of companies that are liquidat
ing in their nature is that of the mining companies. The
mines are being worked out and the owners are gradually
getting their capital returned to them in cash, as well as their
profits. Such companies can well afford to pay out all of
their profits in dividends—as a matter of fact, statistics com
piled by the National Bureau of Economic Research show
that in the last sixteen years the mining companies of the
country as a whole have paid out in dividends more than
their earnings, according to income tax standards, in every
year except two, and in one of those years the two amounts
were practically identical. That means substantially that
mining companies would be free of taxation under this law.
On the other hand, take any company that is develop
ing a business. It does not have cash on hand equal to its
profits because the proceeds of sales are spent largely on de
velopment of new facilities, experimental work, additional
inventories, etc. Such companies, if they paid out all the
cash they had at the end of the year in excess of what they
had at the beginning, would still be liable to a very heavy
tax.
Does that seem to be the sort of thing that is economically
desirable? Granting that any laws we frame are bound to
operate with some inequality, is it economically desirable to
frame laws so that those who are exhausting the natural re
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sources of the country for private gain will be free from
tax, while those people who are developing new industries
which, if successful, will benefit them primarily but will also
strengthen our industrial system, should bear the full brunt
of the taxation?
To my mind, that is the vital economic question, and I
cannot conceive of the possibility of anyone’s reaching a con
clusion other than that this sort of taxation is calculated to
benefit the wrong class of companies—those that are liquidat
ing in nature and those that are going down-hill, instead of
those that are trying to build up additions to our economic
structure.
The proposal seems also to constitute an unwise and un
sound attempt to fetter judgment and substitute fixed rules
and regulations for the wise discretion which must be exer
cised if an enterprise is to succeed. What proportion of its
profits a corporation can wisely distribute is a matter of
judgment dependent on the circumstances of the particular
company and the particular time when the decision has to be
made. To impose a rule of thumb, as this proposal con
templates, is bound to produce both unjust and economically
undesirable results.
I have already mentioned the dilemma in which the Com
mittee on Ways and Means finds itself. On the one hand is
the Treasury, demanding that a rule shall be laid down to
which there shall be no exception. On the other hand, are
witnesses showing conclusively that such a rule would im
pose heavy penalties on corporations for withholding from
distribution profits which they are debarred either by statute
or other compelling considerations from distributing. The
Treasury says that once you make exceptions there is no
logical place at which you can stop doing so and this is true.
The choice is between arbitrary and unjust rules and the
exercise of judgment, with protection to the Treasury against
abuse of that privilege. Only those with a myopic vision
concentrated on a few exaggerated cases of abuse can ques
tion that if the choice has to be made, the rule which permits
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distribution to be made according to the ability and neces
sities of the individual corporation is the only one that is
either just or economically wise.
The proposed law seems to me to be another manifesta
tion of a tendency altogether too general in our country
today to make fixed rules and regulations to govern every
thing, and to attempt to eliminate judgment from the whole
scheme of things. Such measures are bound to operate un
justly, and tend in the direction of a narrow, bureaucratic
control of our life, which means a very large sacrifice of in
dividual freedom.
No doubt there are those who would differ from the views
I have expressed, but no one, I think, can fairly claim either
that the merits of the proposal are clear or that they have
been examined sufficiently to enable an informed opinion to
be reached that the merits outweigh the demerits. I sug
gest that no major change should be undertaken until it has
been exhaustively studied and opinions upon it secured—
not only from those who have a theoretical knowledge of the
subject, or who are familiar with the problem only from the
administrative side, but from those who are familiar with
the practical aspects of taxation and are in a position to ex
press an informed opinion on the question of the probable
indirect effects of the measure proposed. We need some
thing analogous to an exhaustive study by a Royal Commis
sion, which in England invariably precedes any substantial
change in the fiscal system or, indeed, almost any major
modification of domestic policy. Those commissions consist
of members of both houses of the legislature and men chosen
from the worlds of finance, science, economics, and the pro
fessions. They seek testimony from competent witnesses on
specific points. They cross-examine the witnesses, politely,
but searchingly. They make a report (or majority and
minority reports, if irreconcilable differences develop be
tween the views of the different members). These reports
are state papers of the highest value, and those who are
called upon to vote on proposals can find in them an ade-
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quate and fair statement of the arguments for and against
the proposals.
In conclusion, I would say this: on my way here I spent
yesterday in Rochester, and I had a very interesting after
noon going over the Kodak plant—or rather, a small fraction
of that plant. With this talk in mind, and thinking, also,
of the first time I went over that plant thirty-nine years ago
with Mr. Eastman, the founder of the business, I could not
help thinking that there were object lessons which one could
draw from the case of that Company. I recalled that on my
first visit, in rather less than half the time we spent yesterday
going over a fraction of the plant, Mr. Eastman and I went
through every building and every department. The East
man Kodak Company was then a developing business; it is
now fully established and highly successful. I do not sup
pose this tax law would impose any additional burden upon
it or its stockholders. On the other hand, anyone attempting
to rival the business of the Company with a new company
would be greatly hampered by this law. Further, if we can
imagine this law having been passed back in the nineties,
when that business was being built up, we may question
whether in those circumstances that industry, and all the
enterprises that have grown out of it, would have progressed
at anything like the rate at which they did progress; and we
must realize that the continued growth of new enterprises,
and the continued development of new inventions, are essen
tial to continued successful life as an industrial community.
Then, there is another thought which I brought very
strongly impressed upon me away from Rochester. I looked
at many huge machines that do the most complicated things
in the most ingenious ways, and I thought that a new tax
law was a very important new piece of Governmental ma
chinery. And I contrasted the way in which the machinery
of industry and the machinery of Government were being
developed in our country today. I thought how before one
of those industrial machines had been built the best theoret
ical and technical advice had been secured as to how a de
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sired result could, in theory, be attained; how the idea had
then been subjected to the criticism of those familiar with
the practical working of machinery; how working models
had first been developed and subjected to all kinds of strains
and stresses and experimental operations before the actual
machines were put into operation. Not only that, but I
observed the many ingenious devices to prevent those ma
chines from doing injury to other property or people work
ing in the plant, and reflected how those safety devices had
been given as much consideration as the principles of the
machines themselves.
Further, I thought how lightheartedly legislative proposals
which may conceivably serve a given purpose, are put for
ward without much thought of all the indirect consequences
—the injury, the unfairness, and the injustice—that might be
caused by them. Does it not seem that since the power of
Government machinery to influence the lives of our people
is so much greater than the power of any industrial machine,
we should give more care and thought to trying to make any
new machine work with at least some part of the efficiency
and safety which we demand and secure in the industrial
field?
TESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE FINANCE COM
MITTEE, MAY 6, 1936 *

The Chairman. Mr. May, you represent the firm of Price,
Waterhouse & Co.?
Mr. May. Yes; I am senior partner of the firm, sir. I
appear here as an individual interested in the subject of
taxation, upon which I have worked from the time of the
passage of the first income-tax law.
I was in the Treasury during the war and subsequently
I served on the advisory committee of the Joint Congres
sional Committee on Taxation, and my interest in the sub
ject has been active and continuous.
I represent no private interests of any kind, nor any clients
* Hearings on the Revenue Act, 1936, pp. 538-48.

UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS TAXES

245

or institutions in the country. I would like to state broadly
the reasons why I am here today.
I am intensely sympathetic with the view of the Treasury
regarding the avoidance of taxes by withholding of divi
dends. Nevertheless, I am convinced that a graduated tax
on corporations’ undistributed earnings is not a satisfactory
solution, is unsound in principle, will cause great injustice,
and the evidence that I have seen in the record does not lead
me to believe that this bill will produce any substantial in
crease in revenue.
I would like to say in regard to that that my reason is not
so much that I think the estimates of the revenue that will
be produced are excessive—I am in no position to pass on
that—but I think the Treasury underestimates the yield
under the existing law if business picks up. I think the
Treasury underestimates the effect of the recovery of earning
capacity of the country under the existing law.
I would like in the first instance to address myself to the
paragraph in the statement of the Secretary of the Treasury
to this Committee which reads as follows:

What are the dimensions of tax avoidance with which we
are dealing? A few simple figures tell the story. It has been
estimated by the Treasury Department that under the pres
ent tax law the income-tax liability of corporations on the
basis of 1936 earnings would approximate 964 millions.
The Department has also estimated that under the present
law more than 4½ billion dollars of corporation income in
the calendar year 1936 will be withheld from stockholders
and that if this income were fully distributed to the indi
vidual owners of the stock represented in those corporations,
the resultant yield in additional individual income taxes
would be about $1,300,000,000.
It is, I think, most unfortunate that the Secretary should
have been permitted by his advisers to make, as he does make
in this paragraph, an obvious and serious misstatement of
fact upon such an important question. The misstatement is
apparent on a comparison of his language with that of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who said:
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The Treasury estimates that, if the present corporation in
come, capital-stock, and excess-profits taxes were repealed,
and all corporation earnings during the calendar year 1936
were currently distributed, the income of individuals would
be increased by more than 4½ billions of which approxi
mately $4,000,000,000 would be taxable.
The Secretary says that the 4½ billion represents the sum
available for distribution to stockholders under the existing
law; the Commissioner makes it clear that the repeal of the
existing law is prerequisite to the existence of the 4½ billion.
Under the existing law, according to the Treasury tables,
approximately $1,100,000,000 of the 4½ billion mentioned
by the Secretary as being withheld from stockholders would
go to the Federal Government in taxes.
In the second place, it is unjust to describe the figure,
even when it has been reduced by a billion or more, as “tax
avoidance.” A very large part of this income accrues to
public companies whose dividend action is not in the least
influenced by thoughts of tax avoidance but is dictated either
by legal or contractual requirements or practical necessities,
or an honest regard for the best interests of the stockholders.
Senator King. There were considerable dividends from
those corporations, I assume?
Mr. May. Yes; but some withheld profits for perfectly
good reasons that have nothing to do with tax avoidance.
In the third place, I think the figure of 4½ billion dollars,
even when interpreted as the Commissioner interprets it, is
greatly overstated. This figure appears on the sixth line of
the main statement submitted to the Treasury in support of
the proposal which appears at page 36 of the House hearings.
A careful study of that table leads me to the definite con
clusion that the figure is excessive even as applied to the
special circumstances of the year 1936. If it be regarded—as
we are entitled to regard it—as an indication of the perma
nent increase in revenue which the proposed law is expected
to produce, the overstatement becomes larger and even more
apparent.
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If the Treasury estimate of statutory net income for 1936
of $7,200,000,000 is correct, then the increase of yield which
may be expected from this law if all net income is distributed
thereunder, turns on the estimate of the dividend distribu
tion which would take place under the law as it now exists.
To secure a fair comparison this estimate should be an esti
mate of the dividends which will be paid out of 1936 earn
ings either in 1936 or in the first months of 1937. The
Treasury, however, makes the comparison with the dividends
which it estimates will be paid in 1936 partly out of 1935
earnings and partly out of those for 1936. Since dividends
naturally rise as income rises, and since the Treasury esti
mates that 1936 income will exceed that of 1935 by $1,700,000,000, or 30 per cent, this method of comparison artificially
inflates the estimate of increase of yield from the new law by
a sum which must run into the hundreds of millions. It is
like comparing the rainfall in two places, A and B, taking
the rainfall at A for the calendar year and that of B for
the year ending on the 15th of March in the following year,
with the knowledge that the first 75 days of the earlier years
were in both places a period of relatively small rainfall.
Further, the estimate of distribution within the year 1936
seems to me to be low. The Treasury estimates that the
increase of dividends in 1936 over 1935 will be from $3,600,000,000 to $3,900,000,000, or 8% per cent. Statistics for the
first quarter, covering rather less than 3,000 corporations,
show an increase from $659,000,000 to $781,000,000, or an
increase of $122,000,000, equivalent to more than 18 per
cent. If earnings continue to rise, as the Treasury estimates
they will, then the rate of increase in dividends should grow.
Only on Monday the General Motors Corporation declared
a dividend on its common stock for this quarter which was
greater by 43½ million dollars than the dividend which it
paid to the corresponding quarter of last year. This is oneseventh of the total increase for all corporations for the
entire year as estimated by the Treasury.
Approaching the question in a somewhat different way,
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I find from a table submitted by the Treasury showing the
statutory net income and dividends for corporations having
net income that during the 12 years for which actual or
approximate figures are given dividends have averaged about
66 per cent for statutory net income. The Treasury’s esti
mate of $3,540,000,000 as the dividends which would, under
the existing law, be paid by such corporations in 1936 is
equivalent to about 49 per cent of the estimated statutory
net income. The difference of 17 per cent amounts to about
$1,200,000,000.
Apparently, also, the Treasury, while making its main
calculation on the basis that all net income would be dis
tributed within the year, assumes that the amount of divi
dends paid by corporations having no net income will not
be affected by the change of law. This seems to me to result
in an overstatement of the increased distribution to be ex
pected by some two or three hundred million dollars.
Finally, the amount estimated as the increase in yield due
to the change in law includes taxes which will or might be
recovered under the existing law in respect of dividends
unreasonably withheld by corporations, and I am not con
vinced that the Treasury has made adequate allowance for
the changes in taxable status that such laws inevitably pro
duce, such as charitable gifts, reclassifications of capital
stocks, and so forth.
Taking all these considerations together, I do not find in
the statistics presented any ground for believing that this
law, if adopted, will increase the revenue. It is, of course,
possible that it will do so, but the Treasury has not, to my
mind, made out any case that it will. The position is such
that immediate enactment of the law is certainly not neces
sary from a fiscal standpoint.
No doubt there is a large amount of tax avoidance through
the device of withholding profits from distribution, and all
taxpayers—especially, I might say, those professional men
whose income is almost wholly taxable—are sufferers from it.
It should be curbed, and I am entirely sympathetic with the
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desire of the Treasury to curb it. But measures which affect
equally those who are and those who are not avoiding taxes
are unnecessary and unjust, and too often, like Herod’s mas
sacre, they cause great suffering but fail to reach the par
ticular cases which inspire them.
The figure of profits withheld should be revised and
analyzed. Corporations may be divided into three groups—
(1) a very large number of small corporations which in the
aggregate contribute and should contribute only a small frac
tion of the revenue from taxation of corporate income; (2)
a relatively small number of public corporations most of
which are owned by large bodies of stockholders and follow
dividend policies practically Uninfluenced by consideration
of taxability of their stockholders; (3) a relatively small num
ber of privately owned companies, some engaged in business,
others substantially private holding companies, the dividend
policies of most of these being governed largely by tax con
siderations. If we knew how much of the profits withheld
were retained by these different classes of companies, the
formulation of sound legislation would be facilitated greatly.
After all, the problem is not one of stupendous magnitude.
In 1933, for instance, about 10,000 corporations paid 90
per cent of the corporation income tax. An analytical study
of those 10,000 cases would not be a burdensome task, and
I think the Congress and the people are entitled to have
some information of this kind furnished them and legisla
tion framed in the light thereof, instead of being asked to
support a hit-or-miss measure of the kind now before the
Senate.
I would emphasize the fact that continuity in taxation is a
consideration of great importance. It inspires confidence
and it minimizes the injustice which inevitably results from
heavy and changeable taxation applied to income on the basis
of a necessarily very imperfect allocation of income to par
ticular years. Hasty experiments are wholly undesirable.
I would point out, further, that income taxation, and the
business to which it is applied, constitutes an intricate net
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work, and that any important change in the frame of this
network produces all sorts of strains and stresses which can
be guarded against only by very careful and prolonged study.
The Treasury, when proposing this measure, contemplated
its universal application. Some of the most striking in
justices that this would produce have been brought to the
notice of Congress, and in the House provisions were im
provised to guard against, or at least alleviate, these injus
tices. It cannot be supposed that all the important injus
tices have been developed. Obviously, the Treasury made
no exhaustive study of them, because it contemplated a rigid
rule, free from any exceptions.
I should like, purely by way of illustration, to mention
one or two injustices which immediately occur to me. Take,
first, the law which taxes capital gains but substantially
denies relief in respect of capital losses. Suppose a corpora
tion to have an ordinary income of $100,000 in each of 2
years, and to make a capital gain of $100,000 in 1 year and
a capital loss of $100,000 in the other. Its true income over
the 2 years is clearly $200,000, whether capital gains and
losses are or are not considered as entering into the deter
mination of income. This is the amount that it should be
required to distribute in order to get the maximum benefit
of the proposed law. Actually, it would have to distribute
practically $300,000 in order to get such a benefit.
Again, in this same field we have recognized that capital
gains should not be taxed in the year in which they are
realized in the same way as if they were ordinary income
of that year. We have provided that individuals making
capital gains shall pay a tax which decreases according to
the length of time for which the investment has been held.
An individual who sells property which he has held for more
than 10 years pays tax on only 30 per cent of the profit.
Under the proposed law, if a corporation in which he is in
terested makes such a profit, and in order to avoid taxes dis
tributes all its statutory income, the individual would pay
tax on his share of the full amount of this profit—yet the
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whole basis of the present proposal is that individuals should
pay neither more nor less on profits which come to them
through the medium of a corporation than on profits which
come to them directly.
Section 27 (i) also violates this same principle, not only in
respect of the holding companies at which it is aimed, but
also in respect of minority stockholders in corporations in
which such holding companies own a majority. Their tax
is determined not by their own status but largely by the
status of the other stockholders. This provision should be
eliminated.
Many other instances of the same kind could be cited. I
do not think it is possible to anticipate all the serious in
justices. I am inclined to agree with the Treasury that once
you begin to make exceptions there is no logical place at
which you can stop. This, however, merely means that the
real choice is between a rigid rule and the abandonment of
the principle, and I have no hesitation in saying that the
wise choice is to discard the principle.
I should like to point out, also, that all the injustices which
result from the taxation of corporate income under the exist
ing law will be magnified by the substitution of a steeply
graduated tax on undistributed earnings for a practically
uniform tax on the whole amount of earnings.
For instance, the injustice which even under the present
law results from the discontinuance of consolidated returns
will be aggravated. Certainly opportunities ought to be
given to readjust corporate structures so as to prevent double
taxation resulting from the discontinuance of such returns,
and Section 112B (6) is quite inadequate for the purpose.
To sum the matter up, I think the bill is as likely to pro
duce less revenue as it is to produce more, and to produce
more injustice than it remedies.
When we consider the measure from the standpoint of
social policy as distinct from fiscal policy, we of course
enter the realm in which wide differences of opinion are
possible. On this point I should first of all like to point out
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that this law does not constitute an application of the prin
ciple of “ability to pay” which underlies the graduated tax
on individual incomes and has no analogy to that scheme of
taxation. The closest analogy in the field of individual taxa
tion would be a steeply graduated tax on income saved
under which all individual income would be exempted from
taxation if spent. It is a surprising thing to me that Dr.
T. S. Adams—who regarded the opposite concept of a tax
on spending which would leave saved income free as ideally
preferable to the individual income tax—should be claimed
as a supporter of a measure of this kind.
Senator King. What was your view when you were in the
Treasury advising them?
Mr. May. As a matter of fact, I had extended discussions
with Dr. Adams and Treasury officials on the question of a
substitute spending tax. We agreed it was ideally preferable,
but there were some objections on the ground of excessive
accumulation of fortunes by individuals, and of practical ad
vantage, and on the whole we advised against it. But cer
tainly, in all the long and intimate talks I had with Dr.
Adams I had never heard a word that would lead me to sup
pose he would support this measure.
Senator Barkley. A tax on spending is a sales tax.
Mr. May. A graduated tax on spending is paid by the
individual.
Senator Barkley. That is a sales tax.
Mr. May. An ordinary sales tax is a regressive tax because
it falls equally on all products.
Senator Barkley. Any sort of a tax based on spending is
a tax on sales.
Mr. May. It is in one sense, but not when it is ordinarily
thought of as a sales tax.
Senator Barkley. - You have got to buy something when
you spend anything, and you are taxed on that.
Mr. May. That is the same thing. The sales tax is usually
levied on the sale.
Senator Barkley. Regardless of that, it is levied on the
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price, whether you levy it on the sale or on the expenditure.
Mr. May. There is a great deal of argument that under
an ordinary income tax there should be an exemption of
saved income. I think the argument is against it.
Senator Walsh. Is a graduated spending tax a spending
tax?
Mr. May. That is what we contemplate, a graduated
spending tax. It would reach the man who spent his capital.
Senator Walsh. A man who spent $50,000 would pay a
higher tax than a man who spent $5,000?
Mr. May. That is right.
Senator Hastings. Would the spending tax apply to the
wages of a chauffeur, for instance?
Mr. May. Yes.
Senator Hastings. In that instance it is different from a
sales tax.
Mr. May. Yes; it covers all expenditures for goods, and
services.
Upon the social aspects of the bill generally all I propose
to do is to indicate some effect that it seems to me to be
likely to have, leaving the Committee to decide whether
those consequences are socially desirable.
I do not want to go over ground already covered by other
witnesses. I agree with Mr. Ballantine that the adoption of
these proposals will have a serious adverse effect on the de
velopment of industry and the ability of industrial corpora
tions to withstand depression. Not only was the policy of
withholding profits in periods of prosperity followed and
approved before our income tax was initiated; it is common
in all countries and was followed in England before the
principle of graduation was introduced here. I believe that
in recent years the proportion of profits retained by English
companies has been as great as here even in the years of pros
perity. To regard such retention by publicly owned cor
porations as tax avoidance or even as prejudicial to the inter
est of the revenue, is, I think, an error.
Clearly, if corporations are compelled by taxation to dis
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tribute all their surplus in times of prosperity, it is inevitable
that in any subsequent period of depression when they suffer
losses they will be forced into bankruptcy or compelled to
resort to State aid to a greater extent than heretofore. The
idea that they should sell additional stocks to finance future
losses seems to me academic and unrealistic.
I think it is a great mistake in formulating measures such
as this to attach much importance to averages. Taxes are
not levied on averages, but on individual cases. Businesses
differ radically in their character. Some companies are what
may be called developing companies, creating a new indus
try or exploiting a new idea. At the other extreme are cor
porations of a liquidating character, either because the na
ture of the business is in itself liquidation, or because the
businesses are declining. Mining companies, for instance,
are essentially liquidating in their nature. Such companies
can well afford to pay out all of their profits in dividends.
As a matter of fact, statistics show that they do in almost
every year in the aggregate pay out more than they earn.
Senator King. Now, in regard to profits, most of the min
ing companies have had no profits for. many years.
Mr. May. That is true.
Senator King. Where one succeeds there will be two or
three hundred who fail.
Mr. May. That is quite true; but as a matter of fact, the
statistics show that in almost every year the mining com
panies, in the aggregate, pay out more dividends than they
earn, so they would be practically free of tax under this law.
On the other hand, developing companies, if they paid
out in dividends the net cash they received from operations
during the year, would as a rule be liable under the law to
a heavy tax. It seems to me a pertinent question whether
it is desirable to frame laws which favor those who are ex
hausting the natural resources of the country for private
gain, and handicap those who are developing new industries
which they expect, no doubt, to be profitable to themselves
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but which, if successful, would also strengthen our industrial
system.
I think it is unquestionable that the law will operate in
favor of the large, established companies as against those of
their aspiring rivals. This no doubt accounts for the fact
that comparatively little opposition to the bill has come from
the large corporations.
Senator Gerry. Mr. May, I notice in going over the House
hearings that there were certain large copartnerships, 23 of
them, if I recollect correctly, that had incomes of over a
million. What sort of businesses would they be in?
Mr. May. Senator, I saw those figures myself. I thought
that 23 must be on the low side, to be quite frank, because
I thought I could have named 23 firms within a gunshot
of the corner of Broad and Wall in New York that had in
comes of a million, the large stockbroking firms which, under
the New York Stock Exchange regulations, cannot incor
porate, and the large Wall Street law firms, and other service
firms of that kind, I should think would have numbered
more than 23 alone.
Senator Gerry. How would the partnership compare with
a corporation? Of course, the corporation has the advantage
of a limited liability.
Mr. May. Yes. I think, broadly speaking, when you get
into large partnerships they represent, in the main, different
classes of business from corporations; comparatively few of
your partnerships carry on an industrial business. They
are mostly what I might call service businesses. Their in
come is derived in cash. They would make their returns on
the cash basis. So they have cash equal to the profits that
they return.
On the other hand, business corporations, as we all know,
have either got to develop or else die, generally speaking.
That means that they are constantly making new investments
in plant and capital assets, and the reality of their profit
today is dependent on the usefulness of their plant in the
future. Their income is determined, as I see it, on a less
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favorable basis to the corporation than the average partner
ship’s income is determined to it.
So I think the disparity between the two is somewhat
exaggerated, and, incidentally, in relation to those figures
that you mentioned, I think you will find that while the
Commissioner took as an illustrative case a partnership with
an income of $1,000,000 and four partners, the more typical
company in that number of 23, or whatever the proper num
ber may be, would be a firm with far more partners than
that. Big law firms have, perhaps, 15 or 20 partners, which
rather modifies the conclusion.
Senator Barkley. Mr. May, is your firm a corporation or
a partnership?
Mr. May. It is a partnership, sir.
Senator Barkley. It is a partnership of certified account
ants, economists, experts, or which?
Mr. May. Certified public accountants.
Senator Barkley. You appear here just as an amicus curiæ,
a friend of the court, you do not represent anybody?
Mr. May. No; not at all, sir.
Senator Walsh. Mr. May, you stated that corporations
could be placed in three classifications. One which you
have stated was few in number. Are those the corporations
that did not distribute their earnings because they wanted
to avoid their taxes?
Mr. May. When I say “few,” I mean relatively few, of
course.
Senator Walsh. Have you any information as to their
number?
Mr. May. No, sir; I have no knowledge at all. It must
be a considerable number. You know, under the English
law there is a distinction in taxation between the publicly
owned corporation and privately owned corporation, and I
always thought we ought to pursue the question in that way
if we are to arrive at really satisfactory legislation.
Senator Walsh, You think that there are a considerable
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number of corporations that withhold distributing their
earnings for the purpose of taxation avoidance?
Mr. May. I have no doubt that that is a substantial ele
ment, undoubtedly.
Senator Barkley. What do you mean by the distinction
between publicly owned and privately owned corporations?
You do not mean that in the sense that we use the term
“public ownership”?
Mr. May. No; owned by the general public. In England,
of course, the legislature has a very great advantage. We
have always got to recognize, in comparing our procedure
with the English, that all their legislation is confined to the
one body. They control corporations as well as taxation and
they can classify corporations for their own purposes, which
you cannot do, because the States have jurisdiction in one
field and you are legislating in another. I do think that that
whole problem could be intensively studied to great ad
vantage.
Senator Barkley. Where is the line of distinction in the
number of owners of stock in order to make it public or
private?
Mr. May. You mean in England?
Senator Barkley. Yes.
Mr. May. In England there is a limit, on the number of
stockholders, and as a penalty for being a public corporation
you have to disclose a lot of information which private cor
porations do not have to, and they offer advantages that
counterbalance. On the other hand, the private companies
stand in a different relationship for tax purposes from those
that are called public companies, and they are a larger num
ber.
Senator Barkley. What is the line of distinction?
Mr. May. Any line is bound to be more or less arbitrary.
Senator Barkley. Under the British law, how many stock
holders form a private corporation and how many does it
take to make it public?
Mr. May. I do not know at the moment. If I should
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make a guess, I would say 20 was the figure; something of
that sort.*
Senator Walsh. You do not mean that private corpora
tions are personal holding companies?
Mr. May. No.
Senator Walsh. For your information, in connection with
the question I asked you, the expert informs me that there
are 4,000 personal holding companies who make filings
under the existing law and who, in all probability, do so for
the purpose of the tax.
Senator Barkley. Do you know whether the British law
makes any distinction as to whether the shares of stock are
listed on an exchange where they may publicly inspect and
purchase them?
Mr. May. I do not think it turns on the listing on an
exchange, but it does require disclosure of information to
the Registrar of Companies. They have to give more in
formation to the public than the private companies do.
Senator Bailey. You began by making a statement which
indicated a contradiction of fact as between the Secretary of
the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
I would like for you to make a statement about that. Just
give me the facts over again.
The Chairman. May I ask you, was the Commissioner’s
statement from which you quoted made before the House
Ways and Means Committee?
Mr. May. No; I think they were both made before this
body.
The Chairman. You read the statement which was made
before this Committee?
Mr. May. Yes; I think I am right about that.
* Under the existing English law a private company is one whose regula
tions limit the number of its members to fifty, restrict the right to transfer
its shares, and prohibit any invitation to the public to subscribe for any
of its shares or debentures. (Cf. Companies Act of 1929, Sec. 26.) The dis
tinction between companies for purposes of the surtax no longer follows
the distinction between public and private companies. In order to be liable
to surtax on undistributed income, a company must inter alia be under the
control of not more than five persons, as defined in the Act. (Cf. Finance
Act of 1927, Sec. 31.)—Author’s note.
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Senator Bailey. Just what is the difference between them?
Mr. May. The Commissioner states that if the existing
taxes were repealed, there would be four and a half billion
dollars. The Secretary says—
Senator Bailey (interposing). Four and a half billion
dollars of what?
Mr. May. Of income available for distribution, which
the Treasury estimates would not be distributed. I think
that is a fair way of saying it. The Secretary said there
would be that same amount of money available under the
existing law. The difference between the two statements
is that the amount of the taxes under the existing law, which
is a billion one hundred million dollars, roughly—
Senator Bailey (interposing). Is it possible that both state
ments could be reconciled?
Mr. May. I do not see how. It seems to me that the
Secretary misunderstood the figure, and I believe the word
ing of the figure was a little unfortunate and may have given
rise to that misunderstanding.
Senator Bailey. Did he adopt that figure for this state
ment from the Commissioner’s statement without getting the
facts upon which the Commissioner’s statement was predi
cated?
Mr. May. I am not in the confidence of the Treasury.
Senator Bailey. Can you explain that?
Mr. May. I think there is no other explanation.
Senator Hastings. As I understand your position, you
figure that there ought to be a billion one hundred million
taken from the figures given by the Secretary of the Treas
ury?
Mr. May. I think one billion one hundred million should
be deducted from his figure.
Senator Hastings. So that instead of his figure being four
billion one hundred, it ought to have been three billion?
Mr. May. If he wanted to state it on that basis.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. May.
. Senator Bailey. Your other statement is that, in your
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opinion, the proposed legislation if adopted is not likely to
raise much more money, if any, than the existing law? Is
that your opinion about it?
Mr. May. And the reason is I think the Treasury under
estimates the yield of the present law on the conditions.
Senator Bailey. We have been predicating legislation on
the basis of fifty-five billions this year. I read in the New
York Times this morning an article in which the President
was quoted as saying that the annual income this year would
be about sixty-five billion. Can you give me some informa
tion or view about that?
Mr. May. I am afraid I am not currently up to date on
the statistics sufficiently for that, Senator. I am taking the
same estimates that the Treasury assumes; they take as their
basic year on which these calculations are predicated, an
estimate of seven billion of statutory net income. I think
the yield under the existing law would be larger than they
have assumed on that basis. It is not that I think they are
exaggerating the yield under the new law, but that they are
underestimating the yield under the existing law.
Senator Bailey. Your theory is that the bill is wrong in
principle and that we cannot get rid of injustices in it?
Mr. May. Yes. And I do not feel that we have adequate
bases to formulate legislation in which we could reasonably
limit the injustices.
Senator Bailey. Are you prepared to suggest to us legisla
tion that would surely add $800,000,000 revenue as com
pared with the last bill?
Mr. May. I do not think that I can say that on the Treas
ury figures it is necessary to increase the yield of the taxation
under the present law by $800,000,000 in order to reach the
total taxation that is contemplated. I think you will get
pretty close to it under the existing law, if all of the other
estimates are realized; that is what I got from an analysis of
these figures of the Treasury. Certainly my strong feeling
is that there is not sufficient fiscal advantage in passing this
law to justify precipitate action, and I would like to see a
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very careful study made and more considered legislation
based on it.
Senator Connally. Would you rather raise the flat cor
poration tax, rather than this plan?
Mr. May. I would; I would rather see any rational levy
raised, frankly. I would be willing to see my own taxes
raised, because I think it is much better for us to pay more
taxes than to leave the budget unbalanced.
Senator Connally. I congratulate you.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. May.
Senator Gerry. I would like to ask Mr. May a question,
and see if I get it clear, on this last statement. What you feel
is that the revenue raised by the present bill will be greater
than the Treasury estimates?
Mr. May. Yes.
Senator Gerry. Under the present law?
Mr. May. Under the present law.
Senator Gerry. Than the Treasury estimates?
Mr. May. That is my feeling.
Senator Bailey. How much greater?
Mr. May. Very considerably, sir.
Senator Bailey. Six or seven hundred millions?
Mr. May. Of course, I have not got the detail, but I
should say pretty nearly the amount that this increase was
expected to raise. Five or six hundred million.
Senator Bailey. Could you prepare the data in a short
time?
Mr. May: I could make a summary, as I have done here
of the causes which lead to it; but I should have to have
some information from the Treasury to convert increases in
individual incomes into taxes on individual incomes, be
cause they have figured it out on the distribution to be ex
pected, which I have not.
Senator Bailey. I would like very much to have it.
Mr. May. I would have to have certain data from the
Treasury in order to do it.
The Chairman. You believe the increase would come
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under the present law because of the general increase in
business?
Mr. May. Yes, sir.
Senator Connally. Disregard the income. Could you esti
mate how much the corporation income in 1936. would be
over 1935 if we make no change in the rates? Can you give
a rough estimate?
Mr. May. I do not carry those figures clearly enough in
my head to make the estimate. I am cautious of making esti
mates except from actual figures.
Senator Connally. I am not calling for an opinion that I
will pay you for as an expert.
Mr. May. My services are always at the disposal of the
Committee.
Senator Connally. You figure the business in 1936 is
going to be better than in 1935?
Mr. May. The Treasury estimates it, and I believe there
is ground to believe it.
Senator Connally. But you do not know how much?
Mr. May. The Treasury estimates that there will be one
billion seven hundred million increase in taxable statutory
income, which, on a 15 per cent basis, would be $255,000,000.
Senator Barkley. You think that the present law, un
changed, would raise this eight hundred million in addition
to the amount raised in. 1935, or in addition to the Treasury
estimates for 1936?
Mr. May. I think for the graduated tax end of it, it would
raise the larger part of the six hundred million that it was
supposed to raise over the Treasury’s estimates for 1936; yes.
Senator Barkley: You think we are liable to be more
prosperous than the Treasury does?
Mr. May. I think more money is going to be distributed
than the Treasury estimated, and that will mean large in
creases to the individual income tax.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. May; thank you.

B. TAXATION AND ACCOUNTING
I

CLASSIFICATION OF PROFITS ON INVESTMENTS *
(1921)

The question involved in the case of Brewster v. Walsh in
which a decision was recently handed down by the Connecti
cut district court is one of far-reaching and great interest to
accountants. That question is whether profits realized on
investments are capital or income.
We shall not attempt to deal with the legal aspect of the
question, but in the business and accounting world such
profits would, we think, ordinarily be regarded as income.
The average man also doubtless thinks that he can properly
spend such profits without laying himself open to the charge
of dissipating his capital: indeed he is likely to regard them
as a peculiarly appropriate basis for expenditures on luxuries
as being what is sometimes called “velvet.”
There is a group of economists whose views are in accord
with those of the District Court that such profits are not in
come. This group includes those economists who solve the
problem of living within one’s income for everyone by
holding that whatever is spent is ipso facto income. We
are very far from saying that this concept is useless or un
interesting, but we feel that it is so far at variance with the
commercial concept of income that the economists in ques
tion would be well advised to adopt for it some name other
than income. Fortunately there is a larger body of econo
mists whose concept of income does include such profits as
were involved in this case and is more closely in harmony

*An editorial contributed to The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XXI (Jan
uary, 1921).
263

264

TAXATION

with the accounting and commercial interpretation of the
phrase.
We should be sorry to see the meaning of the word “in
come” restricted by the courts either on legalistic grounds or
on the basis of an interesting but unpractical economic con
cept in such a way as to limit the ability of Congress to tax
anything that is ordinarily regarded by the average citizen
as being income. If a taxpayer by choosing investments, the
fruits of which are to be expected in the form of the return
of a larger sum at the end of a period of years rather than in
actual income, can thereby escape the income tax altogether
in respect of such investments, the opportunities to the rich
taxpayer now offered by tax-exempt securities will be im
mensely enlarged, and dissatisfaction with the tax will corre
spondingly increase.
In our view it is desirable that the broadest possible inter
pretation should be given to the term “income,” leaving the
determination of the forms of income to be taxed to be con
sidered by the legislative bodies.

II

THE SOURCE OF PROFITS *
(1922)
A provision of the new tax law which has a general account
ing interest apart from the tax feature, is the rule that profits
from the sale of personal property produced within and sold
without the United States, or produced without and sold
within the United States, shall be treated as derived partly
from sources within and partly from sources without the
United States, the Commissioner being authorized to pre
scribe processes, formulas and general apportionment for de
termining the portion of such net income attributable to
sources within the United States.
The previous act did not deal specifically with this ques
tion and the Attorney-General, when the question was re
ferred to him, ruled that in such cases all the income was de
rived from sources within the country in which the goods
were sold. In the course of his opinion he said: “No income
is derived from the mere manufacture of goods; before there
can be income there must be sale; and there is no income
from sources within the United States from goods manufac
tured here unless there is in the language of Section 223 both
manufacture and disposition of goods within the United
States.”
Many qualified persons felt that the Attorney-General had
been betrayed into an incorrect application of a sound ac
counting rule and that the argument just quoted was a clear
case of non sequitur. The completion of the sale deter
mines the time of the making of the profit, but it does not in
the least follow that it determines the source. The real
source of profit in a manufacturing business is the employ* An editorial contributed to The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XXXIII
(March, 1922).
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ment of capital and labor in the conversion of goods; selling
is the realization of the profit rather than the source. The
amount of profit is affected by the degree of efficiency of
the methods of realization, just as it is affected by the degree
of efficiency of the capital assets and the labor employed in
production, and it is entirely equitable that there should be
attributed to sale some part (but certainly not the whole) of
the profit.
The new provision is therefore sound in principle. It
should be understood, however, that it does not lend any
sanction to the practice of taking interdepartmental profit
when goods are transferred from the manufacturing to the
selling department. This practice, thanks largely to its con
demnation by accountants, is now comparatively seldom
adopted, and the new law should not be allowed to form an
excuse for its revival. The essential fact on which the ac
countants’ opposition has always been based still remains.
There is no profit until the goods have been both manufac
tured and sold

in
TAXABLE INCOME AND ACCOUNTING BASES FOR
DETERMINING IT *
INTRODUCTION
On various occasions when the question has arisen, I have
been impressed by the uncertainties and misconceptions
shown to exist concerning accounting bases for determining
income for tax purposes and in regard to the significance
of such terms as “the cash basis” and “the accrual basis” com
monly employed in tax practice. It has therefore seemed
to me to be worth while to devote some time to a considera
tion of this subject and in so doing to go back over the de
velopments affecting it since the passage of the corporation
excise-tax law in 1909.
As a preliminary to such consideration it seems necessary
to inquire to some extent into the nature of taxable income,
but I do not propose to go into this very large subject except
in so far as may be necessary to an intelligent discussion of
the accounting bases for determining income. To allay still
further any anxiety created by the comprehensiveness of the
title of this paper, I will add that I shall confine myself to
commercial income, which constitutes the major part of the
taxable income of the country and presents the more difficult
problems, and I shall not discuss personal, professional or in
vestment income.
In income taxation, the first problem is to define income
and the second to allocate income in respect of time. The
question of allocation to sources geographically arises in some
cases and presents some difficulties, but this question affects
only a restricted field.
The problem of definition resolves itself mainly into a

• A paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Institute of
Accountants at Washington, D. C., September 15, 1925. Published in The
Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XL (October, 1925).
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choice between several different concepts of the nature of
the income and, though important, is relatively simple. The
more serious difficulties are encountered in determining
when income emerges from the complicated business trans
actions of modern commerce so as to be properly taxable.
The accounting bases employed in determining income
affect the time when income becomes taxable rather than
the amount of income ultimately taxable, and this paper
therefore has to do mainly with the time element in taxa
tion. This is conspicuously a case where “time is of the
essence.” Whether an amount is to be deemed taxable in a
year of high war taxes or in some remote future year may be
of far more practical importance than whether the whole or
only a part is to be finally taxed.
WHAT IS TAXABLE INCOME?

Since 1913 our income tax laws have been enacted under
the authority of the sixteenth amendment to the Constitu
tion, which authorized Congress to tax without apportion
ment among the several states “incomes from whatever
source derived.”
Now there are numerous theories as to what is income. In
one case (Doyle v. Mitchell) the government argued that the
gross proceeds of sale were income. Economists sometimes
argue that earnings that are saved are not income, so that
what is income is determined by how what comes in is subse
quently expended. Apart, however, from any such extreme
views, there are two materially different theories of income
which are supported by considerable authority: One holds
that income is necessarily gain, the other that it may be in
part a conversion of capital.
The difference may be illustrated by the case of a man
purchasing an annuity. The general public regards the
whole of the annuity as his income and this view is shared, I
think, by many economists and reflected in the English and
probably other tax laws. The actuary and the accountant
would, however, insist that only in part is the annuity right

TAXABLE INCOME

269

fully called income, a part being a realization of capital.
Congress in 1913 might, I suppose, have adopted either of
these theories, and if its intent had been clearly manifested
the Supreme Court would hardly have rejected that theory.
This, however, Congress did not do. The clauses of the
1913 and 1916 acts purporting to define income or gross in
come, as definitions, left much to be desired. What are we
to infer from the definition of income as including “gains,
profits and income” from certain specified sources “or from
any source whatever”? Is income something different from
gains and profits, and if so, what is the distinction? In Sec
tion 4 of the act of 1916 Congress provided that annuities in
so far as they represented returns of premiums were not
taxable income, but in doing so it in plain language char
acterized them as income; the law of 1918 retained the ex
emption but avoided the characterization [Sec. 213 (a)].
It might fairly be argued that Congress, taking the acts as a
whole, indicated an intention to tax only gains. This view is
supported by the provisions above mentioned and by those
allowing depreciation and depletion. On the other hand,
the fact that these items were allowed by way of deductions
from income or gross income in arriving at taxable income,
the limitation of the deductions in purely arbitrary ways,
and the language of Section 4 of the Act of 1916 above al
luded to, might be claimed to support the view that Congress
intended to assert the right to tax as income what might be
in part a conversion of capital, but not to exercise its rights to
that extent.
However this may be, the Supreme Court presumably
settled the matter when in the case of Eisner v. Macomber
it defined income as the gain derived from capital, from
labor, or from both combined.
This decision, for the reason that it contained the defini
tion I have referred to and held that Congress had attempted
to tax as income what was not income, is of great importance,
and it may be worth while to discuss it briefly. Many pass
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ages from the opinion are of interest to accountants, but I
will quote only one paragraph:

After examining dictionaries in common use (Bouv. L. D.;
Standard Dict.; Webster’s Internat. Dict.; Century Dict.),
we find little to add to the succinct definition adopted in two
cases arising under the corporation tax act of 1909 (Stratton’s
Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 415; Doyle v.
Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U. S. 179, 185)—“Income may be de
fined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from
both combined,” provided it be understood to include profit
gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets, to which
it was applied in the Doyle case (pp. 183, 185).
In the dictionaries cited, both of the views of income above
mentioned are set forth; the definition coming closest to
that adopted by the Court is found in Bouvier’s Law Dic
tionary.
Reference to the decision in Stratton’s Independence v.
Howbert, in which the definition was first used, discloses
that in that case the Court was at pains to point out that, as at
the time of the passage of the 1909 law Congress had no
power to levy a general income tax without apportionment,
the theoretical distinctions between capital and income were
of little value to the Court in interpreting that statute. Curi
ously enough also, the case was one in which the court sus
tained the taxation as income of the proceeds of gold mining
without any provision for the exhaustion of the capital rep
resented by the mine. In Doyle v. Mitchell, arising under
the same act, the Court adopted the same definition in a
decision in which it ruled that the proceeds of lumbering
could not be taxed as income without a deduction for the
capital value of the timber exhausted. However, these de
cisions, being rendered under the excise-tax law, have no
necessary bearing on the present question; and in Eisner v.
Macomb er which was decided under an income tax law,
none of these special features was present.
Just how far-reaching the effect of that decision is in law
is a question for lawyers. The Supreme Court decisions
under the excise-tax law of 1909 rather suggest that Con
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gress can levy an excise tax measured by income without
availing of the sixteenth amendment, and in so doing can de
fine income as it pleases without regard to the views of the
Supreme Court or anyone else. So long, however, as it levies
a tax on income it apparently cannot tax as income what the
Supreme Court does not consider to be income.
The point is largely academic, and Congress has not shown
any disposition to disagree with the general interpretation
of income adopted by the court. The two bodies have, it is
true, differed on the question whether stock dividends are
income; but dividends constitute a special problem and are,
both under the acts and under court decisions, an exception
to the rule that there is no income unless there is gain. If
an investor buys $100 shares of a company which has a sur
plus equal to its capital stock for $200 a share and if the next
day the company pays a dividend of $100 a share and its
shares fall to par, the dividend is not gain to the investor
whether the dividend is paid in stock or cash. Dividends are
however, in general, income; and it is so manifestly impos
sible to provide for treatment thereof varying according to the
circumstances surrounding the holders’ acquisition of the
stock on which the dividend is paid, that purchasers of stocks
of companies having large earned surpluses may reasonably
be expected to realize that in making such purchases they not
only acquire the prospects of dividends out of profits earned
prior to their purchase but also assume the burden of any
tax on the dividends they may receive. It was for this reason
that Mr. Justice Pitney in the Phellis case said the hardship
in the case of such purchasers was more apparent than real.
It is on similar grounds that supporters of the English system
justify its treatment of the proceeds of an annuity or of min
ing and similar operations as taxable income without any de
duction for exhaustion of capital. In this connection it is
pertinent to point out that the English income tax has been
levied continuously since 1842 and that therefore the great
expansion of industry and corporate enterprise has taken
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place mainly with notice of the burdens in the form of in
come tax to which it might be subject.
Other similar cases may arise where something which is
not gain is taxed as income. It would probably be a fairly
accurate statement to say that the general test of the exist
ence of income is whether there is gain, but that items which
ordinarily constitute gain and are commonly regarded as in
come may be taxed as such even though in exceptional cases
they may not result in a gain to the recipient.
As regards commercial operations there are probably few
exceptions to the rule that income must be in the nature of
gain. Gain in commercial business is, however, usually not
a separate item but a difference between items on opposite
sides of the account. On the one side are the proceeds of
sale, on the other the costs involved in producing the sales.
Frequently also the gain is the result of a series of transac
tions or a gradual process extending over two or more dis
tinct tax periods. If a taxpayer buys raw materials in one
year, manufactures finished goods therefrom in another, sells
those goods in a third and collects the proceeds in a fourth
year, the ultimate gain is obviously not attributable wholly
to any one of these four years nor is there any way of allocat
ing portions of the gain to the operations of the several years,
which can be said to be the scientific and only proper way.
In one such series of transactions the main factor contribut
ing to the gain may be cheapness of buying, in another low
cost of manufacture, in another advantageous selling and so
on. Further, the transactions of a taxpayer are frequently
so interrelated that we cannot ascertain the profits of any
given series separately. Commercial profit is in fact, as an
eminent English judge puts it, necessarily a matter of esti
mate and opinion.
In the determination of income for commercial purposes
the best practice is to be governed by considerations of con
servatism. Profits are not taken except when and to the ex
tent that they are received or at least reasonably assured.
Losses that are foreseen are provided for even though not
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actually sustained or measured. The legislature naturally
approaches the question from a rather different point of view.
On the first point it may be questioned whether Congress has
power to tax profits not actually received. On the second,
if it allows actual losses as deductions it can hardly be ex
pected to allow deductions for potential future losses to be
made at the discretion of the taxpayer.
It should be said at once that Congress has shown no dis
position either to tax income not received or to deny losses
actually sustained. Indeed in at least one important instance
it has deliberately allowed the anticipation of potential
losses. The provision in the Act of 1918 that inventories shall
be taken on the basis conforming to the best trade practice
was enacted with the knowledge that one of the best trade
practices was to value inventories at cost where cost was less
than market, and at market where that was less than cost,
thus anticipating a loss wherever market might be below
cost. This recognition of one of the best established of those
trade practices which find their justification not in logic or
scientific considerations, but in conservatism and practical
wisdom, is very significant. In 1921 also the law was amended
to permit deduction of a reasonable reserve for bad debts in
stead of only debts ascertained to be worthless, thus recog
nizing another well-established trade practice.
Whether the deductions permitted for depreciation and
depletion are properly regarded as provisions for anticipated
losses is difficult to say. From the accounting standpoint the
provisions for depletion and depreciation of manufacturing
plant are elements of cost, which must be provided for be
fore there can be said to be any gain. The decisions of the
Supreme Court on this branch of the subject are not alto
gether easy to reconcile either with one another or with the
Court’s general definition of income. Quite apart from the
decision in the Stratton’s Independence case, under the Act
of 1909, the significance of which may be lessened by the fact
that the claimants were asserting that all the proceeds of min
ing were capital, the court has approved under an income
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tax law a purely arbitrary limitation on the depletion allow
ance which it would seem could hardly have been sustained
except on grounds which would have applied equally to the
total denial of any deduction. This, in turn, would seem to
mean that depletion is not a factor necessarily taken into ac
count in determining the gain.
One other point may be noted. In general our laws have
taxed the income of the taxpayer from his business, which
may be less than the total gain from the business to the ex
tent of the portion of the economic gain which the taxpayer
may be required to pay over to others in the form of interest,
rentals and other participations. In this respect ours has
differed from the English system, which assesses against the
taxpayer carrying on the business the entire gain from that
business without regard to any such distributions, leaving the
equitable adjustment between taxpayers to be effected by a
system of deductions by the taxpayer when making the dis
tributions, and refunds by the revenue to the distributees if
they should be exempt from tax. In the Act of 1909 and the
income tax acts up to that of 1918, however, the interest de
duction allowed to corporations was arbitrarily limited and
the limitation was sustained by the courts. Here again the
power to impose purely arbitrary limitations on the deduc
tion would seem necessarily to imply power to deny any
deductions whatever. In the cases which came before the
court the objection urged was apparently that the limitation
was discriminatory and the decisions may, therefore, not be
authority for the proposition that Congress has the power to
tax all that is economically income in the hands of the per
son who realizes the income, even though it is not all income
to that person. The point might become important, for a
tax so levied without some provision for the proper adjust
ment of the burden between the ultimate beneficiaries of the
gain might easily result in a tax on a person receiving the
income greater than the portion thereof which he might be
entitled to retain. In the year 1917 the limitation on interest
deductions undoubtedly worked some hardship, and would
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have caused gross injustice but for the action of the Commis
sioner in allowing, without any very obvious warrant in the
law, the capital sum corresponding to the interest disallowed
to be treated as invested capital.
While the arbitrary limitations to which I have referred,
and which are now fortunately removed, were blemishes on
the earlier acts, criticism of the methods of determining tax
able income established by those acts must be directed mainly
at their lack of precision and clarity and their failure to
recognize business methods and considerations of practical
convenience.
BASES OF ACCOUNTING FOR INCOME HISTORICALLY CONSIDERED

It is perhaps not surprising that at the outset receipt or
payment in cash should have been adopted as the general
basis for inclusion of items in income tax returns. Legisla
tion is framed and interpreted largely by lawyers, and
lawyers apparently seek to atone for the bewildering com
plexities they have introduced into their own sphere of activ
ity by insisting on the utmost simplicity in other spheres.
The legal mind that distrusts simple interest and regards
compound interest as wholly pernicious is naturally suspi
cious of any account more complex than a cash account. In
Great Britain, the home of the income tax, this tendency has
been manifest, but in regard to commercial income it has
been counteracted by another principle of judicial action, the
principle that in commercial affairs the established practices
of business men are a better guide than rules framed by
theorists. Consequently, the courts there have always held
that the determination of income from business was a busi
ness problem and that in the absence of express statutory
provision to the contrary, established trade practices must be
followed even though to the revenue authorities or even the
court those practices might seem theoretically unsound or
illogical. An excellent illustration is found in the methods
of valuing inventories, the English courts having sustained
both the “cost or market” basis and the “basic stock” method
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where a practice in the trade was shown to exist and there
was no statutory prohibition.
In our case, however, the tendency towards the cash basis
was perhaps strengthened by the accident that our first in
come tax was enacted in the guise of an excise tax. The law
of 1909 was framed so as to provide that corporations should
return income actually received and expenses actually paid.
As soon as this became known the accountants vigorously
protested to the Attorney-General that such a basis ignored
the nature and practices of modern business and would en
tail inconvenience that would be more burdensome than
the tax. The Attorney-General, however, remained un
moved by their protest, said that the straight cash basis was
adopted advisedly, and retorted that he had too much con
fidence in the ability of the accountants to think that they
would find the difficulties of complying with the law unsur
mountable.
His confidence was apparently justified,
for with the assistance of accountants the Secretary of the
Treasury issued regulations which certainly presented no spe
cial difficulties to taxpayers.
Some have thought that the authors of those regulations
found their inspiration, where so many others have found
inspiration, in the works of W. S. Gilbert. Certainly when
one reads the provisions to the effect that the term “actually
paid” does not necessarily contemplate that there shall have
been an actual disbursement of cash or even its equivalent,
and that an item is paid as soon as a taxpayer recognizes that
it has to be paid, one is irresistibly reminded of Koko’s ex
planation to the Mikado of his statement that Nanki Poo had
been executed when in fact he was still alive.

When your Majesty says, ‘Let a thing be done,’ it’s as good
as done,—practically it is done,—because your Majesty’s will is
law. Your Majesty says, ‘Kill a gentleman,’ and a gentle
man is told off to be killed. Consequently, that gentleman
is as good as dead, practically, he is dead, and if he is dead,
why not say so?
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It is, however, quite possible to find a more logical justifi
cation for the method of determining net income established
by the regulations at least in the main, though this justifi
cation, I admit, does not extend to the language in which the
method is prescribed and ostensibly justified.
The Act of 1909 provided that the “net income” which was
subjected to tax should be determined by deducting “from
the gross amount of the income . . . received within the
year from all sources:”
First. All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid
within the year out of income in the maintenance and opera
tion of its business and properties including all charges such
as rentals or franchise payments required to be made as a con
dition to the continued use or possession of property.
Second. All losses actually sustained within the year and
not compensated by insurance or otherwise, including a
reasonable allowance for depreciation of property if any.
Third. Interest actually paid within the year subject to
specified limits.
Fourth. All sums paid within the year for taxes.
Fifth. Dividends from other companies subject to the tax.

The regulations regarding commercial income apparently
ignored the word “received” just as fully as the word “paid.”
It was not necessary that proceeds of sale should have been
received in order that there should be taxable income there
from. The regulation treated income from sales as received
when the goods were exchanged for an account or note re
ceivable or cash. This was, in ordinary cases, an obviously
convenient rule (and in considering the almost complete
acquiescence these regulations secured, it must always be
borne in mind that the tax was so small as to make it not
worth while to fight a reasonably convenient rule), but
whether if challenged it would have been sustained is open
to question. The courts have pointed out that the expecta
tion of gain in the future is not present income and have
been reluctant to sustain a tax where nothing had been re
ceived out of which the tax could be paid. The justification
of the regulation would have had to be found in the argu
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ment that something equivalent to cash had been received,
and in many classes of transactions the recognition of the
principle of cash equivalence must be conceded to be prac
tically essential to an effective income tax administration.
Once this principle is adopted, however, it has to be admitted
that in measuring the gain the proceeds must be reduced to
a true cash equivalent. This would mean bringing pro
visions for the cost of collection, for discounts and for credit
risks into account at the same time as the sale itself, which
it may be noted the regulations did not permit.
The next point to be observed is that the proceeds of sale
are not income (Doyle v. Mitchell); only so much as is gain
is income. Assuming, therefore, that the gain is received
when the proceeds of sale are received (not necessarily in
cash), it follows that all costs attributable to the sale must be
brought into account at the same time as the sale itself,
whether such costs have or have not been paid. -Otherwise,
on balance, something which is not gain will inevitably have
been brought into account and taxed as income. It is gen
erally recognized that this is true of the direct cost of the
goods sold, but it is not so universally understood that it is
equally true of the cost of making the sale and the cost of
collecting the proceeds. A commission paid in order to
effect a sale is as much an element in determining the gain
therefrom as the cost of the property sold. This point seems
to me to have a most important bearing on the determina
tion of taxable income whether the question be approached
from the theoretical, historical, or practical standpoint.
In considering the proper treatment of any item in rela
tion to taxable income, the first essential is to decide whether
it properly relates to the determination of gross income or
to a deduction from gross income. If the former, its treat
ment is not in any way affected by any limitations of deduc
tions to amounts paid, accrued or incurred, as the case may
be, since these limitations apply only to items which are in
fact charges against gross income after gross income has been
determined. As the Court indicated in Doyle v. Mitchell it
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is immaterial whether there is any express provision allowing
elements in the production of gross income as deductions
from gross proceeds, for until they are deducted there is noth
ing ascertained which Congress can properly tax as income.
This principle would have warranted a regulation that
all costs of effecting sales, as well as the costs of producing
the goods sold and provisions for the costs of collection, were
allowable in the period in which the sales were returned, as
a part of the computation of gross income. Only expenses
not falling under any of these three heads would have been
left to be taken as deductions under the head of “ordinary
and necessary expenses actually paid within the year out of
income.”
Looking back on the problem of 1909 in the flood of light
which the developments of the last sixteen years have thrown
on the subject, one feels that along such lines a • solution
might have been found that would have been almost as con
venient as the one adopted and would have avoided inter
preting the words “actually paid” in the Gilbertian manner
of the regulation then promulgated. It may be suggested
that the language of the provision for deduction for business
expenses stood in the way, but this does not seem to be
necessarily so. That provision authorized the “deducting
from the gross amount of the income all the ordinary and
necessary expenses actually paid within the year out of in
come” Expenditures necessarily made to produce income
surely did not fall in any such category. In point of fact,
expenses of maintenance of the property of the taxpayer
were specifically enumerated in the Act among the “ordinary
and necessary expenses,” yet the regulations provided that
expenditures for maintenance of manufacturing plant should
be included in cost of goods sold in computing gross income
and not under the deduction.
The regulations of 1909 did not follow the course I have
suggested, but treated only cost of goods as a deduction from
sales in determining gross income and dealt with cost of
selling and collection as “ordinary or necessary expenses”
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to be deducted from gross income when “actually paid” pro
viding, however, that when such items were duly set up on
the books they were “actually paid” within the meaning of
the law.
The convenience of the solution is undeniable, and it may
be that the framers were governed by this consideration.
They may well have felt that the solution was so convenient
that no one would be likely to challenge it, and that if it
were challenged they could readily show that it produced
erroneous results only as regards expenses which were not a
part of the cost of effecting and collecting the sales returned,
the amount of which was in ordinary cases relatively in
significant.
In substance these regulations were sound, convenient and
did little real violence to the language of the law. Their
form, however, must be admitted to have been defective,
particularly in its apparent disregard of the language of the
law. No doubt if continued interest in the work of ad
ministering the law by men of the quality of those who
framed the regulations could have been secured, the defects
in form would have been corrected, while the advantages of
the substance would have been retained. This, however, was
not possible, and in the event just the opposite result fol
lowed. The influence of the defective form has continued
long after the advantages derived from the substance have
ceased to be felt.
One result of the defective form was that a widespread
feeling was created both within and without the department
that the regulations were at variance with the law and that
any day dissatisfaction with their operation in a particular
case might bring the issue into court and cause the whole
house of cards to collapse. Another result was that the aver
age taxpayer who was told that when used in connection with
expenses the word “paid” did not necessarily mean a dis
bursement in cash, but that when used in relation to interest
or taxes it did contemplate such a disbursement, felt that
the law was unreasonable and so far as he was concerned
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incomprehensible. Still another result, certainly of a most
unexpected character, which I shall discuss later in this
paper, grew out of the establishment by the regulations of
the making of book entries as a criterion of deductibility, a
criterion not warranted, either in theory or in the language
of the law.
Further, while the solution by the Secretary of the Treasury
of the problem presented in the Act of 1909 produced im
mediate benefits in the form of convenience, it stood in the
way of efforts to secure a more satisfactory wording when
in 1913 the first income tax law was enacted. Efforts to
secure an improvement were made by, among others, the
American Association of Public Accountants. The sugges
tion of a change was met with the argument that the existing
law had in practice worked quite satisfactorily and that if
such a law could be applied to corporations there was even
greater justification for applying it to individuals, most of
whom would keep no books and would make returns on a
purely cash basis. The law of 1913 thus followed closely
the language of the law of 1909. The efforts were, however,
continued, and in 1916 a modification was effected and tax
payers were given the option of making returns either on
the statutory basis or on the basis on which their books were
kept, provided the method of keeping the books was such
as in the opinion of the Commissioner correctly reflected in
come. For various reasons which it is hardly necessary at
this time to discuss, this provision did not work very well,
and the regulations under the Act of 1916 continued to follow
very closely those made under the Acts of 1909 and 1913.
In passing it may be pointed out that Article 126 of Reg
ulations No. 33 issued January 2, 1918, strongly suggests
that at the time those regulations were issued the line of
reasoning which I have put forward above as an alternative
to that indicated by the language of 1909 regulations had
developed in the Bureau. It begins by apparently flouting
the language of the statute in the most open and flagrant
manner. The first sentence reads “ ‘paid’ or ‘actually paid’
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within the meaning of this title, does not necessarily con
template that there shall be an actual disbursement in cash
or its equivalent.” The next sentence, however, states very
succinctly the underlying justification of the results of the
regulation which I have suggested. “If the amount involved
represents an actual expense or element of cost in the pro
duction of the income of the year, it will be properly de
ductible even though not actually disbursed in cash, pro
vided it is so entered upon the books of the company as to
constitute a liability against its assets, and provided further
that the income is also returned upon an accrued basis.’’
It will be observed that this regulation does not in terms
permit the deduction of any expense which has not actually
been paid unless it is “an expense or element of cost in the
production of the income.” To support such a position it
was not necessary to give a forced construction to the words
“actually paid” used in the statute. In practice, however,
the regulation was applied to all business expenses, and the
Bureau no doubt preferred to retain substantially the lan
guage of the regulations under the Acts of 1909 and 1913
and to be in a position to invoke the rule that re-enactment
of the provisions of an act by Congress with a knowledge of
the way in which it has been interpreted sanctions that in
terpretation.
When in 1917 the excess-profits tax law was passed levying
high taxes on the income determined under the 1916 law
and regulations, the whole question assumed new importance
and the need for revision of the law became apparent.
In the 1918 law, therefore, it was provided (in Section 212)
that returns should be made on the basis on which the tax
payer’s books were kept unless that basis did not clearly re
flect income, in which case returns were to be made on such
basis as the Commissioner might prescribe as clearly reflect
ing income.
In considering this section it is important to bear in mind
the provisions of the Act that the terms paid or incurred
(used in relation to deductions for expenses) and paid or
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accrued (used in relation to deductions for interest and taxes)
should be construed according to the method of accounting
used in computing net income.
Even more important, however, is the provision that items
of gross income were to be included in returns for the tax
able year in which received, unless under methods of ac
counting permitted under Section 212 they were properly
accounted for as of a different period.
The intent seems clear to give the fullest effect to sound
accounting practice in the determination of gross income.
It may be conceded that the law gave no authority to the
Commissioner to prescribe or permit bases of accounting
which would result in deductions from the gross income of
expenses in periods other than those in which they were paid
or incurred, or of interest and taxes in periods other than
that of payment or accrual. “Incurred,” however, is a suffi
ciently broad term and no serious criticism of the rules thus
established could be offered by the most ardent advocate
of the policy of allowing commercial practice to govern the
determination of commercial income. The law certainly
authorized the acceptance of well-established practices for
determining gross income on the basis of the fair present
value of the sales price, instead of its face value—in other
words, the exclusion from the computation of gross income
of so much of the nominal sale price as might be necessary
to provide for discounts, for the credit risk assumed and
the cost of collecting that sale price. It did not permit de
duction from gross income of reserves for potential future
losses nor for expenditures not yet incurred and not in
volved in the production of the gross sales reported. From
the legislative standpoint such deductions could not reason
ably be allowed, however legitimate or even praiseworthy
purely precautionary reserves may be from the standpoints
of sound finance and business prudence.
To most accountants the Act of 1918 seemed to dispose
of the vitally important question of accounting bases for
determining taxable income in a sound and satisfactory way.
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It can hardly be said that the expectations entertained
have been fully realized. The regulations (Reg. 45) seemed
to observe the spirit as well as the letter of the law. Article
23, for instance, provided that “approved standard methods
of accounting will ordinarily be regarded as clearly reflect
ing income’’ and Article 24 said “the law contemplates that
each taxpayer shall adopt such forms and systems of account
ing as are in his judgment best suited to his purpose.” In
such articles as 151 the propriety of computing gross income
upon the basis of the cash equivalent rather than the face
value of credit sales was recognized. Other articles explicitly
recognized approved alternative methods of treating ex
penditures in the twilight zone between obviously capital
expenditure and ordinary operating expense. In adminis
tration the law has frequently been construed with less
breadth and with less regard for its spirit. In part this is
perhaps attributable to failure to realize the nature of the
problem of determining the income of a single year.
Accountants realize that income cannot with even approxi
mate accuracy be allocated to a particular year, especially in
the case of taxpayers carrying on an extensive and complex
business. No year is sufficient unto itself—each year’s opera
tions are bound up with and dependent on the operations
of earlier and later years. Consequently, any attribution of
income to a single year in such cases must at best be no
more than a very rough approximation based on accepted
conventions. Many, however, who have not had much ex
perience in such matters look on the income of a year as a
very definite, significant and even a precise thing. They are
reluctant to accept the proposition that there can be two
ways of determining the income of a given year, which will
give substantially different results and be equally admissible
and correct. Experience suggests that such reluctance was
very general among those in the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
and when the 1918 act compelled recognition of the prin
ciple that there might be more than one legally correct way
of computing income for a given year, they apparently re
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solved at least to limit the number of alternatives. Since
the passage of the 1918 act the correspondence and briefs of
the Bureau have contained constant references to the two
bases of accounting permitted under the act, these two being
described respectively as “the cash basis’’ and “the accrual
basis.” Of course, the more experienced members of the
Bureau realized that there were far more than two bases of
accounting possible and recognized under the Act, and doubt
less many of those who spoke of the cash basis and the accrual
basis used the latter term generically to describe anything
other than a cash basis. But to a large number of the em
ployees of the Bureau the accrual basis has become not
merely a significant phrase, but an article of faith. Indeed,
one can almost imagine such employees of the Bureau scat
tered over the land turning their faces towards the Treasury
daily at the appointed hour and reciting their creed, “There
is but one accrual basis and the Bureau is its prophet.”
“the

accrual basis”

It may be worth while to inquire just what is meant by
“the accrual basis.” This is by no means clear, nor is it even
clear precisely how it differs from the so-called cash basis
as applied to commercial income since 1909.
It will be evident from what I have already said that both
in theory and in practice cash has very little to do (in the
case of commercial enterprises) with the determination of
income on the “cash” basis, and very little reflection is neces
sary to a realization of the fact that accruals (in any proper
sense of the word) have still less to do with the determination
of income on the so-called accrual basis. This fact has been
obscured by the practice, which has grown up, of using the
word “accrue” in senses hardly dreamed of before the Reve
nue Act of 1916 was passed. The Bureau, having adopted
“the accrual basis” as the only alternative to “the cash basis,”
has proceeded to term “an accrual” almost everything that is
not a cash item. Thus, we find the Bureau speaking of
taking up an inventory as an accrual and of “accruing ac
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counts receivable from sales” and quite generally using the
word “accrue” in a transitive sense as being equivalent to
the “setting up on the books” which, as I have pointed out,
was, under the regulations of 1909, established as being for
tax purposes equivalent to actual payment. Applying
Euclidean methods, we may deduce that since setting up on
the books is equivalent to actual payment or receipt and is
also equivalent to accrual, and since things which are equal
to the same thing are equal to one another, accrual is equiva
lent to actual payment or receipt and the cash basis and the
accrual basis are identical. Such use of the word “accrual”
could not have been justified from the dictionary nor from
common accounting or business practice. Indeed, the latest
citation in any standard dictionary of the use of the word
“accrue” in any transitive sense whatever, that I have been
able to discover, is from a work published in 1594.
The fact is, that the word “accrue” is a singularly un
happy choice for use in income tax practice. One of the
great difficulties of income taxation is that income earning
is a gradual process, and yet the necessities of taxation require
that particular portions of income shall be attributed to
particular moments in time. It is not feasible to tax income
during the period of growth, but only when it becomes defi
nite and measurable. Now in its basic meanings, the word
“accrual” is ambiguous when applied to such a situation,
because one of its meanings is to “grow up” and the other
is to “spring up” or “fall in,” so that it is equally capable of
application either to the period of growth or to the moment
of falling in of income when it takes a definite form. There
is a similar ambiguity in the legal and commercial uses of
the word. When the term “accrue” is used in regard to
interest, the reference is usually intended to be to the gradual
accumulation of interest between one maturity date and an
other. In regard to taxes, it has repeatedly been held to
mean “become due.” The use of the word in the recent acts
has been sufficiently confusing in that the two deductions in
respect of which it has been used in the acts are interest and
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taxes, two items in relation to which it has quite different
meanings. When to such ambiguities is added the further
confusion arising from the use of the word by the Bureau in
the transitive sense as equivalent to “set up,” its last shred
of descriptive value disappears.
One may wonder why of all the terms used in the acts this
term, which is the least illuminating, should have attained
the widest use in the Bureau. Partly, no doubt, it is due to
the fact that of the various terms used such as “paid,” “re
ceived” and “incurred,” “accrued” is the. only one from
which an adjective is easily formed that is applicable to both
sides of the account. Its use therefore achieved brevity,
though at a complete sacrifice of significance. However this
may be, I venture to suggest that the misuse of the word
“accrue” has contributed to the confusion of the income tax
administration in the later stages as much as the artificial
solution of the problem presented by the words “paid” and
“received” in the Act of 1909 occasioned in the earlier stages.
Before leaving the subject, I would like to admit that the
accountants are not wholly without responsibility for the con
fusion that has existed. Our own use of terminology is
lamentably inconsistent and reflects too often the idiosyn
crasies of the individual rather than the established practice
of the profession. I recall a statement put forward over the
signature of a well-known accounting firm which began with
a figure described as “gross income” from which allowances
and refunds were deducted to arrive at a figure described as
“net gross income.” Operating expenses were next deducted
and the result described as “net operating income”; the addi
tion to which of net income from other sources produced a
so-called “gross net income” which it must be observed
meant something quite different from “net gross income.”
Our treatment of cost of goods, cost of selling and cost of
collecting in relation to gross income has too often been
determined by habit rather than by logic. Many of us have
acquiesced in or even adopted the Bureau’s unwarranted
usage of “the accrual basis,” Burdened with so much re
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sponsibility, we must be restrained in our criticisms of the
Bureau which, facing a heavier task and equipped with less
experience, has fallen into errors similar to our own.
CONCLUSION

We may now, I hope, look forward to rates that will be
lower and more stable than in recent years with a resulting
reduction of the temptation to taxpayers to allow their ac
counting methods to be influenced by tax considerations. If
so, there will be even more reason than in the past why the
Bureau should carry out the obvious intent of the law and
adopt a broad policy towards taxpayers’ accounting methods,
which will make the law less burdensome in procedure as
well as in amount.
In order to accomplish this result some old misconceptions
need to be removed and some old truths emphasized anew.
It would greatly improve the administration of the income
tax if the Bureau generally—not merely those who frame
regulations but all charged with the administration of the
law—would realize that “the accrual basis” is a meaningless
phrase; that the choice today is not between a so-called “cash
basis” and a so-called “accrual basis” but between the basis
on which the taxpayers’ books are kept and the basis pre
scribed by the Commissioner as clearly reflecting income; and
that as stated in Regulations 45, Article 24, the law contem
plates that “each taxpayer shall adopt such forms and systems
of accounting as are in his judgment best suited to his pur
pose.”
They should keep constantly in mind the fundamental
difference between the considerations governing the deter
mination of gross income and those governing the treatment
of authorized deductions from such gross income. In this
connection they should realize that the mention of any class
of items among the authorized deductions from gross income
does not stand in the way of the deduction of similar items
from gross proceeds in the determination of gross income
where they are a part of the cost of producing that income.
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For instance, the provision that taxes may be deducted
either when paid or when accrued does not stand in the way
of customs duties accrued and paid last year entering into
the determination of the income of this year if the goods
imported are sold this year. Similarly, the provision that
debts actually ascertained to be worthless may be claimed
as deductions does not stand in the way of valuing sales ac
counts receivable at their fair market value at the time when
they are created, in determining the gross income from such
sales, but merely limits the deduction which may subse
quently be claimed for bad debts if the account receivable
proves uncollectible.
They should never forget that income is at best a matter
of estimate and opinion, and that in its allocation in respect
of time, business practice and the treatment adopted in good
faith by the taxpayer are entitled to great weight; also that
the injustice of taxation of income which has not been re
ceived may not be adequately remedied by allowing the
amount as a so-called loss against the income from other
transactions in a later year. Both the law and business prac
tice warrant conservatism in determining when income is
received and is taxable.
These are the practical conclusions which seem to me to
emerge from consideration of our subject. I hope you will
feel that they give some present value to this paper, which
otherwise might seem to have at best only historical interest.

IV

ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING AND RESERVES IN TAX
PRACTICE *
(1925)
I ask the privilege of your columns to discuss briefly
two points arising, one directly and the other indirectly,
out of my paper † which was published in your October
issue? Of these points the first relates to the origin of the
expression “the accrual basis of accounting’’; the other to
the treatment of reserves in tax practice.
In my paper I implied that the expression “accrual ac
counting” had little if any currency among accountants prior
to the development of the expression in tax practice. It has,
however, been suggested to me that the phrase had been used
for many years by economists, and it is I think due to your
readers that the fact should be brought to their notice.
Professor H. C. Adams, in his Public Finance, published
in 1898, uses the phrase and discusses the relative advantages
of cash and accrual accounting for governmental purposes.
Professor Adams does not seem to me to deal altogether
satisfactorily with the question when items accrue, and the
difficulty suggested in my paper as arising from the fact that
to accrue may mean either “to grow up” or “to fall in,” is
indicated but not solved in his book. Thus, he regards taxes
as accruing as assets to a government when they are assessed;
interest he regards as accruing from day to day. Supposing
then that a special annual tax be levied to meet interest on
government debt, the income to the government (taxes)
would be deemed to accrue on the day or days of assessment,
but the expense to accrue from day to day. For the pur
poses of annual budgets the inconsistency would be of no
May

* A letter to The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XL (December, 1925).
† Taxable Income and Accounting Bases for Determining It. (See above.)
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great importance, but as soon as accounts are made up for
a shorter period, or a balance sheet is prepared, the incon
sistent uses of the term “accrued” give rise to serious diffi
culties.
That the phrase “accrual accounting,” even though used
by economists in regard to government accounting, was not
generally employed by accountants even in that limited
sense is indicated by the proceedings at the first congress of
accountants held in St. Louis in 1904. A series of papers on
municipal accounting formed an important part of the pro
gram at that congress, arid the need for something more
than “cash accounting” was one of the main points stressed
in these papers; yet the alternative was nowhere, I think, de
scribed as a system of “accrual accounting.” In the first
paper Harvey S. Chase said:

The fundamental basis of correct municipal accounting
is now being thoroughly discussed from a true accounting
standpoint as witnessed in the other papers presented at this
meeting. This true accounting standpoint is of course
revenue and expense in contradistinction to cash receipts
and disbursements.
Indeed, the title of one of the papers, which was presented
by Professor F. A. Cleveland, was “Revenues and Expenses
as Distinguished from Receipts and Disbursements in Mu
nicipal Accounting.”
It is interesting to note that speaking of commercial ac
counting Professor Adams said, “Should we turn our atten
tion from public [i.e., governmental] accounting to the
best corporation accounting one will discover that ‘earnings
and expenses’ have almost universally supplanted the older
bookkeeping phrases of ‘receipts and expenditures.’ ” Fur
ther evidence on this point is afforded by the correspondence
between a number of accounting firms and the AttorneyGeneral immediately prior to the enactment of the corpora
tion excise-tax law of 1909. As opposed to the cash basis they
advocated the basis of earnings and expenses, and throughout
the correspondence used the word “accrue” only in regard to
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interest. They spoke of income earned, expenses incurred
and losses sustained, and written off and when they came
to taxes they used no qualifying adjective at all, from which
it might, perhaps, be inferred that they were not prepared
to suggest any alternative to taxes paid.
A discussion of English authorities would, I am sure, lead
to precisely the same result, and the economists must there
fore be left to share with the Bureau of Internal Revenue the
credit or responsibility for giving currency to the phrase
“accrual accounting.” Incidentally, it is consoling to ac
countants, who are frequently criticized for adopting ter
minology for their own purposes without regard to practice
in other fields of activity involving the same subject matter,
to find that the economists apparently coined the phrase
“accrual accounting” to meet a need without regard to the
fact that accountants commonly used another term which
if not quite so brief was at least clearer and more accurate.
It would, I believe, be an advantage if we should revert
to the practice indicated by the correspondence with the At
torney-General, and restrict the use of the word “accrue” to
interest and similar items which grow with the mere lapse
of time, in which relation its sense is universally understood
and agreed. In recent years its use has been extending in
the same sense to items to which it is not properly applicable,
and in other and ill-defined senses to still other items. This
is particularly true, as pointed out in my paper, of tax
practice, and even the tax law has for many years provided
for the deduction of taxes accrued as well as interest accrued.
Now, undoubtedly the legal and accounting usages of the
phrase “taxes accrued” differ, even if lawyers do not differ
as to its legal, and accountants as to its accounting, meaning.
Much controversy has arisen on the question whether the
term is used in the tax laws in its general legal sense or in
an accounting sense. It would be a distinct gain if account
ants would cease to use the term “taxes accrued” in a sense
altogether different from its legal meaning.
Consideration of possible alternatives brings me immedi
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ately to the second point on which I would like to comment
in this letter. Probably the first alternative which would
occur to most accountants would be “reserve for taxes,”
but the use of the word “reserve” in accounting practice
must be admitted to be even more vague and inconsistent
than any use of the word “accrue” to which I have referred.
A reserve may be anything from segregated surplus to a
mere accounting device for adjusting to a proper net value,
assets which it is convenient to carry on the books at more
than their actual value.
Accountants have recognized this unsatisfactory situation
for many years, but it must be conceded that they have done
little or nothing to correct it. A perusal of the decisions
of the Board of Tax Appeals, however, suggests that the Board
does not sufficiently appreciate that the proper treatment
of reserves cannot be determined without enquiry into their
nature and their effect on the accounts.
The point may be illustrated by a decision in the case of
M. I. Stewart & Co., Docket 473, decided September 30, 1925,
on the question of reserves for discount. The Board dis
poses of the question in effect by saying, “Reserves are not
allowable deductions from gross income unless specifically
provided for by statute.” True, but irrelevant. A reserve
for discount is a step in the computation of gross income,
not a deduction therefrom. If a trader sells on December
31, 1924, goods which cost $80 for a nominal price of
$100 less 2% ten days, his gross income in that year from
the transaction is but $18. The impossibility of maintain
ing any other view becomes apparent if we assume the debt
to be paid on January 1, 1925. How can it be argued in
such a case that the trader made a profit of $20 in 1924
and a loss of $2 in 1925 (as the Board’s treatment implies)
when he received exactly what he had a right to receive.
Correct accounting calls for determining income in such
cases on the basis of taking accounts receivable at the sum,
which if paid on December 31 would completely discharge
the indebtedness. If through failure to pay promptly the
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debtors become obligated to pay more in the subsequent
year, the forfeited discounts are income of that year.
Whether such correct accounting is secured by taking the
accounts receivable at their present value when created and
taking up the discount as an asset, as, when and if, forfeited,
or by setting up the accounts receivable immediately at their
nominal sum on the one side and carrying a reserve on the
other is immaterial. The so-called reserve is not a reserve
but a mere accounting device the convenience of which is
obvious. The Board in such decisions as above quoted is
misled by terminology into taxing as gross income some
thing which has not and may never become income.
The first essential to a correct disposition of so-called re
serves in computing taxable income is to determine into
which of various categories the reserves in question fall. If
they are reservations made out of profits, the dictum of the
Board above quoted from the Stewart case applies to them.
If, however, they are merely a part of the accounting mechan
ism for determining either the gross income earned or the
expenses incurred, then the sole question is whether the
method of accounting is such as correctly reflects income.

V
OBSOLESCENCE OF GOODWILL

Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co. v. Clarke *
(1930)
It is to be hoped that we shall not be suspected of introduc
ing a highly controversial question of national importance
into the columns of a technical journal if we discuss a recent
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of the Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Company; †
nor, we trust, shall we be charged with a refusal to accept
the decisions of the Court or with a lack of respect for its
members if, in the course of discussion, we question the
validity of the arguments by which the decision is supported
in the opinion handed down. The case is interesting to ac
countants in more ways than one. The point at issue—
whether under the tax law an allowance should be made for
obsolescence of goodwill—is itself an interesting technical
question. The decisions in the courts below turned largely
on the legislative history of tax provisions, which account
ants played an important part in formulating, and the whole
history of the case indicates the strange turns of fortune to
which taxpayers may be subject. We propose, therefore, to
consider it in some detail.
Let us deal first with the proceedings in the Supreme
Court. As has been said, the question at issue was whether
or not under the Revenue Act of 1918 an allowance could be
made for the obsolescence of goodwill. No question of fact
was in dispute. In the language of the opinion, “The good
will was that of a brewery and is found to have been de
stroyed by prohibition legislation. The deduction claimed
* An editorial contributed to The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XLIX
(March, 1930).
† 280 U. S., 384.
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is for the fiscal year ending May 31, 1919, it having been
apparent early in 1918 that prohibition was imminent, and
the officers having taken steps to prepare for the total or
partial liquidation of the company. The amount of the
deduction to be made is agreed upon if any deduction is to
be allowed.” The sole contention of the Government, which
brought the appeal, was that in the provisions of the Revenue
Act of 1918 relating to exhaustion, wear and tear and ob
solescence, “the statute only intended to embrace property
of such a nature that it was decreased, consumed or disposed
of by use in the trade or business, and goodwill is not such
property.”
As between the parties, nothing turned on the nature of
the event which destroyed the goodwill. The Government’s
position would have been precisely the same had the case
been one of a business brought to an end by an unexpected
exhaustion of the world’s supply of its raw material. The
Court, however, decided against the taxpayer, on the ground
that neither of the words “exhaustion” and “obsolescence”
was apt to describe termination by law as an evil of a busi
ness otherwise flourishing; and that to make such an allow
ance would be to grant part compensation to the taxpayer
for the extinguishment of his business by law, in the form
of “an abatement of taxes otherwise due,” and that it was
incredible that Congress should have intended such a result.
But it is difficult to perceive how any question arises of
abatement of taxes otherwise due. The profits for the last
years of the Company’s operation had to be determined and
taxed. The fact, conceded on the record, that the useful
life of the capital assets of the business was to be cut short,
was claimed to be under general provisions a factor which
would reduce the taxable income and the tax. The Revenue
Act did not exclude breweries from the benefit pf these pro
visions. The taxpayer had been guilty of nothing illegal.
Upon what theory, then, can the taxpayer be denied the
benefit of the provisions and its tax increased by such denial?
If the general provisions would not give the relief sought,
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if the premature termination of the useful life of an asset
employed in a business which is brought to an unexpected
end is not covered by the terms used in the act, the taxpayer
has no right to succeed. But if they would afford that re
lief, there is nothing in the Revenue Act, nor surely in con
siderations of public policy, to deprive the taxpayer of the
benefit on account of the nature of the event which brought
the business to a premature end. Congress, acting within its
powers, saw fit to enact prohibition without compensation;
but there is nothing to suggest that it intended to impose
an added burden on the industries affected by requiring that
their taxable income, during the short period of legal opera
tion left them, should, by an exception to a general rule, be
determined as if that period had been unlimited. The opin
ion, we think, does an injustice to Congress when it imputes
to Congress such an intention.
Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Stone concurred
in the result, but wrote no opinion. Their decision prob
ably turned on the question of the applicability of the clause
relied upon to goodwill in general, rather than on the inter
pretation of the attitude of Congress toward a business which
had become noxious to the constitution, which led to the
rather summary dismissal of the taxpayers’ contentions by
Mr. Justice Holmes. The only words in his opinion which
seem to bear directly on this question are contained in the
sentence: “Neither word is apt to describe termination by
law as an evil of a business otherwise flourishing, and neither
becomes more applicable because the death is lingering
rather than instantaneous.” It may be that if the effect of
the decision as an authority comes to be considered in a
future case, the declaration that neither word (exhaustion
or obsolescence) is apt to describe the termination of a busi
ness otherwise flourishing will be held to have been the basis
of the decision, and the references to the prohibition law to
have been merely obiter dicta. Accurately speaking, the
question is perhaps whether either “exhaustion” or “ob
solescence” is or is not an apt term to describe the effect on
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capital assets of an event which is about to bring a pros
perous business in which they are employed to an unex
pected end, rather than whether the words are apt to de
scribe the event itself or not. In considering such a ques
tion, an examination of the history of the legislation and of
the practice of the Treasury would seem, under the decisions
of the Court, to be pertinent if not essential.
In the Bureau of Internal Revenue and in the court below,
the question had turned on the interpretation of the pro
vision of Section 234 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1918, allowing
as a deduction from gross income, inter alia, “a reasonable
allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear of property used
in the trade or business, including a reasonable allowance
for obsolescence.” Acting under this authority, the Treasury
in 1919 issued a regulation providing for an allowance for
obsolescence of goodwill of breweries as a result of prohibi
tion. This ruling remained in effect from 1919 until 1927.
In 1927, a case having come into the courts on the question
whether or not the goodwill had, in fact, been destroyed in
that case, a district court held that the provision relied on
did not authorize a deduction in any case for obsolescence
of goodwill. This decision being affirmed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals, the Commissioner amended the regulations
so as to deny the deduction. It is to be presumed that the
great majority of the cases had been decided under the
regulations in force from 1919 to 1927, so that only a small
residue of taxpayers was affected by the change of position.
The Circuit Court of Appeals, in deciding the case referred
to (the Red Wing Malting Company case), held that the
language, “including a reasonable allowance for obsoles
cence,” did not add a new kind of deduction, and that the
allowance for “exhaustion, wear and tear of property used
in the trade or business” covered no more than the pro
vision of the Act of 1916, which allowed a deduction for the
“exhaustion, wear and tear of property arising out of its use
or employment in the business or trade,” and that there
fore exhaustion was not allowable unless caused by use. This
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conclusion was based largely on the Court’s reading of the
legislative history of the provision, a history which is of par
ticular interest to accountants.
The corporation excise-tax law of 1909 allowed the de
duction of “a reasonable allowance for depreciation of prop
erty, if any.” This act. is memorable because it led to the
first occasion on which the accountants of the country as a
body presented the views of the profession on what they
conceived to be unsound legislation, and also the first oc
casion on which members of the profession were called in to
assist in framing regulations to give effect to an apparently
unworkable act. Since the tax was in terms based on receipts
and payments, any allowance for depreciation might seem in
congruous if it were not well understood that the law was
conceived and was to be administered as an income or profits
tax, and that the words “received” and “paid” were used as
what has since come to be known as camouflage, which was
expected to protect the law from attack on constitutional
grounds. In the regulations, the term “depreciation” was
interpreted in the accounting rather than the etymological
sense, and it was provided that the deduction should be “the
loss which arises from exhaustion, wear and tear or ob
solescence out of the use to which the property is put.”
There was, however, a disposition in the Treasury to make
the determination of the allowance at least in part a ques
tion of value rather than of exhaustion.
When the Revenue Act of 1913 was being prepared, a
committee of the American Association of Public Account
ants, predecessor of the American Institute of Accountants,
conferred with those who were drafting the bill and recom
mended, among other things, that the sense of the regulation
under the Act of 1909 should be embodied in the text of the
Act of 1913. That Act, when passed, provided for “a reason
able allowance for depreciation by use, wear and tear of
property, if any.” It was, however, apparent that deprecia
tion of property used, which ought to be allowed, might
arise while the property was in use, but not by or from use.
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Such allowances were commonly made by the Treasury under
the Act of 1913 and also under the Act of 1916. In 1918,
income taxation had assumed a new importance, and, the
1917 law having proved almost unworkable, the Treasury,
for the first time, was allowed to draft a law. The bill, as
it passed the house, provided for “a reasonable allowance for
exhaustion, wear and tear of property used in the trade or
business.” The Senate amended the provision to read, “a
reasonable allowance for depreciation of property used in
the trade or business.” The conference committee changed
the provision to read as it now stands, “a reasonable allow
ance for exhaustion, wear and tear of property used in the
trade or business, including a reasonable allowance for
obsolescence.” The reasonable interpretation of the intent
of Congress would seem to be that in 1918 it sanctioned the
previous practice of allowing deductions for exhaustion of
property used, even though that exhaustion resulted not
from use but from other causes such as lapse of time, and
that it specifically provided for consideration of the element
of obsolescence in determining the allowance. It was upon
this construction that the Treasury regulation, above referred
to, specifically allowing obsolescence of goodwill in the case
of breweries, was formulated. The Circuit Court of Appeals
in the eighth circuit appears from the record to have based
its decision adverse to this regulation in the Red Wing
Malting Company case on a reading of this history which was
not entirely accurate. The Circuit Court of the second cir
cuit, in a careful opinion in the Haberle Crystal Springs
Brewing Company case, sustained the regulation. It was on
this narrow point of statutory construction that the latter
case went to the Supreme Court, there to .be decided, as we
have said, on a point which apparently had not been con
sidered by anyone in the ten years’ history of the question.
This history strikingly illustrates the hazards involved in
taking a tax case to court. The Red Wing Malting Com
pany, presumably convinced of the soundness of its position
on the question of fact which was at issue in the Treasury
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(i.e., whether its goodwill had been destroyed or not), went
to the courts only to have its contention on the question of
fact sustained but the allowance denied as a matter of law
on the basis of a new meaning read into the statute in the
light of the previous legislative history of the question. The
Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Company, having suc
ceeded in convincing one circuit court of appeals that the
other circuit court had erred in its reading of legislative
history and its legislative construction, was taken to the
Supreme Court on this narrow question, only to have its case
decided on a point which had never been urged or argued.

PART VI
THE INFLUENCE OF ACCOUNTING ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AN ECONOMY

THE INFLUENCE OF ACCOUNTING ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AN ECONOMY
following three chapters constitute an expansion of a
paper under the above title read before the annual meeting
of the American Institute of Accountants in October, 1935.
The first deals with the question of how accounting can
influence the development of an economy, which involves
some consideration of the nature and purposes of account
ing. The second discusses accounting practice in the treat
ment of gain or loss on the sale of capital assets, and some of
the economic effects of such accounting and of the habit of
thought which it reflects. The third is devoted to a his
torical consideration of the accounting treatment of the ex
haustion of property in the course of operation, in the case
of railroads, and a discussion of the effect of the accounting
theories adopted upon the growth of the capital equipment
of the United States.
The

I
THE NATURE OF ACCOUNTING *
Growing recognition of the importance of accounting is
bound to result in closer examination of the relation between
accounting and economics, a subject that has not as yet re
ceived very extended consideration. Professor John B. Can
ning, in his The Economics of Accountancy,† suggests that
the accountant’s approach to problems is similar to that of
the economist, but there is little to suggest that the course of
accounting has been consciously influenced to any consider
able extent by economic thought. The fact is, rather, I
think, that accounting is a tool of business, and that the
development of accounting, like the development of business
law, has been determined by the practices of business men.‡
Where accounting and economic thought are found to run
along parallel lines, it is probable that both will be found to
be running parallel to good business practice. Where ac
counting treatment diverges from economic theory, a similar
divergence is likely to be found between economic theory
and business practice.
To many persons, even in the business and financial world,
the first question which our title would suggest is: How can
accounting have any effect upon the development of a na
tional economy? “Is not accounting,” they would ask, “the
application to particular facts of certain definite rules which
can produce only one result?” Such a misconception of the
nature of accounting is, I believe, less general today than
it was a few years ago. During the last five years much has
been done to secure recognition of the fact that accounting
• The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. LXI (January, 1936).
†Cf. below, pp. 371-73.
‡ This being so, the subject of this paper is, I recognize, merely one phase
of the broader question of the effect of business practice on economic develop
ment.
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is not exact and rigid but is based very largely on convention
and judgment. To the necessary work of education on this
point the New York Stock Exchange and the Securities and
Exchange Commission have made important contributions.
The regulations of the Commission have followed the
policy adopted by the Exchange in allowing registrants to
follow their own methods of accounting, provided that those
methods were not obviously unacceptable and were clearly
disclosed. I have understood that objection was offered to
this proposal on the ground of its novelty, and it was, there
fore, with particular interest that I read an editorial brought
to my notice, in which this principle was referred to many
years ago almost as a truism. The editorial appeared in the
Morning Chronicle of London in 1849, when the question of
railway accounts was being widely agitated and was under
consideration by a select committee of the House of Lords:
What are the precise criteria which distinguish revenue
from construction charges it is no easy matter to determine.
... At present there is great room for controversy, but this,
at least, will be generally agreed to, that the principle adopted
by any company in the distribution of its expenditure be
tween the two accounts is of comparatively minor impor
tance, provided that the system pursued be distinctly avowed
and understood by the shareholders.

The English courts, in decisions under the income-tax law,
have repeatedly taken the view that what is profit is to be
determined by the practices of business men. Moreover, as
I have pointed out on other occasions, our own tax law has
since 1918 laid down the rule that taxable income is normally
to be determined “in accordance with the method of ac
counting regularly employed by the taxpayer in keeping
his accounts,” and this language remains on the statute book,
although it must be admitted that the Bureau of Internal
Revenue has done its best to make it nugatory.
So today it is, I think, clear that upon both principle and
authority, accounting must be regarded as a process involv
ing the recognition of custom and convention and the use
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of judgment, rather than as the application of rigid and un
varying rules. It follows that rules may, and sometimes must
be, changed as conditions change. This is of course true of
law; and it may serve to emphasize the point in relation to
accounting if I refer here to certain legal decisions on an
accounting question with which I expect to deal in a later
article.
In 1876 the Supreme Court said that the public “rarely
ever took into account the depreciation of the buildings in
which the business is carried on,” and in 1878 it supported
the government in its claim that a railroad company should
not be allowed to include a depreciation charge in operating
expenses, holding that “only such expenditures as are actually
made can with any propriety be claimed as a deduction from
earnings.” In 1909, however, we find the Court saying: “Be
fore coming to the question of profit at all, the company is
entitled to earn a sufficient sum annually to provide not only
for current repairs but for making good the depreciation and
replacing the parts of the property when they come to the
end of their life.” *
Now, once it is recognized that accounting is largely a
matter of convention, it is easy to perceive that the nature
of the conventions adopted may greatly influence the de
velopment of an economy. This is particularly apparent
under a system of free enterprise, under which the hope of
profit is the main reliance for the upbuilding of the industry
of the community; for what is profit in the commercial sense
here involved is not only an accounting question but is,
indeed, the central question of modern accounting.
In the simplest forms of organized life, accounting prob
lems arise, and the way in which they are decided influences
action. The administrators of even a non-profit institution
—a club, for instance—are called upon to account to its mem
bers. Shall they limit the accounts to actual receipts and
disbursements? Must they not at least exclude or deal sepa* Eyster v. Centennial Board of Finance, -94 U. S. (1876); U. S. v. Kansas
Pacific Ry. Co., 99 U. S., 459 (1878); City of Knoxville v. Knoxville Water
Company, 212 U. S., 13 (1909).
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rately with borrowings and repayments; and if they ignore
unpaid bills, may there not be a temptation to delay pay
ments that ought to be made in order to present a more
favorable showing? If bills owing by the club but unpaid
are to be brought into account, should amounts owing to the
club also be taken into consideration? In technical language,
should not the account be one of income and expenditure
rather than one of receipts and disbursements? Taking a
further step-in order to reduce the cost thereof, insurance
has been written for three years; should the whole cost be
charged against the one year and the next two years be re
lieved of any corresponding charge? Or, an automobile has
been bought—should the cost be charged against the year
or distributed over the probable useful life of the car?
Speaking technically again, should not some accrual basis
of accounting be employed?
From this example, it is easy to see how considerations of
policy may influence accounting, or how the form of account
ing may influence the course of events. One form of ac
counting may show a balance for the year in favor of the
club, with the result that the dues may be left unchanged
or even reduced; another might show a balance against the
club and lead to an increase of dues. Reluctance to put an
increase in force may lead the administrators to choose the
method which gives the seemingly more favorable result.
Indeed, to leave bills unpaid at the end of an administration,
thus unfairly relieving the accounts of the outgoing and
unfairly burdening those of the incoming administration, is
a well-known device of dishonest politicians.
Apart from such crude devices as this, what would have
been the effects if our municipalities had adopted the ac
counting practice of providing for future pensions in the
years in which the service which gave rise to the right thereto
was rendered? It is by no means abnormal that the actuarial
value pf the pension benefits attaching to municipal employ
ment should be equal to twenty per cent of the nominal
compensation of the employee. If, therefore, municipal
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budgets provided currently for the deferred compensation
as well as for that immediately paid, and if the present value
of the future liability were treated as a part of the indebted
ness of the municipality, both the budgets and the borrowing
capacity of the municipality might be very largely affected.
In the City of New York, some of the funds are maintained
on at least a quasi-actuarial basis, while in other cases no
provision is made for future liabilities, the present value of
which today runs into several hundred millions of dollars.
As against the advantages of a more accurate disclosure of
the costs of government and of the financial position of a
municipality which would be derived from the inclusion of
the provision for deferred pensions liabilities, there would
no doubt have to be considered the possibilities of abuse that
would be created if funds to meet such liabilities were cur
rently set aside and entrusted to city officials for investment
in order to provide for the obligations as they become due.
The most important group of problems which the account
ant has to consider relates to the distinction between capital
and income. In some cases, the question is whether amounts
receivable or payable shall be carried once and for all to the
income account or to the capital account. In other cases,
the issue is how and when amounts which have been carried
in the first instance to the capital account shall be transferred
to the income account.
At this point it seems desirable to emphasize the fact that
accounting is not essentially a process of valuation, as some
writers on accounting and some economists conceive it to be.
Professor C. R. Rorem’s Accounting Method * seems to me
to suffer from this misconception, and it is hardly too much
,to say that Professor Canning’s book (to which I have already
referred) is built up on it. Primarily, accounting is historical
in its approach, with valuation entering into it at times as a
safeguard. The emphasis is on cost, though where an asset is
intended for sale and its selling value is known to be less
than cost, the lower figure may be substituted for cost. The
* Cf. below, pp. 365-70.
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outstanding illustration of this practice is the almost uni
versal custom of valuing goods on hand at cost or market,
whichever is lower.*
Capital assets, in particular, have traditionally been re
corded by the accountant at cost or at cost less deduction for
depreciation. To the accountant it has seemed to be neither
a practicable nor a useful undertaking to attempt to deter
mine the value of assets not intended to be sold and for
which there is no ready market, especially as the concepts of
value differ (and it has been said that in one English act
the word “value” is used in twenty-seven different senses †).
If the accountant accepts the economic measure of value as
being the discounted value of a prospective income stream,
it seems to him futile to attempt to reflect fluctuations of the
income prospects and the discount rate on the books of a
corporation which has no thought of attempting to realize
its capital or of doing anything except receive and deal with
the income stream as it comes in. He would rather concen
trate on the more useful task of measuring—with what ac
curacy is attainable—the income stream as it flows.
True, during the 1920’s, accountants fell from grace and
took to readjusting capital values on the books of companies
to an extent never before attempted. In extenuation, they
might plead that unsound laws, unpractical economics, and
a widespread, if unfounded, belief in a new order of things
combined to recommend such a course, but the wiser policy
is to admit the error and to determine not to be misled into
committing it again.
The accounting function in relation to capital assets is to
measure and record not the fluctuations in their value but
the extent to which their usefulness is being exhausted
through age or use, and to make proper charges against in
come in respect of such exhaustion, based on the cost of the
* Incidentally, the growing emphasis on the income account as an index of
earning capacity, and hence of capital value, may make desirable some modi
fication of the treatment commonly adopted in this matter.
† See Proceedings of the International Congress on Accounting, London
(1933), p. 135.
. .
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property exhausted, with the intent that the property shall
stand on the books at its salvage value when the term of its
usefulness is ended. Conversely, when money is borrowed
to be repaid at a premium (as, for instance, when a bond is
sold at a discount), the amount borrowed forms the basis of
the accounting, with sums added thereto and charged to in
come periodically as the obligation is maturing, so that at
maturity the full amount repayable will stand on the books
as a liability.
In practice, two accounts are frequently used in dealing
with either capital assets or capital liabilities. In the case,
of an asset, one will record the original cost and the other
the accumulated provision for exhaustion. In the case of a
liability, one will record the ultimate amount repayable and
the other the proportion of the discount which is carried for
ward to be charged against the unexpired period of the loan;
but this subdivision of the account into two parts is merely
a technique employed for the sake of convenience.
The fact that cost rather than present value is thus com
monly used in the accounting upon which published balance
sheets are based is by no means universally recognized; and,
when recognized, it is sometimes criticized on the ground
that the main purpose of a balance sheet is to enlighten the
investor, and that what the investor is interested in is the
value of property, not its cost. The misunderstanding and
the criticism are so common, and reflect so many disputable
assumptions, that it seems desirable to discuss them briefly.
The misunderstanding appears to arise mainly from the
looseness in the use of language which is responsible for so
much of the existing confusion of thought in relation to ac
counts. I have already mentioned the fact that in a single
act of the English parliament the word “value” is alleged to
have been used in at least twenty-seven senses, and it would
certainly not be difficult to match this record in our own
experience.
Any thoughtful student of finance must have been struck
by the fact that one constantly encounters the word “value”
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with a qualifying adjective attached to it which in every case
limits and in some cases negatives the meaning of the noun.
Thus we have the phrases—“book value,” “cost value,” “re
placement value,” “assessed value,” “going concern value,”
“liquidation value,” “market value,” “intrinsic value,” “fair
value,” “sound value,” “discovery value” (perhaps the most
fantastic of all), etc., etc. Almost any asset will be found
to be stated in the balance sheet at one or other of these
so-called values.
These expressions, no doubt, have a certain usefulness,
though in some instances the concept they are used to de
scribe is remote from the concept of value. The real trouble
is, that since the word “value” forms a part of each phrase,
and since all of them represent things that are expressed in
money, essential dissimilarities in their significance are apt
to be overlooked. Hence people who would not dream of
adding together a cart-horse and a saw-horse and speaking
of the result as two horses, have no compunction at all about
adding together a book figure (or, as they call it, a book
“value”) and a market value, and speaking of the result as
a “value,” even in the case of a stock the selling price of
which is a mere fraction of that “value.” Oscar Wilde de
fined a cynic as a man who knew the price of everything and
the value of nothing.* It would be well if some of those
who talk glibly of value would develop enough cynicism
to keep the test of salability (and earning capacity) more
constantly in mind.
The fact is that the word “value” has come to be used to
describe what is often really a mere figure—“book figure”
would be more accurate than “book value,” and the “figure”
at which an asset is carried more accurate than the “value”
at which an asset is carried. It must be admitted that ac* Cecil Graham: What is a cynic?
Lord Darlington: A man who knows the price of everything and the value
of nothing.
Cecil Graham: And a sentimentalist, my dear Darlington, is a man who
sees an absurd value in everything and doesn’t know the market price of any
single thing.
Lady Windermere’s Fan, Act III.
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countants have themselves some responsibility for the mis
understanding that exists, and academic writers, regulatory
bodies and appraisers have also largely contributed to it.
However, what has come to be called “wishful thinking” is
probably mainly responsible for it. The transition from the
thought that it would be convenient and helpful if balance
sheets did represent realizable values to the thought that
they do has been all too easy.
A similar misunderstanding is not altogether uncommon
in England, though there is little or no real justification for
it there. In the case of railroads and public utilities, to
which what is known as the “double account” system has ap
plied (as prescribed, for instance, in the Regulation of Rail
ways Act of 1868), capital assets have not appeared as such
in any balance sheet—instead, the expenditures thereon have
been recorded in a statement of receipts and expenditures on
account of capital, only the balance of which has entered
into the general balance sheet of the company. In the case
of companies incorporated under the general incorporation
law, the model balance sheet embodied in Table A of the Act
of 1862 contained an instruction in respect of not only capi
tal assets but also stock in trade, reading as follows: “The
cost to be stated with deductions for deterioration in value
as charged to the reserve fund or profit-and-loss account.” I
have even seen an opinion by eminent counsel, now on the
English bench, to the effect that it was no part of the purpose
of a balance sheet to reflect the values of assets, though di
rectors might, in their discretion, see fit to embody in it in
formation which would throw light on those values.
Turning now to the objection that if balance sheets do not
reflect values they ought to do so, because that is what the
investor is interested in—a number of minor exceptions to
the position thus asserted might be taken, but the answer to
the objection is that it is utterly impracticable to ascertain
the values of capital assets in the case of businesses of any
magnitude, and that the figures would be of no real interest
to the investor if they could be ascertained. What the. in-
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vestor is actually interested in is, obviously, the value of his
investment; and the objection therefore presupposes that
the value of an investment may be computed by adding up
the values of the assets which represent that investment and
deducting from the total any liabilities to which they are
subject.
Now, only brief consideration is necessary to show that this
assumption is valid in the case of a profitable business only
upon the further assumption that the value of the assets essen
tial to the business and not intended for sale is simply the
difference between the value of the business as a whole and
the realizable value of the assets which can be separately sold
without sacrifice. By the hypothesis and in fact, what the
investor or speculator is interested in is the value of the
business as a whole, and that is dependent mainly on what
it will produce in the future and is not determinable by any
purely accounting process. Not only so, but if the account
ant were to assume the task of valuing the business as a
whole, he would have met the assumed need, and it would
be entirely supererogatory for him to attempt to allocate
that value as between the different assets of the business.
How great the difficulties presented by such an allocation
would be may be indicated by stating generally the character
of the problem presented, as follows: How shall we compute
the value of a producing unit which has been in use for a
term of years, assuming that another type of unit could be
bought new today for substantially less than the cost of re
producing the existing unit and would effect an economy
in operation; assuming, further, that there is a strong prob
ability that still another type will be developed within a few
years which will cost less and be more efficient than any now
available, and making due allowance for the fact that the
existing unit is in actual operation and that a period of time
more or less considerable would be needed for the installa
tion of a new unit?
There may be other elements in the problem to be con
sidered, but certainly any so-called valuation which ignores
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those I have suggested cannot be claimed to represent the
value of the asset. The easy solutions, termed “replacement
values” or “sound values,” beg the question. While it is im
possible to say what percentage of the capital equipment of
the country would be replaced even substantially where
and as it is, it is quite certain that the percentage is small.
It is well known, also, that correct timing of major replace
ments is one of the most important factors in determining
whether a given industrial enterprise shall succeed or fail.
To carry consideration of the question one step further—
inasmuch as the value of a successful business is dependent
mainly on its earning capacity, it follows that to anyone in
terested in determining that value the greatest service which
accounts can render is to throw light on earning capacity—
not on the so-called values of assets which are not intended
to be sold. And, so far as the records of the past can be an
aid to the estimation of future earning capacity, an account
which ignores fluctuations in the value of capital assets is
likely to be far more useful than one that attempts to reflect
them.
Accounts have other important uses, possibly not less im
portant than that of throwing light on the value of the evi
dences of ownership in a business. The determination of
realized profits, and of the income subject to taxation, and
the presentation of fairly comparable statements of operating
results for successive periods, would all be made more diffi
cult and more complex if at the same time the accounts were
being adjusted periodically so as to reflect the fluctuations in
the value of the assets held for use and not for sale.
The canon of sound accounting, that fluctuations in the
value of capital assets not only may but should be ignored,
rests on surer ground and is more realistic than the conten
tion that balance sheets should aim to reflect values. In this,
as in so many other fields, error has resulted from attempts at
oversimplification. What the equation: “Assets minus lia
bilities equals proprietorship” and the phrase “net worth”
gain in simplicity, they sacrifice in significance. A balance
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sheet, in which one asset is stated at book value, another at
replacement value, a third at liquidation value and a fourth
at going-concern value, and the liabilities at their face value,
does not yield a figure that can be described as net worth
expressed in a single measure of value any more than a figure
in which were mingled American and Chinese dollars and
Mexican and Chilean pesos, all preceded by the same famil
iar dollar sign, could produce a net worth expressed in any
one of those currencies.
Of those who decline to recognize the impossibility of de
termining capital value by the methods commonly proposed,
few have suggested annual or anything more than periodical
adjustment of the balances on property accounts to conform
with so-called valuations. The Interstate Commerce Com
mission, while insisting on the need for valuation as a basis
for a revision of the property accounts of the carriers, has in
dicated quite clearly that, once the revision had been ef
fected, it contemplated cost as the basis for all subsequent
accounting; and it has treated as axiomatic the proposition
that charges against income for property exhaustion should
be based on cost.
The question may no doubt fairly be raised whether, even
if value is eliminated as a possible basis for arriving at the
figures at which capital assets shall be carried (due allowance
being made for exhaustion of useful life), there is any other
basis which is preferable to cost. The alternative most fa
vored is estimated cost of replacement; but while the useful
ness of computations of cost of replacement for a wide variety
of administrative purposes may be admitted, the regular
use thereof as the basis for the restatement of the book figures
is not, I think, one of them.
Any adequate discussion of this question would involve
consideration of all the manifold purposes for which ac
counts are used and go far beyond the scope of such an
article as this. In my judgment, however, it will as a rule be
wiser to retain the virtues of continuity and reality in the
book records which the cost basis affords and, in appropriate
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cases, to furnish to stockholders a supplementary statement
based on replacement cost (which must in any event be hy
pothetical and ephemeral). Whatever course is followed, it
is necessary to relinquish the hope that balance sheets can be
made to reflect the value of capital assets, if that word is to
be used without any qualifying phrase that destroys the sub
stance and leaves only the shadow of its meaning.
Cases will arise—as, for instance, that presented by a de
valuation such as occurred in Germany—in which cost figures
lose their significance to such an extent as to make some
different treatment necessary, but such cases are exceptional
and their existence merely emphasizes the fundamental im
portance of honest and competent judgment in accounting.
This does not mean that the balance sheet is valueless, but
only that it is a highly technical production the significance
of which is severely limited and has in the past often been
greatly over-rated. In origin the balance sheet is an ac
count; in England it still commonly bears the headings
“Dr” and “Cr” instead of the “assets” and “liabilities” to
which we have become accustomed. These facts were
recognized by the Committee on Cooperation with Stock
Exchanges of the American Institute of Accountants in its
report to the New York Exchange of September 28, 1932,
in which it included as among the objects which the Ex
change ought to pursue:
1. To bring about a better recognition by the investing
public of the fact that the balance sheet of a large modern
corporation does not and should not be expected to represent
an attempt to show present values of the assets and liabilities
of the corporation.
2. To emphasize the fact that balance sheets are necessarily
to a large extent historical and conventional in character,
and to encourage the adoption of revised forms of balance
sheets which will disclose more clearly than at present on
what basis assets of various kinds are stated.
3. To emphasize the cardinal importance of the income
account, such importance being explained by the fact that
the value of a business is dependent mainly on its earning
capacity.

318

INFLUENCE OF ACCOUNTING

In recent years it has become increasingly apparent that
for the large modern corporation, at least, the balance sheet
is not in itself an adequate supplement to the income and
surplus accounts, and it is not surprising that the regulations
of the Securities and Exchange Commission have called for
additional statements. The schedules filed under those reg
ulations, and the explanations, often voluminous, which
commonly accompany them, should do much to create a
juster appreciation of both the significance and the limita
tions of a balance sheet. There will still be those who will
clamor for an unattainable combination of completeness, pre
cision and simplicity and for a uniformity which would be
superficial and illusory. The demand for predigested prepa
rations which will meet all needs, without any exercise of
selective judgment or intelligence, is encountered in the
fields of accounting and finance as elsewhere.

II

CAPITAL VALUE AND ANNUAL INCOME *
of the most striking contrasts between American and
English financial and accounting practice is to be found in
the fact that here we regard gains or losses on the sale of
capital assets as finding a place in the income account, while
in England they are regarded as increasing or decreasing
capital. In this article I propose to consider some of the
economic policies which may be in part, at least, attributable
to the habit of mind which our practice reflects.
Unquestionably, the difference in practice does reflect a
difference in habit of mind. Anyone who has lived both
here and in England will recognize the truth of the state
ment that here we think in terms of capital value and there
they think in terms of annual income. Inquire whether a
man is well-to-do here and you will be told he is probably
worth so many dollars; ask a similar question in England and
the answer (if you get one at all) will certainly be that he is
probably worth so much a year. It is not difficult to under
stand why this should be so. In England, modern business
developed in a community in which previously the predomi
nant interest had been in land and which already thought
in terms of annual produce. The opening sentence of Adam
Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (1776) reads:
One

The annual labor of every nation is the fund which origi
nally supplies it with all the necessaries and conveniencies
of life which it annually consumes, and which consist always
either in the immediate produce of that labor, or in what is
purchased with that produce from other nations.
Cannan, in his edition of the work, comments on this
passage as follows:
* The Journal of Accountancy (February, 1936).
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This word [i.e., “annual”], with ‘annually’ just below, at
once marks the transition from the old British economists’
ordinary practice of regarding the wealth of a nation as an
accumulated fund (Note 1, p. 1).

He says, further, that:
The conception of the wealth of nations as an annual
produce, annually distributed, . . . has been of immense
value (Introduction, p. xxxiii).

With us, business developed in a new country: the great op
portunities for gain lay in sharing in the growth of the
country rather than in securing a part of its current annual
yield.
Three fields in which the effects of the difference in the
point of view may be discovered at once suggest themselves
—those of local taxation, rate regulation, and income taxa
tion.
In colonial days, according to Seligman, there were many
cases in which, while the tax was imposed on property, the
assessment was made on the basis of annual value. This was
true of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, New
York, Delaware and Virginia.* Bullock, in discussing the
local general property tax, also mentions that Massachusetts
as a province levied taxes on the basis of the annual value of
property, but that the second tax law passed after the adop
tion of the Constitution of 1780 changed to the basis of capi
tal value, which is today, in general, the basis of local taxation
throughout the United States.† Whether the causes of the
change were in any way related to those which produced the
more momentous political developments of that time, I am
not sufficiently versed in history to say.
When we turn to rate regulation, it is apparent that the
principles we have adopted were based upon the Federal
Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court in a series
of cases of which the most important was perhaps Smyth v.
* The Income Tax, 2nd ed., p. 380.
† c. J. Bullock, Selected Readings in Public Finance, 3rd ed., p. 311,
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Ames (1898). So, too, the enactment of what was really an
income tax law in 1909, and of an avowed income tax law in
1913, brought definitions of income in conformity with the
same habit of mind in the cases of Stratton’s Independence v.
Howbert, Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., and Eisner v. Ma
comb er.
In Smyth v. Ames the Supreme Court decided for the first
time that the basis for all calculations as to the reasonable
ness of rates must be the “fair value” of the property being
used for the convenience of the public. Giving only the
most general indication of how this value was to be deter
mined by reciting some of the factors that must be con
sidered, without any expression of opinion as to the weight
to be assigned to each, and making the clear reservation that
there might be still other factors to be considered, the Court
started that pursuit of the will-o’-the-wisp of fair value which
is still being carried on with no greater success than was to
be anticipated. The charge made by Jevons against Ricardo,
that he “shunted the car of economic science on to a wrong
line,” might perhaps with more justice be made against
those who were responsible for bringing about the decision
in Smyth v. Ames.
In Doyle v. Mitchell the Court held, first, that the value, at
the date of the passage of the taxing act, of capital assets con
verted into manufactured articles and sold, must be deducted
from the proceeds of sale before anything to be taxed as in
come could be arrived at; and, secondly, that the proceeds of
sale or conversion in excess of that basic value were income.
On the first point, there is at least some appearance of in
consistency between this decision and that in Stratton’s In
dependence, in which the Court held that the proceeds of
mining could be taxed as income without any allowance for
the exhaustion of the mine which was a necessary incident of
the operation. However, no distinction between the two
cases was made in the decision in Eisner v. Macomber which
provided what has become the accepted legal definition of
income in our Courts:
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After examining dictionaries in common use (Bouvier’s
Law; Standard; Webster’s International and the Century),
we find little to add to the succinct definition adopted in
two cases arising under the corporation tax act of 1909
(Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S., 399, 415;
Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U. S., 179, 185): ‘Income
may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor,
or from both combined,’ provided it be understood to in
clude profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital
assets, to which it was applied in the Doyle case. (252 U. S.,
207.)
It may be noted that in presenting the Income Tax Bill of
1913 Congressman (now Secretary) Hull expressed the view
that an occasional purchase not for immediate resale, fol
lowed after a substantial interval by sale at a higher price,
would not produce taxable income thereunder. It would
have been well, perhaps, if his view had prevailed.
The decision in Smyth v. Ames forced the question of
present value of capital assets upon the attention of all public
utility companies. The income tax decisions made the value
of capital assets at March 1, 1913, a question of cardinal im
portance for all corporations owning capital assets at that
date. The attention thus focused on the subject of present
fair value, and the marked change in price levels which took
place during the war period, together constitute an adequate
explanation of the extent to which the practice of readjusting
book values of capital assets to so-called present values was
carried in the 1920’s, which was criticized in the previous
article of this series.
That the principles and practices, established as I have out
lined, have met with scant approval in economic circles is
indicated by examination of the works of economists of high
standing. Upon the question of local taxation, Bullock says:

After forty years’ discussion, the United States has the
most crude, inequitable, and unsatisfactory system of local
taxation—if, indeed, we can call ‘system’ that which more re
sembles chaos—that can be found in any important country
in the civilized world.*
* Bullock, op. cit., p. 289.
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And T. S. Adams speaks of the system as “a hypocritical pre
tense, a source of wholesale lawbreaking and chronic in
equality, a by-word for inefficiency and injustice.” *
Undeterred by this experience, we enacted Federal capital
stock tax laws which required taxpayers to report annually
under oath the “fair value” of property for which no market
existed or was desired, and any real valuation of which would
have involved the difficulties and complexities mentioned in
my previous article and would have been useless for any
other purpose than compliance with the law. Needless to
say, in practice no real attempt to fix fair value was made—
instead, the tax being relatively small, the taxing authority
was usually able to collect substantially more than was justly
due because the additional tax was less than would have been
the cost of demonstrating its injustice.
This tax was abolished in 1926, but in 1933 it was revived
in the particularly obnoxious form of the linked capital tax
and excess-profits tax—the corporate taxpayer was first per
mitted (and required) to fix the taxable fair value itself, with
the knowledge that placing the taxable value low would in
crease its liability to excess-profits tax on its income. The
two taxes were imposed at the bottom of a depression, when
the market value of capital invested in industry was gener
ally far below the amount actually invested—thus the tax
payer was faced with the choice of paying a capital stock tax
on a value that did not exist, or an excess-profits tax on
profits which were not excessive upon the test set forth in
the law of what constituted an excess. It is hard to conceive
of a tax device better calculated to bring the taxing system
into disrepute.
In England, local taxation has for centuries been based on
the annual value of property.^ In national taxation the in
fluence of the landowning classes was for a long time domi
nant, and prior to 1894 even death duties on land were levied
only on the capitalized value of an annuity equal to the net
* Bullock, op. cit., p. 982.
f Cf. Carman, History of Local Rates in England, passim.
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rental value of the land for the life of the heir. In that year,
however, land was subjected to death duties (estate duty) on
the basis of its full capital value, at progressive rates which
have since been greatly increased.* In 1909, a further step
was taken. A system of taxation on the increment in land
value was initiated, but the administrative difficulties proved
so great that this experiment was abandoned. Thus, apart
from transaction taxes, such as stamp duties on the transfer
of property, death duties remain as the one case (of course,
an important case) in which English taxes are levied on the
basis of capital values.
The estimation of the capital value of land from the an
nual value, which is fostered by the English practice, serves
a useful purpose in checking too optimistic valuation. Had
this method of approach been general here, the disastrous
Florida land boom could hardly have occurred, and fewer
of our farmers would have found themselves ruined through
acquiring by the use of borrowed money additional lands
at prices out of proportion to the annual yield obtainable
therefrom. A writer in the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review for December, 1935, has suggested that there is a
tendency today to give more weight to current annual value
in establishing valuations of real property for purposes of
local taxation.†
Economic opinion on the theory of value in relation to
rate regulation scarcely calls for comment, if that opinion is,
as I believe it to be, accurately summed up in the following
quotation from J. C. Bonbright:
* These provisions were the subject of a sharp difference of opinion be
tween the Prime Minister (Lord Rosebery) and the Chancellor of the Ex
chequer (Sir William Harcourt) who had been the rival candidates for the
succession to Mr. Gladstone. It is interesting to find in the Chancellor’s reply
to the Prime Minister’s criticism this comment:
“Your observations upon the American attempt at a property tax are well
founded, but everybody admits the objections to a property tax, which is
levied annually on the possessors do not apply to a death duty which occurs
only once in a generation on the transmission of estates into other hands.’’
Cf. A. G. Gardiner, Life of Sir William Harcourt, Vol. II, p. 285.
† A bill to amend the tax law, in relation to the assessment of real property,
has recently been introduced in the New York State Senate. It would re
quire that all real property: "Shall be assessed at the full annual income
value thereof.”
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I think I am speaking the truth when I say that every
economist without a single exception agrees that whatever
is the proper basis of rate control . . . that basis cannot
logically be the value of the property . . . this country alone
of all the countries in the world attempts to use valuation
as a basis of rate control.*

I shall, however, discuss some special phases of the problem
of regulation in my final article,
In the third field already mentioned, that of income taxa
tion, economic opinion has not, I think, generally approved
the taxation of capital gains as income, even though the prac
tice has escaped the wholesale condemnation which has been
visited on our systems of local taxation and rate regulation.
For myself, I have long felt that though it may seem unfair
that unearned increment should escape taxation while earned
income is heavily taxed, the weight of the argument is against
the taxation of capital gains. And I am still more opposed
to the treatment of capital gains as income for purposes other
than those of taxation—indeed, one of the minor objections
to the taxation of such gains as income is that it encourages
the taxpayer to treat them as income in ordering his own af
fairs, instead of adding them to his capital or holding them
in reserve against the all too probable future capital loss.
In an article written in 1922,† I recited some of the reasons
that led me to the conclusions which I still hold, and I shall
now do no more than consider what further light on the ques
tion the events of the intervening years have afforded. They
have shown that the tax operates to produce artificial markets
for securities, by preventing sales which, but for the tax,
would be made, and thus has tended to make the fall more
violent when it comes. They have also demonstrated with
disconcerting completeness the validity of the argument that
an equitable tax, designed to give relief in respect of losses
commensurate with the tax on gains will, on balance, ad
versely affect the revenue, and that the adverse effect will be
* J. C. Bonbright, Accounting Review, Vol. V (1930), pp. 111, 122.
above, Part V, Chap. II.

† See
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felt when the revenue is least able to bear it. As a result,
changes have been made in the law which implicitly admit
that capital gains are not income but leave them subject to
tax as if they were, changes which sacrifice justice to im
mediate revenue, through the continuation of the tax on net
gains and the practical denial of relief in respect of net
losses.
The new provisions, by which a portion of the gain on
sale of assets held for a period of years is taxed as income
at rates which are reached by adding that portion of the
gain to what happens to be the income of the year in which
the gain is realized, are difficult to justify upon any theory
of ability to pay or equality of sacrifice, or upon any of the
canons of sound taxation. The denial of allowances for
losses on property sold is manifestly unjust and results in
such absurdities as taxpayers being led to sacrifice substantial
salvage values in order to preserve the right to take deduc
tions for losses which are allowable if property is abandoned
but not if it is sold. There is, moreover, something repug
nant to one’s sense of justice in the sight of a Government
deliberately devaluing the currency and taxing as a gain the
difference between the price received in depreciated cur
rency and the price paid prior to devaluation in the unde
preciated currency, and at the same time denying to tax
payers relief in respect of losses occasioned by the fall in
prices which is pleaded in justification of the devaluation.
The provisions of the law relating to non-taxable reorgani
zations and exchanges, and other provisions necessitated by
the taxation of capital gains, are constantly adding to the
complexities and uncertainties of taxation. Meanwhile, the
great argument for the taxation of capital gains—that without
it unearned increment would go untaxed—has been greatly
weakened by the enactment of high gift and estate taxes.
The amount of capital gains spent as income, though large
in itself, is small in comparison with the aggregate of such
gains. If gains are offset by later losses, it is grossly unjust
that heavy taxes should be levied on the gains with no com-
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pensating relief in respect of the losses; if they are added to
capital, that capital is heavily taxed whenever it is transferred
by gift or bequest.
Students of taxation have agreed that an income tax at
high rates cannot long continue to be successfully levied un
less the law is generally regarded as broadly just in its form
and administration. It cannot, I think, be maintained that
this is true of our existing income tax system, and those who
deny its justice can point to the provisions respecting capi
tal gains and losses as striking evidence in support of their
position. It is inevitable that provisions which the taxpayer
regards as deliberately unfair shall encourage deliberate eva
sion; and, even if it is true that evasion existed prior to the
enactment of these unjust provisions, this hardly seems suffi
cient ground for a policy of deliberate injustice on the part
of the Legislature. Congress would be well advised to aban
don the policy of taxing capital gains—or, if that is deemed
to be politically impossible, to tax them as something other
than income at a flat rate not high enough to act as a deter
rent to the taking of profits. This could be done without
awaiting the general revision of our Federal tax system,
which it so urgently needed.
Sooner or later, however, we must broaden the scheme of
Federal taxation, and particularly the basis of the income tax.
Not until this has been done can we hope to enjoy the rela
tive stability of revenue which England has experienced in
spite of the depression and of the magnitude of its tax
burden.
Turning from the tax aspect of the question of capital
gain, I would draw attention to a danger against which some
safeguards are, I think, urgently required. This danger arises
from the alarming habit which seems to be developing of
regarding every' annual report as a new edition of a pros
pectus. Even those who contend that realized capital gains
are a form of income must concede that such gains and recur
rent income have no common relationship to earning capac
ity, except to the small extent that capital gains may represent
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recurring income that has not been distributed. Apart from
this item, which for practical purposes may be disregarded,
the gain normally represents either (a) the capitalized value
of a change in capacity to earn recurring income (demon
strated or assumed); or (b) a change in the rate of capitaliza
tion applied to an unchanged earning capacity; or (c) a com
bination of the two. This being so, such a capital gain can
not properly be added to a recurring earning capacity (which
has not already been capitalized) to form the basis from
which, by multiplication, a capital value may be determined.
To my mind, few points are of more importance in connec
tion with the problem of presenting illuminating reports to
investors than that of taking some steps which will tend to
prevent investors from including capital gains with current
income in one sum, from which they will compute capital
value by a single multiplication.
The treatment of capital gains as income reached its most
pernicious development during the boom period in the
practice of regarding stock dividends as income in an amount
equal to the market value of the stock, the evil being espe
cially marked in the case of pyramided holding companies.
To the extent that the amount included in income exceeded
the amount of earnings which formed the basis of the distri
bution by the company declaring the dividend, the credit to
income by the receiving company represented nothing except
an unrealized capital appreciation. Another unsound prac
tice is that of requiring investments of insurance companies
to be carried in their reports at “market value” even if above
cost.* When market prices rise to dizzy heights, as in 192829, the assets of such companies as reported under the regula
tions rise with them. When prices fall too precipitately,
however, the evidence of the market is rejected and artificial
market prices are constructed by the Commissioners. The
result in practice is, therefore, that the portfolios of what
should be our safest and soundest institutions are carried at
quoted market prices if those are very high but above
* It should be noted, however, that in the case of bonds “amortized value’’
is permitted and freely used as an alternative,
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market prices if those are very low. The fact that resort
to artificial prices was deemed necessary three times within a
quarter of a century suggests that the Commissioners should
at least recognize the limited significance of market quota
tions when they are high as well as when they are low.
From the point of view of the technical accountant, it is a
curious contradiction that we, who have gone further than
any other country in refining double-entry bookkeeping and
distributing charges over successive periods by elaborate sys
tems of accrual, should in our thinking have, in effect, ad
hered to the old single-entry method of determining gain
or income by deducting worth at the end of the period from
worth at the beginning thereof.
Some of our economists and statisticians have even under
taken to include fluctuations in the value of the “national”
capital in computations of the “national” income. In doing
so, they have exaggerated the growth of wealth in boom
periods and its decline in periods of depression with, as I
think, unfortunate results. In a recent article, Sir Josiah
Stamp commented on this procedure as follows:

American writers have included the rise in the market
value of capital assets under income (or the fall as a deduc
tion), but the practice is not generally accepted in other
countries.*
He went on to express the opinion that this was “all of a piece
with the strange compound of capital charges and income in
the American system of taxation.” In fairness to American
economists, however, it may be questioned whether the
views which he criticized are shared by more than a small
minority of them. In publishing his paper, he printed the
following interesting footnote:

On the day of reading, the latest official publication was
received from Washington.† In this, the whole method has
been abandoned: ‘the inclusion of gains and losses yielded
* "Methods Used in Different Countries for Estimating National Income,”
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society (1934), pp. 449-50.
†National Income, 1929-1932, Department of Commerce in cooperation
with the National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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by such changes in asset values would be either a duplication,
since it would amount to counting both a change in net in
come, and the change in capitalization of that income, or a
distortion of the national income estimate as a measure of
the economic system’s end product.’ It seems clear that the
publication to the nation of figures of national income al
ready heavily diminished, but reduced to a minus quantity
by the special deduction of the huge shrinkage in capital
values for 1932-3, was too much for any realistic official
statisticians to face.
The preoccupation with capital and capital gains is also
to be found in the securities legislation passed under the
present administration, which is obviously, if unconsciously,
framed in the interest of the short-time speculator for the
rise rather than of the long-time investor for the yield. Even
the members of the Securities Commission seem to have
developed doubts on the question whether the Acts were
really necessary or will prove beneficial in relation to issues
of securities by seasoned corporations. Further, some of the
information which is required by the Commission in regis
tration statements and annual reports would seem possibly
to be helpful to speculators (though more clearly to competi
tors), but more likely to injure than to benefit the long-time
investors, whose interests surely deserve special considera
tion.
It has seemed to me particularly unfortunate that at a time
when devaluation, inflation, and apprehension of further ex
perimentation with our fiscal system were impairing confi
dence in what had been regarded as high-grade securities and
tempting small savers to gamble in equities, the whole em
phasis of the Administration and of Congress should be upon
efforts to diminish slightly the hazards of stock gambling,
and none upon the magnitude of the hazards that were bound
to remain.
Granting the desirability of telling the public that great
losses had been caused by the misdeeds of issuers and vendors
of securities, it was at least equally desirable to tell the public
that these losses were but a small fraction of those resulting
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from the financial, industrial and political hazards to which
all business is subject, and that enormous losses on invest
ment in enterprise and invention are a part of the price we
must pay for progress.* The two Securities Acts are calcu
lated to create expectations which they cannot satisfy; and
although they may perhaps be made to serve a useful pur
pose, the hope would be stronger if the Acts had been less
theoretical and punitive in conception, and had had more
regard to what is remedial and practical. It lies in continued
wise administration and judicious amendment rather than
in the Acts themselves. Indeed, one of the dangers of the
admitted excellence of administration by the Securities Com
mission up to the present time is that it may tend to blind us
to the inherent defects of the law.
The same emphasis on capital value is, I think, also in
large measure responsible for the laws passed in recent years
making the propriety of dividends dependent on there being
an excess of assets over liabilities and capital, thus displac
ing the old rule under which the source of income to a stock
holder was the earning of a profit by the corporation in
which he held stock, and the declaration of a dividend merely
fixed the time when it became income to him. This change,
whether desirable or undesirable,' may obviously have very
important economic consequences, particularly in conjunc
tion with the no par value stock laws. If generally adopted,
it would rob the word “dividend” of its old significance, since
under it the payment of a dividend does not imply the previ
ous earning of a profit and a dividend may be, in every real
sense, a distribution of capital. Though perhaps the new
law represents only an attempt to escape from the difficulties
* I expressed substantially these views when securities legislation was pend
ing, both in 1933 and 1934. In my testimony before the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency in 1934, I said:
“My feeling on this subject, I think, must be very much that which the
committee feels in regard to the larger subject. You want to do everything
that you can to make buying and selling securities, particularly by the small
man, safer and surrounded with more information. But you must realize
that all you can do will not reduce the risks that he is bound to run very
greatly, and there is always the danger that by legislating you create a feeling
of confidence in the securities that are offered which legislation cannot pos
sibly impart to them” (Hearings, p. 7176).
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with which we are familiar without adequate thought of the
new difficulties which may be encountered, to me it seems to
be fraught with great possibilities of evil.
There was doubtless a time when the assets test was re
garded as protecting the interests of creditors and necessary
for that purpose; but with the law and common practice
permitting legal capital to be fixed at nominal figures, such
a rule adds little or nothing to the common proviso that no
dividends shall be paid when a corporation is insolvent or
when payment of the dividend would make it so. It is
noteworthy that even this last provision is deemed unneces
sary in England; it was in the English law of 1855, but was
eliminated in 1862. Since then, apart from the general
Statute of Frauds, the sole reliance in England for protection
against improper dividends (and also against the acquisition
by a corporation of its own capital stock) has been the section
which sets forth the way, and the only way, in which the
share capital may be reduced. This protection seems to
have been adequate; no doubt its effectiveness has been in
creased by vigorous declarations such as that of Lord Camp
bell in Burnes v. Pennell (1849): “Dividends are supposed
to be paid out of profits only, and when directors order a
dividend, to any given amount, without expressly saying so,
they impliedly declare to the world that the company has
made profits which justify such a dividend.” This dictum is
commonly reflected in articles of association in the form of a
terse declaration that: “No dividend shall be paid otherwise
than out of profits.”
In its new form (e.g., in Delaware), the assets test is, of
course, nothing more than a device to permit directors to
declare dividends when there are no profits. The power con
ferred by that law to make the legal capital of a corporation
only a fraction of its economic capital makes such dividend
declaration possible without insuring any substantial margin
of protection to creditors.
An anomalous situation is presented by the New York
law as at present construed by the courts of that state (the
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construction and the constitutionality of the provision, how
ever, are at present involved in cases pending in the Court of
Appeals of the State). It makes directors of a business cor
poration liable if they declare a dividend unless, after the
declaration of the dividend, the value of the remaining assets
is at least equal to the liabilities and the legal capital of the
corporation. The elusive term “value” is not further de
fined, and as the law is at present construed, no defense of
good faith or reasonable care will protect the director if it is
subsequently found by a court of competent jurisdiction that
upon some theory of value accepted by it the value of the
assets fell short of the required standard.
Now, in any such legislation, the relationship between the
theories governing the definition of capital and the restric
tion of dividends is of the first importance. A rigid rule re
garding dividends may be made tolerable by liberal rules de
fining capital. If the law seeks to make legal capital and
actual capital correspond closely, then a dividend rule like
New York’s becomes unreasonably harsh.
It is obvious that in the case of a company whose legalcapital is approximately the same as its actual capital, such
a law would subject directors to a hazard which they would
not be warranted in assuming; a director could vote only at
his peril for the distribution by way of dividends of unques
tioned current earnings. New York, which took the leading
part in adopting the questionable device of stocks without
par value has, however, afforded domestic corporations an
opportunity to make their legal capital a purely nominal fig
ure which may be only a fraction of the true capital. This
provision, while open to many objections, does afford a way
in which the hazards of the dividend rule may be avoided.
However, the New York law goes further than to establish
a rule applicable to domestic corporations—it imposes the
same liability on directors of foreign corporations which
transact business in New York. Now, outside the State of
New York, and particularly outside the United States, there
are many jurisdictions in which either the law or custom
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makes the legal capital substantially the true capital of the
corporation and in which the law permits the distribution
of current profits without regard to fluctuations in the value
of capital assets not intended to be sold. Such an approach
to the question is at least as reasonable as that of the State
of New York, but it will be observed that the directors of a
company formed in such a jurisdiction, but transacting busi
ness in New York, are placed in a peculiarly unhappy posi
tion. For the capital of the corporation will be determined
by the laws of the jurisdiction in which it is incorporated,
but the question whether a dividend paid was warranted
will be determined by a New York court, under New York
law, and upon New York theories of value. The law so con
strued seems to constitute an obnoxious attempt to impose
New York ideas of questionable soundness upon corporations
formed in other jurisdictions but transacting business within
the state. If the Court of Appeals sustains the current con
struction, modification of the law would seem to be called
for.
In each of the several fields which have been considered,
the habit of thinking in terms of capital value seems to me
to have encouraged economic tendencies which are harmful
to the community. It is clear, also, that while it is seldom
possible to determine annual income precisely, and some
times difficult to arrive at even an approximation thereto, the
problem of determining income is easier than that of estab
lishing capital value. This for the simple reason that value,
itself, must be dependent mainly on the income prospects;
and in order to measure it, we must first estimate earnings.
Then we still have to face the difficulty of determining what
is the capital value of an earning capacity of the kind with
which we are dealing.
Economists, teachers, legislators and accountants should
all do what is in their power to bring home to our people the
truth of Adam Smith’s doctrine that the annual produce
constitutes the wealth of the country; and to encourage them
to rely for economic security on the income derived from
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their work and their property, rather than upon the hope
of enhancement of capital value, which may seem to offer
the easy road to affluence but more often proves a lure to
disaster. Then the Economist may no longer be able to say,
as it did on October twelfth last, that:
Even today, in spite of depression and Securities Acts, the
capital profit is still as completely monarch in Wall Street
as the income yield is in Throgmorton Street.

III
RAILROAD RETIREMENTS AND DEPRECIATION *
In this article I propose to consider briefly some economic
and historical aspects of the problem of accounting for the
exhaustion of the useful life of fixed properties (not includ
ing equipment) of railroads.
I have chosen this question for discussion for a number of
reasons. Undoubtedly, the way in which it has been dealt
with has had a marked effect on the economic development
of our country; it lies in the field in which, as I pointed out
in my first article, the most important problems arise which
the accountant has to consider; it has a close relation to the
question of regulation of rates on the basis of capital values
on which I touched in my second article; and the Interstate
Commerce Commission has, in recent years, decreed a revo
lutionary change in the practice of carriers under its control.
An examination of past practice and of suggested alterna
tives raises sharply the question of the nature of accounting
conventions and of the justification therefor.
Methods of providing for the expense represented by the
exhaustion of property, though varying greatly in detail, fall
into two broad classifications: those which aim to distribute
the charge as uniformly as possible over the period of use
fulness of the particular unit of property, and those accord
ing to which the time for making the charge is fixed by the
actual or impending retirement of a unit. The former are
commonly referred to as depreciation methods and the latter
as retirement methods, and these convenient designations
will be employed in this article.
In order to keep the discussion within appropriate limits,
it seems desirable to restrict it narrowly to the fixed proper
ties of railroads and to refrain from dealing either with

* The Journal of Accountancy (March, 1936).
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equipment, which constitutes the other main division of the
capital assets of railroads, or with the case of other public
utilities. The cases of fixed property and equipment differ
in the fundamental fact that so long as operations are con
tinued, fixed property must either be reasonably maintained
or replaced, while so long as an adequate supply of newer
equipment is available to do the work of the road, obsolete
equipment can be kept in nominal service and under a re
tirement system of accounting carried at cost in the accounts,
indefinitely. It was doubtless this consideration which led
the Interstate Commerce Commission to require the railroads
in 1907 to adopt a system of depreciation charges in respect
of equipment, but not in respect of track and other fixed
properties.
Up to the present, railroads both here and abroad have
generally adopted retirement methods. The question
whether railroads should adopt some depreciation method
does not appear to have been extensively considered in our
country at least until the railroad system was largely built up.
The word “depreciation” does not appear in the Instructions
in regard to the keeping of Railway Accounts, issued by the
Railroad Commissioners of Massachusetts in 1876, or in the
index of Hadley’s Railroad Transportation (1885), or in the
decision of the Supreme Court in Smyth v. Ames (1898). Our
practice, however, was undoubtedly greatly influenced by
English practice, and in that country the issue was hotly dis
cussed as early as the middle of the last century, following the
collapse of the great railroad boom of the forties. A select
committee of the House of Lords in 1849 took testimony on
the subject (including, incidentally, that of an accountant
who stated that he had been carrying on his profession in
London for more than twenty years) and in its report favored
the creation of depreciation reserves:
It must be obvious [it said] that for the maintenance of
railways in a due state of efficiency, as relating to the way, the
buildings, the rolling stock and other property, an adequate
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provision ought to be made, as a matter of necessary precau
tion and prudence. The creation of a Reserve or Deprecia
tion Fund for such purposes, as contemplated by Parliament
(Companies Clauses Act of 1845, 8 Vict. c. 16, s. 122),* seems
now to be generally admitted as necessary, and in some in
stances, the Committee rejoice to observe, it is practically
adopted. Without such fund there is a constant temptation
to misapply capital, where capital still exists; and where capi
tal is exhausted, the progressive deterioration of the line can
hardly be avoided, greatly to the risk of the public, and to
the inevitable sacrifice of the ultimate interests of the com
pany itself. It would be difficult to prescribe by law the ex
act amount to be carried annually to this fund; but the
fact of the creation or the non-existence of a Reserve or De
preciation Fund, together with its amount, where it exists,
should always appear upon the face of the accounts. The
receipts and expenditure of such fund, where it has been
established, should in all cases be kept and exhibited, sepa
rate and distinct, should be examined and certified by the
auditors, and should be annually submitted, as well as left
open to the inspection of the shareholders.†
The controversy continued for many years until the pas
sage of the Regulation of Railways Act of 1868. That act
provided a special form of accounting for railways, which
came to be known as the double account system. Under that
system, all capital outlays were carried in an account entitled
“Receipts and expenditures on account of capital”; only the
balance of this account appeared in the general balance sheet
of the company. Rejecting the pleas that depreciation re
serves should be made mandatory, Parliament contented it
self with requiring certificates that the properties had been
adequately maintained and that the dividends proposed to be
declared were, in the opinion of the auditors, properly pay*.The provision seems to have been permissive rather than mandatory.
Section 122, the section cited, provides that:
"Before apportioning the profits to be divided among the shareholders the
directors may, if they think best, set aside thereout such sum as they may
think proper to meet contingencies, or for enlarging, repairing, or improving
the works connected with the undertaking, or any part thereof, and may
divide the balance only among the shareholders.”
† Third Report, Select Committee on Audit of Railway Accounts, X Parlia
mentary Papers (1849), p. ix.
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able after making all charges against revenue which in their
opinion ought to be made thereagainst.
Thus, while directors were free to make provisions for
depreciation if they saw fit to do so, the question whether
such provisions had to be made turned ultimately on whether
the auditors regarded such depreciation as one of the ex
penses which ought to be provided out of revenue; and lead
ing accountants both here and in England took the view that
this was not a necessary expense.*
I turn now to consider what the effect on the develop
ment of our country would have been if the depreciation
method of accounting had been put into effect in the early
days of railroad enterprise. I raised this question in a
memorandum which was submitted in 1927 to the Interstate
Commerce Commission and in an article which appeared in
the Quarterly Journal of Economics of February, 1929, and
from which I may, perhaps, quote:

The result of a depreciation plan is obviously to throw
an added charge for use and exhaustion of property upon
the earliest years of operation, years in which the traffic
development would be in progress and in which conse
quently the charge would be more burdensome than in later
years. Such a condition would seem to be exactly the reverse
of that which would be economically desirable from the
standpoint of the community. Its interests would be served
by keeping the charges in the early years down to the mini
mum consistent with maintaining the efficiency of the prop
erty, thus enlarging the volume of the commodities that
could profitably be transported, and building up both the
traffic and the community more rapidly than would other
wise be possible. The best interests of the community in
such a situation would be served, it would seem, by a mutual
agreement to ignore the depreciation on the property in so
far as it could never be made good while the property was
being operated; the owners of the railroad agreeing that
this depreciation should not be treated as a part of cost of
operation, and the community agreeing on the other hand
* Cf. H. R. Hatfield, Accounting, p. 142.
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that in computing return no deduction should be made from
the original investment therefor.*
From a financial standpoint, with depreciation charges
treated as a part of operating cost, only a small proportion
of the enterprises proposed could have been claimed to pre
sent the prospect of being able to earn their fixed charges
within a reasonable period after being opened for traffic.
The published results of the ventures of those who had been
bold enough to proceed would have discouraged others from
attempting similar enterprises. On the basis of the account
ing methods then employed, which ignored accruing depre
ciation, Hadley estimated in 1885 that the railroads as a
whole were earning not more than five per cent on the actual
capital invested. To my mind, it is incontestable that the
effect of the application of such depreciation accounting
would have been that the construction of a large part of our
railway mileage would at least have been greatly delayed—if,
indeed, some part would ever have been constructed at all.
Such a result would have been exactly the opposite of that
sought at the time by legislatures and the public.
Hadley begins his chapter on railroad legislation with the
statement:

The early railroad legislation in the United States was
devised for the object of securing railroad construction. The
only fear was that railroads would not be built as fast as they
were needed. †

And, as late as 1907, the Interstate Commerce Commission
was complaining:
It may conservatively be stated that the inadequacy of
transportation facilities is little less than alarming. ‡

Since the development of other public utilities and com
mercial enterprises followed naturally on the development
of railroads, this portion of the growth of our capital equip* Vol. xliii, p. 211.
T. Hadley, Railroad Transportation (1885), p. 125.
‡ Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission (1907), p. 9.

† A.
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ment would also have been greatly retarded. It has been
said that we owe our great railroad facilities and the develop
ments which they made possible, in a large measure, to un
sound finance; but if it be held that depreciation provisions
are an essential element of sound railroad accounting, then
unsound accounting must share with unsound finance in the
responsibility for the tremendous economic development
that has taken place since railroad enterprises were first
begun. I do not here undertake to consider whether the
growth may have been too rapid to be healthy—I make only
the point that the accounting practice affected the economic
development of the country; whether for better or for worse,
others may dispute.
It is no doubt true that as a result of the accounting meth
ods followed, large amounts of capital have been lost by
investors. How large such losses in the aggregate must have
been is brought home to us when we consider enterprises
such as street railways, in respect of which capital has been
furnished by investors—first, for the cost of an original in
stallation of horse-cars; then for the cost of equipping the
lines for electrical operation (with, in some cases, an inter
mediate cable development); and, finally, as we have recently
seen in New York and elsewhere, the electrically operated
street cars have been displaced by buses. This, however,
merely emphasizes the truth too often ignored by unfriendly
critics of the existing economic order—who see only the large
gains made by a relatively small number of fortunate indi
viduals from the development of the capital equipment of
the nation—that in the aggregate, the community pays only
a relatively small return to capital for the amount invested,
and that it is the community that is the one sure gainer
therefrom. However legitimate the project, however honest
the finance, however conservative and scrupulous the ac
counting, and however competent the management may be,
the losses in industry are bound to be enormous, and the
community can well afford to allow the few who meet with
unusual success to receive and retain substantial rewards
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as a part of the price it pays for all the capital invested.*
I should perhaps anticipate here an objection that the
methods of accounting adopted may have been an effect
rather than a cause: the objection that this may be a case in
which methods of accounting have been influenced by other
than accounting considerations, rather than one in which
accounting judgment has influenced the economic develop
ment. True, the methods followed here and in Great Britain
might represent the giving of effect to an opinion deliber
ately reached as to what was economically desirable, or they
might be the reflection of the views (born, perhaps, of the
wishes) of those who were interested in the creation of such
enterprises. There is, however, nothing to suggest that the
depreciation method was regarded by those responsible for
the enabling legislation, either here or in England, as
sounder, but was deliberately ignored because it was believed
that the development and welfare of the country would be
aided by ignoring it. Nor do I believe that those who were
responsible for finding the capital for railroad enterprises
in England or here, or those auditors in England who were
required under the Act of 1868 to certify that dividends
were bona fide due after providing for the charges which
ought to be made against revenue, believed that sound
finance or good accounting called for depreciation provisions
which would ultimately provide for the amortization of out
lays on all property except that which was indestructible and
could never become obsolete, and deliberately refrained from
requiring such provisions.
The policy that omitted any provisions for depreciation
was, in England, entirely consistent with the policy which
omitted any provision for amortization of obviously wasting
assets such as mines, ships, or annuities. It was consistent
with the whole theory of the determination of income under
the English income tax laws (which had been revived in 1842
* Failure to recognize frankly these simple truths seems to me to be a
major ground for criticism of measures for control of security issues which
have been put forward in the last year or two.
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before railroad development in England had proceeded very
far). American practice in the early days was undoubtedly
determined largely by English precedents, which was natural
in view of the fact that the capital for our railroad enter
prises came largely from abroad, and particularly from Eng
land.
I believe that in dealing, or omitting to deal, with de
preciation the railroads merely followed the general account
ing practice of the times. In my first article I referred to the
change of attitude on the question on the part of the Su
preme Court between 1878 and 1909. It was not until
the present century that depreciation charges became general
even in industrial accounting practice in our country—in
fact, full recognition of the necessity therefor might almost
be said to date from the enactment of the first corporation
income tax law in 1909, under which depreciation was an
allowable deduction which corporations generally were
anxious to secure, and which was allowed only if taken up
on the books.
The first serious proposal to apply depreciation methods
to fixed properties of railroads appears to have been made as
the result of the study of the question of railroad valuation
by the Interstate Commerce Commission under the Valua
tion Act of 1913, though, as already noted, the Commission
had in 1907 taken steps looking to the application of a de
preciation method to railroad equipment. In its valuations
under the authority of the Act, the Commission consistently
deducted from the gross value depreciation on what is known
as the straight line method—that is to say, the method which
aims to distribute the ultimate loss of value evenly over the
service life of a unit of property. The Supreme Court in its
decisions on valuation questions has consistently rejected the
straight line method, and the deductions it has recognized
have resembled more nearly what has been called observed
depreciation.
By an amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act in 1920
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(Section 20, § 5), the Commission was given authority to pre
scribe the classes of property for which depreciation charges
might properly be included under operating expenses and
the percentages of depreciation which should be charged
with respect to the uses of such classes of property. After
much consideration of the question and extended hearings,
the Commission handed down a report in November, 1926; *
but, as a result of objections to its conclusions, granted a
rehearing which eventually resulted in a new report dated
July 28, 1931.† This varied in some important respects from
the earlier one, but adhered to the theory of straight line
depreciation which the railroads were ordered to put into
force as from July 1, 1933. The effective date has since been
changed by executive order and now stands indefinitely post
poned.
Shortly before the second report, the Supreme Court in
the United Railways case ‡ had laid down the principle that
for the purposes of rate cases any depreciation charge must
be based upon present value and not upon original cost, as
was contemplated by the Commission. Clearly, however, a
system of depreciation charges based upon a fluctuating
present value was altogether impracticable for the purposes
of current accounting by the railroads. If the Commission
was for such current purposes to require depreciation charges,
they could hardly be based on anything except cost. At
the same time, with the Commission insisting on straight line
depreciation and original cost, and the Court insisting on
observed depreciation and present value, there was no ap
parent prospect of the Commission’s attaining the objective
which it had stressed of placing railroad accounts on such a
basis as to make them equally useful for the purposes of
current accounting and rate-case determination.
In the report of 1931 the Commission, after citing the
* No. 14700, Depreciation Charges of Telephone Companies; No. 15100,
Depreciation Charges of Steam Railroad Companies.
† Same title.
‡ United Railways and Electric Company of Baltimore v. West et al., 280
U. S. (1930), 234.
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varied views of carriers and the need for uniformity, con
cluded that a depreciation method was preferable to a re
tirement method. Observing that in regulating accounts
the Commission was performing its administrative function,
and that so long as the regulation was not arbitrary in the
sense of being without reasonable basis, there was no ground
for judicial interference, it proceeded to consider various
depreciation methods. It recognized that the arguments in
favor of the sinking fund and annuity methods had force,
going so far as to say, “It may be that from a scientific and
theoretical standpoint the annuity method is the soundest
of all,” but concluded that the balance of the argument was
in favor of the straight-line method. Its discussion of this
question concludes thus:
We are disposed to abide by the finding in our prior re
port in favor of the straight-line method. It is the method
which has consistently been used in our valuation proceed
ings. On the record before us, indeed, we would hardly
be justified in reaching any other conclusion.
This conclusion, it should also be said, is associated with
the confidence we entertain that the courts, when the issues
and facts are made entirely clear to them, will recognize the
connection and interrelation between depreciation in ac
counting and in valuation which have been pointed out
hereinbefore (p. 413).
Here we have what are at once the weakest and the deter
mining arguments of the Commission on the question at
issue. While unquestionably straight line depreciation is
commonly used for current accounting purposes, particularly
in the industrial field, its use for valuation purposes does
not find support either in theory, in practice, or in court
decisions. The Commission’s own view of fixed property is
that it represents a given number of years of service value.
If this view be accepted, the unit which has at the beginning
of a year 100 years of useful life, has at the end thereof 99
years of such life left in it, and the reduction in value during
the year is measured by the difference between the value of
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an annuity for 100 years and that of an annuity for 99 years.
This difference is not 1%, but less than 1% of 1%.
Continuing, the Commission found that (to use the lan
guage of the syllabus), “Depreciation accounting becomes a
necessary measure of self-protection to the carriers, in view
of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
to the effect that accrued depreciation must be taken into
consideration in ascertaining the rate-base value” (§ 34, p.
353). This argument would be more convincing if the
views of the Commission had been shared generally by the
carriers, which, however, regarded the Commission’s pro
posals as “neither practicable nor wise” (p. 382), or if the
methods of computing depreciation prescribed by the Com
mission had been more in harmony with the past decisions
of the Supreme Court. Perhaps a more accurate statement
of the argument would be that depreciation accounting will
become necessary for the self-protection of the carriers if the
Supreme Court justifies the confidence of the Commission,
recognizes the connection and interrelation between valua
tion and depreciation accounting, and does so in such a way
as to substitute the Commission’s ideas upon depreciation for
those which it has heretofore expressed.
Referring again to the syllabus, while paragraph 22 reads:
“It is not essential that the accounts should correspond in
all respects with the facts which may be controlling in a con
fiscation case,” we find in paragraph 43 the statement: “It is
a matter of vital importance to harmonize the requirements
for valuation and depreciation accounting purposes, so that
unnecessary duplication of effort will be avoided.”
Reading the order as a whole, one is left with a very defi
nite impression that the Commissioners participating in it
are thoroughly convinced that straight line depreciation
should be deducted from gross value in any determination
of the rate base, and that depreciation computed on the
same basis should be charged against income. In order to
secure recognition for the first of these two points, they are
willing to make large concessions on secondary questions.
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Encouraged by dicta in minority opinions of the Court,
they hope by the exercise of their authority in the matter of
current accounts to induce the Supreme Court at long last
to come around to their point of view. In presenting their
case they make effective use of the arguments and practices
of the telephone companies in support of straight line depre
ciation as an operating charge, though declining to accept
the contention of those companies that unexpended deprecia
tion reserves are in the nature of surplus.*
In 1934 an opportunity was afforded to judge how far the
reasoning of the Commission had made progress with the
Supreme Court. The opportunity did not come in a rail
road case, in which the proponents of straight line deprecia
tion would have had to face the argument that their proposal
ran counter to the practice of railroads generally, here and
abroad since the earliest days of operation, including nearly
a quarter of a century during which railroad accounting had
been under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Com
mission—it came up in the case of a telephone company †
which had followed a straight line depreciation plan after
the Commission’s own heart. As a result, the depreciation
reserve had grown to be from 26% to 28% of the cost of
property, including land. The court below had found the
proper deduction for depreciation for valuation purposes
to be from 15% to 16%, and the telephone company had
claimed the proper deduction for this purpose to be from
8% to 9%.
The Supreme Court’s decision against the telephone com
pany was based on the ground that it had failed to sustain the
burden of showing that the amounts charged to operating
expenses for depreciation had not been excessive. It spoke
of the “striking contrast” between the reserve that had been
accumulated and the existing depreciation as indicated by
* For efforts to enlist the support of the Congress, see letter of January 21,
1931, reprinted in the Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission
(1931), pp. 347-57.
† Lindheimer et al. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 292 U. S. (1934), 151.
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“proof which the Company strongly emphasizes as complete
and indisputable in its sharp criticism of the amount of
accrued depreciation found by the District Court in valuing
the property.”
Mr. Justice Butler, in a concurring opinion, indicated that
he was not a convert to the view of the Interstate Commerce
Commission. In doing so, he stated in clear language one
of the objections which has been most strongly urged against
the depreciation method;

From the foregoing it justly may be inferred that charges
made according to the principle followed by the company
create reserves much in excess of what is needed for mainte
nance. The balances carried by the company include large
amounts that never can be used for the purposes for which
the reserve was created. In the long run the amounts thus
unnecessarily taken from revenue will reach about one-half
the total cost of all depreciable parts of the plant. The only
legitimate purpose of the reserve is to equalize expenditures
for maintenance so as to take from the revenue earned in
each year its fair share of the burden. To the extent that
the annual charges include amounts that will not be required
for that purpose, the account misrepresents the cost of the
service.
The company’s properties constitute a complex and
highly developed instrumentality containing many classes of
items that require renewal from time to time. But, taken
as a whole, the plant must be deemed to be permanent. It
never was intended to be new in all its parts. It would be
impossible to make it so. Expenditures in an attempt to
accomplish that would be wasteful. Amounts sufficient to
create a reserve balance that is the same percentage of total
cost of depreciable items as their age is of their total service
life cannot be accepted as legitimate additions to operating
expenses (pp. 181-82).

The argument thus admirably stated raises two important
questions pertinent to the present discussion. The narrower
one is whether any economic advantage is to be gained by
adopting a system which calls for the creation today of a
reserve of the character described by Mr. Justice Butler as
“unnecessary”—a reserve which if created at all should have
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been created in the past, but which has not been called for
under the system of railroad accounting heretofore in force.
The second is whether there is any principle higher than that
of general economic advantage and justice by which account
ing practices must be governed and judged.
It is interesting to note the way in which the Commission
has dealt with the first point. In its report of November,
1926, it ordered that a reserve account equal to the amount
of depreciation which under its new system was deemed to
have accrued in the past could be set up on the books of the
carriers, and a suspense account of equal amount set up on
the asset side. It asserted, quite unjustly I think, that the
theoretically correct way would be to make the charge to
profit and loss, on the ground that it represented a failure
to accrue depreciation charges in the past; but recognizing
the impracticability of this course, proposed that it should
remain in suspense until extinguished by charges against
profit and loss in the future. Strong exception was taken to
these proposals, and in the revised order of 1931 the Com
mission decreed that the amount of the accrued depreciation
at the date when the new system was to become effective
should be computed and broken down into component parts
corresponding to the primary investment accounts—but that
no cognizance of the sum so computed should be taken in
the books.
This solution was more realistic than the Commission’s
previous proposal and was calculated to avert in the case of
the carriers such criticism as that expressed later by Mr.
Justice Butler in respect to the telephone company. Coupled
with a change which required depreciation accounting by
groups of units instead of by units (as previously contem
plated), it provided a way out of the difficulty of dealing,
when retirement occurs in the future, with the depreciation
deemed to have accrued in the past on the unit retired. In
effect, this depreciation is to be charged against the reserve
that is to be created to provide for depreciation in the future.
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The procedure as laid down is open to several criticisms: it
is illogical; it involves the abandonment of a large part of
the Commission’s theory; and it results in charging against
a reserve expenses for which no corresponding credit has
previously been made to that reserve. However, the only
alternative would have been to require the accumulation of
a reserve out of future earnings at the expense either of the
shippers or of the security-holders, a course for which there
would be no economic justification. Of the two alternative
courses, that adopted by the Commission was doubtless the
wiser.
Our railroads having reached a state of maturity, there is
reason to expect that a depreciation plan on the modified
basis would over a period of years produce charges to opera
tion not greatly different from those which would result from
the application of a sound retirement method. With the
objection to the earlier plan that it added greatly to the
burdens upon the carriers’ future earnings largely removed,
the major question now is whether any advantages sufficient
to justify such a change in the general railroad practice of
the past, here and abroad, are likely to result from the adop
tion of the Commission’s plan.
A serious demerit of the scheme is its complexity, and the
enormous amount of bookkeeping which it would entail.
Outside the Commission probably no great virtue will be
seen in the fact that with the aid of the extra-accounting
statistical record of accrued depreciation at the date when
the system becomes effective, it would bring about some sort
of coordination between the accounting and the Commis
sion’s theory of valuation. A further advantage claimed by
the Commission was that the procedure would insure more
uniform charges for upkeep against operating in good times
as well as in bad. Events since 1931 have already proved
the vanity of this hope. We find the Commission itself re
porting in 1934 that, although depreciation remained on a
pre-depression basis, it had allowed carriers to charge not
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only certain retirements but also certain repairs against profit
and loss instead of against operating expenses.*
Unless the order does bring about a change in the attitude
of the Supreme Court as the Commission hopes, and of this
there is no present indication, it will, I think, have to be
conceded that the results of the activities of the Commission
in the matter have not justified the expense they have occa
sioned. Moreover, the importance of the rate base in the
case of the railroads as a whole has steadily diminished as
competitive methods of transport have reduced their rev
enues. Recapture of earnings has gone by the board and
railroad valuation has lost most of its former importance.
I shall conclude this series of articles by discussing very
briefly the question raised earlier herein, whether there are
principles higher than those of general economic advantage
and justice by which accounting practices must be governed
and judged. Some accountants believe that there are such
principles, and it has been suggested that the American In
stitute of Accountants, or some other body, should under
take to lay them down. It is difficult, however, to see why
this should be true of accounting, when it is obviously not
true in respect of law or of economics.
The better opinion is, I believe, that, as I suggested in the
first of these articles, accounting is a tool of business, and the
development of accounting, like the development of business
law, should be determined by the best practices of business
men. As stated in the report of the American Institute to
the New York Stock Exchange of September 28, 1932, out
of the necessities of business there has “grown up a body of
conventions, based partly on theoretical and partly on prac
tical considerations, which form the basis for the determina
tion of income and the preparation of balance sheets today.’’
There is every reason to desire and to expect improve
ments and a constantly increasing degree of uniformity in
accounting conventions. This improvement and this uni
formity cannot be attained through any attempt to make
* Annual Report (1934), p. 2.
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accounting practice a reflection of purely metaphysical con
cepts, but only through careful consideration of what is fair
and in the best interest of those having a legitimate interest
in accounts. In the case of corporate accounts, this may in
clude stockholders and creditors—actual or potential—em
ployees, customers, and the general public, and nice ques
tions may arise in giving just recognition to the rights of
the different groups. Clearly, however, no rule which is con
trary to the interests of all of the parties should be established
on the sole ground that it conforms to some abstract notion
of what is sound accounting.
It is because the best accounting can be attained only
through wide knowledge of business, sound judgment and
mental integrity that the profession of the accountant offers
today one of the most attractive fields of activity to the highminded and clear-minded among the rising generation.

PART VII

REVIEWS AND CRITICISMS

I

REASONS FOR EXCLUDING INTEREST FROM COST *
(1916)

schemes of accounting for various industries are
receiving much consideration at the present time. This is
due partly to the encouragement given such movements by
the Federal Trade Commission, and partly to the work which
has been carried on for some time by the Bureau of Busi
ness Research of Harvard University and other organiza
tions, the value of which is now being recognized.
In connection with these schemes it may not be amiss to
reconsider the question of the treatment of interest, par
ticularly interest on invested capital. Many who favor in
cluding interest in expense or cost as a general principle be
come dubious when they are asked to specify the rate or the
kind of rate they would adopt. Broadly there are three kinds
of rate suggested:
Standard

(1) A rate equal to that yielded by the safest investments.
(Some go further and try to eliminate the small ele
ment of risk from such a rate and call the balance pure
interest or compensation solely for the use of the
money.)
(2) A rate equal to that at which money can be borrowed
for the particular industry.
(3) A rate sufficient to attract permanent investment into
the industry.

Of the three alternatives the second is probably the most
generally favored, and it will therefore be assumed as the
basis of the following discussion.
At the outset it is important to consider what such a rate
represents. In an industrial business commercial loans can
usually be obtained up to a limit of, say, 50 per cent of the
* The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XXI (June, 1916).
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current assets. Money lent, therefore, has behind it 100 per
cent margin of security in current assets alone, as well as
plant values which may represent another 100 per cent or
more. The difference between the position of the loan and
that of the invested capital which stands behind it is there
fore obvious.
It is suggested that it is undesirable to treat such a rate of
interest on invested capital as cost in standard classification
of expense or in cost of manufacture:

First, because the method is unscientific and unsound for
the immediate purpose in view;
Second, because the inclusion of interest in cost produces
results which are financially and economically undesirable;
Third, because in so far as the results of such methods have
a bearing on the broad question of the relations between
capital, labor and the public, the inclusion of interest in the
manner suggested tends to mislead and thus to promote dis
cord and social injustice.
Objection No. 1. “Because the method is unscientific and
unsound for the immediate purpose in view.”

The purpose in view is to arrive at the cost or expense in
volved in doing business in the line of industry under con
sideration. For such a purpose the essentials are:
First, tp ascertain as far as possible all costs and to exclude
anything that is not a cost;
Second, to arrive as far as possible at results that are
actual and to avoid if possible the introduction of arbitrary
or estimated figures;
Third, to present each element of cost as a separate item
in the classification and to avoid the inclusion of any one
element in more than one heading thereof.

Considering these essentials in order, whether the return
on proprietor’s capital is wholly or in part a cost or expense
is a question on which opinions differ. As to this it is suffi
cient to say that if, after consideration of other essentials, it
should be deemed preferable to omit the charge in respect
of proprietor’s capital from cost or expense, this fact would
at least not impair the value of the results presented.
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Turning to the second essential, it is obvious that any
charge in respect of proprietor’s capital must be an estimate.
The next point to consider is, therefore, how accurate an
estimate made in the way that is proposed will be. Now it is
apparent that if the capital required in a business is pro
vided partly in the form of a loan by A, who is given priority
in respect of principal and interest, and partly by B (the
proprietor) whose rights are subordinated to those of A, then
without attempting to define exactly the rate of interest ap
plicable to B’s contribution, it must obviously be something
different from and greater than the rate applicable to A’s
contribution. It appears, therefore, that the proposed rate
is from its very nature inapplicable.
Further, it is apparent that some of the compensation of
the proprietor’s capital must be left to be provided out of
the balance remaining after deducting costs, so that the pro
cedure involves the sacrifice of the third essential above re
cited, namely, the presentation of each element of cost as a
separate item in the classification. It may be suggested that
the compensation of the proprietor’s capital is not an ele
ment but a compound of two elements, namely, the compen
sation for the use of the capital and the compensation for
the risk incurred. The answer to such a contention is, how
ever, that the rate proposed to be used is itself a compound
of these two elements, the defect of the rate being that it is
formed in an erroneous and half-hearted manner.
At this point it may be worth while to consider roughly
how far the method does provide for the two elements. The
rate at which money is lent to industry, and especially small
industries, is probably double the interest rate on the safest
securities. The rate necessary to attract investments (not
loans) into such an industry is not less than three times the
rate on the safest investments.* If, say, one-third of the
* If the safe investment rate be taken at, say, 3 per cent, this gives, a bor
rowing rate of 6 per cent and an investment rate of 9 per cent, which happens
to be almost exactly the average rate earned on the amount invested (capital
and surplus) in all the national banks of the country for the seven years end
ing June 30, 1914.
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capital be raised by borrowing, the rate to be applied to the
proprietor’s capital would on these assumptions be three and
a half times the safe investment rate.
For, taking the total capital invested at 300 and r as an
nual interest on a safe investment of 100:
the interest on 300 at r would be.................................. 9 r
the interest on 100 borrowed at 2 r.............................. 21
leaving for interest on 200 proprietor’s capital of 3½
r per cent...................................................................... 7 r

Now if the rate on safest investment (r) be taken as the
compensation for use of capital, the borrowing rate of 2 r
provides 1 r for risk. If the proper rate for proprietor’s
capital be taken at 3½ r, of which 1 r represents compensa
tion for use and 2½ r compensation for risk, it may be said
that the method provides for the “use” element and about
40 per cent of the “risk” element contained in the “cost” of
proprietor’s capital.
To sum up, the position is that whether the first essential
is fulfilled is a controversial question, and that the second
and third essentials are clearly sacrificed. It would seem that
in these circumstances the first objection urged is fully sus
tained. This objection would not be fatal if the method
produced good results when viewed from a broader stand
point, and it is therefore desirable to proceed to a considera
tion of the next objection.
Objection No. 2. Because the inclusion of interest in cost
produces results which are financially and economically un
desirable.

The evil effects from an administrative, financial and ac
counting standpoint of including interest in cost have been
pointed out in previous articles in The Journal of Account
ancy, and no attempt will therefore be made to deal with
this subject exhaustively here. Briefly the main objections
are:
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First, plant investment which yields only a rate which is
admittedly less than commensurate with the risk attending
investment in the industry is commercially and economically
unsound.
A method which purports to allow for cost of increased
capital by means of a rate determined by the rate at which
money can be borrowed, therefore, tends to encourage un
wise plant expenditure.
If the money is obtained, not by borrowing, but by a
permanent increase of capital, then the return on that cap
ital will have to be far greater than the loan rate. If the
money is obtained by borrowing, then, quite apart from the
rate, the policy is unwise—excessive investment in fixed assets
of capital obtained by borrowing being one of the common
est causes of failure.
Second, there is no sense or advantage in including in cost
interest on investment in fixed assets unless interest on in
vestment in current assets employed in manufacture is also
considered.
The attempt to introduce correctly computed interest al
lowances on both classes of investments involves difficulties
out of all proportion to any possible benefits.
These objections may seem strange in view of the fact that
the principal argument advanced in favor of including in
terest in cost is that it takes capital investment into account
in comparative costs. But it is submitted that it is better
to leave capital investment out of account altogether than
to take it into account on a basis that does not even purport
to represent the true cost of capital. There are theoretical
grounds for the claim that interest on some logical basis
should be included in cost, though it is not worth while in
practice to attempt to do it. There would seem to be no
basis in theory and far more danger than advantage in prac
tice in including a rate determined as the rate now under
discussion would be determined.
Third, the method leads to less conservative valuation of
inventories and to showing as profits available for dividends
amounts which have not been realized or even earned.
It may be asked why, if these views are correct, so many
people do favor including such a rate of interest in cost. The
answer is perhaps found partly in the following considerations:
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First, the great extent to which capital is obtained by
borrowing in this country;
Second, the very general use and acceptance of 6 per cent
as an interest rate;
Third, the general failure to appreciate the true rates of
return earned in industry. This is in a measure the natural
result of the “watering” of capital in the past for the purpose
of concealing the true rates of profits being earned;
Fourth, anxiety to do anything that tends to reduce under
selling;
Fifth, the hope that, by including part of its claim to com
pensation as cost and a part as profit, capital may be able
to secure more than it otherwise would obtain. Later rea
sons will be advanced for concluding that such a hope is
ill-founded;
Sixth, the influence of bankers, based on a false analogy
from their own business.
A man who has never considered the problem of fair re
turn regards 6 per cent as a* well-recognized rate, applies it
often where it has no proper application, and accepts it when
it is charged against him.
The executive head of a business who charges 6 per cent
on capital employed against each department of his business
may or may not be conscious that he would never invest
money in a department at that rate. He knows, however,
that the department head will recognize and accept that rate,
but would not probably understand or willingly accept a
charge of a higher rate and feels that by charging 6 per cent
he gets at least that much protection against underselling.
The same comment applies to trade associations which com
bine to put out accounting schemes, the underlying purpose
of which is as a rule the reduction of destructive competition.
Whether or not the result accomplished in this direction
is good or bad from an economic standpoint is an open ques
tion. In the case of a man who does not realize what a
selling price ought to include, it is probably helpful both
to him and to his competitors. But at its best the method
is a hybrid and a makeshift, and taking all effects together
the evil effects preponderate.
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Objection No. 3. “Because in so far as the results of such
methods have a bearing on the broad question of the rela
tions between capital, labor and the public, the inclusion
of interest in the manner suggested tends to mislead and
thus to promote discord and social injustice.”

The relation of the problem to the broad question of the
proper distribution of the fruits of organized industry be
tween labor and capital is apparent, and nothing could be
more essential than that the practice adopted should avoid
anything likely to add to misconceptions of one another’s
equitable claims which are largely responsible for the bitter
ness of the controversy between the two.
Upon any great question the tendency must be to reduce
the issue to the simplest terms. The fair disposition of the
results of organized industry is one of the greatest of ques
tions, and the issue here is reduced in the public mind to
one between labor and capital—everything that does not go
to labor is regarded as going to capital. The elements other
than labor entitled to compensation may in the economic
mind be subdivided, and the economist may attempt to dif
ferentiate between pure interest, compensation for risk, the
reward of the entrepreneur, etc., but in the public mind
and for practical purposes these elements are combined in
capital. Moreover, in general, once an enterprise is
launched these elements are vested in the same body of in
dividuals, so that the fact that the isolation of the elements
is not possible except in theory does not cause any difficulty
in practice.
If so-called interest on capital is deducted as expense, the
general disposition will be to assert claims to a part or the
whole of the balance. The public (especially in the case of
public service companies) will attribute the net profit shown
to over-exaction from the public. Labor will claim that it
is attributable to underpayment of labor or at least to the
results of combined effort in which labor should participate.
If, however, the results are presented without including
anything in expense for return on capital, it will be clearly
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recognized that if capital is not entitled to all the residuum,
at least capital has a claim on it which must first be satisfied.
That claim would seem to be for an amount standing as
nearly as possible in the same relation to capital as the
amounts included in expense in respect of labor stand to
labor.
The elements included in the compensation to labor in
clude some or all of the following:

(a) A minimum wage;
(b) Payment for special skill;
(c) Compensation for special conditions of employments
including risk, responsibility and inconvenience;
(d) Compensation paid on account of specially favorable
financial conditions (such as the two 10 per cent additions
to wages by the Steel Corporation recently);
(e) A share of the final residuum (paid in the form of
wage dividends or otherwise);

All these items except (e) are treated as expense, under
the head of wages.
Turning now to capital—pure interest may be said to cor
respond roughly to minimum wage in the case of labor.
There is no element in capital corresponding to the special
skill in the case of labor. There are, however, in the case
of capital, elements corresponding exactly to the items (c),
(d) and (e).
But while the items (a) to (d) are included in expense in
respect of labor, only item (a) and an indefinite fraction *
of (c) are proposed to be included in expense in respect of
capital.
The ordinary reader of the figures (and certainly also the
enemies of capital) will, however, assume that the interest
included in expense stands to capital in the same relation
as the wages included in expense do to labor, and no amount
of explanation will be very effective in avoiding or removing
such a misconception. Nor can such an explanation be
effectively made, since it involves explaining that while the
* Possibly 40 per cent.
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amount included under wages does represent compensation
based on the conditions under which the labor is employed,
the compensation assigned capital under interest does not
even purport to be the compensation to which it is fairly
entitled under the conditions under which it is invested, but
what it would fairly earn if employed in some different and
much safer way.
An analysis of the amounts paid or due to labor and cap
ital such as is suggested above is outside the scope of a classi
fication of expenses, though it would be a positive contribu
tion towards the proper treatment of the problem of the re
lations between the two bodies. It is, however, in the high
est degree important that classifications should not present
figures in such a one-sided and erroneous way as to add an
other misconception to those that already keep labor and
capital apart. If accounts cannot actually promote harmony
between the two, at least let every possible step be taken to
insure that they shall not add to the discord.
It may be asked whether interest should not be included
in expense on some other basis if not on the one proposed.
The alternatives are apparently the “pure interest” rate
(or the rate on the safest investments which approximates
thereto) or else the rate that will attract investment into the
industry. To adopt the pure interest basis means providing
for compensation for the use of money, but not for the risk
to which it is subjected; and as the risk is by far the more
important element, there would seem to be little or no prac
tical advantage in following this course, nor indeed any
probability of being generally understood. The rate which
will attract capital into an industry would seem to be one
of the things which accounts should help to determine rather
than anything which could be assumed as an element of cost.

II
COST ACCOUNTING *

(1925)
This term embraces methods of cost determination which
are either a part of, or coordinated with, the general ac
counting of the enterprise as distinguished from estimates
of costs not so controlled or checked. Cost accounting meth
ods have probably been developed more extensively in the
United States than in any other country. This development
has taken place mainly in the period since 1895, and it may
be regarded as a natural phase of the general industrial
development in that period. The same conditions which
have stimulated the use of labour-saving methods and mass
production have naturally lent new importance to the de
termination and analysis of costs; and have made it impera
tive that the substantial accuracy of the statistics of cost used
shall be beyond question. This can only be assured by link
ing up cost statistics with general financial and accounting
records and results.
In the problem of cost accounting there may be said to
be usually three main objects to be achieved, three main
classifications to be followed and three major considerations
governing the scope of the methods to be employed. These
nine elements are necessarily to some extent interrelated,
and it may therefore be well to state them at the outset.
The main objects referred to are: (1) To afford a sound
basis for selling policy; (2) To provide tests of operating
efficiency; (3) To establish a basis for accounting records
and financial policy. The classifications of cost are broadly,
(1) labor, (2) material, (3) overhead expenses. The character
and scope of the methods to be employed must be deter* From an article written for The Encyclopedia Britannica, 13th edition
(1926).
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mined largely by considerations of (1) speed, (2) accuracy,
(3) expense.
The relative importance of the objects enumerated varies
with different classes of enterprise. In the case of a builder,
contractor or shipbuilder, or in the case of a plant capable
of producing different types of products, a cost system may
be of even greater value in the determination of selling
policies than in producing operating efficiency. On the
other hand, in the case of a plant producing standard articles
for a highly competitive market, the value of a cost system
may lie almost wholly in helping to secure manufacturing
or operating efficiency.
The success of any cost accounting system depends largely
on correct judgment concerning the relative importance of
the different elements of the problem in the particular case
involved, and particularly on the success with which the
naturally conflicting considerations of speed, accuracy and
expense in the cost department are reconciled. If the cost
system is to be of real service to those in charge of operations
or sales, its results must be substantially accurate and suf
ficiently specific to enable those officers to localize waste and
the responsibility therefor. Such results will, however, be
of .little value if in an attempt to secure accuracy the ascer
tainment of the results is unduly delayed, or an expense is
incurred greater than the possible benefits to be derived
from the greater accuracy ultimately secured. The recog
nition of this fact and the consequent resort to simpler,
though perhaps less scientific and less meticulously accurate
methods, have perhaps been the most marked characteristics
of the development of cost accounting in the United States
in recent years. The growth of interest in cost accounting,
which began about 1895, was greatly stimulated by the con
solidations which were effected about the year 1900.
Among the results of these consolidations were the trans
fer of ownership on a large scale from persons immediately
interested in the operation of plants to the general public,
and also a transfer of the general direction from small groups
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of operating officers to boards of directors less intimately
associated with actual operations. This change resulted in
a demand for more frequent and more accurate reports of
operating results as a guide to financial policies and for the
information of those financially interested. In the develop
ment of methods to meet the new situation the importance
of the purely accounting and financial uses of costs were not
infrequently overrated.
Purely accounting uses of cost records have come to be
viewed in a more accurate perspective, and accounting re
finements and technicalities have been increasingly subor
dinated to practical usefulness. At the same time, remark
able results have been achieved in expediting the compila
tion of costs by careful organisation, so that today large
corporations frequently have completed cost figures for a
month available for the operating executives within three
or four days of its close.
The accountant called upon to devise a system of cost
accounting will be wise to regard the accounting uses of the
system as entirely secondary, and to aim at making the sys
tem as valuable as possible to those controlling the policies
and operations of the business. The sales manager, in fix
ing prices, must estimate costs in advance of sale, and the
value to him of a system which records actual costs lies
mainly in the check it affords, on the correctness of his esti
mates, and the extent to which it permits and facilitates the
use of actual costs of the past as a basis for estimates of cost
in the future under changing conditions.
The operating or production manager’s requirements are
more extensive and more varied. He must be in a position
to determine whether fluctuations in cost are due to con
ditions within the control of the management or not, and
if so, to localise the responsibility. He must, for instance,
be in a position to determine such questions as whether a
higher cost of material at one plant than at another is at
tributable to less efficiency in purchasing, or to the use or
the waste of more material, and how far apparent high costs
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of production are really costs of production, and how far
they are attributable to lack of production, i.e., to idle time
and such causes. Every effort should therefore be made to
frame a cost accounting system so as to afford as much light
as is practicable on manufacturing operations and make that
light available at the earliest possible moment.
Broadly, there are three main types of cost accounting
systems. The first undertakes to determine the cost for each
production order, which may cover either a single unit of
production where units are large, or a batch of units where
they are smaller. The second takes account of costs by
separate processes or operations—thus determining a unit
cost for each process or operation and leaving the cost of
any article produced to be determined by bringing together
the costs of several processes or operations through which
it passes. The third seeks to determine costs by products
or classes of products and to compute the costs of the units
produced by dividing the total costs incurred in producing
similar units in any period by the number of units produced
in that period. Multiple products from a common raw ma
terial, as in the case of petroleum and packing industries,
constitute a separate and difficult problem.
An important question is the relation of the cost account
ing to the general accounting records of the enterprise.
From the standpoint of accounting technique the cost sys
tem, which forms an integral part of a general accounting
system, possesses a unity and completeness which cannot be
achieved in any other way. It is, however, easy to pay too
great a price for this artistic completeness, and there has been
a marked disposition to employ methods under which the
cost accounting is less closely tied to the general accounting.
The value of cost figures is greatly enhanced by compari
sons either with past achievements or with an “ideal” or
standard of cost. Much attention has been given to meth
ods of cost accounting in complex industries, based on stand
ard costs for specific articles, processes or operations, sup
plemented by methods for adjusting these standard costs for
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changes in conditions, and for ensuring that the aggregate
costs allocated as the results of these adjustments are in actual
or substantial agreement with the aggregate costs incurred as
shown by the general books. For discussion of the sub
division of costs, the reader must be referred to text-books.
A warning may be given that accounting text-books are apt
to over-rate and engineering text-books to under-rate general
accounting and financial desiderata. In particular, the im
portance may be emphasised of avoiding use of a cost sys
tem in a way which would involve inventorying goods at
more than true cost through the inclusion in costs of either
(a) interdepartmental profits (and for this purpose whollyowned subsidiary companies should be regarded as depart
ments), (b) profits in the form of interest or otherwise, or (c)
selling costs. All these items may, however, be included in
appropriate ways in costs compiled for executive use in
formulating policies.
Overhead costs per unit (up to the limit of economical
production) decrease as the output increases, and vice versa.
Sales may therefore be. advantageous, even though they do
not reimburse direct costs and a rateable proportion of over
head expenses. The cost accountant should therefore do
all in his power, especially where profit margins are narrow,
to segregate overhead costs, to analyse them and to interpret
them to the executive, so as to ensure that they will be given
due, but not undue, weight in the formulation of policies.
The allocations of overhead are, at best, rough approxima
tions, but much has been done to secure more accurate allo
cations by computing overhead for individual departments,
machines or tools, by adopting bases of apportionment, more
carefully selected and more closely related to the actual facts
of production than previously, and in similar ways.
In some systems, standard rates of burden rather than
actual rates are charged into cost, being credited to clearing
accounts to which actual overhead expenses are charged.
Where this is done, watchfulness and judgment in dealing
with these clearing accounts are imperative. This is, how
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ever, only one illustration of the most important of all truths
in cost accounting, that skill and judgment in applying, ad
justing and interpreting cost methods in actual use are even
more important than ingenuity in devising a system in the
first instance.

Ill
AN EXAMINATION OF AFFIDAVITS IN

De Koven et al. v. The Lake Shore & Michigan Southern
Railway Company
(1923)
The case of the plaintiff rests substantially on Mr. Thomp
son’s affidavit, as Professor Friday simply restates what Mr.
Thompson has said. In his first affidavit Mr. Thompson
propounded a method of determining the relative values of
Lake Shore and Consolidated Company stock, based on the
theory that, in income, expectation has a value graduated ac
cording to the extent of mortgages ranking ahead of it. . . .
Mr. Thompson takes one element which admittedly af
fects to some extent the market value of earning capacity
(the extent of the fixed charges or mortgages to which in
come is subject); assigns to that element a weight fixed by
himself; calculates the relative values of the respective in
come capitalizations with reference to this element alone;
and then briefly dismisses all other elements of value by
calling attention to certain elements which he claims would
on comparison be favorable to the Lake Shore, arguing that
therefore, if he took into account these other favorable fac
tors, he would necessarily reach still higher values.
The fundamental importance to this method of the cor
rectness of the weight assigned to the one element taken into
consideration and the fallacy of the statement as to the other
elements of value may be illustrated as follows: Suppose the
problem were to determine the relation in areas between
two rectangles, A, 14 feet long and 5 feet broad, and B, 6
feet long and 414 feet broad; and suppose the proposition
were advanced that it was a well-known mathematical fact
that the areas of rectangles were to some extent dependent on
37o
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their length and that therefore the areas of the two rectangles
were to one another at least as the squares of their lengths,
i.e., as 196 to 25; that in reality this conclusion understated
the relative size of rectangle A because the breadths had not
been considered and the breadth of rectangle A is 5 feet and
of B only 4½ feet. It is at once clear that the crucial ques
tion involved in this proposition is the propriety of the step
by which the method proceeds from the undoubtedly correct
statement that the area of rectangles is affected by their
length to the precise measurement of such effect. If the
proponent of the method cannot demonstrate that this re
lation is correctly expressed by the squares of the length,
or if his opponents can disprove this claim, then no amount
of evidence that areas of rectangles are affected by their
length, or that the areas are affected by their breadth, or that
where the length and breadth are equal the area is the square
of the length, can be of any avail.
In Mr. Thompson’s calculation the corresponding crucial
step is that in which he undertakes to measure precisely the
effect of the influence of prior fixed charges or mortgages
on the value of an income expectation. If this step cannot
be successfully defended, no mass of evidence to show that
market values are affected to some extent by the proportion
of fixed charges to corporate income, or to show that esti
mates of future earnings are made in financial practice, or
any of the like propositions to which so much of Mr.
Thompson’s second affidavit is devoted, can save his method
from complete rejection.
Let us consider what the reply affidavits show and how far
Mr. Thompson has been able to combat them.
The reply affidavits show clearly that the method em
ployed by Mr. Thompson is not one generally recognized
or commonly employed for similar purposes.
They show that the method is fundamentally defective
because amongst other errors:
(1) Mr. Thompson, whilst making the extent of the mort
gages to which the final net income is subject the
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crucial test of value, has ignored the mortgages upon
the income before it reaches the Lake Shore or the
combined companies as the case may be; and
(2) The method by which Mr. Thompson arrives at the
rate of capitalization of 15% of 46% of the net cor
porate income in each case is incorrect, and that rate
is not warranted upon a fair consideration of the facts.
They show that the error in the conclusion resulting from
these two errors alone is so great that a correction thereof
would lead to the conclusion on Mr. Thompson’s own
method that the basis of consolidation is fair and equitable
to the Lake Shore minority stockholders.
They further show that, tested by application to other
cases, the results derived from Mr. Thompson’s method are
incorrect.
Messrs. May, Porter and White (all having wide experi
ence in matters involving the determination of the absolute
and relative values of stocks) all testify that they have never
known Mr. Thompson’s method or any method at all similar
thereto employed for such purposes. Mr. Thompson in his
reply says:
I submit that my method is novel only in this, that it
reduced to concrete form a principle universally recognized
in the financial world; and as evidence of that fact I submit
herewith, out of a great number of citations from financial
works and investors’ manuals, the following quotations.

The citation which comes nearest to supporting his method
is from Sakolski:

Considered in relation to the funded obligations out
standing, this item determines to some extent the investment
values of these securities.
As well might Mr. Thompson quote Sakolski as authority
for the undoubtedly correct statement that the area of a field
depends to some extent on its perimeter as supporting a
novel method invented by himself for determining areas
from perimeters without regard to shape. The whole world
of finance and the world of physics are full of influences
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whose existence is recognized but which have never been
measured.
In effect Mr. Thompson concedes the novel and untried
quality of the method—and the fact that it is new is not with
out significance. If the method were reliable the oppor
tunities for its use would be innumerable; and its simplicity
renders it extremely unlikely that the method would have
remained so long undiscovered, seeing that the problem of
determining relative values of securities has engaged for
many years some of the keenest minds engaged in business.

IV

THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Versus MR.
HOOVER *

(1926)
Summing up the impression one derives from an examina
tion of the report † and the evidence, the Secretary was evi
dently keenly alive to the fact that a rubber shortage was
impending, and to the desirability of bringing to the atten
tion of the American people, in a striking way, the need of
some action to forestall this condition. This he has un
doubtedly done.
If in doing so he has advanced theories and contentions
which upon the evidence of his department seem incapable
of being sustained, this merely confirms what some of the
most ardent admirers of his ability and achievements have
reluctantly concluded: that his undeniably great gifts lie
rather in the fields of organization of effort and of public
opinion than in the fields of economics and the dispassionate
analysis of controversial facts. His plea for a policy of free
dom of raw materials from governmental control suffers
from a too strongly nationalistic approach, from an over
statement of the case in specific instances, and from a failure
to anticipate the obvious retort upon our own protectionist
policies and to set forth the economic grounds upon which
he distinguishes between the two policies and bases his
appeal.
The evidence fails to demonstrate that the restriction
scheme was either very beneficial to growers or highly in
jurious to consumers. It rather raises doubt whether the
* Excerpt from "Rubber: The Inquiry and the Facts,” The Atlantic
Monthly (June, 1926).
† Plantation Rubber in the East Indies, Department of Commerce (1925).
See also Hearings Before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
House of Representatives, 69th Congress, 1st Session on H. R. 59 (1926).
374

MR. HOOVER

375

benefits to those whom it was intended to help were sufficient
to justify its adoption..
The continuance of control after the rise of last summer
may legitimately be criticized, but nothing in the nature of
a serious grievance against the growers seems to be estab
lished. They have, of course, conducted their operations
with a view to gain, and not from altruistic motives; but,
viewing the whole subject in perspective, and taking one
year with another, it is evident that they have provided the
raw materials upon which a major development of our in
dustry and comfort is based, at prices which would not have
been attractive to our own capital.
The problem of rubber supply is a serious one and may
be said to have entered into a new phase during 1925. It
is fortunate that the change should have come at a time of
prosperity so that its effects were not of serious consequence
to our manufacturers or to our consumers.
Our people have a genius for economy in production, and
our national vice is extravagance in consumption. Stimula
tion of the one and a slight curb on the other should suffice
to bring about a satisfactory relation between demand and
supply during the years immediately ahead, in which no
great increase of production can be expected. The rise in
prices will afford such a stimulation and such a check, and
should at the same time encourage the plantation of new
areas which will in the course of years provide for the natural
expansion of demand.
If Americans find in the field an attractive opportunity
for the employment of some of the country’s abundant sup
ply of capital, well and good; the record certainly establishes
no case for our entering the field on an uncommercial basis.

V

REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPO
RATE RELATIONS, G. O. MAY, CHAIRMAN, TO THE
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL

(1927)

committee believes that modern developments in the
field of corporate relations have great social significance and
importance and constitute a field in which valuable research
may be undertaken. They suggest that any project should
be so framed as to form part of a general review of the cor
poration of today in connection with the broader problems
of the relations in industry between capital, management,
labor and the public interest. Such a general review would
include:
Your

I. An inquiry into the extent to which the business ac
tivities of the country are carried on by corporations or
quasi-corporations, in the aggregate and in specified
fields, including comparisons with the past to indicate
the trend and rate of change

II.

A survey of the existing corporations in the United
States with a view to classification according to—
(a) Character of activities
(b) Character of beneficial ownership *
(c) Effective control
(d) Size

*The general type of classification contemplated under the second sub
heading is somewhat as follows:
(1) Investor owned (directly or through holding company)
Widely distributed
Closely held
Personally owned
(2) Customer owned
(3) Banker owned
(4) Management owned
(5) Employee owned
(6) Cooperatively owned
(7) Charitably or publicly, owned
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III. A study of the trends of recent corporate developments:
(a) The nature of the trends including the tendencies
to develop new types of corporate stocks, towards
employee ownership, management ownership, etc.,
and including particularly an examination of the re
lations between beneficial ownership and effective
control and management of corporations the owner
ship of which is widely distributed
(b) The intended and actual effects of the methods
being developed on the relations of those interested
or engaged in the activity (beneficial owners, man
agement and labor)
1. Inter se
2. With the rest of the community
(c) The relative social importance of the principal
trends noted
IV. A consideration of existing corporation laws and prac
tice with a view to determining in what ways they tend
to promote or interfere with the development of the in
dustrial economy of the country along socially desirable
lines.

For the first head of inquiry the bulk of the necessary
material is, it is believed, available in the records of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
The second head of inquiry your committee regards as of
very great importance. The corporations of the country
are not a homogeneous group but differ widely in their es
sential character. The corporation which is owned by a
single stockholder is different in almost every respect from
a corporation like the American Telephone & Telegraph
Company, whose stock is widely distributed.
Your committee believes, however, that before an effective
survey under this head can be undertaken there should be
secured a substantial improvement in the statistical material
available. It believes that, in particular, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue is in a position to secure statistical data
which would be of great value to the tax administration and
at the same time would be of great value for broader eco
nomic purposes. The question has been discussed with the
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Treasury and it is hoped that steps in the desired direction
may be undertaken. Your committee recommends that this
head of the inquiry be left in abeyance until this phase is
further developed.
The fourth head of the inquiry covers a very wide field
and your committee does not believe that more should be
undertaken at this time than perhaps a general survey of
the situation such as would enable the lines of a more ex
tensive subsequent survey to be formulated.
The main recommendation of your committee is, there
fore, a project covering subjects included under the third
head of the inquiry as above outlined.
A suggested outline of the scope of such a project follows:
I. The ownership, direction and management of corpora
tions and the trends and rates of change therein:
A. The extent to which property is held by publicly
financed (as contrasted with personal, family or
close) corporations in the United States:
1. In gross
2. In particular fields
3. The trend and rate of change in this respect
B. The nature and distribution of beneficial ownership
in such property:
1. By ownership of obligations or redeemable pre
ferred stocks entitling the holders to fixed divi
dends or distributions
2. By ownership of non-redeemable preferred stocks
and securities entitling the holders to participa
tion in profits, other than fixed dividends or
distributions
C. The sources from which the personnel of direction
and management is drawn—the object being to as
certain to what extent such personnel bears a rela
tion to:
1. The group of beneficial owners as a whole
2. Particular divisions of that group
3. Groups otherwise interested in the corporations
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D. The extent to which direction and management is
virtually separated from beneficial ownership:
1. Through legal devices
2. Factually, through mere size or otherwise
E. The methods and motives regulating the selection
of direction and management, regard being had to
fact rather than form
IL The situation considered from the standpoint of those
interested in the enterprise, as beneficial owners, man
agers or employees:
A. Considering the group as a whole—the effectiveness
of the modern public corporation tested by:
1. Business success
2. Relations to other entities in the industry
3. Industrial conditions within the entity
B. Between owners and managers:
The cost—and rewards—of management
C. Between owners and managers and employees:
1. The merger of beneficial ownership and em
ployees’ interest
2. The development of community of interest be
tween employees and management (rather than
owners)

III. The situation considered from the standpoint of eco
nomic welfare and the public interest:
A. The effectiveness of the modern corporation from
the standpoint of:
1. Service to customers—quality and adequacy
2. The trend towards or from monopoly
3. Public relations
IV. Development of the social regulatory machinery to meet
the existing and prospective situation:
A. As between those in control and beneficial owners:
1. Legally through the creation of new or the ex
tension of old legal rights and obligations and
relationships
2. Through economic machinery such as regulatory
functions of stock exchanges or other business
bodies
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3. Through mores, the development of ethical
standards in the several groups concerned
B. As between the corporate entity and the public:
1. Extension of the regulation of business in the
public interest

V. Historical parallels, if any

VI. Conclusions

The reasons for making such a study are sufficiently clear
to require little discussion. Manifestly, separation of man
agement responsibility from beneficial ownership has already
taken place in large measure, and is continuing to take place
with great rapidity. Apparently, at the same time, new legal
and economic relationships are being built up both within
the corporate entity and between it and its public, its em
ployees, and the state. These relationships are being forged
partly on a basis of experience and partly as a result of
underlying concepts of lawyers, business men, economists
and statesmen. Old safeguards have become insufficient;
new ones, if improvidently worked out, may harass economic
development, and fail to protect. Even a new psychology is
growing up as the United States becomes increasingly an
investing creditor nation. Law, banking methods, business
standards, all are involved. Underlying any philosophy
there must be a sound understanding of the facts.

VI

SOME MEMORANDA
(1) CONSOLIDATED RETURNS

(1929)
Like most such questions, the question of consolidated re
turns presents different phases in the case of public utilities
and commercial businesses, respectively. The question of
reflecting interests in companies controlled, but not sub
stantially wholly owned, arises in relation to the earnings
statement and the balance sheet. The problem as regards
the earnings statement can, I think, be met without very
much difficulty, the most important point being that the
amount of the earnings accruing from companies in which
there is a substantial minority interest should be shown sepa
rately. In the case of the balance sheet, the pronounced
difference between public utilities and commercial con
cerns is that in the case of the latter the quick asset position
is of crucial importance, while this point is relatively a
minor one in the case of public utilities. In the case of
commercial companies, I do not think a balance sheet is
adequate if it shows a very large minority interest outstand
ing and gives no indication whether that minority interest
is mainly in the capital assets or in the current assets.
As a matter of fact, I have had some doubts about the
suitability of the consolidated balance sheet to public utility
accounting. The basic idea of consolidated accounting was
that the subsidiary companies were essentially parts of the
same business and that the allocations between them were
almost entirely in the discretion of the management. The
position in regard to public utilities which, though under
the same ownership, are subject to regulation, is materially
different; and I am by no means sure that the best form of
381
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reporting for a group consisting of a holding company and
a number of public utilities has yet been evolved.
I do not think it is desirable to minimize the difference be
tween substantial ownership and mere control. Those who
control but do not wholly own a corporation have a fiduciary
obligation to the minority which is very real in equity and
probably also in law, though not always fully observed. I
think the application to companies barely controlled of
methods based originally on substantial ownership is open
to objection on this broad ground. Of course, each case
differs in detail; a 25% minority interest may be only a
means of giving one or more people an interest in the busi
ness similar to that which might be given a branch manager,
or it may represent an important and possibly justly dis
gruntled body of stockholders.
One comes back as usual to the conclusion that there can
be no satisfactory arbitrary rule of universal application nor
any substitute for judgment. The one essential is to reveal
fairly the effective position, and this may be done in different
ways in different circumstances. I am inclined to think that
one should aim to establish broad limits and allow discretion
within those limits, satisfying oneself by inquiries from time
to time that an honest and competent discretion is being ex
ercised in particular cases.
Our own feeling is that roughly the burden of proof shifts
at somewhere about 90%—above that point the presumption
becomes increasingly strong in favor of consolidation; below
that point the reverse is true.
I think the view correct that where companies are con
trolled but not consolidated, the holding companies’ equity
in their earnings and assets should be fairly disclosed in its
annual reports in some way; in many cases this can best be
done in a statistical statement.
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(2) THE CORPORATION LAW OF DELAWARE *

(1929)
Dear----- :

I have read with much interest the document containing
suggested changes in the corporation law of Delaware. I do
not see at the moment how greater license could be conferred
on promoters and directors and at the same time any sem
blance of rights preserved to stockholders or the State. I am
particularly interested to note the conclusion that the dis
cretion of the directors is such a perfect substitute for all
other forms of protection to stockholders, and that the dis
tinction between capital and income can be obliterated by
legislation. Possibly some of our “manufacturers of securi
ties” will find that the law as amended still unduly fetters
corporate development, but there will be time enough to
strike off these fetters if and when they are discovered. In
the meantime no-one can, I think, deny that a substantial
advance has been made along the primrose path.
Personally and unofficially yours,
George O. May

P.S. I suppose there is no possible chance of a court hold
ing that the granting of such freedom of action to directors
implies corresponding responsibility.
(3)

CAPITAL STOCK OF NO PAR VALUE

(1929)
The one substantial advantage which we recognize in
capitalization through capital stock without par value is
that which was stressed by the promoters of the first law,
namely, that it facilitates the financing of corporations which
have met with misfortunes and therefore would, as a practical
matter, be unable to sell stock having par value at or above par,
and would be legally unable to sell it at a price below par.
A second and psychological advantage is that the payment
of dividends on stock without par value in some cases carries
* A letter written March 4, 1929.
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less suggestion of excessive profits than would a similar
distribution on stock having par value. This consideration,
it seems to us, would have weight in the case of companies
which are large employers of labor and carry on an unregu
lated business with the general public.
Against these advantages we feel that there are substantial
disadvantages, and that these are particularly important in
the case of companies incorporated in Delaware whose finan
cial policy includes the regular payment of stock dividends.
We do not feel that the development of the no par value
stock laws up to the present has been very sound or satis
factory; particularly in the State of Delaware the changes
in the law which have been made from time to time seem
to us to have been determined by the exigencies of particular
situations rather than by any clear and complete understand
ing of the problem. As the law now stands the distinctions
between capital and income are almost obliterated, and the
freedom granted to treat what is essentially a capital contri
bution as surplus, and to pay dividends either from such sur
plus or from earnings, would, if generally availed of, soon
destroy the significance of dividends. We think a reaction
is to be expected and that signs of this reaction are to be
found in such statutes as those of Ohio and Louisiana, which
require a formal notification to stockholders in case a divi
dend is paid from any source except profits earned—not to
mention more rigid statutes such as that of Wisconsin.
It may be also that the removal of practically all restraint
on directors in the statutes of a state may result in their be
ing held to a higher degree of responsibility under the com
mon law than if the statutes were more restrictive. We have
heard this view expressed by lawyers of high standing, though
it is perhaps not the majority view.
In what is perhaps one of the earliest of the English divi
dend cases Lord Campbell said:
Dividends are supposed to be paid out of profits only, and
when directors order a dividend, to any given amount, with
out expressly saying so, they impliedly declare to the world
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that the company has made profits, which justify such a
dividend.
This is clearly not today an accurate statement of the law
in most states, or particularly in the State of Delaware, but
it does seem to state the position fairly from the standpoints
of financial morality and good practice. Cases may arise,
especially in connection with mergers or consolidations, in
which distributions from something not technically profits
of the paying corporation may be justified, but these cases
are exceptional and rare. The provisions of the Delaware
law to which we have referred were probably drafted to meet
such situations, and if their application were restricted to
such cases no great harm would be done; experience, how
ever, suggests that this will not be the case.
Under the Delaware law a dividend may perhaps be de
fined as an allocation to stockholders of funds which are not
capital. Such an allocation may be satisfied either in money,
property, or additional stock of the corporation declaring the
dividend; in the last-mentioned case the dividend becomes
a stock dividend, the funds allocated become capitalized. In
every case the amount of the allocation is necessarily, we
think, the amount of the dividend. Though these proposi
tions seem to us almost self-evident, we are aware that they
have not been uniformly followed in actual practice. Issues
of capital stock which have been termed “stock dividends”
have been made without any contemporaneous allocation
to capital, and stock dividends have been described in terms
inconsistent with the conclusions above reached. In our
judgment, however, when additional shares of capital stock
without par value are issued without any contemporaneous
allocation to capital of funds not previously a part of the
capital of the corporation, the transaction is a splitting of
stock or multiplication of stock, rather than a stock dividend.
Further, we think that a description of a stock dividend paid
on capital stock without par value in stock without par value
as a dividend of so much per cent is erroneous and essentially
meaningless. The amount of the dividend is the amount
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allocated to capital in respect thereof. Where stock has a
par value the rate of dividend' may be indicated either ex
plicitly as a dividend of so many dollars a share, or implic
itly as a dividend of so much per cent, which, the value being
known, is readily susceptible of expression in dollars a
share. Where stock has no par value the latter alternative is
not available.
Under the Delaware statute the amount allocated to capi
tal in respect of a stock dividend appears to be in the abso
lute discretion of the directors. It would apparently be
permissible to capitalize, say, 5 cents a share in respect of the
stock issued as a dividend even though contemporaneously
other stocks were being sold for cash at $100 a share.
The effect of this liberality of the law seems to us to be two
fold: First, that it imposes on directors a moral responsi
bility to capitalize a reasonable sum in respect of the divi
dends which they may declare; secondly, that it imposes on
the responsible officers and directors of the corporation the
obligation to describe the dividend clearly in terms of the
amount a share capitalized in respect thereof. No rules
regarding the amount to be capitalized have been formu
lated, so far as we are aware, either by authority or by cus
tom. In some cases amounts derived from previous practice
while par stock was outstanding have been continued though
the logic of the figure has ceased to exist; in other cases
merely nominal figures have been capitalized. The Listing
Committee of the New York Stock Exchange has indicated
its view that the amount capitalized should be substantial,
but has not, we think, given any more definite indication
of its position. Our feeling is that the burden is normally
on directors to justify their action in so far as they capitalize
a sum less than the minimum price at which they would
consider selling the stock to subscribers, though we recog
nize that there may be ample justification for such a course
in individual cases. The conversion of common stock to
stock of no par value would, as we see it, add to the responsi
bilities of the directors and involve the sacrifice of certain
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psychological advantages in relation to dividend policy
without compensating benefits. For these reasons we would
advise against such a change unless there are important ad
vantages in other directions, of which we have no knowledge,
which tend to make the change expedient.
(4) ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK DIVIDENDS RECEIVED

(1929)
The periodical stock dividend policy is, as I understand it,
predicated on the belief that in such businesses there is a
continuous opportunity to invest new money at more than
the going rate of return on comparable investments, and
that the method of withholding cash dividends and declar
ing stock dividends conserves this benefit to the stockholders
to the full extent of the annual earnings in a most advan
tageous way. Those who advocate this practice usually insist
that it is legitimate only if it is reasonably expected that the
earnings a share will not be reduced by the procedure
adopted.
Even upon these assumptions I am convinced that it is
wholly incorrect to treat such dividends received as income
to the extent of the market value of the stock received at the
time of its receipt. I say that it is wholly incorrect because
I am convinced that it is incorrect on the basis of established
accounting practice, is incorrect on the basis of any other con
sistent and reasonable scheme of accounting that can be sug
gested, is incorrect as a matter of economics, and should be
incorrect as a matter of law.
The first point requires little or no discussion. Account
ing for profits is, as I have frequently before said, not a
matter of logical definition but a matter of established prac
tice; but while practice varies, still, among all the varieties,
one principle is almost universally observed, namely, that
profits should not be taken credit for until realized. In the
stock dividend cases the Supreme Court held that in common
usage and therefore in law the term “income” included only
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realized gains and not unrealized increment. Nothing is
realized when a stock dividend is received.
It may be argued, however, that new conditions and new
financial systems call for new principles of accounting, and
it is, therefore, desirable to consider the question from the
standpoint of one attempting to lay down sound rules of
accounting to fit a new financial system in which the declara
tion of such dividends is assumed to be an integral part.
The question then arises, What basic principle could be sub
stituted?
Three possible alternatives suggest themselves. The first,
which would involve the least departure from the accepted
practice of the past, would be to treat a legitimate periodical
stock dividend as being income in the amount of the income
of the paying corporation during the period covered thereby.
It might be more nearly correct to limit the amount credited
by the recipient to the amount capitalized by the payor in
respect of the dividend, but no great harm should result from
the more liberal policy of allowing a credit to the full extent
of the realized income of the payor, though of course there
would be need for safeguards against later duplication of the
credit in respect of the part of realized income not capitalized
on the declaration of the stock dividend.
The second alternative is the complete abandonment of
the now practically universal rule that unrealized increment
should not be treated as income or profit, and to determine
profits by a single-entry method involving complete revalua
tion at the close of every fiscal period. If this method were
adopted, the stock dividend point would become immaterial
because all assets, whether acquired by purchase or through
stock dividends, would be revalued. It may be that there
are some arguments for such a method of determination of
profits; personally, I should be extremely sorry to see it
adopted, and I do not think it is likely to command the
support of any large section of the legal, business, banking,
accounting, or economic opinion of the country. Further
discussion of this point would be irrelevant to the present

SOME MEMORANDA

389

issue because, as I have pointed out, if this method were
adopted the treatment of stock dividends would become im
material.
The third possible basis seems to me to be a recognition
of the economic fact that a dividend, whether paid in cash
or stock, is not a real source of gain to a stockholder; the real
source of gain to him is the earning of a profit by the cor
poration in which he holds stock. A dividend is merely
a realization (and is a credit to income under the existing
methods of accounting simply because it is a realization). It
is upon such considerations that the use of the consolidated
balance sheet and income account in the case of parent and
subsidiary is based. So far as the present question is con
cerned, the effect of its adoption would be the same as would
follow from the adoption of the first suggestion considered.
The credit to income could not exceed the earnings of the
corporation paying the dividend.
It seems to me that the same conclusion is reached from
an analysis of the nature of a share of stock. If a stockholder
holding ten shares of a corporation receives during a year
one share of stock as a stock dividend, he cannot properly
treat this as income except to the extent that the eleven
shares held at the end of the year represent something which
was not represented by the ten shares held at the beginning
of the year. A share of stock in a public company represents
essentially a right to participate in the benefits of future
earnings and opportunities; physical assets are important
only so far as the proceeds thereof may be distributable or
as they constitute instrumentalities for the production of
earnings and opportunities. Among the things represented
by the ten shares at the beginning of the year was a share
of the benefits derivable from the opportunity to invest
additional capital in the business on terms more advantage
ous than the going rate of return on such investments. It is
obvious that the eleven shares held at the end of the year
represent no larger right under this head than the ten shares
represented at the beginning of the year. Such part of the
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value of the eleventh share, therefore, as is based upon this
right or opportunity has merely been transferred from the
ten shares to the eleventh.
Assuming the market appraisal of this right or opportunity
as a whole to be the same at the end as at the beginning of
the year, the market value a share will fall to the extent of
one-eleventh of the value a share assigned to the right in
the market at the beginning of the year, though of course
this effect may be offset by the effect of other changes in con
ditions during the year. It may be that the psychological
effect of the dividend action will be to raise the market valu
ation of future opportunities; but upon a rigid analysis it is
apparent that the right to benefit from psychological effects
of the action of the directors attached to the stock held at
the beginning of the year. The new stock does not represent
any new property created during the year except that created
by the investment of the income of the year.
The Supreme Court has held categorically that stock divi
dends are not income. Admittedly the periodical stock divi
dend (the kind here under discussion) is different in its na
ture from the stock dividend that was before the Court in
Eisner v. Macomber, but the line of reasoning contained
in the last preceding paragraph of this memorandum leads
to the conclusion that if the question were re-presented, the
Court would be likely to extend its previous decision to cover
periodical stock dividends, a conclusion reinforced by a
reading of the Court’s decision. In any case it would be
most unlikely to hold that such periodical stock dividends
were income in an amount exceeding the amount of income
earned and not distributed in cash by the distributing corpo
ration during the period covered by the stock dividend.
It is not without significance that in Eisner v. Macomber
the Act under consideration provided that stock dividends
should be considered income to the amount of their cash
value when received, and that the Government made no ef
fort to support this position, apparently recognizing the im
possibility of doing so successfully. It merely claimed that
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the dividends were income to the extent of the profits upon
which they were based. In the synopsis of the Attorney-Gen
eral’s argument he is reported as arguing as follows:

The substance of the Act of 1916 is that no corporate earn
ings are taxed as distributed gains which might not have been
taxed as undivided profits when they accrued, and all such
earnings which might have been taxed as undivided profits
are taxed when distributed.

And as ending with the following:
His gain comes, not from the declaration of a dividend of
any kind, but from what his capital has earned. The only
effect of the dividend is to fix the date upon which, under
the law, his share of corporate earnings, previously accrued,
becomes taxable.

The only remaining point to be considered is whether the
treatment of stock dividend as income to the amount of the
value of the stock when received would be in the general
interest. I feel sure that it would not.
Market values are affected by innumerable conditions, one
of the most important of which may be monetary inflation.
The result of this practice is to treat an increase in value
due to monetary inflation as current income, analogous to
interest and dividends based on actual earnings; and where
the practice is adopted by a series of corporations, each one
of which, except the first, holds stock in preceding companies,
this effect of inflation is increased in geometrical progression;
The practice seems to me to. be fraught with the greatest
danger to the whole financial structure. It involves inserting
the thin edge of the wedge of unrealized increment into the
income account. If such increment is to be treated as in
come, profits or earnings, it should be recognized frankly
that a fundamental revision of existing business accounting
practice is being effected.
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(5) THE PROPRIETY OF A CORPORATION’S TRADING IN ITS OWN
STOCK

(1929)

The question of the propriety of a corporation’s trading
in its own stock may be considered from three points of view:
1. From the standpoint of corporations in general.
2. From the standpoint of a corporation which has invited
the public to trade in its stock by listing that stock on
a public exchange.
3. From the standpoint of the exchange on which such
stock is listed.
Considered from the first of these standpoints, the question
may be a difficult one and the conclusion doubtful. The ob
jection to the practice seems to me to become clearer when
the question is considered from the second standpoint and
quite clear when considered from the third, which is the one
in which the Committee on Stock Lists of the Exchange is
interested
As is usually the case in the ethics of stock dealing, the
objections to corporations’ trading in their own stock are
more clearly manifest on consideration of the sale than of
the purchase of stock. It may well be in the interests of all
concerned for a corporation to purchase its own stock in
certain circumstances; it seems to be doubtful whether it is
ever right for a corporation to sell its own stock over the ex
changes.
Certainly this seems objectionable from the standpoint of
the Exchange, which is as much concerned with the rights
of potential purchasers of stock as it is with the rights of
existing stockholders. The main purpose of the Exchange
is to offer opportunities for trading in securities under con
ditions as nearly fair to both parties as can be secured. It
should be, and is, always on its guard to prevent insiders’
gaining an undue advantage over the general public. In
doing so, it is naturally handicapped by the impossibility
of framing any precise rule to define insiders; but a corpo
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ration, itself, clearly falls in such a category, and the Ex
change should not countenance the corporation’s dealing
with the general public in relation to its own stock over the
exchanges.
Probably in the majority of cases no detriment to the gen
eral public would result from the corporation’s being per
mitted to buy its own stock over the Exchange. The only
people who might conceivably have a right to object would
be the vendors of such stock and possible purchasers of the
stock. The vendors could hardly have a complaint, since the
presence of the corporation in the market would tend to
raise the price; nor could the potential purchasers have any
serious cause of complaint, assuming always that the pur
chases by the corporation were in good faith, because the
corporation might be assumed to buy only when the stock
was selling below what the management conceived to be its
intrinsic value.
When, however, the case of the sale of stock by the cor
poration is considered, the position is different. In such
cases, the possible complainants would be the stockholders
and the potential purchasers. The former would seem to
have cause for complaint if the stock were sold below its true
value, and the latter if it were sold above the true value.
Pursuing this line of thought, it seems to me clear that
merely upon the consideration of abstract principles the
Exchange is fully warranted in refusing to list stock of com
panies which do not agree to refrain from trading in their
own stock, and in reserving the right to make reasonable
regulations governing any occasional purchases or sales. Ob
viously, the arguments on the basis of abstract reasoning in
favor of such a rule are fortified by consideration of the
abuses in which the trading by corporations in their own
stock is likely to result. Such abuses are illustrated by the
many cases in which corporations bought their own stock
during the market collapse of 1929, primarily for the purpose
of supporting the value of the stock in the interest of insiders
whose stock was pledged for loans.

VII
SOME BOOK REVIEWS
(1)

INTEREST AS A CQST

by Clinton H. Scovell
New York (1924) *
Mr. Scovell’s book contains an attempt, which is not
wholly consistent or convincing, to reconcile economic theory
and practical cost accounting, as well as a discussion of the
general accounting and legal phases of the subject. Com
mencing with the statement that the “margin between sell
ing price and cost is profit,’’ the author considers different
kinds of cost, such as sacrifice cost and consumers’ cost, and
ultimately decides that the objective of the cost accountant
should be “entrepreneur’s cost.’’ At this point having per
haps, as we have, referred to two dictionaries and found as
the primary definition of “entrepreneur”: “One who gets up
a musical entertainment,” he wisely undertakes to define “en
trepreneur.” His definition is embodied in the following
sentence:

By ‘entrepreneur’ is meant the person or persons—
whether single proprietor, partners, or body of common
stockholders—who own the capital goods and the product,
hold control, and undertake the risks of operation.

Clearly there are here included qualifications which may
or may not be united in the same individual or group. The
defining paragraph, however, ends with the following sen
tence:
An entrepreneur may receive managerial wages or salary
as laborer, interest as capitalist and profit as entrepreneur.
* The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XXXVII (June, 1929).
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Further, in his appendix the author quotes with approval
Taylor’s statement:

In strict economic analysis, however, profits ought to be
limited to the third element, the taking of responsibility and
the making of final decisions.
This evidence leads to the inference that the term “entre
preneur” is used in the common economic sense of someone
standing back of labor, capital and management alike. If so,
it may be questioned whether the standpoint of this some
what shadowy individual is the most useful one from which
to consider “cost” for practical purposes. Certainly also
from this standpoint the cost of capital includes compensa
tion for risk as well as for use, just as it includes accident
insurance as well as wages.
Frequently, however, the author seems to regard profits
as including, if not indeed being the compensation to, capi
tal for risk (though not for use), and expresses it in terms
of a percentage on the capital employed. As he also quotes
and italicizes a reference by Taussig to “earnings of man
agement or business profits,” it would seem that he is un
willing to make a definite choice between three materially
different concepts of profit and consequently of cost.
The uncertainty thus created is not dissipated by his dis
cussion of specific rates, for he proposes a rate of 5%, 6% or
7%; that is, a rate substantially higher than is necessary as
pure compensation for use of capital but substantially less
than is required to cover both use and risk.
On the accounting phase the author quotes Simpson’s
Economics for the Accountant to the following effect:
Obviously he (the accountant) is not making his statements
for anyone other than the common stockholders. On the
balance sheet, for example, the surplus is not described as
the. common stockholders’ surplus, but it so evidently be
longs to them that no specific mention is necessary. Every
accounting statement is made for the common stockholders,
who may or may not be entrepreneur-capitalists but who are
always entrepreneurs.
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We are not prepared to accept either of the arguments
here advanced without question. The second point lies in
the field of economics and may turn on the definition of
“entrepreneur.” On the accounting point the author is
clearly in error; surplus does not necessarily belong to com
mon stockholders. It may, for instance, be used to pay divi
dends on preferred stock in respect of either a past or a
future period.
The review of court decisions does not lead to any very
significant conclusions one way or the other, and indeed this
is not a question upon which the courts could be expected
to furnish guidance.
The author makes a valiant effort on behalf of his favorite
theory, but it cannot be said that he has succeeded in putting
it beyond the reach of controversy.

(2)
THE ECONOMICS OF INSTALMENT SELLING (2 vols.)
by

Edwin R. A. Seligman
New York (1927) *

Professor Seligman’s two volumes, The Economics of In
stalment Selling, illustrate in a striking way the new tend
ency in business to secure a broad basis of fact for business
decisions rather than to rely on “hunches” and inspirations.
Evidence abounds of the increasing use of basic statistics and
special studies in the development of business policies. The
tendency, like most other tendencies, is not without its
dangers. There is the danger of predicating policies too
largely on statistics; there is also the danger of predicating
statistics too largely on policies. As Sir Josiah Stamp empha
sized in a recent address, statistics are an invaluable aid to in
telligence but never a substitute for it.
Nothing is further from our thought than to suggest that
Professor Seligman’s work illustrates, the dangers as well as
the tendency. Without regarding it as the last word on the
* The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XLV (January, 1928)..
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subject arid without accepting even Professor Seligman’s
view that “an entirely new chapter is opening up in both
theory and business life” and that “we now stand on the
brink of another revolution in economic science and eco
nomic life, scarcely inferior to its predecessor,” this publica
tion must be recognized as an invaluable contribution to the
study of a subject which is of undeniably great social im
portance.
The first volume discusses the economic aspects of the
problem, states the broad results of the studies undertaken,
and formulates conclusions. The second gives statistics of
the volume of instalment selling and retail selling, and also
gives five separate studies entitled:
The
The
The
The
The

consumers’ study
merchandise study
dealer study
repossession study
depression study

The reader is thus given the choice of accepting the conclu
sions or re-examining the problem for himself on the basis
of a substantial amount of authentic statistics.
To the layman the discussion of the economic meaning of
the terms production and consumption will have little in
terest. He will, however, readily agree that credit cannot
be adjudged good or bad merely by labeling it production
credit or consumption credit. Consumption is necessary to
production since, in order to live, producers must consume,
and if what they consume adds more than an equivalent to
production such consumption is economically justified.
Probably instalment purchases of automobiles in com
paratively few cases come within that most desirable cate
gory of short-time credits, the self-liquidating transaction;
the automobile will seldom earn currently for its owner
enough to pay the deferred instalments. The evidence
seems to indicate, however, that the credits arising from
such purchases are usually in the class of secured credits.
The question that is uppermost in many minds is how
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instalment sales of automobiles would be affected by a seri
ous, and particularly a sudden, depression; and therefore
many will turn at once to the “depression study” which
deals with business in the anthracite region during the strike
period, September, 1925—February, 1926. A study of the
data suggests, however, that it does not afford an adequate
basis for any very definite conclusions. Apparently the ac
ceptance company whose records were studied only began
buying paper in the district in August, 1924, and its pur
chases suggest that its policy was conservative, perhaps be
cause the strike was in prospect.
The purchases are given for a period of 24 months, of
which 13 preceded and 5 followed the strike. The compara
tive purchases for successive periods are significant, bearing
in mind that normally the months from early spring to early
summer would be those of heaviest business.

Sep.-Feb., 1924-25...................................... $114,000
Mar.-Aug., 1925........................................
244,000
Sep.-Feb., 1925-26 (strike period)............
226,000
Mar.-July, 1926 (five months)................ 1,029,000

The purchases during six spring and summer months of
1925 were scarcely more than those during an equal period
covering fall and winter months and the strike period, and
were about equal to one month’s purchases in the summer
following the strike.
The effect of depression on automobile instalment sales
still remains to be measured. It would be interesting to have
a more exhaustive study than the volumes contain of the
effect of depression on the piano and other classes of instal
ment business for which longer records and more ample ma
terial is available.
The dangers involved in the policy of taking used property
in part payment for new are emphasized. This is a point
on which accounting can exercise a real and helpful influ
ence. Clearly property taken in trade should not be valued
on the basis of the trade-in prices. In the past, adoption of
this practice even with some reserve has been known to result
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in used property being valued at higher figures than similar
new units which were valued at manufacturing cost. The
sound rule is that the used unit when made ready for resale
should not stand at a higher percentage of its probable sale
price than the new unit. Adoption of such a rule tends to
keep the trade-in business on a financially sound basis.
Though Professor Seligman began his study with an open
mind, he was fully convinced of the economic value of in
stalment selling before it ended. His discussion may at
times seem to suggest the advocate rather than the judge, but
it is clearly the expression of honest conviction, not special
pleading. In general his conclusions seemed well founded.
A large amount of desirable buying is facilitated by instal
ment selling. In desirable buying is included not only buy
ing for directly productive uses, but buying which lightens
the burden of heavy toil, shortens unduly long hours of
labor, or in other ways adds to the efficiency or the just con
tentment of the purchaser.
There is good and bad instalment selling of automobiles;
good and bad buying. The nature of the buying is less
susceptible of analysis, but in general the selling seems to be
as economically sound as most selling. Down payments are
substantial; the periods over which instalments are spread
are reasonably short. The method is still on trial and the
rapidity of its development cannot fail to cause some con
cern, but the study seems to show that at least the worst
fears are ill founded. Certainly all interested in the subject
owe a debt to Professor Seligman for his thorough and able
analysis of the problem.

(3)
ACCOUNTING METHOD

by C. Rufus Rorem
Chicago (1928) *

The interest to the legal profession of such books as that
of Professor Rorem, and others written for the use of stu* American Bar Association Journal (November, 1929).
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dents, is twofold. They have a narrower usefulness as in
dicating the commonly accepted rules covering the treatment
of particular items; examination suggests that the general
practice is as a rule fairly stated in Professor Rorem’s volume.
They have, however, a broader interest in so far as they con
vey an understanding of the underlying philosophy of ac
counting, which is by no means generally understood by law
yers. Upon this phase the first part of Professor Rorem’s
book, which deals with “the rôle of accounting in modern
economic life,” should be interesting to lawyers who have
come to recognize the rapidly growing importance of that
rôle. As the author points out, accounting today concerns
itself not merely with the formal recording of business trans
actions but with their analysis and interpretation also, and
in the complex business life of today has become an eco
nomic tool of the first importance. Upon the proper use of
that tool, or in other words upon the correct interpretation
of the facts recorded, depends in large measure the success
or failure of business enterprises.
The book will not perhaps be entirely successful in clear
ing up existing confusion regarding the principles and ob
jectives of general corporate accounting—a confusion for
which accountants are themselves largely responsible. They
commonly state that a balance sheet is intended to be a state
ment, as nearly accurate as possible, of financial position, but
when the question is pursued it becomes clear that this is
not the case. On the contrary a corporate balance sheet is
usually a congeries of figures, some historical, some conven
tional, and some reflecting actual current values, and its
importance is subordinated to that of the profit and loss
account.
What are profits and when do they emerge? is the question
most frequently asked of accounts by lawyers, and indeed
also by bankers, business men and economists. Now, profit
earning is in general a process that is continuous and often
drawn out, and the attribution of profits to particular short
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periods of time, though a practical business necessity, does
violence to fact and must therefore be arbitrary. The oftstated rule that a profit should not be taken up until realized
does not altogether meet the case, for not only is there the
question, what constitutes realization, but there is the ob
vious fact that a profit is usually a balance of a number of
items, some positive, some negative, which cannot all be
realized simultaneously. The determination of profits is,
then, the result of method and opinion, not of logical defini
tion, and the question arises how method and opinion are
to be controlled,—the ultimate purpose being, as already
stated, to attribute to a particular day, month or year a profit
which is the result of interrelated transactions extending over
much longer periods of time. The answer is that principles
have in fact been evolved which seem in general to work
satisfactorily, and that such rules have acquired authority
and to some extent the force of law. The courts in England
have held, for instance, when called upon to interpret statutes
taxing profits without defining them, that the answer to the
question, What are profits and when may they be deemed
to have emerged? must be found in the practices of respon
sible business men. But business practices are not uniform
or unchanging, consequently there is usually more than one
correct answer to the question, What are the profits of a
given business for a given period? Our own statutes have
recognized this condition and every Revenue Act since that
of 1918 has provided that income shall be determined “in
accordance with the method of accounting regularly em
ployed by the taxpayer” unless that method does not cor
rectly reflect income, in which case it is to be determined in
accordance with such method as in the opinion of the Com
missioner does clearly reflect income.
Both lawyers and economists have been bothered by the
lack of fixed rules for determining profits and by the fact
that two equally legitimate methods of accounting may give
widely different results for a given period. It is possible that
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the tendency to make the declaration of dividends less de
pendent upon profits, which characterizes some new corpora
tion laws, is in part due to legal dissatisfaction with the un
certainty attaching to the determination of profits.
Some economists have favored the determination of profits
by periodical valuations; the increase in net worth plus the
amount distributed representing the profit for the period
intervening between any two valuations; accounting being
relied on only for a record of the assets and liabilities to be
valued and for the analysis of the profits and not for the
determination of the amount thereof. This method does
not, however, in. practice give satisfactory results.
Professor Rorem explains the established accounting
method as a continuous process of evaluation, with the pro
viso that for certain purposes and in the case of certain assets
and liabilities the valuations are conventionalized. While
this view is interesting and often expressed, it may be doubted
whether it is either particularly helpful or historically cor
rect. When the accountant records an asset acquired at cost
and retains it at that figure even though its value is greater
than cost, he does so because it is the cost that is significant
to him, not because he desires to value the asset and accepts
cost as the measure of value, in default of any better. The
point may be illustrated from the case of valuation of in
ventories at cost where the market value is clearly in excess
thereof. Dickinson, in his Accounting Practice and Pro
cedure, page 93, says:

The object of the profit and loss account of a manufactur
ing or merchandising concern is to ascertain as closely as
possible the profits which have been realized on sales actu
ally made; and for this reason raw materials on hand, and
products partly or wholly manufactured, but not sold, should
be entirely eliminated. In practice this result is obtained by
valuing them at cost, no more and no less, and so exactly
offsetting the charges to manufacturing account for materials,
labor and expenses, in so far as the result of their combina
tion in manufacturing processes is still uncompleted and
unsold.

BOOK REVIEWS

403

This reflects the philosophy of accounting more accurately
than Professor Rorem’s explanation of the use of cost in the
case cited as being a conventional valuation.
Historically, it may be noted that the form of balance sheet
under the English Companies Act of 1862 (the general cor
poration law) called for the inclusion therein of plant and
stock in trade “at cost with deduction for deterioration in
value as charged to the reserve fund or profit and loss.’’ The
provisions regarding accounts contained in the Act (which
were to govern unless the articles of association of a company
expressly provided otherwise) are interesting for their em
phasis on the Income and Expenditure (or Profit and Loss)
Account:

§ 79. Once at the least in every year the Directors shall
lay before the Company in General Meeting a Statement of
the Income and Expenditure for the past year, made up to a
date not more than three months before such meeting.
§ 80. The Statement so made shall show, arranged under
the most convenient heads, the amount of gross income, dis
tinguishing the several sources from which it has been de
rived, and the amount of gross expenditure, distinguishing
the expense of the establishment, salaries, and other like mat
ters: Every item of expenditure fairly chargeable against the
year’s income shall be brought into account, so that a just
balance of profit and loss may be laid before the meeting;
and in cases where any item of expenditure which may in
fairness be distributed over several years has been incurred
in any one year the whole amount of such item shall be
stated, with the addition of the reasons why only a portion of
such expenditure is charged against the income of the year.
§81. A balance sheet shall be made out in every year, and
laid before the Company in general meeting, and such bal
ance sheet shall contain a summary of the property and lia
bilities of the Company arranged under the heads appearing
in the form annexed to this table, or as near thereto as cir
cumstances admit.

In practice the provisions of § 80 were often modified
in the articles of association of companies, and frequently
only a balance sheet was required to be furnished; but there
is no doubt that the amount and nature of the earnings and
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the manner in which they are computed are the facts of para
mount importance to investors in reasonably successful com
panies, as the present market abundantly witnesses.
The constantly widening diffusion of corporate securities
makes more important than ever before a proper disclosure
to stockholders of corporate affairs, and this in turn requires
that broad rules relating to the determination of corporate
profits should be clearly established and given legal effect.
To accomplish this result cooperation between theorists,
practicing accountants, and lawyers experienced in business
affairs is necessary.
Chapters 21 and 22 of Professor Rorem’s book contain a
statement of working rules which is generally clear and ac
curate, though this reviewer prefers to describe them as work
ing rules of accounting rather than as working rules of ac
counting valuation, as Professor Rorem terms them. These
chapters are brief and illuminating and should be of real
interest and value to the legal or general reader.

(4)
IRVING FISHER’S DEFINITION OF INCOME *

The method by which Professor Fisher attempted to con
vince his European readers (the article was apparently first
published in German in Vienna) that legislatures and courts
were coming round to his views is more interesting than con
vincing. He takes a few specific corollaries that would fol
low from his general propositions and treats approval of
those corollaries as implying at least a degree of concurrence
in the basic proposition. Thus one of these corollaries is that
stock dividends are not income. Hence Eisner v. Macomber,
in which the Supreme Court so held, is quoted. But the
quotation does not include the paragraph in which the Court,
after referring to economic concepts, popular usages and dic
tionaries, approved an earlier definition of the Court: “In* From an editorial discussion in The Journal of Accountancy, Vol. XLV
(February, 1928), of Irving Fisher’s The Income Concept in the Light of Ex
perience.
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come may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from
labor, or from both combined”—with the proviso that—“it
be understood to include profits gained through a sale or
conversion of capital assets,” which incidentally is not income
upon Professor Fisher’s theory. He sums up his legal discus
sion by saying that it shows “how the true theory of capital
and income seems to be slowly working itself out.” But until
the language just quoted is reversed, the theory that is being
worked out cannot be claimed to bear any strong resemblance
to that which Professor Fisher seeks to thrust upon us. By
similar methods he even seeks to make it appear that his con
cept is in accord with popular usage, though the mere fact
that upon his theory such phrases as “spending more than his
income” and “saving half his income” are meaningless is
sufficient to demonstrate the contrary. It is difficult to see
what good such articles accomplish beyond producing psychic
income to their authors.

(5)
THE ECONOMICS OF ACCOUNTANCY

by John B. Canning
New York (1929) *

In a review of this work in The American Economic Re
view for December, 1930, Professor Fisher says: “It would
not seem an exaggeration to say that The Economics of Ac
countancy: A Critical Analysis of Accounting Theory, by
John B. Canning marks an epoch in the two branches of
knowledge to which it relates—economics and account
ancy.”
Even those who deem this praise extravagant must wel
come the evidence that professors of economics do not carry
the insensibilities of the economic man into their own work,
but are human beings with genial human failings. The rela
tion between the two professors is gracefully acknowledged
in Professor Canning’s preface. If he is the father of the
work, Professor Fisher is the grandfather; and the indulgence
• Written in 1929; not previously published.
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of grandparents is proverbial. Naturally enough, also, it is
the family traits in the grandchild that particularly gratify
the grandparent.
Not that it is necessary that one’s mind should be bound
by family ties to that of Professor Canning in order to see
value in his book. It is painstaking, informed, interesting,
and stimulating. Least of all should accountants be unduly
critical of the work, for Professor Canning displays a sym
pathy with accountants and a knowledge and an apprecia
tion of their work that is not common in other than purely
professional writers.
It may, however, be questioned whether the relation be
tween accountancy and economics is exactly that which
Professor Canning suggests—as, for instance, where he says:
“The economist will be quick to note that the accountant’s
conception of assets is economic rather than legal.” It is
fairly clear that accounting practices have not been con
sciously influenced by economic thought to any considerable
extent. The simple fact is that accounting is a tool of busi
ness, and the development of accounting, like the develop
ment of business law, has been determined by the practices
of business men.
Professor Canning’s suggestion that the viewpoint of the
accountant is not legal is based on inadequate premises. In
the argument from which a sentence is quoted above, his
conclusion is based on the fact that accountants are not gov
erned by legal title in determining whether or not property
is an asset of the corporation or enterprise with whose ac
counts they are concerned. True; but property title is only
one branch of law, and there are other branches which take
cognizance of and aim to protect beneficial interests and ef
fective ownerships where those are vested in other than
the holders of the legal title.
Generally speaking, where accounting, and economic
thought run along parallel lines, they do so because both are
running parallel to business practice. Where accounting
treatment diverges from economic theory, it is usually be-
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cause economic theory has diverged from business practice.
To accountants, as to business men, income is essentially
a money concept, and the idea of psychic income leaves them
cold. A definition of income which will make an income tax
identical with a tax on expenditures seems to them a misuse
of terminology, however interesting the underlying concept
may be.
. *
(6)
CORPORATION PROFITS

by Laurence H. Sloan
New York (1929) *

In this book the author presents some statistics of the
larger industrial corporations and some criticisms of the
present contents of corporate reports. We may assume that
the statistics are the best of the kind readily available, but
if so we must recognize how unsafe it is to draw inferences
from them without a careful study of each individual com
pany.
To the fact that the data cover only two years the author
points as the chief deficiency of the volume. A more im
portant if less easily remedied deficiency is the lack of
homogeneity in the material. This defect impairs the sig
nificance of all the statistics, most seriously, perhaps, where
computations are based wholly or largely on book values of
capital, as, for instance, in Chapter IV, in which percentages
of depreciation charges are discussed, and Chapter VII deal
ing with the percentage of earnings on invested capital.
In any such discussions it is essential to understand how
varied are the bases on which the capital assets of indus
trial corporations are carried. The point is particularly im
portant just now because in the last quarter of a century we
have had radical changes both in the practice relating to in
corporation and in price levels. Capital assets may be stated
on the basis of cost or on the basis of a valuation. It may be
a pre-war or a post-war basis. The cost may be a cost in cash
* Journal of the American Statistical Association (December, 1929).
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or a cost in securities. If the latter, it may be a legal cost meas
ured by a par value of a grossly inflated stock issue if the
corporation was formed early in the century, or it may be
greatly understated if the assets were acquired by a recent
issue of stock without par value.
A computation which ignores such differences can scarcely
be regarded as more significant than one showing the aver
age consumption of food by a group of animals in which
mice, rabbits and elephants are included in undisclosed pro
portions. The difficulty of securing a really satisfactory
grouping is undoubtedly great, but the reader is at least en
titled to a clear statement of the defective character of the
material used. It may be that the author appreciates fully
the varied character of his material, and has satisfied himself
that after making due allowance therefor his conclusions
are valid and significant. He does not, however, succeed in
creating such an impression.
The criticisms of present practice and the suggestions for
improvement are of a rather perfunctory and elementary
character, though put forward with an air of daring innova
tion. The form of ideal report suggested bears a strong re
semblance to the standard forms set forth in the first general
corporation act in England, that of 1862.
The author reveals no understanding of the complexities
of accounting in a large business corporation of today or of
the philosophy of accounting. Those who hope to find in
this work an important contribution to the solution of a
question of great and growing importance will be disap
pointed.
THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY

by J. M. Keynes
London (1936)
Dear Mr. Keynes:

I have been examining with interest your new book. Your
explorations lead into fields in which I can scarcely claim to
follow you, much less to criticize, and therefore I am not go
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ing to make any general comment except that I gather the
impression that you have at times deliberately overdrawn
the picture in order to arrest attention. Your discussion of
the influences which determine security prices, though acute
and admirably presented, seems to me a case in point; but I
have welcomed it as a useful corrective to the views of people
like Mr. Frankfurter, who think that prices are determined
mainly, if not solely, by intelligent analysis of the statistical
information which is given to potential traders.
At page 103, however, you enter a field where I can feel
reasonably at home, and here I will venture, if I may, to
criticize. In your table based on Kuznets, the deductions
clearly relate only to business capital formation, and there
is no corresponding deduction in respect of state and private
capital formation. Consequently, your “net” figure remains
a gross figure in respect of these last-mentioned items (which
constitute by far the larger part of the aggregate with which
you are dealing) and is net only in respect of one part (con
siderably less than half) of the whole. It follows that com
ments based on that net figure rest on unsound premises.
For instance, your point that Kuznets must have underesti
mated the rate of depreciation and depletion is surely not
well taken, since your percentage is arrived at by comparing
the deduction in respect of business capital with the total
amount of capital formation of all kinds.
In casting about for an explanation of the apparent statisti
cal error, I noted that your discussion of the Kuznets figures
began with the statement that his figures gave results similar
to those given by the English figures of Mr. Colin Clark. I
have been interested to find that, using only the figures for
business capital formation for the four years, this statement
is fully borne out, the percentage of net to gross capital
formation being approximately 30% in one case and 33%
in the other, whereas on the figures in your table the per
centages are 70 and 33, which cannot be said to be strikingly
similar. This has led me to wonder whether at least a part
of your text may not have been written originally in relation
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to a table derived from Kuznets but dealing only with the
formation of business capital.
I have found your book stimulating, and recognize the
penetrating character of much of your analysis, though I
have a feeling that you fail to distinguish adequately be
tween what is theoretically possible and perhaps ideally de
sirable in the way of a planned economy and what is actu
ally attainable under modern political conditions.
Yours very truly,
George O. May
February 25, 1936.
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